

## PART - II MOCK EXAMS

### QUESTION NO:- 1

#### 1. INTRODUCTION:

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817-1898) emerged as the foremost **Muslim reformer** of 19th century India at a time when Muslims were **politically marginalized**, economically backward, and educationally deprived after the War of Independence (1857). His political strategy was **pragmatic, gradualist, and community-centric**, aimed at safeguarding Muslim interests through loyalty to the British, modern education, and political separatism. This approach stood in sharp contrast to the **agitational, majoritarian, and confrontational** politics of the

Indian National Congress, which claimed to represent all Indians but in practice reflected Hindu socio-political dominance.

## 2. SIR SYED AHMED KHAN'S POLITICAL STRATEGY : Key arguments

### 2.1 Policy of Loyalty to the British Raj :

Sir Syed believed that open confrontation with the British would further marginalize Muslims, who were already viewed with suspicion after 1857. In "The Causes of Indian Revolt" (1858), he rationally explained Muslim grievances while advocating cooperation with the British.

### 2.2 Education as the Foundation of Political Empowerment :

He prioritized modern Western education over immediate political agitation, considering it essential for

Muslim revival. The establishment of MAO College, Aligarh laid the intellectual groundwork for future Muslim leadership.

### 2.3 Two-Nation Consciousness:

Sir Syed categorically stated that Hindus and Muslims were two distinct nations with different religions, cultures, histories, and social norms.

"Hindus and Muslims are two eyes of the beautiful bride that is India". This idea directly conflicted with Congress's claim of composite nationalism.

### 2.4 Opposition to Representative Democracy under British Rule:

Sir Syed opposed early democratic institutions because Muslims being a minority, would be permanently outvoted. He rejected the Congress demand for elections and majority rule.

## 2.5 Advocacy of Separate Political Interests:

He insisted that Muslims must organize separately to protect their political, educational, and economic rights. This thinking later materialized in: Simla Deputation (1906) and Formation of All-India Muslim League (1906).

## 2.6 Rejection of Congress's Agitational Politics:

Sir Syed criticized Congress for:

- 1) Creating hostility between rulers and ruled
- 2) Ignoring Muslim interests
- 3) Promoting Hindu dominance through majority rule

(As quoted in) "The Congress is a civil war without arms" - Sir Syed.

## 2.7 Gradualism Instead of Revolutionary Politics:

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Unlike Congress's immediate demands for self-rule, Sir Syed favored gradual constitutional development, believing premature political activism would harm Muslims.

### 2.8 Cultural and Religious Protection:

He stressed safeguarding Islamic identity, Urdu language, and Muslim socio-religious values, especially during controversies like the Urdu-Hindi disputes (1867), which exposed Hindu majoritarian tendencies.

### 2.9 Elite-Led Reform Strategy:

Sir Syed targetted the Muslim elite and intellectuals, believing they would uplift the masses - a sharp contrast to Congress's mass-based mobilization.

## 3. Sir Syed's Strategy vs The Indian National Congress:

Sir Syed  
Ahmed Khan

Indian  
National Congress

↳ Loyalty to  
British

↳ Confrontation and  
agitation

↳ Muslim-centric  
approach

↳ Claimed pan-  
Indian but  
Hindu-dominated

↳ Opposed majority  
rule

↳ Advocated  
majority democracy

↳ Education before  
politics

↳ politics before  
social reform

↳ Separate Muslim  
identity

↳ Composite  
nationalism

↳ Gradual  
constitutionalism

↳ Immediate  
self-rule demands

While Sir Syed's policy of loyalty has been criticized as **over-cautious or pro-British**, it must be understood in the context of Muslim vulnerability after 1857. His foresight about **majoritarian democracy** proved accurate, as later developments confirmed **Congress's Hindu dominance**. Without his efforts, Muslims might have been permanently sidelined in Indian politics.

#### 4. CONCLUSION:

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan's political strategy was **realistic, farsighted, and proactive** rather than emotional or confrontational. By prioritizing education, separate identity, and political caution, he laid the **intellectual and ideological foundations of Pakistan**. In contrast, Indian National Congress pursued a majoritarian model of **nationalism** that failed to accommodate Muslim concerns. Thus, Sir Syed's approach was not only

different from Congress but historically more suited to safeguarding Muslim interests in British India.

## QUESTION NO:-2

### INTRODUCTION:

Climate change has transformed from an environmental concern into a **non-traditional security threat** for Pakistan, exacerbating vulnerabilities in food security, water availability, public health, internal stability, and governance. Ranked among the **top climate-vulnerable countries** despite contributing less than 1% to **global emissions**, Pakistan faces recurring floods, heatwaves, droughts, and glacial melt. These climate stresses have deep **socio-economic repercussions**.

and political consequences, testing the capacity of Pakistan's institutions and governance structures.

## 2. Socio-Economic and Political Implications:

### 2.1 Food Insecurity and Agricultural Disruption:

Climate variability has reduced crop yields due to erratic monsoons, floods, and draughts. Agriculture employs nearly 40% of the workforce, making climate shocks a direct threat to livelihoods and national food security.

### 2.2 Water Stress and Hydro-Political Risks:

Glacial melt, declining river flows, and groundwater depletion have intensified water scarcity. This heightens inter-provincial tensions and complicates Pakistan's position in Indus Water Treaty diplomacy with India.

### 2.3 Economic Losses and Developmental Setbacks:

Climate disasters cause massive **fiscal strain**, diverting development funds toward relief and reconstruction. (In 2022 floods, Pakistan suffered over **USD 30 billion losses**, weakening the macro-economic stability)

### 2.4 Climate-Induced Poverty and Inequality:

Vulnerable populations — small farmers, women, and daily wage earners — bear disproportionate losses, worsening **income inequality and social exclusion**, especially in rural Sindh and Balochistan.

### 2.5 Urbanization and Climate Migration:

Floods and droughts trigger **internal displacement**, accelerating unplanned urbanization. Cities like: Karachi and Lahore face pressure on housing, sanitation, and employment, increasing social tensions.

## 2-6 Public Health crisis:

Heatwaves, waterborne diseases, and malnutrition have increased climate-related **morbidity**. Weak healthcare infrastructure struggles to cope, undermining **human structure**.

## 2-7 Political Instability and Governance Stress:

Inadequate disaster response erodes **public trust** in the state. Climate mismanagement has increasingly become a **political accountability issue**, influencing public discourse and electoral narratives.

## 2-8 Security Challenges and Fragile Regions:

Climate stress aggravates **instability** in fragile regions (e.g. Balochistan) where resource scarcity fuels **grievance**, indirectly affecting internal security and counter-terrorism efforts.

## 2.9 Diplomatic and Global Equity

### Dimensions:

Pakistan's vulnerability has pushed climate justice onto its **foreign policy agenda**, highlighting the **North-South divide** and demanding loss-and-damage compensation at forums like **COP27** and **COP28**.

## 2.10 Impact on National Security

### Paradigm:

Climate change has broadened Pakistan's security framework beyond military threats to include: **human security**, **economic resilience**, and **environmental sustainability**, reshaping strategic planning.

## 3. Evaluation of Pakistan's Institutional Response to Climate Induced Challenges:

### 3.1 Policy Framework: Ambitious on Paper Weak in Execution:

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Pakistan adopted the **National Climate Change policy** (revised in 2021), **National Adaptation Plan**, and **climate change Act (2017)**, signaling institutional recognition of climate risks. But, policies suffer from **poor translation** into **actionable programs**, there is absence of clear timelines, performance indicators and accountability mechanisms. Climate policy often remains detached from **economic and development planning**.

### 3.2 Institutional Fragmentation and Co-ordination Failure:

Climate governance involves multiple actors: Ministry of climate change, NDMA, PDMA, provincial governments, and line ministries. But, **overlapping mandates** create confusion during disasters, there is weak **federal-provincial coordination** post 18th amendment, there is limited data-sharing and integrated risk assessment

mechanisms.

### 3.3 Reactive Disaster Management Culture:

Institutions focus heavily on post-disaster relief rather than pre-disaster risk reduction. There is insufficient investment in early warning systems and resilient infrastructure. NDMA and PDMA remain under-resourced for preventive planning and climate adaptation is treated as an emergency issue, not a development priority.

### 3.4 Financial Constraints and Donor Dependence:

Pakistan allocates less than 1% of GDP to environmental and climate-related sectors. The heavy reliance on international donors undermines policy autonomy, climate financing lacks transparency, and there is absence of climate budgeting and risk

insurance mechanisms.

### 3.5 Provincial and Local Capacity Deficit:

Post 18th Amendment, provinces bear the primary responsibility for climate adaptation. The provincial climate units are understaffed and technically weak, local governments are largely excluded from climate planning, and disparities exist among provinces in preparedness levels.

### 3.6 Urban Planning and Infrastructure Failures:

Rapid urbanization has outpaced climate-sensitive planning. There is weak enforcement of building codes and zoning laws, drainage failures worsen flood impacts and there is no integrated urban climate resilience strategy.

### 3.7 Governance and Accountability

## Deficit:

Weak accountability mechanisms undermine institutional performance. There's lack of climate audit frameworks, poor monitoring of funds and project outcomes, minimal parliamentary oversight on climate governance.

## 4. CONCLUSION:

Climate change constitutes a multi-dimensional non-traditional security threat for Pakistan, with far reaching socio-economic and political implications. Pakistan's institutional response remains fragmented and under-resourced. Addressing climate-induced challenges require a shift from ad-hoc disaster management to long-term climate resilience, governance reforms, and sustainable development planning, making climate security a core pillar of national security.

## QUESTION NO:-3

### 1. INTRODUCTION:

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) marks a shift in global politics from geo-strategic to geo-economics, with connectivity, trade corridors, and infrastructure as instruments of power. Pakistan occupies a central geo-economic position in this framework through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) linking China to the Arabian Sea. However, evolving regional alignments in Asia—such as US-India Strategic convergence, Indo-Pacific strategies, and Middle Eastern realignments—raise questions about whether Pakistan's strategic relevance has diminished or merely transformed.

### 2. Geo-economic Significance of Pakistan's Connectivity Initiatives:

## 2.1 CPEC as The Flagship of BRI:

CPEC is considered the 'crown jewel' of BRI, providing China the shortest trade and energy route to the Arabian Sea via Gwadar. This reduces China's dependence on the vulnerable Malacca Strait and enhances Pakistan's role as a transit and logistics state.

## 2.2 Transformation from Geopolitical to Geoeconomic State:

Pakistan's connectivity initiatives reflect a strategic shift from geo-politics to geo-economics emphasizing trade, energy corridors, and regional integration over military-centric security. This aligns with Pakistan's National Security Policy (2022) which prioritizes economic security.

## 2.3 Gwadar Port and Maritime Connectivity:

Gwadar provides access to West Asia, Africa, and Central Asia, positioning Pakistan as a potential hub of

maritime trade. This enhances Pakistan's relevance in Indian Ocean trade routes.

#### 2.4 Regional Connectivity with Central Asia:

Through CPEC extensions, Pakistan aims to connect CARs to warm waters integrating itself into Eurasian supply chains. Projects like: ML-1 and road networks strengthen this aspiration.

#### 2.5 Energy Security and Industrial Base:

BRI-led energy projects have reduced Pakistan's power deficit, while Special Economic Zones (SEZs) aim to boost exports and industrialization. This strengthens Pakistan's internal economic resilience - key to strategic relevance.

#### 2.6 China-Pakistan Strategic Interdependence:

CPEC has deepened long-term strategic interdependence between China and Pakistan,

making Pakistan indispensable to China's western development and regional outreach. This partnership offsets regional isolation pressures.

## 2.7 Counterweight to Indo-Pacific Exclusionary Frameworks:

Pakistan's alignment with BRI provides an alternative to US-led Indo-Pacific strategies, which largely bypass Pakistan. This reinforces Pakistan's role in a multipolar Asian order.

## 2.8 Challenges from Evolving Regional Alignments:

Emerging alignments - US-India partnership, Quad, India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) - have reduced Pakistan's relative visibility in Western strategic calculus. India's rise as an economic and strategic partner has shifted attention away from Pakistan.

## 2.4 Internal Constraints Undermining Geoeconomic Potential:

Despite strategic location, Pakistan's relevance is constrained by: political instability, security concerns and slow implementation of **CPEC Phase-II**. Thus, having strategic geography alone is insufficient without economic performance.

## 2.10 Strategic Relevance: Reduced or Reconfigured?

Pakistan's importance hasn't disappeared but **reconfigured** from a frontline security ally to a **connectivity and economic corridor state**, primarily within the China-centric regional order.

While regional alignments have reduced Pakistan's tactical importance to the West, they have increased its structural relevance to **China and Eurasia**. However, Pakistan has yet to fully

capitalize on its connectivity potential due to governance deficits and limited regional trade integration.

### 3. CONCLUSION:

Pakistan's connectivity initiatives under **BRI**, particularly **CPEC**, have significantly enhanced its **geo-economic significance**, positioning it as a bridge between **South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East**. Although evolving regional alignments have altered Pakistan's strategic visibility, they haven't diminished its relevance; rather, they demand a shift from security dependency to **economic competitiveness**. Pakistan's future strategic relevance will ultimately depend on its ability to translate geography into **sustainable economic influence**.

## QUESTION NO:-8

### 1. INTRODUCTION:

In the contemporary global economy, technological innovation has emerged as the primary engine of productivity, competitiveness, and sustainable growth. Countries like: South Korea, China, and India have successfully leveraged technology through strategic policy interventions and strong institutions. Pakistan, despite structural economic constraints possesses significant demographic, entrepreneurial, and digital potential. However, realizing technology-led development requires coherent policies, institutional reforms and sustained investment in human capital.

### 2. Pakistan's Potential for Technology-led Development:

## 2.1 Demographic Dividend and Human Capital Base:

Pakistan has a young population, with over 60% under age of 30, offering a large potential workforce for the digital economy. With targeted STEM education and digital skills training, this demographic can drive innovation and productivity.

## 2.2 Expanding Digital Infrastructure:

Rapid growth in broadband, mobile penetration, and 4G services has laid the foundation for digital inclusion. Digital connectivity enables e-commerce, fintech, telemedicine, and online education, particularly in underserved areas.

## 2.3 Growing IT and Freelancing Sector:

Pakistan's IT exports and freelance economy have shown consistent growth. Platforms like software

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Services, fintech, and gaming demonstrates Pakistan's comparative advantage in low-cost, skilled labor.

## 2.4 Policy Frameworks Supporting Innovation:

Initiatives such as Digital Pakistan Policy, National IT Policy, and Special Technology Zones Authority (STZA) indicate policy recognition of technology's role in growth. These aim to attract investment, encourage startups, and integrate Pakistan into global value chains.

## 2.5 Startup Ecosystem and Entrepreneurial Momentum:

The emergence of tech startups, incubators, and venture capital interests reflects a shift toward innovation-driven entrepreneurship. Youth-led startups offer solutions in fintech, healthtech, agritech, and edtech.

## 2.6 Role of Institutions in Research and Development:

Institutions like HEC, Ignite, and

YOUSAF PAPER

National Incubation Centres (NICs) provide support for innovation and commercialization. However, R&D Spending remains below global benchmarks, limiting technology absorption.

## 2.7 Public Sector Digitalization and Governance Reform:

E-governance initiatives (e-taxation, NADRA, digital payments) demonstrate the productivity gains of technology in governance. Digital public services can reduce corruption, improve efficiency, and enhance investor confidence.

## 2.8 Constraints in Policy Implementation:

Despite sound policies, Pakistan faces weak coordination, regulatory uncertainty, and bureaucratic inertia. Frequent policy reversals discourage long-term technology investment.

## 2.4 Skills Mismatch and Education System Gaps:

The education system remains focused on rote learning rather than innovation. Weak university-industry linkages restrict commercialization.

of research.

## 2.10 Need for Institutional Reforms for Tech-Led Growth:


Achieving technology-driven development requires:

- 1) Stable quality frameworks
- 2) protection of intellectual property rights
- 3) Incentives for private-sector R&D
- 4) Export-oriented digital strategy

Pakistan's potential for technology-led development is **structurally real** but **institutionally underutilized**. While policies acknowledge the centrality of innovation, **fragmented governance**, **low R and D investment**, and **human capital deficits** undermine outcomes. Without **deep institutional reforms** and **political continuity**, technology risks remaining an auxiliary rather than **transformative growth driver**.

## 3. CONCLUSION:

Technological innovation offers Pakistan a viable pathway out of **low-growth equilibrium** by enhancing productivity, exports, and governance efficiency. With a young population, expanding digital infrastructure, and emerging startup culture, Pakistan has the **foundational ingredients** for technology-led development. However, translating this potential into sustained economic growth requires **coherent policy execution, strong institutions, investment in human capital, and regulatory stability**. Technology alone isn't a panacea—but with right reforms, it can become Pakistan's most powerful **engine of growth**.



Good  
Keep it up