

Q No 2

(1)

INTRODUCTION

After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, the initial optimism in Pakistan soon scattered after anti-Pakistan militants surged. More prominently TTP and Baloch separatist militants found safe heavens within Afghanistan. Even after several political and diplomatic methods that Pakistan resorted, Afghan Taliban rarely takes any action against these non-state actors. This led to 2024, a deadliest year in the history of Pakistan. Consequently, the relations tensed as Pakistan resorted to coercive diplomacy. The Indian brouhaha with Afghan Taliban during the May conflict alarmed the security analysts in the region. Thus, a trilateral summit between the foreign ministers of Pakistan, China, and Afghanistan was hosted by China. Even after mediation by China that although led to some diplomatic thaw, the relations remain tense as the underlying factors persist. They

include border dispute over durand line, porous border and sanctuaries to non-state actors, TTP, coercive diplomacy by Pakistan, and increasing Afg-Ind brouhaha. To resolve and thaw this tension following social, political, and economic incentives must be provided to ~~TTP~~ Afghan Taliban to take action against TTP, as the sole bone of contention.

(2) MEDIATION BY CHINA: TRILATERAL SUMMIT

After repeated diplomatic and economic pressures, Pakistan conducted airstrikes within Afghan territory. This led to Afg-Indis brouhaha, highlighted during the May-emblic between Indis and Pakistan. To arrest the downward spiral of the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, China conducted a trilateral summit of foreign ministers in China in May. China, Afghanistan and Pakistan reached common understanding and following conclusions were globally inferred from the meeting:


(i) Afghanistan will not allow its

Soil to be used by anti-Pakistan militants

- (ii) Afghanistan would ensure stabilization of Xinjiang province of China by not letting non-state actors in its territory.
- (iii) Economic incentives were provided to Afghan Taliban like including Afghanistan in CPEC
- (iv) Afghan Taliban solicited diplomatic profile from the summit.
- (v) Pakistan and Afghanistan decided to reopen their diplomatic channels.

(3) Pak-Afg RELATIONS CONTINUE TO REMAIN TEN- SED

Even after mediation the relations continue to remain tense as TIP still conducts terrorist attacks within Pakistan with leadership inside Afghanistan. Once all diplomatic and economic options were exhausted, Pakistan resorted to military options.



→ The diagram shows downward spiral of relations, where Pakistan initially exhausted all soft measures before resorting to hard, coercive ones. The tensions peaked during Oct. military border clashes.

(4) MAJOR FACTORS BENEATH THE TENSED RELATIONS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN

(i) Border dispute: Durand Line

Afghanistan still cling durand line as legitimate border. This lead to enfeeced border, thus a porous one. A porous border lead to easy intrusion of terrorists across the border. The border dispute also reignite irredentist claims of Pashtunistan.

(ii) Afghanistan's soil being used by anti-Pakistan militants:

Afghanistan's soil is being used by TTP and Baloch militants to conduct terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Afghan Taliban lack will and capacity to ensure the security of its territory.

(iii) Afghan Taliban - TTP nexus:

TTP and Afghan Taliban have shared historical legacy of fighting against NATO forces. They are ideologically aligned too. This Afghan Taliban and TTP nexus further deteriorate the relations.

(iv) Coercive diplomacy by Pakistan further deteriorate the relations:

Coercive diplomacy includes repatriation of Afghan refugees, border closure to hinder Afghan's trade (northern border) and military coercion like border clashes and airstrikes to achieve military objectives.

(v) Afghanistan - India bromance frustrates Pakistan's security calculations as Indian presence in Afghanistan pose threat:

The increasing bromance between Afghanistan and India threaten resurgence of Doral doctrine by increasing RAW presence in Afghanistan.

(5) Policy RECOMMENDATION TO IMPROVE THE TENSED RELATIONS

As TIP remain sole bone of contention, Pakistan must provide following incentives to Afghan Taliban to take action against TIP:

(i) Political incentives: Providing Afghan Taliban diplomatic coverage at multilateral forums:

Pakistan can incentivize diplomatic coverage to Afghan Taliban if they take substantial action against TIP.


(ii) Economic incentives: including Afghanistan in CPEC, investments, and unobstructed path to sea without border closures: Economic incentives like CPEC, unhindered trade and living investments can incentivize Taliban.

(iii) Social incentives: halting the repatriation of Afghan refugees and initiating a phased-wise approach:

Repatriation of Afghan refugees at the current exhaust Afghanistan's social and economic reserves. Social fabric gets hindered with large number of migrants. Pakistan can incentivize Phased-wise repatriation instead.

(iv) Security measures: Joint military operations against TIP, Pakistan providing operational and military competence. Pakistan can jointly fight along Afghan Taliban against TIP, required they provide mandate and legal backing. This will not exhaust Taliban's men power and ammunition.

(v)



(6) CONCLUSION

Pakistan - Afghanistan relations remain tense even after mediation by China in bilateral summit. The factors include: coercive diplomacy, border dispute, TIP-Afghan Taliban nexus, and sanctions. The ways to improve include incentives and CBMs.

QNo3

(1) INTRODUCTION

Globally, in no country does one province hosts more than 25% of its population except Pakistan. Punjab holds 51% and Balochistan & Sindh 5%. This population-administrative mismatch cause the demand for new provinces (administrative units). Those in favour enlist its positives like political, ethnic grievances will be resolved of peripheries, administrative governance issues would resolve. While those against it see ethnic violence, sub-nationalism to ignite if ethnic lines are used for demarcation of new provinces. The formation contain financial, constitutional, political, administrative hurdles. Thus, they call to improve local governance as the best available option. The recommendations include administrative considerations not ethnic must be employed while demarcating, a commission to be formed, phased-wise approach must be inacted, and local government must be improved.

(2) THE FORMATION OF NEW PROVINCES: A REWRITING DIS- COURSE IN PAKISTAN

Sirkhistan movement of 1970's, restoration of provincial status of Baluchistan, Hezari division to be a separated unit, and Karachi province over ethnic, muhajir-sindhi lines, are the major features of this debate.

(2.1) Arguments in favour of the debate:

- (i) New provinces would resolve administrative hurdles for peripheral areas, as government would be brought closer to them.
- (ii) It would improve governance and service delivery.
- (iii) It would improve political representation of people.
- (iv) It would address the ethnic grievances of the people.

(2.1) Arguments against the formation of new provinces:

- (i) It would ignite a chain reaction, inducing sub-nationalism to ethnic cause.
- (ii) There are several hurdles.
- (iii) Local government, as a best available option, must be improved rather than duplicating administrative machinery.

(3) HURDLES IN FORMATION OF NEW PROVINCES

(3.1) Constitutional hurdles:

Constitutionally, any amendment require $\frac{2}{3}$ majority of the houses. Where as, any amendment changing provincial status must also require $\frac{2}{3}$ rd majority in provincial assembly.

(3.2) Political hurdles:


There are often different parties in center and concerned province. Even if some party it is very rare to have $\frac{2}{3}$ majority in center and province both. This political hurdle make it difficult to agree on something.

(3.3) Financial hurdles:

financially, formation of new provinces would incur huge financial burden on taxpayers and centre, or concerned province. Moreover the new unit must be assured to have financial capacity to sustain its expenditures.

(3.4) Administrative hurdles:

creating new provinces would require new administrative infrastructure and bureaucracy. It would duplicate the established offices, thus require economic and human capital.



(4) : RECOMMENDATIONS

(4.1) Administrative factor must be employed not ethnic to arrest any ethnic chain reaction

To arrest any subnationalism in the

country, not ethnic lines but administrative viability must be employed as a factor in creating of new provinces.

(4.2) National Commission to be formed to see the urgency, measure the consequences and prospects and solicit public opinion.

A National commission must be formed to measure the urgency of the need to create new provinces; analyze prospects and consequences and also solicit public opinion to make any judgment.

(4.3) Phased-wise approach must be injected in creating new administrative units.

Phased-wise approach imply that slow and gradually new units must be formed not all at once. one must be financially, administratively sustained before moving towards next.

(4.4) Constitutional amendment to ease out constitutional hurdle
constitutional amendment must be enacted to ease out some constitutional blockade in creating new units.

(4.5) Local government must be improved to make service delivery efficient

Local government

still serves as the best available option to resolve governance issue. If improved, maybe the administrative grievances are resolved and the new 7 new provinces dilute.

(5) CONCLUSION


The formation of new provinces is a recurring discourse in Pakistan. There are points in favor and argument in against for. There are several hurdles: constitutional, political, social, financial. There are recommendation to resolve this discourse: National commission, amendment, local governments, and phased-wise approach.

Q No 4

(1) INTRODUCTION

The peripheral provinces of Pakistan Balochistan and KP are fraught with military, heavy risk in history. Currently, Balochistan is threatened due to a terrorist, separatist movement led by BLA, and KP is threatened due to a terrorist organization having ideological differences with the Pakistan state, TTP. There has been a dangerous revival of military in KP and Balochistan. As 2024, became the deadliest year in the history of the country. The reasons for this revival include withdrawal of US from Afghanistan, Afghan Taliban-TTP nexus, sanctuaries in Afghanistan and ~~Balochistan~~^{98an}, porous border, political grievances in Balochistan, political crisis in KP (center-province skirmishes), RAW funding, Indian dove doctrine's resurgence. To resolve following recommendations must be injected: Border fencing, diplomatic pressure on India and Afghanistan, counterterrorism operations with help of world powers like US, political realignment between province and center.

(2) REVIVAL OF MILITANCY IN BALUCHISTAN AND KPK.



"2024, deadliest year"

→ The map shows how terrorists invade

from safe havens in Afghanistan and Iran conducted attacks like Jabbar train attack, Operation 'Beem', and Pakistan's Bajaur operation, currently.

There has been revival of militancy in KPK and Balochistan, which has regions as under.

(3) REASONS FOR THE REVIVAL

(3.1) US, NATO forces withdrawal from Afghanistan allowed anti-Pakistan militants' resurgence.

US withdrawal ^{was by} followed by Afghan Taliban's take over of Kabul. This led to thousands of TTP soldiers coming out of imprisonment. This led to resurgence of TTP and safe heavens for BLA.

(3.2) Afghan Taliban - TTP nexus:

Safe heavens in Afghan soil

Afghan Taliban and TTP share ideological and historical legacy. Taliban sees TTP as brothers in arms. This nexus allow TTP leadership in Afghanistan to carry out terrorism in Pakistan.

(3.3) Porous border, helping intruders to carry out cross border terrorism

Porous border, allow terrorists in Afghanistan and Iran to carry out terrorist attacks in Pakistan. The revival of militancy is much credited to this porous border.

(3.4) RAW funding BLA and TTP: Indian dovel doctrine at play

Indian dovel doctrine is employed to carry out balkanization of Pakistan

"You do one more Mumbai, and lose Balochistan"

- Ajit Dovel

(3.5) Political grievances in Balochistan

Political grievances in Balochistan like lack of representation, social safety net, services, governance, missing persons issue lead to separatist emotions.

(3.6) Political crisis in KP (center-province skirmishes)

political crisis in KP as fuelled through 2024 elections, alleging them rigged, led to skirmishes with center. This deadlock led to compromised counter-terrorist policies.

(4) RECOMMENDATIONS

(4.1) Border fencing and patrolling to not allow cross-border terrorism

Border fencing must be completed as quick and efficiently as possible to not allow terrorists intrude into the state. Patrolling must improve and increase.

(4.2) Diplomatic pressure on India: exposing indian terror trail at international level

Internationally at multilateral forums, India must be engaged with its terror trail in Pakistan to put diplomatic pressure on it.

(4.3) Pressurizing Afghan Taliban to follow Doha accord: not letting terror outfits to operate in Afghan territory

Afghan Taliban, although, signed Doha accord with US that dictated no terrorist operating with in Afghanistan. Pakistan must pressurize Afghan Taliban to follow the commitment

(4.4) Resolve political grievances in Balochistan through political and social reforms.

Social reforms like health and education, and political reforms like increased political representation must be initiated.

(4.5) Resolve center-province tussle in Kpk to harmonize counter-terrorism policy.

To harmonize counter-terrorism policy, it is necessary to resolve center-province skirmishes in Kpk.

(4.6) Social development post-military operations must be employed to halt the breeding ground for terrorism in periphery

Post-military operations like the current one Bajaur operation, social development, return of GDPs, and service delivery must be as quick and efficient as possible.

(5) CONCLUSION

2024 became Pakistan's deadliest ~~count~~ year, ~~are~~ pertaining to revival of supremacist military in Balochistan and ideological move in Kpte. Their reasons include: US withdrawal, sanctions, Indian funding, political preference. The recommendations include: Border fencing, pressure on Afghanistan, and India, and post-operations social development program.

Qno7

(1) INTRODUCTION

Pakistan has "all-weather," "Iron clad" relationship with China, that is strategic in nature. It also has historically, transactional, patron-client relationship with US during Afghan jihad, post 9/11 and also in cold war (50's, 60's). The recent engagement with US after a decade of non-engagement over counter-terrorism, middle east peace process, and financial consolidation of engagement in shape of mineral and oil deals. To balance this engagement with US with the China, who is under the process of replacing the US-dominated world order, Pakistan must use strategic hedging as its accepted core: neither opposing nor promoting. Maintain transparency, not involve Great power politics, and remain skeptical of American commitments. Pakistan must distance American and Chinese interests from each other: one in Middle East and other in South Asia. Moreover Pakistan must ensure it maintains

its strategic independence, leverage and not becoming strategically dependent on any.

(2) RECENT ENGAGEMENT WITH US

Economic engagement:
fortifying the
thaw in
relations

- Mineral deal
- oil reserves deal
- US companies: FDI




Diplomatic engagement:
High-level meetings

- COAS' lunch in White House
- Mediation during May-conflict

Geopolitical engagement:
Middle East
and India

- Middle East Peace Plan
- Indian distancing and thawing relations with Pakistan — US under Trump administration


(3) STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA



The above mentioned flow chart illustrates strategic partnership with China and transactional recent engagement with US.

(4) BALANCING BETWEEN US AND CHINA: STRATEGIC HEDGING.

(4.1) Navigating US interests in Middle East and Chinese in South Asia: As illustrated below, Pakistan must restrain, limit US interests in middle east while leveraging China in South Asia. Pakistan must balance the two, in their capacity in Geopolitical arena.



(4.2) Chinese strategic partnership must not be compromised for Pakistan, time-being transactional engagement with U.S. Chinese relationship is time-tested. American recent thaw with Pakistan must not be viewed as permanent strategic reconciliation, rather a time-being under Trump administration.

(4.3) Pakistan must maintain transparency in its policies regarding both sides

Pakistan in order to not let mistrust ruin, must maintain transparency in its policies regarding both sides at multilateral level.

(4.4) Pakistan must not engage in Great power politics

Pakistan must look forward to maintain its sovereignty and not bend-way in current Great power politics of China and U.S.

Not carry dependence

