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(Current Affairs)

Q2: How do you see the chances of success of US-Russia negotiations on Ukraine? critically evaluate the hurdles and give practical recommendation to end the dangerous war.

(I) Where negotiations stand (Aug 21, 2025)

→ Russia has stated terms that exclude an initial ceasefire and press for limits on Ukraine's alignment (e.g. no NATO).
Implying territorial de-facto recognition.

→ The US signals it could enable a Europe-led Security architecture (ISR command, air-defense air support) short of ground forces, tied to a ceasefire monitoring framework.

→ Europeans are organizing options internal divisions and US politics complicate coherence.

→ Front lines remain active;

neither side has decisive momentum
casualty attrition continues

(ii) Probabilistic assessment:-

Near-term success (0-6 months)

low - aims incompatible; trust deficit
verification gaps; both sides still see military utility

Medium-term (6-18 months)

low to moderate if: (a) monitored ceasefire with snap-back penalties
(b) credible European-led security guarantees with US enablers
(c) domestic politics on all sides can absorb compromise

(iii) The hard hurdles (why talks stall)

(i) Clashing war aims:-

Moscow: durable buffer, limits on Ukraine's alliances, de-facto territorial gains; resists front-end ceasefire
U.S./E.U./Kyiv: Sovereignty, deterrence, accountability and guarantees no second go at aggression

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1: **Security guarantees design:-**
 who provides forces, what triggers and how verification works (airspace ISR, no-fly enforcement)

3: **Domestic Politics:-**

US debates on aid / sanctions
 EU cohesion; Russia's regime security calculus

4: **Battlefield incentives:-**

each side hopes for better map tomorrow; ceasefire without settlement²

5: **Justice / sanction linkages:-**

accountability vs amnesties;
 phased sanction relief sequencing

(iv) **Practical recommendations (actionable, not aspirational)**

1: **Phase-gated ceasefire proposal:**

30-day renewable truce tied to verifiable measures (guns - silent rates, IAS flight logs, artillery counter - battery data) with automatic snap-back sanctions for violations.

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2: **EU-led Security mission with US enablers:**

persistent ISR, fused C₂ air policing no-fly enforcement over agreed corridors; no allied ground combat units inside front line zones initially.

3: **Demilitarized buffer & demining surge:**

narrow, tech-monitored DMZ joint humanitarian demining with protected corridors.

4: **Prisoners labductees first:-**

Immediate all-for-all POW swap and ICRC access - front load humanitarian wins to build momentum.

5: **Nuclear & Energy safety package:**

Fortified IAEA presence at Zaporizhzhia; protected gdrd Black sea shipping corridors

6: **Flims-control Pilot:-**

reciprocal limits on long-range strike in defined zones; notification windows for large scale exercises near the line.

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1:

Single-text diplomacy:-

on draft both sides mark up with built in sequencing and verification annexes - avoid fueling narratives

8: Communication discipline:-

Align public lines to prevent domestic backlash - independent fact-checking cell to assess violation credibly

"The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy vicious diplomacy; but diplomacy"

(v) why this might (eventually) work - if ripeness arrives:-

Negotiations typically move only when both sides perceive a mutually hurting stalemate. and a credible "way out"

Today, battle field attrition and sanction threats are mounting Europe is preparing a security architecture and Washington signals enabler support - but Moscow's current stance rejects a

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front-end ceasefire. The architecture above is designed to manufacture "ripeness" (costs + way out) without rewarding aggression.