


SAYYID ABU'L ALA MAWDOUDI



ISLAM

and


The Secular Mind



Translated and Edited by

Tarik Jan

World of Islam Trust
&
Islamic Research Academy Karachi



SAYYID ABU'L A'LĀ MAWDŪDĪ

Islam and the Secular Mind

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

Tarik Jan

Foreword

KHURSHID AHMAD

Introduction

ANIS AHMAD



World of Islam Trust
&
Islamic Research Academy
Karachi

خانه فرہنگ جمہوری اسلامی ایران - کراچی
شمارندیوی:
شمارتہنیت: ۹۵۹.....
تاریختہنیت: ۱۳۸۷/۷/۱۸.....

Copyright © of This Translated Work Jointly Owned By:
ISLAMIC RESEARCH ACADEMY, KARACHI
and WORLD OF ISLAM TRUST, ISLAMABAD

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owners.

ISLAM AND THE SECULAR MIND

(A Selection from "Tanqihat" and "Tafhimat" in URDU)

Mawdudi, Sayyid Abu'l A'la (1903-1979)

Translated and Edited By Tarik Jan
With Collaboration of WORLD OF ISLAM TRUST
House 19-A, Bhattai Road, F-7/1, Islamabad, Pakistan

Publisher: ISLAMIC RESEARCH ACADEMY
D-35, Block-5, F.B. Area, Karachi-75950
Pakistan
Tel: (92-21) 634 9840, Email: irak63@gmail.com

1st Edition: January 2000

Price:





Contents

Acknowledgements v

Foreword (*Khurshid Ahmad*) vii

Transliteration Table xxi

Introduction

Secularism: A Pseudo-Religion (*Anis Ahmad*) 1

An Overview

Mawdudi's Critique of the Secular Mind (*Tarik Jan*) 21

CHAPTER ONE

Our Mental Slavery and its Causes 49

Commentary 61

CHAPTER TWO

The Difference Between Secular and Divine Laws 67

Commentary 78

CHAPTER THREE

Updating Islam: the Faultline 87

Commentary 100

CHAPTER FOUR

The Finitude of Rationalism 113

Commentary 123

CHAPTER FIVE

The Case of a Rationalist 135

Commentary 149

CHAPTER SIX

Darwinian Evolution: Theory or Law? 153

Commentary 160

CHAPTER SEVEN

History as Viewed by Hegel and Marx 191

Commentary 201

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Problem with Western Civilization 211

Commentary 224

Index 235

Acknowledgements

WE GRATEFULLY ACKNOWLEDGE the following sources of our material that constitute this book. The order is sequential corresponding to the chapters:

"Hamāri Dhehni ghulāmī ke asbāb," September 1934.

"Insānī qānūn awr ilahī qānūn mein farq," January 1934.

"Aqliyat kā farayb I," December 1934.

"Aqliyat kā farayb II," June 1936.

"Tajaddud kā pā-i chūbīn," July 1933.

"Darwin kā nazariyah irtiqā'," January-February 1944.

"Haygal awr Marks kā falsafah-i ta'rikh," August 1939.

"Maghribī tahdhīb ke fāsīd usūl," May 9, 1947.

The preceding five writings which first appeared in the monthly *Tarjuman al-Qur'ān*, a journal edited by Sayyid Abu'l A'lā Mawdūdī, are now available in *Tanqīhāt* (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1999), 37th edition.

The pieces on Darwin and Hegel and Marx can be seen in *Tafhimāt* (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1995), 17th edition, while "Maghribī tahdhīb ke fāsīd usūl" is drawn from *Jama'āt-i Islāmī kī*

da'wat (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1997),
21st edition, pp. 11-26.

Tarik Jan's piece on "Mawdudi's Critique of the Secular Mind - An Overview" originally published in the *Muslim World*, July 2003, a quarterly journal of the Hartford seminary, Connecticut, U.S.A. The present essay is a modified version of the earlier one.

Foreword

Muslim Ummah is passing through a critical phase of its history. This is not something new as its entire history is characterized by challenges and responses, crisis and re-emergence; relapse and revival. In a sense, this was inevitable. A message as universal and eternal as Islam can neither avoid crisis situations nor can it escape from phases of depression and renewal, and in some cases even disintegration and re-consolidation. In fact, it is unavoidable in view of the Divine arrangement for humans, which is characterized by endowment of freedom and discretion. Built in the Islamic scheme are elements that are unchangeable, and as such, they constitute reference points for the system in all times. Along with these are elements that are flexible and changeable while still remaining within the Divinely laid ethos of the system.

Today's situation has many similarities with the scenario at the beginning of the twentieth century, albeit with some significant differences. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Muslim Ummah, which had played a distinguished role as a world power for over a millennium, was then totally overwhelmed by the forces of decay within and the onslaughts of European imperialisms from abroad. The power-equation changed to the utter

disadvantage of the Muslim World. It had far reaching consequences for the entire realm of Muslim civilization. Western Imperial powers represented a new civilizational paradigm. The expansionist role of the tutelary powers that vitiated its hold on social dynamics defined its predicament: it lost its leading edge over knowledge and technology, its economy went into shambles, its political power eclipsed. Even morally, culturally and intellectually it went into a tailspin. The lowest point was the abolition in 1924 of what was left of the symbolic *khilāfah*.

This was the context in which a number of Muslim luminaries all over the world addressed themselves to the crucial questions of what had gone wrong with the Muslim Ummah? Had Islam become irrelevant or was something wrong with the Muslim approach to Islam, its role in history making, in short the way the Muslims were treating the Divine guidance? And finally how the Ummah could reset itself along the path to revival and reconstruction? *Jamāl al-dīn Afghānī*, *Amir Shakīb Arsalān*, *Prince Halim Pashā*, *Sa'īd Nūresi*, *Muhammad Iqbāl*, *Rashīd Radā*, *Muhammad 'Abduh*, *Hasan al-Bannā*, *Abul Kalam Azad*, *Abu'l A'lā Mawdūdī*, *Mālik bin Nabī* and a host of intellectuals and reformers reflected on these questions and came up with positive responses to steer the Ummah out of decay.

In this galaxy of thinkers and reformers, Mawdudi occupies a distinct position. Hardly seventeen, he put his shoulders to the task of rebuilding the Muslim Ummah in 1920. After ten years of journalistic encounters, he decided to begin his endeavour to reconstruct Muslim thought and to spell out Islam as a worldview and a way of life. His aim was to develop a roadmap for the

ummah's revival as a blessing for humanity. The publication of *al-Jihād fi al-Islam* (law of War and Peace in Islam) in 1929 was his first such major contribution. And ever since, until his death on September 22, 1979, he authored over 140 books and tracts on Islam, covering almost every aspect of its thought. His greatest work is a six-volume exegesis of the Qur'an – *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān* – spanning several thousands pages. Besides articulation and the reconstruction of Islamic thought, he developed a critique of the Muslim society, identifying the causes and how they got congealed into decay. He also came up with a powerful critique of the Western civilization, the main player in the contemporary onslaught on Islam. He was not oblivious to the achievements of the Western civilization and the ideologies it had spun, but at the same time, he was critical of its intellectual confusion, its moral deprivations, its political and cultural deformities and its economic injustices and exploitation. His thought has influenced three generations of Muslims. Small wonder he is considered as one of the chief architects of contemporary Islamic revival.

The need for translating Mawdudi's essential writings into the English language has now become pressing. The translations I did in the 1960s and those that Br. Khurram Murad did in the 1980s cover hardly twenty percent of his work. The World of Islam Trust, Islamabad, The Islamic Research Academy Karachi and the Islamic Foundation, Leicester have now agreed to co-sponsor English translations of his essential works. The manuscripts would be prepared under my general supervision and editorship, assisted by Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Dr. Anis Ahmad, Dr. Manazir Ahsan and Dr. A.R. Kidwai. Brother Tarik Jan and

Shafaq Hashemi would do the major work of translation. Other good translators would also be involved in this project. The Al-Madinah Trust, Peterborough, and the Sarwar Jehan Charitable Foundation, Leicester, U.K. are also extending some limited financial support for the project.

Our vision is that except those of Mawdudi's writings, which were of local or very contemporaneous concern, the remainder of his work should be available to English readers followed by translations in other languages of the world. Except the Arabic, Persian, Hindi, and Bengali versions, which were largely prepared from the original Urdu text, the other translations in over twenty languages were made from their English and Arabic versions. The idea is that what Mawdudi (*'rahimahuaalha*) did in the twentieth century should be made available to the *Ummah* for its guidance in the twenty-first century, at least as a window on the Islamic revivalist movement of the twentieth century and as a searchlight for the vista of the twenty-first century. This work may also provide an opportunity to others for further development and adaptation of Islamic concepts and strategies in view of the changing circumstances and new challenges. Every human being, however great, has his limitations. Yet what Mawdudi wrote over a period of sixty years remains of everlasting relevance to the issues and problems of Islamic resurgence and reconstruction of Muslim Society and culture in the face of new challenges. The works of Mawdudi are important both in view of their thought content as well as a way of looking at the message and meaning of Islam in view of changing circumstances. His contribution is relevant as datum as well as methodology. We hope to complete the project in

fifteen or more volumes. The volumes could appear, as and when they are ready. The volume we are now in a position to offer in the series is *Islam and the Secular Mind*, which is very ably translated and edited by my colleague Br. Tarik Jan. I wish him the best of rewards for his labour of love.

Islam and the Secular Mind is a collection of those articles of Mawlana Sayyid Abul A'la Mawdudi, which he wrote during 1930s and 1940s in order to challenge the concept of separation of religion and society, divine guidance and state, secular and sacred.

Secularism represents an important politico-historical movement, which has changed the basis and character of the socio-political order developed in Europe and America over the last three centuries. It was in the wake of the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire that a new thinking emerged for re-ordering the entire political, economic, social and legal system *exclusively* on the basis of human reason and experience, to the total disregard of the religious and divine guidance. If religion had to play any role it could only be in and through the personal life of the individual — man and woman. It had no role in setting the rules of the game and major contours of policies to be pursued in the socio-political and economic dimensions of human life and society. This is the real substance of secularism as a cardinal principle, yet, the role of secularism is more varied and many dimensional. As such it may be useful to clearly spell out at least three aspects in respect of which the role and contribution of secularism is of critical importance.

First whatever be the historical relevance of religion under the religious experience of Europe during the era of the hegemony of the Church, the Christian world view remained entrenched in the

idea of division of life into holy and mundane, sacred and secular. 'Give unto God what was God's and to Caesar what were Caesars' represented a vision in which the concern of religion was primarily directed towards the spiritual dimension of human life — of God-man relationship. The entire realm of the secular life was left to the worldly people concerned about mundane affairs. In other words *neglect of the secular by the men of religion* was a reality. Their obsession with the other-world and equating holiness with dislike for the worldly life and approach became the hallmark of the religious ethos. Asceticism and monasticism were the natural result of this one-dimensional approach. The worldly realm was looked upon as less than holy, unbecoming of the men of God.

The Renaissance and Enlightenment challenged this view and focused on the demands of the body — the physical domain of human life. This led to a shift of focus from religion or other worldliness to the concerns of this world. Mankind and not God, this world and not the World-to-come, were now looked upon as the proper fields of study and action. The secular movement represents the triumph of this worldly concerns over the other worldly ones. Consequently there was a new thrust-away from the spiritual to the worldly problems and affairs of the human society.

Secondly, the *medieval religious regimes* in Europe became characterized by religious and denominational persecution, intolerance and rising tide of ex-communications and executions. This brought a bad name to religion as power. Wholesale migration of populations from Europe to America was a result of these regimes of religious intolerance. There was utter disillusionment from the misuse of religion by the

political system. In this context the secular movement expounded the principle of plurality of religions and denominational diversity, and to the exclusion of the role of religion from politics. This resulted in separation of religion and moral and spiritual values based on religion from politics. Fusion between Church and State came to an end. The two became autonomous domains.

Thirdly the secular movement did not stop at these two major civilizational changes. It further established a new paradigm in which God became irrelevant as far as political and social issues are concerned. A new interpretation of cosmos and laws of nature was developed which excluded God as the real force behind all that exists. It is epitomized in Newton's response to the French Monarch who reflecting on his mechanical interpretation of universe asked why there is no mention of God in his formulation. Newton simply said: *Your Majesty! I do not need God to explain the mechanical world.*

This was not confined to the so-called mechanical explanation of the universe. it was also extended to the entire human realm. It was claimed that human reason and experience were enough to guide human beings to live their lives on the planet. The only concession made was that if people wanted to believe in God they may do so in their personal life. As far as the problems of society, economy and politics were concerned they would be resolved on the basis of the wishes of the people, guided only by their intellect and experience. Sovereignty of man became the new guiding principle and human reason and experience were looked upon as the ultimate source for all values needed for the evolution of human society.

Vergilius Fern captured the substance of the movement for secularism in his conceptual summing up on Renaissance, Enlightenment and Secularism:-

Renaissance:

“A wave of intellectual and aesthetic awakening and of secular culture which may be thought of as originating in Italy in the 14th century” Whether for better or for worse, the renaissance certainly had the character of a revolution. Its key note was a secular humanism implying recognition of human and mundane values as having validity unconditioned by theological consideration or ecclesiastical approval.

(*An Encyclopedia of Religion* by Vergilius Fern, the philosophical library, New York, p.655-656).

“The Enlightenment: The name of the movement which characterizes the general atmosphere of the 18th century. Its origin is to be sought in the mental climate of age and spiritual emancipation of man in Renaissance era, which with its materialistic and individualistic tendencies evoke in the minds of people a proud consciousness of the autonomy of reason. As a historic phenomenon, the Enlightenment movement represents the effort of applying the role of reason to actual life.”

(Ibid (p.250).

“Secularism: Specifically a variety of utilitarian social ethic (named and formulated by G.J. Holyoake, 1817-1906) which seeks human improvement without reference to religion and exclusively by means of human reason, science and social organization”. (Page-700).

The Social Science Encyclopedia underlines the real ethos of secularism and secularization as follows:

"Secularization: — refers to a displacement of religious beliefs, ritual and sense of community from the moral life of society. Every day experience in 'secularized' society tends to be carried on without routine invocation of the sacred It was, however, the philosophy of Enlightenment that provided the pivotal impetus towards thorough going secularization... They proposed that society should be founded on the moral principles devised by rational enquiries into the universal nature of human social life. The rational principles of social organization were often presented as *antithetical* to religious traditions resting on faith.

("Secularization", in *The Social Science Encyclopedia*, p.737).

The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World brings home the same message:

"The term secularism signifies that which is not religious. It is rooted in the Latin word *saeculum*, which initially meant 'age' 'generation' in the sense of temporal time. It later became associated with matters of this world, as distinct from those of the spirit directed towards attainment of paradise..... Secularism or secularization process derives from the European historical experience. It meant a gradual separation of almost all aspects of life and thought from religious association and ecclesiastical direction."

The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, edited by John Esposito, Oxford University Press, Vol:IV, p.20.

Islam has no real quarrel with the first two aspects of the secular movement, although the way Islam handles them is distinctive and unique.

However, its real difference relates to the role of religion in society and state. Islam does not divide life into compartments of spirit and matter, holy and mundane, sacred and profane. It believes in the unity of life. The secular world is as much a concern of Islam as the spiritual world. This attitude of Islam is summed up in the *Qura'nic* prayer:

ربنا آتنا في الدنيا حسنة وفي الآخرة حسنة وقنا عذاب النار

O our Lord! Give us the best of this world and the best of the Hereafter and save us from the torment of fire. (Al-Quran 2: 201)

This world and the world to come are linked together. They represent continuity. Islam is concerned about the worldly and mundane issues of life in the same way as it is concerned with the spiritual and moral dimensions. The two are two sides of the same coin, each depending on the other and strengthening each other. As such, neglect of the secular dimensions of life by some religions or men of religion is regarded by Islam as a failure. Islam is seized of these issues and regards mankind as its major domain of action and justice among all human beings is its worldly objective. As such there is no need for any alleged enlightenment to discover their relevance. The whole secular realm has been spiritualized. The spiritual dimension seeks its expression in the secular/worldly arenas of life, individual and collective. The Prophet of Islam, (*blessing and peace be upon him*), has said that the whole landscape of the earth is like a mosque. It does not merely mean that one can pray anywhere in the world. It also means that secular is very much intertwined with the spiritual.

Islam has also clearly and boldly affirmed the principles of freedom of choice and plurality of

religions and cultures. This is a natural corollary of the concept of *Khilafah* rooted in the principle of human freedom and discretion. God Himself has given this freedom to every human being to pursue whatever faith one chooses

لا إكراه في الدين — *There is no compulsion in religion*

(The Quran 2:256) is a charter of religious freedom based on the affirmation of the dignity of man and everyone's inalienable right to faith and freedom of choice. Islam's claim to be the true religion revealed by God for human guidance goes along with acceptance of the people's right to opt for other belief systems, if they so desire. Tolerance of dissent is part of the paradigm. The acceptance of plurality of faiths as a natural phenomenon is integral to the Islamic framework. Muslims are also human beings and there may have been lapses in their behaviour in a history spread over fourteen centuries. But Islam is very clear on this fundamental principle of freedom of religions and beliefs. The real judgment on this count lies in the *Akhirah* and not in this world. Every person has a right to believe and practice according to his/her own faith and as such would be responsible for the consequences of this choice. The final accountability is in the *Akhirah*. As such, as far as the human dispensation in this world is concerned religious plurality and cultural co-existence remain an integral feature of the political order of Islam.

So basically on the earlier two counts there is no fundamental clash between Islam and secularism. The real difference lies in respect of the third dimension, where secularism stands for separation of religion and state and faith and society. This, Islam regards as an aberration and not the natural state of human life. The Islamic

paradigm is God-centered as much as it is man-focused. The Divine guidance is directed towards the welfare and well being of the humans here and hereafter. The establishment of a just society and building of relationships between human beings, amongst individuals and institutions on the basis of equality and fellow-feeling are as much a concern of Islam as seeking excellence in matters spiritual and moral. This is the fundamental difference that makes the Islamic paradigm diametrically different from the secular one.

There is one more aspect that deserves to be noted. Secularism, in the Muslim world came under the cloak of colonial rule. When the Christian missionary movement, operating under the patronage of European Imperialist forces, failed to cut much ice, the foreign rulers concentrated on imposing secularism and purging socio-political life of the country of all religious influence. As this was against the faith and aspirations of the Muslim people, the society was torn asunder between liberals and conservatives, changers and non-changers, secularists and Islamists. It is an irony that the liberals have chosen to impose secularism on an unwilling majority by resort to brute force. Secularism and despotism have gone hand in hand. In fact some of the perceptive Western thinkers have acknowledged that democratization and Islamization go together, and secularism in the Muslim lands can be imposed only under dictatorial rule. Dr. Filmer S.C. Northrop has acknowledged this ground reality in the following words:

- ❖ "I believe this is one of the reasons why such law (i.e. Secular Law) usually has to be put in first by a dictator. It cannot come in as a mass movement because the masses are in old

tradition." (*Colloquium on Islamic Culture*, Princeton University Press 1953, p.109)

Secularization of Turkey under Kamal Attaturk and Iran under Raza Shah Pehlvi are clear examples of this brutal process. Islamic ethos of the Muslim people is a reality that cannot be ignored. Democracy and Islamic revival go together. Liberalism that advocates secularism becomes most illiberal and despotic in Muslim lands. It is only Islam and democracy that can flourish together.

Sayyid Mawdudi's articles collected in this volume bring into sharp focus this distinctive aspect of Islam in contradistinction to the secular approach to life and its problems. Although more than half a century has passed over these writings the issues remain fresh and relevant, changes in the language of the debate notwithstanding. The question however, is not of rhetoric but of substance and approach. Mawdudi's critique of secularism and its offshoots may look to some as too strong but when you are challenging a dominant paradigm there is no other way but to take the bull by the horns. And this is what Sayyid Mawdudi has done. His primary audience were the Muslims in the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent and only subsequently the rest of the world. As the issues and challenges remain relevant for all human beings in all parts of the world, it is hoped the publication of this book at the beginning of the twenty-first century would provide serious food for thought to the new generations. It is in this context that this collection is being published not merely because of its historical value, but also because the challenge of secularism on the moral and ideological plane is as relevant today as it was in the 1930s. The editor has added some valuable notes to bring the discussion up-to-date. These

notes may also help the reader to have a better grasp over the issues that confront us today.

I would also like to place on record my appreciation for the support received from my brothers and colleagues Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Dr. Anis Ahmad, Dr. Muhammad Manazir Ahsen, Khalid Rahman and Ziaul Hasan for this support in enabling the project to see the light of the day. May Allah reward them for their efforts in His cause.

Islamabad
5th October 2007

Khurshid Ahmad

Transliteration Table

Consonants, Arabic

initial: unexpressed medial and final:

ء ' ʿ	د d	ض d	ك k
ب b	ذ dh	ط t	ل l
ت t	ر r	ظ z	م m
ث th	ز z	ع ' ʿ	ن n
ج j	س s	غ gh	ه h
ح h	ش sh	ف f	و w
خ kh	ص ṣ	ق q	ي y

Vowels, diphthongs, etc.

Short: ا a إ i أُ u

long: آ ā إ ī أ ū

diphthongs: أو aw

أَي ay

Secularism: A Pseudo-Religion

Anis Ahmad

TRADITIONAL SOCIETIES HAVE always felt undermined by the forces of secular modernity. The Copernican (1474-1543) interpretation of a coordinated system in the universe threatened the traditional Thomist (1225-1274) view of the cosmos and reality. Real as this threat remains, secular modernity or civil religion, as Bellah rightly names it, has practically replaced the conventional Christian religion.¹ The Muslim world is no exception to this global upheaval. However, studies done on the Muslim world, thanks to the West's own cultural baggage, remain shorn of academic objectivity.

The English term secular comes from the Latin word *saeculum*, meaning present age. Both Latin words *saeculum* and *mundus* stand for a world indicating spatiality. *Mundus* was often translated into Greek as the cosmos, or the created order. However, *saeculum* was understood as a rather lower level of space, that is, in this world, in contrast with the more sublime and eternal religious world. Harvey Cox, looking from a cultural and Western religious perspective, considers modernization and the structuring of the secular city as a major factor

responsible for the erosion of history, one's identity and cultural roots.² The accepted notion takes secularization as being synonymous with modernity.

"More recently, secularization has been used to describe a process on the cultural level which is parallel to the political one. It denotes the disappearance of religious determination of the symbols of cultural integration. Cultural secularization is an inevitable concomitant of a political and social secularization."³ Political secularization made the church and state two separate entities. This was not interpreted as an anti-religious stance by the state. In France, the constitutional separation between Church and state materialized in the early twentieth century when religious education in state schools was abolished in 1882 and replaced by general ethical instruction. Similar steps were taken in Japan, Turkey and the United States of America.

Secularization is also defined as "a historical process, almost certainly irreversible, in which society and culture are delivered from tutelage to religious control and closed metaphysical world views."⁴ As such, it is assumed to be a process through which the world is de-divinized.⁵ It may also be interpreted as a spatial and temporal categorization in which certain space and time are assigned a higher level of sacredness and sanctity, while the other level of existence is considered profane, unholy and this worldly.

More important, it is a process in which systematically and methodologically the realm of the sacred shrinks to some holy places and temporal occasions focusing on ritual and certain ceremonies. However, in this process, the rest of the world is emancipated from the control of the

holy and the sacred. It may sound ironic that Roman Catholicism, as a faith, has followers all over the world, but officially Catholic authority is confined to 0.15 sq. miles or a 0.4 sq. km area of the Holy See, which came into existence on February 11, 1929.

Let it be said that secularization cannot be exactly equated with atheism. On the contrary, it would cease to exist if, for example, in a Christian context, the existence of God were fully denounced. It has instead a unique dependent relationship with its God. It assumes the presence of God at one point in history but through an alleged rational process His presence is marginalized as suggested by Auguste Comte (1798-1857) in his three phases or stages, namely, theological, metaphysical and finally the positive stage wherein reason and empirical reality rule all social transactions.

Historically, the European intellectual tradition emerged under the banner of humanism, with its roots going back to Protagoras (490-410 B.C.), who held that man is the measure of everything. The Renaissance saw Desiderius Erasmus (1466-1536) becoming the main proponent of humanism. While through their work on pragmatism, positivism and humanism, Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and F. C. S. Schiller (1864-1937), influenced nineteenth and twentieth-century European thought, the post-Renaissance European mind took a step further and embraced positivism, humanism, pragmatism and empiricism as its articles of faith. Consequently, secularity assumed the status of an absolute truth if not of a dogma.

At the analytical level, we can identify six domains of secularization in post-Renaissance Europe. First is the secularization of the cosmos

or nature. The Copernican Revolution established the principle of revolution in celestial bodies through the heliocentric theory of the solar system, which not only explained but also took care of the entire workings of the cosmos, and thus made the God of Christianity less functional if not redundant. The substitution of mediaeval Thomist view of the cosmos by the Copernican system of coordinates based on the sun further alienated the God of Christianity from cosmic existence while the primacy of physical laws in the cosmos left little room for Him in the mind of positivist man.

The second domain of secularization was philosophy. Belief in a godless nature, when translated in the realm of philosophy, gave birth to deism, where God was recognized as the Creator but considered non-functional, or at best similar to a constitutional monarch, least expected to intervene by way of revelation or miracles. Herbert of Cherbery (1583-1648) and Mathew Tindal (1655-1733) to mention only two British philosophers as well as the French thinker Voltaire (1694-1778) pleaded for deism. Empiricism and logical positivism defined truth and reality in terms of empirical, experiential, and existential, truth. The God of Christianity was no more considered a transcendental Reality.

The third area of secularization was history. The Hebrew concept of God's presence in history or the Christian view of incarnation or the revelation of God in history, in the person of Jesus (peace be on him) was substituted with a secular view of history. Liberating history from theology, Karl Marx (1818-1883) offered a materialistic interpretation. Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) introduced a biological interpretation of history by

applying biological laws of birth, rise, decay, and decline to the civilizational scene of growth and decay. In this new intellectual climate, in which the secular city and civilization were raised on the ashes of what was now considered a mythical past, both Jewish and Christian traditions faced a crisis of existence.

The demythologization of history was further extended to the Bible. Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918) pioneered Pentateuch criticism by subjecting the Old Testament to demythologization. While through his methodology, Rudolph Bultmann (1884-1976) critically examined the New Testament to demythologize the Christian Scripture.⁶

With secular attitudes on the rise, Charles Darwin (1809-1882) made a hypothetical adventure into the realm of biology. Though unable to achieve his academic objectives and not a professional, his five-year voyage on the *Beagle* brought to the world results of his keen observation and hypothetical thinking. Emancipating the biological world from its Creator, he proposed that the various species change under environmental impact, increase and multiply by themselves, and if left unchecked would overcrowd the world. Apparently, here he was echoing what he had learnt from Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) who published his "Essay on the Principle of Population" in 1798. Presuming the origin, evolution and survival of man on the pattern of other organic beings, Darwin hypothesized his famous theory of evolution.⁷ For some reason several other, equally important and perhaps more qualified scientists, who came up with their own independent views on organic evolution did not receive the same kind of popularity as Darwin.⁸ The implications of his biological evolution were obvious. The Jewish,

Christian, even Hindu doctrines of man's creation by One ultimate Creator were set aside. Humans were made to believe in their secular, biological origin.

This secularization of man's origin perfectly matched the intellectual climate created by the secularization of the cosmos, theology, history and philosophy. It enforced the belief of the Western mind in secularism as a pseudoreligion, which Bellah names as civil religion.⁹

Yet another domain that received the secularization burn was the human soul, psyche and mind. This opened ethical values, morality, and religious notions to secular abuse, stripping human activity of justification and meaning. The secular violation of the sacred was made possible by the supposed victory of the unconscious and subconscious mind over the conscious (ethical, moral and religio-cultural) behaviour of man. Sigmund Freud (1856-1940), an Austrian psychologist, tried to show how ego, the centre of man's rational awareness and ethical and normative conduct, is trapped by the super-ego and id, which is the source of energy or the flow of the libido. The struggle between the id, ego, and the super-ego, according to this empirical approach, leads to confusion between conscious and unconscious contents and superego and ego repression or censor only pushes the empirical experience into the unconscious, which keeps influencing our conscious life. One major consequence of the primacy of the unconscious in one's visible behaviour is related with what Freud called Oedipus and Electra Complexes, both referring to incestuous and tabooed relations by any standards of humanity. This new hedonist view of maturity or adulthood was put

forward in the area of personal relationships as the pleasure principle, which offered an empirical justification for incestuous and deviant behaviour.

Freud re-mythologized it when *eros* (pleasure) and *thanatos* (death instinct) were suggested as two principles to interpret human struggle in history. Religion was considered as a censor to suppress or control individual neurosis and one's desire to act maturely. It also projected a father image with an authoritarian temper. The infant, however, is not supposed to remain small forever. When this infant grows in maturity and childhood gives way to adulthood, it symbolically tries to kill the father in order to do away with illusions. Religion in this natural process of maturing from childhood to adulthood becomes a matter of the past and is no longer relevant. It also implied that since it was already an illusion and repression, the death of religion or that of the God of Christianity should not be mourned. Rather, one should feel jubilant about getting rid of it, and the earlier the better.¹⁰

Needless to say "religion" in the European mindset refers primarily to Western Christianity, though it also carries a general application. That is why when Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) declared God as dead, his main criticism was that Christian values of humility and self-abnegation besides democracy are the main cause of human sickness. The Christian attitude towards the primacy of the other world, the downgrading of this world, fictitious soul trips, and sex seen as something dirty naturally resulted in a culture that eulogized self-denial and self-torture. In Nietzsche's view, this called for a "transvaluation of values". Man in his ideology of power was the bridge to "superman",

one with the will to power, high integrity, intellectual acumen, proud, considerate towards those inferior to him and one who loves solitude. This, he thought, could substitute Christianity's set of outdated values.¹¹

With the secularization of mind and soul, European thought was more or less liberated from the dogmatic hold of Christianity and conservatism. A new world was born. Secularism became not only a historical process to de-divinize the cosmos, history, theology, philosophy, psychology, economy, and political life, but also became a way of thinking and living.

Anyone trained as a social scientist, philosopher, biological scientist, physicist or medical doctor had to go through academic works representative of secularism as the ultimate truth. No wonder wherever European nations colonized people in Asia or Africa or the Middle East, the colonized élite, politicians, men of letters were deeply influenced by the economic, political, social, intellectual and cultural colonialism experienced by them, in some cases for around two centuries.¹²

The Muslim as well as non-Muslim élite in formerly colonized countries, perhaps, not because of their dislike for "religion" but because of the mindset created by the European intellectual tradition considered secularism as a solution to their own inner conflicts. They were also led to regard "religion" as an obsession and a complex in many situations.

Ironic as it may sound, "[s]ecularism, on the other hand, is the name for an ideology, a new closed world view which functions very much like a new religion."¹³ This new religion, as Harvey Cox calls it, with its claim to finality, apparently

leads to a *fundamentalist* outlook in which nothing but secularism can solve socioeconomic and political problems of the so-called developing world.

With its fatalistic fundamentalist nature, secularism pretends neutrality towards religion. It does not stop the church building new churches, funeral homes, and raising charities. While inside their churches, synagogues or *masājīd*, the followers are given liberty to show their respect to their God, with whatever name they call Him. But once they are out of the holy precincts, the same God becomes irrelevant and loses all authority over domains of public authority – economic planning and commerce, governance and political decision making, cultural and social practices, entertainment and legal matters. In short, public space has no place for God.

Does it mean that to empower “religion” the modern man should go back to the medieval ways of Christianity, and enthrone the priests with a divine status to control affairs of the society? This fear of a comeback of theocracy, of dogmatic religious extremism is frequently projected as a threat to the prevailing secular world order. Objective reality, concrete historical facts and rational argument and analysis and not some unfounded fears should, in our view, be the basis of supporting or opposing a thought pattern.

Secularism, as a way of thinking, is more than a utopia. It has manifested itself in humanism, capitalism, communism, socialism, liberal democracy, techno-culture and consumerism in the contemporary human history. Its foundational belief remains tied to man’s superiority as the measure of everything. To realize its objective, it

zealously seeks secularization of total space and time. The dualism of sacred and profane,¹⁴ and the dichotomy of church and state, is essentially its basic premise. Many world religions also justify or condone the existence of such dualism, and hence reconciled to the idea of the coexistence of evil and virtue, *atman* and *prakarti* (soul and flesh) as autonomous realms. Nevertheless, to universalize the European experience, and draw general rules based on the conflict between Western Christianity and the proponents of humanism, empiricism and secularism for every civilization is a reductionist fallacy.

Islamic civilization, despite some phases of stagnation and traditionalism (*taqlid*), is distinct as its paradigm is characterized by a shift from conservatism, dogmatism, dualism and theocracy to a culture of knowledge, research and investigation, rationalization, use of creativity and innovation (*ijtihād*) and a societal living marked by the principle of consultation and participation (*shūrā*). Islamic history, when read free from bias shows continuity in thought, the spirit of *ijtihād* in the Qur'ānic exegesis, *hadīth* criticism, *fiqh* (law) and *usūl al-fiqh* (jurisprudence), philosophy and literature. Not once was Islamic thought dominated by literalism of the Scripture, or spiritual monopoly of the saintly class ('*ulamā'* or *sūfī*). Its "spiritualists" were at the same time hard-core rationalists. One such person in the history of Islam is Abū Hāmid al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) a man who talks about the alchemy of the heart (in his *Kīmīyā-i Sa'ādāt*) and revival of the religious sciences (in his *Ihya' 'ulūm al-dīn*) is a thorough rationalist and philosopher in his refutation of the philosophers (*tahāfut al-falāsifah*) and *Maqāsid alfalāsifah*. He also deals with

theological (*kalāmī*) issues in his *al-Iqtisād fī al-I'tiqād*. While in his *al-Mustasfā*, he appears as a thorough jurist, philosopher of law and judge. His *al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl* indicates his in-depth understanding and command over law, philosophy as well as mysticism. The presence of such various strands of knowledge in one single person shows an intellectual and existential fading away of separation between the sacred and the profane, the holy and the secular.

The question whether Islamic tradition can be called secular or theocratic needs further analysis. First we should ask the question if the Qur'ān projects the Prophet (peace be upon him) as authoritarian or as authority? Is he required by the Qur'ān to seek advice (*shūrā*) from his followers in strategic matters, or whatever he thinks becomes the state policy? What was the practice of his successors? Universally taken as models of good governance by the Muslim community, who are the *Khulafā' al-Rāshidūn* (the Rightly-Guided Caliphs)? Do they present a model of an autocratic monarch, theocratic authority, or seek consultation and counselling at different levels? Is it not a fact that it was only after thorough discussion that they formulated their policies? Do these Caliphs represent in any way "secularity", "theocracy", or a *sui generis* governance in which the intent of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, skilled know-how in various areas, and an interplay of reason and experience take place in every single matter, may it relate to economic policy, family law or international politics?

The Qur'ān condemns theocracy in a clear expression when it criticises the role of the Jewish Rabbis in arrogating to themselves the authority of declaring what they thought was permissible or not

permissible, in the name of YAHWH: "Thus woe to those who write the Scripture with their own hands and then say 'this is from Allah' that they may purchase a small gain therewith ..." (al-Baqarah 2: 79).

At the positive level, the Qur'an commands the Prophet (peace be upon him), and by implication people in authority, to decide their affairs after counselling and consultation: "... and consult them in the conduct of affairs and when you have resolved, put your trust in Allah..." Āl 'Imrān 3: 159. This and a similar command in al-Shūrā 42: 38 makes it binding on the rulers to have free interaction between the authority and the governed and conduct the affairs of the state by mutual consultation, thus eliminating all kinds of authoritarianism whether theocratic, autocratic or monarchic. It establishes the supremacy of law for the ruler as well as for the people. This ensures freedom in society for everyone, making accountability a cornerstone of the polity. This makes it *sui generis*, neither Eastern nor Western but a universal and uniform system, with a worldview in which the so-called sacred and secular lose their separate identities. The integration that the Qur'an wants to see in human life is best illustrated in *Sūrah* al-Jumu'ah (the day of congregation). It says: "O you who believe when the call is heard for the prayer of the day of congregation, hasten to the remembrance (*dhikr*) of Allah and leave your trading. That is better for you if you did but know. And when the prayer is over, then disperse in the land and seek Allah's bounty (*fadl*) and remember Allah much (*wa udhkurullaha kathiran*) that you may be successful" (al-Jumu'ah: 9-10). In a clear manner, the Qur'an tells those involved in trade and commerce that

Friday is not a holy day or sabbath when they leave the so-called worldly activities for total devotion and worship. On the contrary, when they are busy in their trading and the call is heard from the *masjid*, they must suspend economic activity, rush to remember Allah; and as soon as the prayer is over, return to their professional activities while continuing Allah's remembrance in the market place, working with honesty, and truthfulness.

This obliterates the line of separation between the so-called sacred and secular space. The *dhikr* performed in the *masjid* in the form of prayer is extended into economic and commercial activity. This integration is not "theocracy" but the creation of an ethical, and responsible conduct and behaviour towards life and its demands. The same applies to other areas of civilized human existence – culture, scientific research, social and legal matters and so on.

Secularism and secularization are an anathema to Islam and its culture not only on "religious" grounds but also on the basis of its logic, which describes the two as an essential contradiction of terms. Islam, in the first instance, does not regard itself a "religion" in the common Western meaning of the term. It calls itself *dīn* (a way of life). "Indeed *dīn*, with Allah is al-Islām" (Āl 'Imrān: 19). Similarly, it says "this day have I perfected your *dīn* for you and completed My favour on you and have chosen for you al-Islām as your *dīn*" (al-Mā'idah: 3).

The Qur'ān not only names this "*dīn*" as al-Islām but also defines it as a total way of life covering all aspects of the human existence – from interpersonal to social activity, economics to legal system, and domestic and international relations so



that justice is established and exploitation and oppression are routed. In other words, it brings about a social change, a transformation of society and its institutions, a new approach to governance and human interaction. It also includes instruction on how one should relate oneself to the Creator in private and public life.

Being a kind of its own, it will not be fair to reduce Islam to a "religion". It will be equally unfair to equate its history with the history of Christianity in Europe. Both have their distinctions and separate historic features. Present-day Islamic awakening and the Muslim longings for change should not be confused with the European experience of the Renaissance. It should be studied in its own right, not with the mindset and terms of reference of an alien tradition.

It is also important to understand that the encounter of secularism, as an ideology, with Islam has been closely linked with the rise of European colonialism and imperialism. With its utilitarian and pragmatic mindset and a culture of separation between the realms of the Caesar and the Christ, particularly with post-Renaissance mind, the European colonialism could not rule comfortably in Asia and Africa without creating a secular ambience. Secularity caused no conflict or problem of dual standards in the West. A devout Christian suffered no qualms while working as a secular lawmaker, a businessman, an educator or a bureaucrat but it did create a crisis situation for the Muslim society. The cohesiveness of life and the basic ethical foundations of society were challenged by the dualism of the intruding colonialism with its commitment to secular ideology.

The uncompromising attitude of secularism, its conviction that secularity alone has the answer to the problems of the developing world constitutes the real problem. The Western worldview which divides human life into two inevitable realms of "religious" and "secular" eventually gives secularism the status of a dogma that the rest of the world has to accept or suffer damnation.

Convinced of the European experience of evolving from the Holy Roman Empire to the nation states, the European mind could not think otherwise. As a historical process of conflict between the theocratic Christian setup, which established itself as the basis of political legitimacy in the fourth century, secularity soon led to divisions in the Christian Rome. The conflict of interests between the Pope(s) and the emperor(s) led to what is known as localism, development of towns, bourgs and ultimately a collapse of understanding between the two. During the Reformation and the Renaissance, the religious protest also became a political protest. The idea of the nation state (Latin, *nasci, natus*, "to be born") essentially a sociopolitical concept based on common birth evolved into a state (Latin, *status* "position") – a geographic notion with fixed boundaries. Though the emergent nation states had their strong religious affiliations (Germany being Lutheran, Switzerland Calvinist, England Anglican, France and Spain Catholic), they at the same time symbolized their liberation from the central Church authority. The treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and a decade later the termination of war between France and Spain in 1659, ratified the geo-political limitation of the European states and their political liberation from the Holy

Roman Empire. The age of Enlightenment and the rise of humanism re-enforced the total separation of church and state. Thomas Hobbes (d.1679) believed in the emancipation of political thought from theology. John Locke (d. 1704) and Jean Jacques Rousseau (d. 1778) further provided philosophical basis for the separation of these two realms. Allegiance to the state assumed primacy over loyalty to the church.

In the Islamic framework of thought, the revivalists like Muhammad Iqbal (d. 1938), Sayyid Abu'l A'lā Mawdūdī (d. 1979), Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), or the modernists like Fazlur Rahman,¹⁵ consider secularism contrary to the Islamic value system.

Secularism's claim to transcendence has provided a more aggressive mindset, which admits of no defining role for religion in life and frustrates the development of a pluralistic society. The Islamic model, on the other hand, spells out a framework that despite its ideological flavour remains pluralistic. The Qur'ānic affirmation of coexistence between cultures comes from the *āyah* "for you your religion, for us our way of life" (al-Kāfirān: 6) and "there is no compulsion in *dīn*" (al-Baqarah: 256). Together, they define the character of this pluralistic model.

Islam is essentially a moral system that guides human behaviour in all aspects of life.¹⁶ Its integrative approach is substituted by secularism with a fragmented approach separating ethical and moral dimensions from all areas of life except personal life and the limited realm of "religion". This exclusivism of secularism makes it, in the final analysis, a fundamentalist ideology, a dogma and a closed system, which denies place to plurality.

The heart of the problem in our view lies in a totally "this-worldly" approach of secularism in contrast to the "other-worldly" approach of the classical Christianity. Islam being integrative does not recognize such a dualism or preferring one at the cost of the other. Its ethical approach with its roots in the Divine guidance provides a road map for all kinds of human activity, deriving inspiration and guidance from moral values and norms.

The Islamic revivalist movements in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been essentially movements for de-colonization. These movements are not only political but also for liberation from the secular fundamentalism.

It is against this intellectual backdrop that Muhammad Iqbal, Sayyid Mawdūdī, and Sayyid Qutb made a frontal attack on secularism and secularization in the Muslim World. As described before, secularism, understood as a historical process, is often assumed to be inevitable for people everywhere. But with all its claims to ultimacy, it remains irrelevant and out of place for societies and cultures with different values, historical traditions, and structures.

As a major architect of the Muslim thought in the twentieth century, Mawdudi has written a lot about the moral crisis in the East. In the process, he gives a critical look to the basic assumptions of the European intellectual tradition that influenced the Muslim mind, and brings into sharp focus its positive and negative dimensions. Among his books, the 1930s *Tanqihāt* had a major role in shaping the contemporary Muslim discourse. It is for the first time that selections from this important book and another of his works, *Tafhifāt*, are being presented in the English language. Br.

Tarik Jan, our colleague in the Institute of Policy Studies, has rendered Mawdudi's writings in powerful modern English prose accompanied with commentary. His rendition stays close to the text and succeeds admirably well in capturing the essence of the Mawdudi genius and his style in another medium and intellectual tradition. Tarik's commentary is also timely as well as scholarly. His grasp of the current knowledge scene helps him contemporize the original text. We thus hope this book will help foster dialogue between Islam and the West.

NOTES

1. Robert N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 72-73.
2. Harvey Cox, *The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), p. 34.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
5. Arnold E. Loen, *Secularization: Science Without God* (Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1967), p. 9.
6. His principal works which influenced Heidegger and others include: *Jesus and the World* (1926); *Belief and Understanding*, 2 Vols., 1933, 1952; *The New Testament and Mythology*, edited under the titles *Kerygma and Myth*, 1948; *Theology of the New Testament*, 2 Vols., 1948, 1953. *The Question of Demythologization*, 1954; and *Jesus Christ and Mythology*, 1958.
7. His major works include *The Origin of Species*, 1859, *The Variation of Plants and Animals under Domestication*, 1868; and *The Descent of Man*, 1871.

8. These include A. R. Wallace (1823-1913); Herbert Spencer (1820-1903); T. H. Huxley (1825-1895); Ernst Haeckel (1834- 1919); and William G. Sumner (1840-1910).
9. R. N. Bellah, *Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in a Post- Traditional World* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 73.
10. Sigmund Freud, *Humour and its Relation to the Unconscious*, 1905; *Introductory Lectures in Psychoanalysis*, 1916-18; *The Ego and the Id*, 1923; *The Future of an Illusion*, 1927, *Civilization and its Discontents*, 1930; *The Problem of Anxiety*; and *Moses and Monotheism*, 1939.
11. His major works, on this count, include: *The Birth of Tragedy*, 1872; *Human, all too Human*, 1878; *Beyond Good and Evil*, 1886; *Toward a Genealogy of Morals*, 1887; *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, 1883-85; also see Walter Kaufmann, *The Portable Nietzsche* (New York: The Viking Press, 1969).
12. This intellectual colonialism and transformation of the soul has been so deep that even those who succeeded in achieving political liberation from the European imperialists could not shrug off the cultural baggage of the age of colonialism. For an excellent treatment of the problem, see Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1968). See also his *Black Skins White Masks* (New York: Grove Press Inc., 1968); Famous Algerian Muslim thinker Malik Bennabi in his *Islam in History and Society* (Kuala Lumpur: Breta Publishing, 1991) calls this post-al-Muwahhid spirit in the Algerian context as "Colonisibility" (pp. 52-53), which continues even after political independence from the European colonialism.
13. Harvey Cox, *The Secular City ...* p. 18.
14. For elaboration of the concept, see Mircea Eleade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion* (New York: Harcourt Brace & World Inc., 1959).

15. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984). The author defines the character of this pluralistic model.
16. Tamara Sonn, *The State and Islam* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 211.

Mawdudi's Critique of the Secular Mind

Tarik Jan

LIKE ANY EPOCHAL change, the twentieth century had a disturbing particularity. Unsettling in many aspects, it still succeeded in creating a new West that pulsed with a creative rhythm, and pushed its influence into the far reaches of the world. On the flip side, the Ottomans, the last vestige of Muslim power whose writ stretched from the Middle East to North Africa and the Balkans, were in the throes of exhaustion, heaving desperately for a lease on life that the West would mercilessly deny them.

South Asia had already seen the demise of Muslim pre-eminence and had lived in the shadow of British colonial rule for some time. For people like Mawdudi, it was a traumatic experience, and each day that passed agonized his existence. In its essence, it was not just the change from Muslim to British rule, but a cataclysmic subversion of the socio-political order, an invasion of foreign ideas that was eroding the very basis of Islamic society. This situation was made worse by the fact that the British saw the Hindus as natural allies¹ and together, they manipulated the post-1857 situation in South Asia to marginalize Muslims into a

political and economical nonentity. The fall of Muslim power, the loss of their moral leadership, and the eventual decimation of their civilization saddened Mawdudi.

Mawdudi knew that the military occupation of Muslim lands was a temporary phenomenon and might not last long. He saw the real threat in the emergent Western thought, which, after de-Christianizing the West, was now in a position to swallow the Muslims. For the colonial West, it was important that the fall of Muslim power should have its sequel in the conquest of the Muslim soul. He saw the peril in the situation and decided to respond to it in three ways: by understanding Western thought, establishing Islam's supremacy, and by restoring the morale of the Muslims.

Not having had the benefit of formal education in a university, he worked hard to learn English and then read as much as he could to familiarize himself with the matrix of the invading culture. Long before the 1930s, when he came into his prime, the West had cast religion aside by submitting to the sovereignty of science. The world was no more located in God's omnipotence, nor was it explainable through revelatory knowledge but only through man's sensory experiences, explainable through a mechanistic materialism. Einstein and Planck's nonmaterial view would take some time before it made its presence felt.

These were the days of Darwin, Marx and Freud, whose theories and interpretations ruled everything. The three had demolished the long-held belief that humans were noble in creation and that there was a purpose to existence. The evolutionists rejected this as an anthropocentric delusion. By eliminating the providential design, they had stripped life of cosmic meaning. Freud,

who had probed human consciousness, declared it a fragile epiphenomenon determined by dark hostile forces residing in the unconscious. Humans were therefore not even rational, a notion that had been trumpeted during the Enlightenment. Added to this, the new cosmology reduced the significance of the earth by describing it as a much smaller planet in the overall universe. Together, the three not only took away man's nobility, but also questioned his humanity by viewing him as just another animal. The emergent worldview in the West was horrifically opposed to everything that Islam stood for. Mawdudi therefore turned his attention to rationalism, positivism, Darwinian evolution, and secular humanism as expressed by Marx.

RATIONALISM OR ATTITUDES OF SERVITUDE

Before Mawdudi could take on Darwin and others, it was important for him to expose the shallowness of the Muslim educated class, which believed wholeheartedly in the supremacy of the West. He wrote:

Even where Muslims are free and sovereign, their freedom is illusory as they suffer from mental servitude – their academic institutions, their offices, their bazaars, their homes, and even their bodies speak of the West's stamp on them. Whether knowingly or not, they think with borrowed minds, see things through borrowed eyes and tread borrowed paths. They have this notion mounted on them that the West alone has the truth. All else is false. Thus, their manners, their standards of decency and morality are of Western origin. Whatever satisfies this yardstick, they take as true.²

For sure, this was a frontal attack on attitudes of servitude. Rationality, as claimed by educated Muslims, was in reality an imitation of the West, which involved little reflection or analysis. But before he could put them on the defensive, he wanted to tell them that the West in general is not that rational. "The secularists," he said, "disputed God's presence, and called for a probe in the universe without Him. In their view, any effort that allies itself with a transcendent God is unscientific. Small wonder, new scholarship in the West had a taint of prejudice against God, spiritualism and metaphysics. Driven by emotions and not reason, they disputed God's presence not because they had proved His absence through scientific inquiry. Rather, they denied Him because He was the God of their opponents who were hostile to their liberalism. Their subsequent five centuries of work had this irrational attitude behind it."³

In his famous piece on "The Finitude of Rationalism," Mawdudi delved further into the subject:

For the last two centuries, the West has projected itself as a believer in rationalism and naturalism. The rest of the world took it seriously because in make-believe who can deny the power spread of a billboard approach? Anything perceived repetitively has an assured stay in our memory, and thus may engineer our thinking towards its acceptance. Small wonder, we now believe that Western civilization rests on the twin concepts of rationalism and naturalism, though in essence it seeks the validity of its mental attitudes in sensory experiences and the impulsion of desire. For some, it may be news that even the much talked about Enlightenment in the West was essentially

a mutiny against rationalism. And so was the case with naturalism when it overthrew nature-based guidance and embraced desire and empiricism as its guide. In other words, anything that failed in the scale of utility was worth the contempt.⁴

To Mawdudi, the mind-based utilitarian criterion was nothing but positivism, which equated reality with tangibility, weight, and calculation. What this meant was that things that were beyond observation and experience bore no existential worth in the calculus of utility nor could they be believable, for they fell within the realm of irrationality. That being the case, for him it was proper to go after the concept of utilitarian benefits because Western educated Muslims had begun to weigh even Islamic injunctions on the utilitarian scale.

By definition, he said, a rational and utilitarian benefit is incapable of a precise import because of its relative nature. A person may consider something as useful while others see it as injurious. A third person may hold it partially useful but of less significance, while regarding something else as profitable. In judging utility, the chances for disagreement abound as every person could have a different perspective on it. A person may crave for the immediate gain while avoiding injury in it. For sure, his choice will be at variance with others who have their eyes set on its functional utility. Likewise, there are things that may occasion both benefit and harm. A person may go for it because he is willing to engage harm for the sake of its long-term benefit. Others may shy away from it for it entails more harm than benefit. Again, rational and utilitarian benefits may disagree with each

other. For example, experience may suggest harm in a thing but our rational mind could summon up bigger gains in the future. Also, experience may prove a thing beneficial, but our rational mind could insist on discarding it. Such being the high state of subjectivity, a thing may vary in its value among the people.⁵

Mawdudi sought to expose the shallow affliction with reason of the new converts to rationalism in Muslim societies and the exaggerated importance they gave to it as a scientific tool, unaffected by prejudice or emotions:

Making claims of reason-based life notwithstanding, our so-called rationalists violate its dictates every inch of the way in its application to life. Mentally wanting, they fail to grasp the ungraceful union of the opposites and their consequential contrariness. Education could have helped by favouring them with the basic implements of a rational mind and freeing them from a tangled speech.... Inconsistent in their premise and their argumentation, it is chaos that rules their minds. Worse still, the civilizational context, which situates the human self, is not helpful to them either, as it is given to sensuality and material pursuits. It can activate desires in humans making them voracious consumers; it can also create a sensory self, entangled with the known, but gifting them a trained mind that shies away from dabbling in superficialities is beyond its genius. Mostly in their case posing rational is an affect and not reality. Again, it is on Islam alone that their much-paraded rationalism comes into play, for it is in the spiritual, moral and societal postulates of Islam that the Western concepts run into problems.⁶

Mawdudi was not far from the truth. The ability to reason is a human distinction, though it has innate problems. To begin with, it has to operate within a social given. It resides in a human vessel, which has a psychotemporal construct. Thus, what affects humans also affects reason. Besides, reason cannot be the arbiter for everything. It does not function in a trajectory of linear progression; often it has to move in a web, and is likely to get bogged down.

Mawdudi considered it irrational for a person to question his faith after having accepted it. This does not mean he cannot question its postulates or argue its validity with others. He can certainly do this, but that should be before coming into the fold of Islam. Once, however, he accepts it, he must embrace it wholeheartedly. This does not preclude seeking justificatory explanation for an injunction, but it will be neither rational nor practical if every now and then a person seeks justification for a rule as a condition for its compliance. He elaborates this point by putting it in the civilizational context:

Civilization presupposes that when a person agrees to a system, he must have approved its basic presumptions. Belief in the sovereign command of that system, and submission to its dictates are an essential mix of a collective life. As long as one stays in a setup, he has to follow the sovereign will. Criminal neglect or rule violation is another thing, for he can still live within the setup after infracting its rules. But if every now and then he seeks justificatory explanation to a rule as conditional to its compliance, he can be charged with rebellion. If he is in the army, court martial will be his fate. If he is enrolled in an educational institution, he will be thrown out of it. If he is already in the

fold of a faith, he will invite the charge of disbelief. For such seekers of justificatory explanations, the right place will be out of its pale and not inside. To merit an answer, one must step out and then question.⁷

To expose the much-paraded rationality of the so-called Muslim rationalists, Mawdudi suggests a small rationality test. "Draw them into discussion on a subject. Then as a preliminary to the discussion, ask them to affirm their essence [would they be participating in it as Muslims or nonbelievers?], and then cite the religious injunction applicable to the subject. Probably they would shrug their shoulders and say in the vein of their assumed rationality: 'Keep your mullaism to yourself; give us a reason-based answer and not a textual citation.' These may be a few words, but it surely reveals their irrationality. It gives them no credit that they know either the essentials of demanding attestation nor the true posturing of a seeker. With failing as large, where do they fault?"⁸

An argument often made was that religion had become outdated because of the new thought on the brain horizon. Another equally potent notion was the fashionable tendency to narrow down knowledge to sensory experiences, since they are quantifiable. Mawdudi thrashed out these notions at three levels: First, he took up the morphology of the emergent knowledge by pointing to the possibility of its being conjectural and conceptual; second, he demonstrated the absurdity of the claim that experimental methods have replaced faith; third, he showed that people even in present times believe in the unseen. Racing through the secularists' argument, he says:

To change religion in the wake of new thought is the hallmark of those who think that every development is constitutive of knowledge, and that it is in synch with time to embrace it. Whether the emergent thought is of a conjectural and conceptual nature, or whether its soundness has been probed with academic rectitude does not bother them. Superficial as such, they get carried away with the 'blazing trails of new thinking,' even though they know little how new thought crystallizes and which ways are wise and which childish.⁹

DARWINIAN EVOLUTION – DOGMA OR SCIENCE?

By the time Darwin arrived on the scene, the West had already cast the universe into a new model of spatial dimension. Christianity was still a force, but gone was its pre-eminent authority to understand nature. The Cartesian-Newton vantage had begun to evidence its secularizing consequences. For Darwin, the moment had come to effectuate a complete breakaway from religious tradition and explain the universe through adaptation and natural selection. In the process, a new paradigm arose. For the next century, the science community made Darwin their icon. So great was the West's worship of its new icon that in Darwin's life and even after, only a few dared to speak out against his theory. Those who did so were treated with irreverence. It was only in 1958, when the fifth volume of *Encyclopedie francaise* carrying the peak scholarship of the French biologists came heavily upon the theory, that the Darwinians had the shock of their lives. So far the Darwinians took refuge in biology, especially at the micro level, but when the prominent French biologists from Claude Bernard to Lucien Cuénot said "the theory of evolution is

impossible," they lost their steam. Worse, the biologists reduced it to the status of a dogma. "Evolution," they said, "is a kind of dogma in which its priests no longer believe but which they keep presenting to their people. So much about a matter which it takes courage to spell out so that men of the coming generation may orient their research in a different way."¹⁰

Responding in the 1930s to a question from a student who felt his faith crumbling before the might of Darwinian evolution, Mawdudi came up with his short critique on Darwin. It was concise and went to the heart of the problem by making a differentiation between theory and law. "The difference between hypothesis and law," he wrote, "is very important, for a theory that does not cohere with facts has no stay, but truth has. The question of reviewing one's faith rises only when it comes into conflict with a proven truth. A faith that cowers before speculative thought and unproven theories is not worth the claim of faith but is rather a fond hope that decays by mere rumours."¹¹

As a theist, Mawdudi believed that the complexity and variance in life, from the unicellular molecule to a full-blown human form, was not accidental or random but rather had an exceptional order behind it. The universe, said he, is the outcome of a mastermind who helped different organisms grow in a correspondingly compatible environment and then gradually nudged them towards species of differentiated characteristics. If in God's plan some species became unwanted, He phased them out. In contrast, Darwinians observed nature through the blinkered lens of a godless mind, which attributed life on earth to the self-organizing ability of atoms. Darwin's theory, he maintained, became handy for

such a mind. "European atheism by then, though under full steam, still lacked a solid scientific base. Written in scientific jargon and seemingly plausible, his theory received a ready embrace as it provided atheism its wooden legs. Suddenly it made them understand the so-far-elusive reality. Without much reflection, they fixed the theory's wooden legs to every discipline from the sciences to philosophy and from ethics to the humanities, although it carried serious flaws in its interpretation of physical phenomena."¹²

Mawdudi was right as Darwin's confessional statement supports him. For example, the *Origin's* chapter on "Difficulties of the theory" talks, among others, of the non-presence of transitional forms. Repeating the objections of his critics, he asks: "Why, if species have descended from other species by fine gradation, do we not everywhere see the transitional forms?"¹³ In a moment of truth, Darwin considers these difficulties as "fatal to his theory". Nevertheless, he sweeps them aside by saying that the fossil record is not yet updated. "Hence we ought not to expect at the present time to meet with numerous transitional varieties in each region, though they must have existed there, and may be embedded there in a fossil condition."¹⁴ Elsewhere he makes a similar statement that "if my theory be true, linking closely together all the species of the same group, must assuredly have existed."¹⁵ But so great was the cult crafted by his followers that conjecture was exalted to the status of science. His most fervent supporter, Julian Huxley, rated *The Origin of Species* in his "Introduction to the Mentor Edition" a great work. "First of all," said he, "... it provides a vast and well-chosen body of evidence showing that existing animals and plants cannot have been

created separately in their present forms, but must have evolved from earlier forms by slow transformation." Mawdudi considered the reliance on phrases such as, "must have evolved" to be unscientific.

HEGEL'S AND MARX'S VIEW OF HISTORY

Mawdudi is critical of modern civilization for, in his view, it has brought in its fold a horde of problems for humanity that have their roots in Hegelian historiography. Karl Marx added to the human travail by building his materialist interpretation of history on the dialectical process envisioned by Hegel.

So what is this Hegelian historiography that Mawdudi blames? In the succinct style that sets him apart from others, Mawdudi summarizes Hegel in the following manner:

A civilization moves upward when contradictions, conflicts and amalgamations surface in the human situation. Hegel held every historical epoch as an organic whole like a living body system, in which all aspects of human existence – economic, political, social and moral – are in a measured proportion, marked by a relationship of symbiosis and pulsing with a similar rhythm. Taken together, each epoch objectifies the spirit of the age.

When a great epoch reaches its full potential because of its life-giving ideas, then something unusual takes place. From within its womb an opposite force emerges in the form of new concepts and thought, and these begin to take on the old thought.

For a while this conflict between the old and the new eras continues. But eventually they agree to

a marriage giving birth to a newer civilization. And thus begins the fresh phase of history. Hegel describes this process of evolution as dialectical. To him, in the flow of history there is a perpetual exchange and conflict, which is not haphazard but logical: First thesis comes and then as a counter to it antithesis comes. The strife invites the 'World Reason' or 'Absolute Spirit' to move in for a patch up by taking the best from both of the rivals to create a synthesis. In due course, the new synthesis itself turns into thesis and thus the cycle of conflict as well as resolution continues.¹⁶

To Hegel, says Mawdudi, the dialectical process is collective by its essence and total in its embrace. This means that an epoch is like a single living unit while individuals and groups are its organs. None of them is free from the epoch's collective temper, including great historical figures that are nothing but pawns on the chessboard. In the turbulent flow of this mighty river, the "Absolute Idea" surges magisterially to produce thesis, antithesis, and finally synthesis. In this process, as Hegel visualizes it, there is a manifest irony. The "Absolute Idea" or "World Reason" gives individuals and groups an illusion of participation in the dialectic of change, making them believe that they are the real movers and shakers in this historical play. But, in fact, the "World Reason" uses them in the realization of itself. For it, it is an act of becoming.

After discussing Hegelian historiography, Mawdudi sums up Marx's ideas with his characteristic brevity: "Fascinated by Hegelian reason, Karl Marx picked up its dialectical process minus its spiritual or ideational aspect and

replaced it with material stimulants as the basis of historical evolution."¹⁷

In this Marxian vision, states Mawdudi, the sole determinant of human life is the economy. The economic system shapes the whole civilization of an era, its laws, ethics, religion, arts, and philosophy. The dialectical process in the Marxist conception expresses itself in history when under an economic system a class of people takes hold of the means of production and reduces others to abject dependence. When this happens, the oppressed classes gradually grow restive and, in consequence, ask for a counter system of property relations and distribution of goods that serves their interests. This development of a festering schism in the existing body politic is the antithesis of the old system. As the conflict intensifies, the current corpus of law, religion and other concepts finding themselves in jeopardy become supportive of the oppressive system. While the emergent classes, which seek the replacement of the existing economic system, reject established "truths", and seek to impart new values.

To Marx, all changes of history and the evolution of human civilization are attributable to the means of production and their distribution. What gives impulse to this process is class conflict. Marx also argued that there are no enduring values of human civilization, religion and describable as objective truth. Rather, it is human nature to first chose for itself a model to further its material interests and then to justify its continuance, manufacture a new religion and a new philosophy of ethics. This self-centred conflict is in line with nature. If there is a basis for accommodation, it is in the confluence of economic interests. Those who are opposed to such a confluence, call for strife.

To him, Hegel's philosophy of history is correct to the extent that the evolution of human civilization has been possible because of the conflict between contradictory ideas and their subsequent resolution. But along with this brilliant grasp of history, Mawdudi argues that Hegel introduces other concepts, which have no legs to stand on. For example, Hegel describes God as the "World Spirit" and states that God is using humans to complete His self. Consequently, the history of human development is God's quest for becoming. According to Mawdudi, this aspect of Hegel's dialectic is pure fantasy.

Mawdudi describes flaws in the Hegelian system as having the colour of a jigsaw puzzle. "Even his dialectical process, despite its aspects of truth, is highly speculative. For example, he does not substantiate it from history. Nor does he show us the precise nature of the conflict between opposites, and how the resolution takes place between the two warring sets of ideas. He is equally short on telling us why the new amalgamation of thought gives birth to a fresh enemy entity. This calls for an exhaustive treatment of the subject, but he hovers over it like a bird and then flies to other pastures."¹⁸

But if Hegel in his view lacks solidity, Marx is superficial. "The latter," he says, "makes no effort to understand human nature and its makeup. Admittedly, Marx is quick in comprehending the exterior animal that has economic needs, but he does not break into the inside of man, his human core for which the outer animal is the implement. Nor does Marx understand the demands of human nature, which are different from the temperament of the outer animal."

This aspect of Marx's work, says Mawdudi, is extremely shaky and exposes the falsity of his sociology. Marx thinks that the human self is the slave of the animal self. The power of his rational faculties and observation, creativity and intuitive apparatus are all in the service of the exterior animal. "To Marx, the inside human can do nothing but submit to the will of the outer entity – make laws as he wishes, cook up religious concepts and lay down the course of his destiny as he dictates. How corrupt is the Marxist view of humanity? How lowly is his civilizational concept?"¹⁹

Mawdudi does not disregard, however, the effect of animal impulses on the human self. Nor would it be possible to deny that the animal self strives for supremacy over the human self. But Marx is wrong, says Mawdudi, when he claims that the animal self is free from the influence of the human self. His reading of history is totally wrong when he comes up with the statement that civilizations owe their growth to individuals ruled, not by their humanity, but by their animal selves. "A little objectivity," says Mawdudi, "would have helped Marx know that the enduring values of civility, ethics, and justice are the legacy of those individuals who tamed their animal selves to increase the human capital."²⁰

Mawdudi discounted the possibility that one could be a believer and a Marxist at the same time, characterizing this as a super contradiction and a pathetic situation.

THE ALTERNATIVE VIEW

Having made his critique of current theories about the place of humans in the world, Mawdudi offers

his counterview of Islam. According to the Qur'ān, he says, man is not the name of the biological self alone that houses hunger, sex, greed, fear and wrath, it is also the carrier of a spiritual essence that pulsates with moral impulses. Unlike other animals, humans are not bound by instinct, but have been endowed with intelligence, discretion, and the ability to acquire knowledge and make decisions as autonomous beings. God does not force individuals to walk on a predetermined path. Nor does God take full charge of human subsistence. On the contrary, He has empowered them with striving so that they can live by the sweat of their brows, realize their potentials, and obtain for themselves what they want. Man is the name of that ability to strive as an autonomous self.

As for the exterior animal self – an uncouth agent that has nothing but desires and lusts to pursue – God has placed it in the service of the inner human. When charged, it tries to reverse the order and takes hold of the human self so that it serves baser demands through harnessing mental endowments. It attempts to weigh down the human ability to soar, limits its vision, and stokes the fire of *jāhiliyyah* (paganism) in him. In response to the cadence of his soul, the human self asserts his domain over the animal self. In this respect, he has at his disposal the revelatory knowledge of justness and piety, right and wrong. Even when he responds to the urging of his instincts, he seeks rightful ways of satisfying them. His aspirations are far higher than the earthly pulls of his animal self. He wants to be good in his own eyes and in the eyes of his God. His intuition prompts him to excel as a moral being.

Consequently, Mawdudi says, the whole history of humanity is a reflection of this conflict

between the human self and his counterpart animal self. He wants to follow the prompting of his intuition, while the animal self pulls him downwards in directions that are harmful, laden with self indulgence, discord, lust and iniquity. Once derailed, he tries to haul himself up, but in the process selects some wrong solutions under the influence of the animal self. He seeks sanctuary in monastic life, in the rigours of denying self, and in escape from civilizational responsibilities. But instead of increasing his hold on the animal self, this uncalled for withdrawal from life again sets him on wrong paths. This time, the animal self makes sure that he stays astray forever.

Mawdudi states:

The two forces of extremism (that is monasticism and materialism) continue in a tug of war tearing apart the human fabric of existence. Under each impact, some new concepts and thoughts generate, carrying part truth part falsehood. For a while, humanity tests these amalgams of thoughts until it tires itself out. Man's true nature, which longs for the straight path (*sirāt almustaqīm*), surfaces again and after a reflective phase of contrition, while retaining the right elements, flushes the false ones out.²¹

SECULARISM AND ITS TOLL

With those kinds of mortars and bricks in the making of Western civilization, it did not surprise people like Mawdudi that the West's prime values of secularism, nationalism and democracy were problematic. The three, in his view, constituted the triangle of calamity that shadows humanity today.

Mawdudi states that the West's insistence that God should make no intrusion in the secular realm was a reactive response to the clergy-made theology, which bore heavily on its psyche by manacling its freedom and growth. He describes the one-liner cliché "religion is a private matter between God and man" as "the *kalimah* (the creedal declaration)" of present-day civilization. What this implies is that if a person's conscience allows for God's existence, he or she may worship Him in private but must keep the secular realm free from the influence of religion. In consequence, every form of temporal relations – education, business, law, politics or international relations – have torn themselves from the religious grid. Decisions are made free from value input or, in other words, decisions are situational mediated by the human self. He laments the fact that even individual life has been increasingly fashioned into a secular mould because of non-Godly education and irreligious social thrusts. Personal testimony of God's existence and His worship now remain undeclared, especially from those who are the real shakers and movers of this new civilization.

Mawdudi describes the secular project of excluding God from the public space as irrational:

Either God is the master-creator of humans and the universe or He is not. If He is neither the creator nor master nor sovereign, then why have Him even in one's private life. But if He is our Lord and the creator and the sovereign of this universe, it makes little sense to slash His jurisdiction to private sphere and thus oust Him from the authoritative public space. Likewise, if God has made this demarcation, it must go back to Divine provenance for proof. In case it is human drawn, the act would be seditious

against their creator and sovereign. Thus, could there be a more absurd thing to say that every individual in his private life is God's creature but when the same individuals come together in a social melding, they cease to be His creatures? Again as separate units, each individual is God's creature but when together in fusion, they are not? Only an insane person can conceive this kind of aberrance.²²

Enlarging on the theme, he writes: "Absurd as this mental posturing is, one may ask if we need God and His guidance neither in our family life, nor in our neighbourhoods and our cities, then why stay with Him? Likewise, it will be equally absurd to believe in Him if His guidance is of no consequence to us neither in work and marketplace, nor in the courts and government corridors, or in peace and war.... Why should we worship a God who is incapable of guiding us in our existential complexities? On the other hand, He is so short on brains (Allah forgive us) that in not a single matter His guidance makes any sense."²³

Equally problematic is the notion of splintering life between private and public realms. He says what people call private life is a nonentity, for humans are born in a civilized ambience with an inescapable collective shade. They are products of a social union between a mother and a father; they eye their first daylight in the lap of their parents. As they grow into adulthood, they find themselves dealing with society and its body corporate. The countless linkages that connect humans with others, he thinks, have to be sound in their constitution for it is a prelude to their well-being. Such sound and fair values of interconnectivity can come from God alone. Mawdudi states: "When

humans fracture themselves from the Divine guidance, they face their own chaotic desires; social ethos suffer from instability, while justice and fair play surrender to turmoil."²⁴ This is similar to what Russell Kirk said years later: "The sanction for obedience to norms must come from a source higher than private speculation: men do not submit long to their creations. Standards erected out of expediency will be hurled down, soon enough, also out of expediency."²⁵

Mawdudi describes well the problem that secularism creates for the individual as well as society:

A society that binds itself to secularism recedes into a valueless fluidity in which desires rule, pushing every aspect of human relations under the shade of inequity and distrust with an overlay of class and ethno-national considerations. From relations between two individuals to relations between nations, not a single link is distortion free.... In this jungle, if there is a force that can restrain the exaggerated self-interests to a reasonable margin, it is the might of the club wielded by another bully, though the irony is manifest. A club is not the name of a judicious being named God – it is a blind force incapable of establishing moral equilibrium. The wielder of a bigger club does not tailor its use to the excesses committed by the other bully but uses it as a ruse enlarging his own domain of influence. It goes with secularism that one who embraces it will free float sinking into a reckless idolater of the self. A nation-state or a union of nations equally acquires this mental frame.²⁶

Nationalism and its consort irredentism are early eighteenth-century developments in Europe

that came fast once monarchies began to shatter under the impact of changes accumulated during past centuries. Mawdudi deprecated nationalism for the ills it had brought to humanity. In its innocent origin, he thought, it stood for the nations' right to control policymaking. But as the nationality concept consolidated itself, it replaced God in the public space allowing national interests the status of the highest moral value. This must not be construed to mean that he was opposed to the concept of nationality. What he intended was to unseat nationalism from God's place. In his view, it was dangerous to substitute universal moral standards of good and bad with national interests.

Measures for what is good or bad also changed. "Anything profitable for one's nation, even if it violates justice, or what old religious traditions considered as cardinal sin, became desirable and good. Likewise, anything that hurts a nation, even when it involves truth, justice and fair play or what was once considered as the summit of morality has turned now bad. In the same vein, asking a person to surrender his life, money, time, even conscience and beliefs without reservations perfects the measure for an ideal citizen."²⁷

Equally troublesome for Mawdudi is the secular concept of people's sovereignty. "In its contextual thrust the concept held high moral grounds by maiming individual and dynastic rights to rule over a large mass of humanity. It also had the right nuance of empowering people to shape their destiny. These developments, undoubtedly positive, formalized themselves into democracy, which gave rise to another concept of nations having their writs of jurisdiction that must bloom into full expression and not curtailed."²⁸ The problem, however, started when with nationalism

they created another god. "With people seated in the public space, every thing from morals to lifestyle, societal structure and politics became fluid. As the sole arbiters, the majority decided the underlying ethos.... Law is now the expression of the people's will, which they can make or unmake with sovereign exuberance."²⁹

Mawdudi defines democracy "as the crowning of the cumulative will of the people specified to a geographical location where the administrative setup is the vassal of their wishes."³⁰ With this, he thinks the triangle of calamity is completed. "First secularism unfettered them from the moral grid, taking the fear of God from their hearts, and reducing them eventually into irresponsible idolaters of the self. Then came nationalism, which blinded them with national considerations and hate for others. Now democracy saddles them with lawmaking while the administrative machinery takes upon itself the fulfilment of their utilitarian goals."³¹ Concluding his theme, he asks the obvious: "That being the case, how could a nation with that kind of a mindset be different from a powerful rogue? What a rogue does at a smaller level, a nation does on a much larger scale. This obviously takes our comfort away, for almost every civilized nation is organized around secularism, nationalism and democracy, which pushes the world into the embrace of wolves, ready to bite and eat each other."³²

The decomposition of the old world of values in the West as well as in the East has left the new secular society empty, with nothing to bank upon other than the theories of the self. Whether it was Descartes' "canonization of the isolated ego," or Kant's "free self independent of a specified substantive content," or Weber's methodological

individualism which sees the existing social constructions as the reflection of the individual beliefs and attitudes, or Kierkegaard's "aesthetic personality who possesses an overall 'life-plan' with no content but an empty process waiting for adventitious input," the secular society more or less agreed on the concept of the self "as a rational master of the passions housed in a machine-like body ..." This was radically opposed to the concept of the self "as an integral part of a close-knit harmony of organic parts united to the cosmos and society." Released from its organic setting, the self became "a trump to all moral claims." But the secular self, as it should have been, was not restrained: it was an avaricious self, discordant with the imperatives of cohesion, unity, and sanity. Tangled into its own web, the rational self was limited by its fallacies and finitude.³³

To combat the secular mind, Mawdudi suggests a return to the "middle path", as humans cannot find the right kind of path for themselves. This is certainly not a happy summation of man and his abilities. But perhaps history supports him: the redeeming features are missing in the human situation. Narcissism (self love), bohemianism (unbridled expression of raw instincts), and estrangement (hatred for tradition and authority), three strains of disease, have severely restricted the ability of humans to render good to themselves. To understand this pathetic situation, Mawdudi wants us to know that each human is a small universe within his or her self, which has resident mental and physical forces. He has also desires, emotions and biases as well as spiritual and instinctual drives. The societal setup that comes into being because of human interaction is also complex. And as civilization grows, it adds to the complexity.

Again, the generous spread of material resources around him raises issues of ownership and distribution on individual and societal levels.

Because of their innate weaknesses, it is difficult for humans to give a balanced look to the past and come up with a life order that could be fair as well as conducive to human growth in the psycho-spiritual and material senses, which could do justice to his potential and solve his socio-economic problems in an equitable manner. It should also assure the rightful use of material resources both for individual and civilizational needs to foster healthy growth free from damage to ecology and social imbalance. When humans appropriate leadership and become counsellors to themselves, then certain aspects of reality, certain necessities of life, some problems awaiting redress get hold of their minds and they unwittingly begin to do injustice to other aspects. Life loses its balance and takes to the crooked path. Mawdudi characterizes human effort to chart their course as futile and a waste of time. He disputes with those who consider the dialectical process as a natural evolution toward human growth. To him, this is not the evolutionary success path, but the bumpy road of misfortune that makes man tumble into one disaster after another.

Mawdudi's concept of the crooked paths is certainly derived from the Qur'anic "sawā' al-sabil". But when Hegel talks of the crooked path, his source becomes problematic. Maybe he has taken it from the Qur'ān. Nevertheless, it will be of interest to note that Hegel as paraphrased by Engels did speak of "zigzag movements":

According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history, i.e., the

causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all *zigzag movements* and temporary setbacks, is only a miserable copy of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but all events independently of any thinking brain.³⁴ (emphasis added)

The difference between Hegel and the Qur'ān, however, remains critical: while Hegel views the zigzag movement as reflective of a society's conflict within itself to overcome contradictions, the Qur'ān considers this waywardness as a consequence of the conflict between Islamic and non-Islamic ways of life.

Mawdudi sees the rise of the secular mind as a calamity, and suggests a return to some kind of metaphysical framework, belief in the cosmic unity of man and nature, a balance between individual and societal rights, regeneration of the moral man, dilution of the rigid confines of nationality, a just world order in which the poor and the oppressed nations of the world could have equal space of respect and dignity.

For Muslims, Mawdudi's message is to come back to the purity of their value system and clean their house by establishing the moral state of Islam so that it serves as a model of excellence for others and a bridge of understanding between the variants of humanity. This might be difficult, but the more there will be darkness in the world, the more luminous his aspiration will become.

NOTES

1. Brian Gardner, *The East India Company* (New York: Dorset Press, 1990), p. 219. The passage is worth

reading as it demolishes the oft-repeated India-spread thesis that the British sowed the seeds of hatred between the Hindus and Muslims:

Ellenborough's intentions were peaceful, or so he always insisted, but his actions were war-like. No sooner had he extricated the Company from the fiasco of Afghanistan than the question of Sind [present-day Pakistan] became pressing.... The local amirs, or chiefs, were despotic and cruel, but they cared for their independence. They controlled the Indus, which was the main artery of the Punjab, and the lower Sind was a rich, fertile area. They were also Muslims, and Ellenborough *believed that the Hindus were the natural allies of the British in India and the Muslims the natural foes.*

2. Abu'l A'lā Mawdūdī, *Tanqīhāt*, "Hamāri dhehni ghulamī awr us ke asbāb," (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1999), p. 6.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
4. Mawdūdī, *Tanqīhāt*, "Aqaliyat kā farayb," (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1999 edition), p. 103.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-112.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 105-106.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 107-108.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121, 123.
10. See, Stanley L. Jaki, *The Road of Science and the Ways to God* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), pp. 288-289.
11. Mawdūdī, *Tafhīmāt*, "Darwin kā nazariyah-i irtiqā'," p. 278.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 280.
13. Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, 1958), p. 158.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

15. Ibid., p. 163.
16. Mawdūdī, *Tafhīmāt*, "Haygal aur Marks kā falsafah-I ta'rikh" (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1995), 17th edition, Vol. 2, p. 264.
17. Ibid., p. 265.
18. Ibid., pp. 270-271.
19. Ibid., p. 272.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 273.
22. Mawdūdī, *Jamā 'at-i Islāmī kī da'wat*, "Maghribi tahdhib ke fāsid usūl," (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1997), 22nd edition, p. 15.
23. Ibid., p. 16.
24. Ibid., p. 17.
25. Russell Kirk, *Enemies of the Permanent Things – Observation of Abnormality in Literature and Politics* (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969) p. 17.
26. Mawdūdī, *Jamā 'at-i Islāmī kī da'wat*, "Maghribi tahdhib ...", pp. 17-18.
27. Ibid., p. 13.
28. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
29. Ibid., p. 19.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p. 20.
33. See Tarik Jan's, *Pakistan Between Secularism and Islam*, "Secularism the New Idolatry," (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1998), p. 13.
34. See Friedrich Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach*, Chapter 4, cited by David Guest's *Lectures on Marxist Philosophy* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1963).

Our Mental Slavery and its Causes

DOMINATION AND GOVERNANCE are of two kinds: one mental and moral; the other political and material. The former comes from a nation's brainpower when others submit to the ascendance of its thought, concepts, and beliefs. At that juncture, its knowledge systems, the fruit of its research, and standards of right and wrong become for others the legacy of servitude.

The second kind of domination arises from a nation's material strength when it becomes so powerful that others collapse before its might. In such asymmetry, the dominant power prevails on others' resources and their system of governance. This entails either full or partial control.

Likewise, servitude also bears two faces: one mental and the other political. Both are a reflection of mental and moral domination.

In a certain sense, the two vary in kind. It is not necessary that mental domination should follow political ascendance. Nor is it necessary that political domination should escort mental servitude. Natural law, however, suggests that a nation that employs its faculties and excels in the sciences eventually thrives on the material scene as well. Likewise, a nation that ceases to compete in theoretical sciences decays mentally along with its material decline. Since domination is a

consequence of power, nations that are mentally and materially declining eventually qualify themselves for enslavement by other races.

The Muslim people suffer from this twin servitude. In some Muslim countries, both aspects of this servitude are visible while instances also abound where there is less political and more mental servitude. Unfortunately, no present-day Islamic community qualifies itself as mentally and politically free. Even where Muslims are free and sovereign, their freedom is illusory as they suffer from mental servitude – their academic institutions, their offices, their bazaars, their homes, and even their bodies speak of the West's stamp on them. Knowingly or not, they think with borrowed minds, see things through borrowed eyes and tread borrowed paths. They have this notion mounted on them that the West alone has the truth. All else is false. Thus, their manners, their standards of decency and morality are of Western origin. Whatever satisfies this yardstick is true in their eyes.

What has caused this servitude? To enlarge upon the subject may call for a whole book. I would make a brief attempt to examine the issue.

A nation emerges on the brain horizon of the world when it begins to accumulate its brain capital through the creative application of its people's faculties. The leadership role comes to it on its own when its creative ideas clamp their hold on the thought processes of other peoples. On the other hand, nations who fall behind regress into the mental mould of a slavish imitator. With their ideas and thoughts exhausted, they lose their shine for

Even where Muslims are free and sovereign, their freedom is illusory as they suffer from mental servitude. Knowingly or not, they think with borrowed minds, see things through borrowed eyes and tread borrowed paths.

others. Time mercilessly pushes them into anonymity. For example, as long as the Muslims held their ground in knowledge, others followed them. Their standards of beautiful and ugly, good and bad, right and wrong were the signposts of approval. But when they became complacent in the pursuit of innovative approaches to thought and creativity, their hold on leadership waned. The West stepped into the vacuum created by their withdrawal from the knowledge scene. With the fresh vigour of a charged people, it explored the secrets of the universe and tapped its resident powers until its hands were full, pushing it into a leadership role. The Muslims bowed before its might as humanity once abjured itself before them.

For about 500 years, the Muslims enjoyed the ascendant position their elders gave them while the West continued its quest for knowledge and domination. Then, one day, the deluge from the West overtook the world and within a century, it

clamped its hold over the planet. Shaken from their stupor, the Muslims saw Christian Europe armed with both the pen and the sword. A small group resisted but it had neither the power of the sword nor of the pen. Defeat became its destiny.

As for the mainstream Muslim people, they did what has always been the option of weakness: they embraced everything that came from the West. Like all other defeated minds, they exalted imported ideas to the status of faith.

Among the nations that clashed with the West, some had no civilizational base; where they had a base, they were short on courage to withstand the West's ineluctable thrust. Some others had no cause to resist it because in their essence they were similar to each other. Thus, all of them embraced the invading civilization. The only exceptions were the Muslims who with their faith in Islam's eternal values stuck to their civilization. For this reason, the two are in a continual state of conflict with each other. That this had a devastating effect on the lives of the Muslims and their value system is, however, obvious from the start.

THE UNDERPINNINGS OF WESTERN CIVILIZATION

Baked from a 600-year-old brew of irreligiosity and materialism, the heart of Western civilization entails refrain from God. One may also say that this godlessness is born out of the conflict between Christian religion and the natural sciences. That of course does not mean that religion *per se* is opposed to inquiry into material causes or analogical reasoning. To the West's misfortune when during the Renaissance the European movement received a number of spurts, it saw itself pitched against the

Church. The ecclesiastical authorities found themselves in an awkward position. If they had shied away from the conflict, Christianity would have suffered, for at the heart of the conflict were religious doctrines laced with old Greek cosmology. The clerics justifiably believed that the emergent knowledge scene would bring down the whole Christian edifice. Thus, prompted by fears, the Church passed cruel punishments against its opponents. As the days passed, it realized to its grief that it would not succeed in crushing this new awakening fuelled by sturdy ideas popular with the masses. In the end, the Church lost all claims to authority.

Initially, the conflict remained between the Church and the liberals. But since the Church fought in the name of religion, this soon turned into a fight between Christianity and liberalism. So ugly was the conflict and so lasting was the resultant animosity that the liberals started to perceive all religions as enemies of secular thought. Besides, to carry this battle further, they declared scientific thought the only valid way of looking at things. In other words, they stressed that if a person wanted to think scientifically on natural laws, he or she must stay away from religion. For example, the primary to religious concept of the universe holds that an all-powerful final cause exists behind the physical world and its manifestations. This final cause is superior to all physical phenomena.

The secularists, on the other hand, disputed God's presence, and called for inquiries in the universe without such a premise. Any effort, they said, that alloyed itself with a transcendent God was unscientific. Small wonder, new scholarship had a taint of prejudice against God, spiritualism

and metaphysics. Driven by emotions and not reason, they disputed God's presence not because they had proved His absence through scientific inquiry. Rather, they denied Him because He was the God of their opponents hostile to their liberalism. Their subsequent five centuries of work evinced this irrational attitude.

From the beginning, Western philosophy and science opposed a Godcentred life. But since they were immersed in a religious ambience, they still equated naturalism with God. This continued for some time until naturalism prevailed as the

But since the Church fought in the name of religion, this soon turned into a fight between Christianity and liberalism. So ugly was the conflict and so lasting was the resultant animosity that the liberals started to perceive all religions as enemies of secular thought.

primary concept of the new era, sweeping aside everything associated with God and every transcendental value that had its roots in metaphysics. Other than matter and motion, all else were unreal. Science itself was rephrased as naturalism. The new era had its own articles of faith, including its belief that what constitutes reality is its measurability.

THE MENTORS OF THE NEW AGE

René Descartes (d. 1650), the founder of Western philosophy, not only believed in God but also in the duality of matter and spirit. Ironically though, he perceived the physical world through the prism

of mechanics, which later led to the philosophy of materialism.¹

Thomas Hobbes (d. 1679) built on the work of Descartes. He saw only the tangible, which he thought was describable through physical laws. To him, there was no spirit or rational force capable of interfering in the physical realm. Oddly enough, he believed in God's presence as the cause behind everything for he considered God as hypothetically imperative.²

In contrast to Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza (d. 1677) edified rationality with an astounding vigour. He bridged the distance between matter, spirit and God and configured the universe and God into an organic whole in which God had no absolute authority. Leibniz (d. 1716) and John Locke (d. 1704) although believing in God preferred naturalism.

Seventeenth-century philosophy thus meshed with both God and naturalism. Science not yet fully opposed to God went along with deism. Atheism was still far from real as an ideology. Among Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton none denied the existence of God, though they looked for forces other than Him that ran the universe. It is difficult to say if these energetic minds could gauge the result of their mental flights

The new scholarship had a taint of prejudice against God, spiritualism and metaphysics. Driven by emotions and not reason, they disputed God's presence not because they had proved His absence through scientific inquiry. Rather, they denied Him because He was the God of their opponents hostile to their liberalism.

for the future to come. They did, however, believe that both attitudes could move along in different trajectories. Later developments proved them wrong. For the fruit of their labour came in the forms of naturalism and atheism.³

The eighteenth century was the century of harvest for the West. Case after case proved that whoever ignored God in unravelling the riddle of this universe would end up with materialism and atheism.⁴ This century was fertile in the sense that it gave birth to John Toland, David Hartley, Joseph Priestley, Voltaire, d' la Mettrie,⁵ d'Holbach,⁶ Jean Cabanis,⁷ Denis Diderot, Montesquieu, Jean Jacques Rousseau and the like. They either denied God's existence or relegated Him to the role of a constitutional monarch who after having pushed the universe into motion resigned Himself to a corner, with no stakes in its running. These people refused to believe in things other than matter and its motion. To them, only those things mattered, which humans could perceive and touch.

Hume's empiricism and scepticism gave support to these thoughts.⁸ Berkeley tried to rout materialism but he failed. Hegel supported Berkeley's effort by giving the West idealism – the theory that reality consists of ideas – but so absolute was the hold of materialism that it failed to gel. To reconcile materialism with God, Hegel proposed that God's existence, the life of spirit and freedom of choice do not fall in the realm of observation and verification. However, one can believe in their utility, as practical wisdom demands it. But that did not work either. His was the last effort to reconcile naturalism with God.

Kant failed because by then human thought in its convoluted state had already lodged itself into disbelief, namely, that God was the creation of

one's imagination or at most a dysfunctional being. Thus, to believe in Him fear Him and seek His pleasure was irrational.

By the nineteenth century, materialism had reached its zenith. Following their predecessors Carl Vogt, Ludwig Büchner, Auguste Comte, Jacob Moleschott⁹ and others declared everything other than matter and its attributes as ill founded. James Mill promoted empiricism and utilitarianism while Spencer saw chance as behind the origination of life and the universe. New insights into biology, physiology, geology, zoology and the application of science to the harnessing of the material world helped spread new means of developmental economics. This surely furthered the cause of atheism on the following ideas:

- That the universe came into existence by itself.
- That it is running according to inherent mechanical laws.
- That it is growing by its own internal compulsion.

In short, they said there is no living God to breathe life into non-living matter. Rather, matter is self-organizing, growing by itself. According to this view, humans as well as animals are machines that have no free will and function mechanically. Like other machines, they suffer wear and tear. Their exhaustion is their death. Resurrection and accountability are, therefore, redundant ideas.

Nevertheless, the man who consolidated eighteenth-century atheism into an organized theory was Charles Darwin. His 1859 book *The Origin of Species* made a profound impact on the future of science and philosophy. True, atheism

was an old disease, but Darwin elevated it by his scientific methodology. The universe, he said, can work without an extraneous independent source for there are innate natural laws that help life grow regardless of any other causation. Behind the transition from simplicity to complexity, it is evolution, which is quantifiable by neither reason nor wisdom.¹⁰ Thus, his conclusion was that there is no creation. The same small insect that crawled by natural selection and survival of the fittest developed into a conscious talking being – called man.

ISLAM AND THE WEST

Thus, Western civilization is the outcome of a marriage between philosophy and science. Reared in their lap, it has no place for an all-knowing, powerful God. Nor has this civilization any respect for prophethood and revelatory guidance. Nor does it entertain any notion of life after death and accountability. Nor does it seek to rise above animal-like objectives in life or accept the possibility of a higher aim. A purely materialistic civilization, its whole system is empty of any concept that favours a Godcentred life, truthfulness, honesty, trust, modesty and purity. It opposes Islam and seeks to eliminate those very foundational values on which the latter stands. The two do not see eye to eye on individualism or the management of the societal affairs.

The new era had its own articles of faith, including its belief that what constitutes reality is its measurability.

In short, Islam and Western civilization are two boats that sail in opposite directions. He who sets sail in one boat will inevitably have to give up the other. Any attempt to ride the two will kill the person so involved.

Unfortunately, the century that saw this new civilization reach its meridian also witnessed the Muslim world, from Morocco to the Middle East, fall before its might. They received both the cut of the Western sword and the wound of its pen. For many, it was a terrifying period. Military domination brought mental domination in its wake. Islam became secondary while Western values assumed primacy. Muslims began to acquire Western knowledge without reflection. That their failure to sift the useful from the harmful should have had a damaging effect on their outlook was obvious from the start.

Doubtless, even today mainstream Muslims aspire to stay as believers. But swayed by Western influences, their minds have embraced apostasy while their hearts are anchored in Islam. Political domination aside, Western control of the intellectual environment makes it difficult for Muslims to look at things from the Islamic viewpoint. Their situation calls for a moral equivalent of the Renaissance, as the legacy of past Islamic thinkers

The Muslim situation calls for a moral equivalent of the Renaissance, as the legacy of past Islamic thinkers has exhausted itself. To begin with, we must reconstruct a new philosophical system based on the Qur'anic way of reflection and observation. We should also establish a new paradigm for the natural sciences by negating atheistic concepts.

has exhausted itself. The distance between their loss of power and the West's ascendance is almost six centuries. To fling time back into the past is impossible as well as nonsensical. We need a new breed of thinkers and researchers who should challenge the bases on which Western civilization rests. To begin with, we must reconstruct a new philosophical system based on the Qur'anic way of reflection and observation. We should also establish a new paradigm for the natural sciences by negating atheistic concepts.

To explain myself, let me invoke the use of analogy. The world is like a train carrying humanity along as passengers. Its engine draws its components from scientific and philosophical thought while scholars and researchers sit in its driving seat. As it should be, the train travels only in the direction chosen by the driver. The passengers have no choice in selecting its course. If a passenger disagrees with the direction, he can do nothing other than change the direction of his seat from front to back or left to right. Still, this would not change the course of the train. To change its path, he must take control of the engine cabin. Those currently in the driver's seat are deniers of God and are not spirited by Islamic concerns. Thus, the train is hurtling down the track of secularism and materialism. Every day that passes the passengers are moving away from their Islamic destiny. The time has come to slow the train down. Believers in God should rise and free the engine from their hold. Unless this happens, the train, despite our discomfort and pleas, will continue to go the materialism way.

EDITOR'S COMMENTS

1. René Descartes was a theist at heart but his perception of humans as beast machines only helped augment the materialistic temper of his age. "The beast-machine doctrine of Descartes was another source of apprehension," says John Hedley Brooke. "To regard God's creatures as no different in kind from human artifacts caused offence to Gisbert Voet, rector of the University of Utrecht. Another critic saw how the beast-machine could become the thin end of a wedge: 'If one suppresses the vegetative and sensitive soul in brutes, one opens the door to the atheists, who will attribute the operations of the rational soul to a cause of the same kind and will give us a material soul to replace our spiritual soul.'"

He was right. After all, it was insufficient to define the soul as material and made of fiery particles. The seventeenth century was crammed with such ideas. For thoughts to be produced, it was argued, all that was necessary was for fine particles to flow through the filigree ducts of the brain. This mechanization of the mind was a familiar theme in the clandestine literature of the Enlightenment. The ultimate fear was that it might strip humanity of its free will. Further anxieties were raised by this beast-machine. It was often said, for example, that the test of a good Cartesian was whether he could kick his dog. Descartes' doctrine provided ample justification for widespread cruelty to animals. "For the English naturalist John Ray it was an indictment of Descartes' system that it was so viciously anthropocentric." John Hedley Brooke, *Science*

and Religion – Some Historical Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 141.

Descartes believed in God and even wrote a book on validating God's existence but for him "God had no utility other than giving each stellar domain (contiguous polyhedrons) a push to come into motion." See Pascal's *Pensées*, translated by W. F. Trotter (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1958), p. 23.

2. Most philosophers maintained the dubious stance of demolishing old beliefs and upholding Christian values. For example, read this from Hobbes' *Leviathan* – chapter 46 – "because the universe is all, that which is no part of it is nothing." *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes*, ed. W. Molesworth (London: John Bohn, 1839). Criticizing W. B. Glover's *God and Thomas Hobbes*, Professor Stanley L. Jaki points out the contradictory stands in Hobbes' thinking: "Glover ignores Hobbes' cosmology, and as a result he overlooks Hobbes' strategy to profess his supernatural belief in God in his political, ethical, and theological writings and to advocate materialistic atheism in his philosophical publications." See Jaki's *The Road of Science and the Ways to God* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 355.

But this is not all to Hobbes. "His immediate practical aim in politics," says Anthony Quinton, "was to turn the church into a department of state, with its scripture to be authoritatively interpreted by the sovereign and not at the whim of excited fanatics." See Anthony Quinton's piece on "Political Philosophy" in Anthony Kenny's *The Oxford*

History of Western Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 317.

3. Mawdudi is perceptive on this score. The distance between the mechanical view of the universe and irreligiosity was rather short. "The nature of a mechanical philosophy might be theistic in tone," says Brooke, "but its nature was liable to be otherwise. Given a certain arrangement of atoms, argued the French eccentric Cyrano de Bergerac, some object or other was bound to be formed. It was not in the least marvellous, he suggested, that among them would be trees, frogs, monkeys, and men. So too with Thomas Hobbes, a mechanical philosophy was associated with belief in material soul, with a critical attitude toward the Scriptures, with an explanation for the origins of religious belief in an ignorance of natural causes, and with his discomfiting emphasis on self-interest as that which had to be accommodated in a social contract." See Brooke, *Science ...* pp. 140-141.
4. Darwin brought new vigour and depth to the materialists' cause. "[T]he materialism of the 1850s, as proclaimed by Vogt, Büchner, and the Dutchman Jacob Moleschott, paved the way for a positive assessment of Darwin both in its rejection of a dualistic account of man and its deliberate assault on the God of the theologians," says Brooke.

Making use of the prestige that science had lately acquired, "the materialists claimed their philosophy was a deduction from science, [though] much of their inspiration came from Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), then enjoying notoriety for his argument that images of God came from essentially human projections,

which the churches too readily objectified. Feuerbach, and the materialists indebted to him, regarded sensation as the only source of knowledge. They were intolerant of the idealists' claim that the very possibility of coherent experience already presupposed such principles as those of causality and the uniformity of nature, which were as much imposed on the world by the mind as inferred from experience." (p. 301.)

5. His full name was Julien Offray d' la Mettrie (1709- 1751). Because of his unconventional views, he lived most of his life outside France in Holland and Germany. By profession a medicine doctor, he turned to philosophy. Identifying himself with mechanical philosophy, he saw humans as self-moving machines devoid of any soul as a spiritual entity. To him, everything relating to humans, including mental activity was physical. Nature was God.
6. His name was Paul Heinrich Dietrich d'Holbach (1723-1789). He hailed from Germany, the home of eighteenth-century materialism who "maintained that nothing is outside nature. Nature is an uninterrupted and causally determined succession of the arrangement of matter in motion. Matter has always existed and always been in motion, and different worlds are formed from different distributions of matter and motion." He also based "the intellectual faculties on feelings and treated feelings as a consequence of certain arrangements of matter." He denied immortality to the soul. His materialism, however, took an awkward turn when he attributed relations of sympathy, antipathy,

and affinity among material particles. See item "Materialism" in Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), vols. 5-6, pp. 182-183.

7. Like d' la Mettrie, Jean Cabanis (1757-1808) a Frenchman and medical doctor by profession, maintained that the brain was similar to the digestive system in which sensory impressions are its ailments and thoughts its products.
8. Hume's anti-religion stance can be seen in the following: "Celibacy, fasting, penance, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude, and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they everywhere rejected by men of sense, but because they serve no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society." See J. C. A. Gaskin, *Hume's Philosophy of Religion* (London: 1978), p. 153.
9. These individuals - Büchner, Vogt, and Moleschott - lost their university posts (at Tübingen, Giessen, and Heidelberg respectively). Vogt was accused of "overt revolutionary activity or of corrupting the minds of the students with doctrines that undermined morality. Not surprisingly, Vogt became even more venomous in his attack on a system that had excluded him, his philosophical position became even more deterministic." See Brooke, *Science ...* p. 302.

In the vein of scientific rationalism, Vogt derided the creation of matter as "palpable nonsense" by asserting the principle that "from nothing can nothing come." (p. 300.)

10. With religion fast becoming obsolete, something else had to be sought in its place, which could check the rebound of philosophical idealism as well as provide a return to the metaphysical. Evolutionary naturalism filled the void. "This suspicion of idealist philosophies," says Brooke, "was common to Darwin and the German materialists, who quickly saw the attraction of an evolutionary naturalism. During 1860 Büchner was already criticizing Agassiz's position on the fixity of species and calling for more research on the topic. When Darwin's *The Origin of Species* appeared in German translation, Büchner welcomed it as the answer to a prayer. To a German audience, already exposed to the view that the relation of mind to brain was as that of urine to kidneys, the news that humans were somehow derived from apes came as no great surprise." (p. 301.)

The Difference Between Secular and Divine Laws

DECEMBER 1933 SAW the abolition of the U.S. prohibition law. And with it, after 14 years of legal "dryness", the citizens of the New World became "wet" again. One may say that Franklin Roosevelt's induction into presidency trumpeted wetness victory over dryness.¹ First, drinks containing two-to-three percent alcohol were allowed. Four months later, the 18th Amendment, which had banned the sale and purchase of liquor, saw repeal. Within months, the prohibitionists lost what they had gained after years of hard work. By all measures, this was the greatest experiment in the regeneration of morals through law, with no known precedent in history.²

Prior to the passage of the 18th Amendment, the Anti-Saloon League strained itself in persuading the Americans through the media as well as pictographs to give up the liquor habit for its harmful effects. In monetary terms, the exercise was enormous. One estimate puts the cost of this liquor campaign from its inception to the year 1925 at about \$60.50 million.³ The anti-liquor literature itself ran into 9 billion pages. Besides, to comply with the 14-year ban on liquor, Americans had to bear the huge cost of almost \$640 million dollars.

Justice Department figures for January 1920 to October 1933 show that 200 people lost their lives,

534,335 people were imprisoned, \$100.60 million worth of fines were levied, and \$400.40 million worth of properties were impounded. These are enormous figures and show the extent of the effort made to educate people on the liquor harm.

But the cumulative effort spreading over years, including the coercive power of the state, failed to frustrate the American wish to

Prohibition was the greatest experiment in the regeneration of morals through law, with no known precedent in history.

drink. And as it should be, the greatest *jihad* in history for people's moral restitution hit the skids.

Repeal of the prohibition law did not take place because liquor-related problems, so zealously highlighted and fought against with state power, had evaporated or a new finding had invalidated the time-honoured opinion against liquor. In fact, experience lent force to the antiliquor stance insofar as prostitution, homosexuality, thievery, gambling, homicide and other similar moral problems are mostly caused by alcohol. One may say liquor is the mother of most evils and has played a major role in the devolution of moral and social standards in the West. Nevertheless, what forced the U.S. government to recall the law was a liquor-dependent America unwilling to part company with it.⁴ The whole episode had an ironic twist to it: the same people who voted liquor as prohibitory now sought its open sale.⁵

To my knowledge, I do not recall a single drinker who has ever denied the harm caused by liquor. Nor do I know of any portfolio on alcohol merits prepared by the opponents of the prohibition law, which could outweigh its harm. The Congressional debate on the people-sponsored

18th Amendment covered a broad spectrum of opposing views on the subject. It was because of the alcohol-caused harm that the anti-liquor lobby proposed an amendment, later ratified by forty-six states.⁶ The Volstead Act [1919] that provided for federal enforcement of the prohibition was a child of this amendment.⁷ Every measure had the people's support. But as the administration began to apply the ban, people became nostalgic of the good, old liquor; their behaviour was bizarre. Distanced from liquor, the world's most civilized and hardheaded nation found itself sliding into insanity. Their maniacal frenzy gave others cause to believe as if like the imaginary lovers of Eastern poetry, they would break their own skulls.

When the law clamped down on the bars, thousands of clandestine "speakeasies and blind pigs" sprouted up all over the nation,⁸ selling liquor in contravention of the law through ingenious ways. To tip a friend or a relative of a secret liquor bar and pass him the code word were construed as acts of great favour. Before prohibition, the administration could monitor licensed pubs, the kind of drinks they served, and the people who frequented them. Now these liquor outlets proliferated on a huge scale selling all kinds of alcohol injurious to health. Adding to the problem, teenage boys and girls increasingly frequented such places, sending a wave of concern over the whole United States.⁹ The price tag on liquor rose many times. As an attendant effect, the liquor business became highly profitable luring a large number of people into it. Besides clandestine vendors, a myriad of bootleggers popped up on the scene to peddle their wares – they constituted the revolving pubs that made liquor accessible to people in offices, recreation centres and homes. A

conservative estimate put the number of drinkers at about ten times the number before prohibition. From cities, it spread to villages. Concealed distilleries dotted the rural scene. Before the ban, licensed distilleries numbered 400. But within seven years after the constitutional amendment, 79,437 brewers were booked, and 93,831 distilleries were sealed. Even then, it did not put a check on the growth of the liquor business. A former commissioner of the department of prohibition says, "We could hardly prosecute one tenth of the liquor-making units and breweries."

Likewise, the rise in alcohol consumption was also phenomenal. During prohibition, consumption jumped to 200 million gallons.¹⁰ Besides, its poor quality created serious health hazards. Medical authorities speak plainly: it is better to call this thing poison rather than liquor. As it goes down the throat, it poisons the stomach and the brain begins to slow, an effect lasting for two days. Worse, under its drunken stupor, a person is neither merry nor exuberant; instead, he is disposed toward picking fights and committing crimes.

The increasing use of poor-quality liquor produced adverse affects on health as well. For example, the New York statistics for 1918 show that before prohibition 3,741 people had liquor-induced diseases while 252 died. In 1926, the number of people who fell sick because of it was 11,000 and the death toll escalated to 7,500.

Likewise, the crime rate, particularly among the youth and children, spurted. The U.S. judges viewed this as serious because never before in U.S. history had such a large number of children been caught drunk. Since 1920, liquor consumption among children has increased. In certain cities a 200 percent rise during the ensuing eight years was

observed. The Director of the National Crime Council¹¹ Col. [Amos W. W. Woodcock] said that out of every three individuals one is a criminal while homicide had increased by 350 percent.

In short, during those 14 years of prohibition, the changes that ensued can be summed up as under:

- Respect for law diminished and almost every segment of society turned into law evaders.¹²
- The real objective of prohibition was far from realized; the post-prohibition era saw its spread manifold. In the application of prohibition, the government as well as the people suffered a huge money loss with a straining impact on the U.S. economy.¹³ The rise in ailments, increase in the death rate, the eruption of immorality with corresponding increases in crime were some of the outgrowths of the liquor ban.
- This happened in a nation which was high on progress and civility and which had the ability to know good from harm.
- The American people indulged themselves in liquor despite the huge effort involving millions of dollars and the large amount of printed material informing them of its evils.
- This happened despite the fact that the majority of Americans stood convinced of the need to ban liquor and the subsequent law had their full support.
- Both the government and the people backed the legislation banning the use of liquor. But neither could they sustain the ban¹⁴ nor were its results beneficial. Frustrated, they decided in the end to lift the ban.

THE PROPHETIC EXAMPLE

Contrary to this, let us go back in time to a people that were by all standards one of the most backward: they were illiterate, with no semblance of the arts, the sciences or civilization. The lettered perhaps constituted one out of ten thousand and they too bore no comparison to present-day educated people. The logistics of management were non-existent; the system of governance was of a rudimentary nature and lately established. Morally, people loved taking liquor with gay abandon. Their language carried a repertoire of about 250 names for alcohol, which is exceptional for any culture. This proves their profound bent for drinking. The content of their poetry further establishes their disposition to liquor. It was an essential part of their lives with which they could hardly break company.

Under these circumstances, they had a serious liquor problem. They asked the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) for Islam's position on it. Allah guided him to tell them:

They ask you about strong' drinks and games of chance. Say: In both is great sin, and (some) utility for men; but the sin of them is greater than their usefulness. And they ask you what they ought to spend. Say, that which is superfluous. Thus, Allah makes plain to you (His) revelations that haply you may reflect.

al-Baqarah: 219

By its construction, this was not an abiding edict – it only made a factual statement that alcoholic drinks contained benefits, though its harms dominated. A small piece of information, still a group of people stopped taking it.

After some time, they asked again for guidance because people would offer *salāh* while intoxicated, making errors in their Qur'ānic recitation. The revelation informed the Prophet to tell them:

When it comes to improving the human situation, secular laws are of no consequence, for they rely on the same morally deformed people whom they propose to rehabilitate.

O you who believe! Draw not near prayer when you are drunk until you know (the words) you utter...

al-Nisā': 43

The preceding revelation brought about a swift behavioural change: people rescheduled their drinking hours between *fajr* and *zuhr* or after '*ishā*' so that they could offer their prayer free from drunken stupor.

Nevertheless, its harm still showed as people continued to quarrel while intoxicated and spilled each other's blood. People wished for a clear verdict on the liquor problem. The occasional revelation declared it filthy:

O you who believe! Strong drink and games of chance and idols and divining arrows are only an infamy of Satan's handiwork. Leave it aside in order that you may succeed.

al-Mā'idah: 90

No sooner did the people receive this revelational injunction through the crier than they broke the wine goblets and containers. The drains in Madinah overflowed with wine. The same people who had a pathological dependence on liquor became dry. One scene in particular demonstrates this. In a party about 11 Companions

reveled in drinks when the voice of the Prophet's crier reached their ears, and they stopped forthwith.

In another incident, a person had his lips close to the goblet when someone arrived on the scene and recited to him the prohibitory *āyahs*. The man wrenched himself from the goblet and never partook a drop of liquor again.

From then onward, whoever indulged in liquor, people took him to task. Later, punishment for infracting the norm was fixed at 40 lashes and finally upgraded to 80 lashes. This had a healthy effect. Muslim Arabia became liquor free. Looking at it on a larger scale, so massive was the Islamic contribution towards solving the alcohol problem, that wherever Islam went it helped people recover from this sickness. Even today when Islam has shrivelled on the civilization level, the majority of Muslim people are still liquor-free, without fear of punishment or prohibitory laws.

Having said this, let us now go to the realm of intellect and wisdom where judgement is contingent on experience and observation. So conclusive is this judgement that it calls for respect. On the one hand, we have the U.S. model and on the other, the Islamic. The difference between them is obvious.

For years, the Americans struggled to build an anti-liquor offensive. They spent

So massive was the Islamic contribution towards solving the alcohol problem, that wherever Islam went it helped people recover from this sickness. Even today when Islam has shrivelled on the civilization level, the majority of Muslim people are still liquor-free, without fear of punishment or prohibitory laws.

millions of dollars highlighting its harm. Supporters of the ban built a powerful case around its harmful impact on humans' morality and economy, lacing it with information from the medical sciences, statistical data, and reason. Doubtless, it was a conclusive case. They employed every conceivable means in order to persuade people to give up liquor. Besides, the nation's greatest body, representing its collective will, merged to pass legislation on its ban. The whole U.S. geared up its resources to make prohibition effective. But despite its high literacy rate, intelligence and wit, the nation refused to honour the ban. Within 14 years, prohibition laws collapsed before the recalcitrance of the American people and were withdrawn.

As opposed to this, Islam launched no organized campaign against liquor. Not a single penny did the Muslims spend on it. Nor did they have an Anti-Saloon League with its money and influence. The Prophet just said that Allah had declared liquor unlawful, and his people complied with the ban immediately. Their retraction was so genuine that as long as they stayed within the bounds of Islam, they never regressed into their old dependence. To keep "dry", they did not need the coercive apparatus of the state.

Besides, this prohibition is not of the kind that can be subverted through man-made laws. Even if the whole world of Islam joins to change it into something permissible (*halāl*), it will not happen.

If one looks into this great difference that sets the two systems apart, some notable aspects surface, which are not only the key to liquor prohibition but also to all aspects of law and morality.

For example, man-made laws receive their rationale and sustenance from the will of the people. Unfortunately, what we call the people's will is nothing but a reflection of their inclinations and feelings, the influences that they receive, and the hidden persuasion that works on them. It also includes changing contents of knowledge and intellection that may not always be scrupulous. Such a mix of factors has a compulsive effect on determining right and wrong, allowed and disallowed. The law changes because of it.

Thus, in the absence of any enduring value behind them, both laws as well as civilizations are in a declining flux.

Human fickleness rules over law-making that spills into life itself. This is similar to a novice driving a vehicle. His untrained hand on the steering wheel leads the vehicle to an uneven motion making for a zigzag drive. The worst

To rebuild man's moral fibre, or to remake his conscience and enthuse it with resistance to evil is outside the realm of philosophy and science. Only belief in Allah the Exalted can accomplish it.

sufferer of course is the person in the driving seat who waywardly drives with an obvious lack of control as well as direction. Deprived of a smooth ride, his crash is imminent.

Contrary to this in Islam, Allah and His Prophet have chartered all the foundational principles for lawmaking and morality. Humans have no role in these realms other than secondary lawmaking to cope with the flow of time. Here again, new legislation is not free but tied to an honoured tradition. This has saved Muslims from the revelries of the self. Their societal laws have

immutable standards of morals and culture behind them: they cannot replace "allowed" with "disallowed". Expressed differently, they have left driving to a skilled driver. They are sure that He will drive them to safety.

Allah confirms those who believe by a firm saying in the life of the world and in the Hereafter, and Allah sends wrongdoers astray. And Allah does what He wills.

Ibrāhim: 27

Second, all secular efforts to societal reform are dependent on the people. Without their willingness, reform fails for nothing is above them. In other words, whether people want to improve their moral situation or not becomes the overriding concern in lawmaking as well as repeal. The United States is not the exception. So, what does it prove? That when it comes to improving the human situation, secular laws are of no consequence for they rely on the same morally deformed people whom they propose to rehabilitate.

For example, manmade laws receive their rationale and sustenance from the will of the people. Unfortunately, what we call the people's will is nothing but a reflection of their inclinations and feelings, the influences that they receive, and the hidden persuasion that works on them.

To overcome this dilemma, Islam solves it the other way round. Before undertaking such a moral enterprise, it invites humans to surrender themselves to the triangular power of Allah, His Messenger, and the Book (al-Qur'ān). Whether they

submit or reject is at their discretion. But once they submit to the divine call, they shut themselves off from other influences. Whatever comes to them from Allah and His messenger they take without adding riders to them. The whole of the *shari'ah* becomes the gamut of their lives. Small wonder, what could not be achieved in the United States with billions of dollars and the state force behind it was obtained in the Muslim world with a single pronouncement from Allah's messenger.

Third, no matter how enlightened a society is in knowledge and organizational management, it cannot rid itself of the vagaries of the self unless it believes and submits itself to divine laws. In the absence of a living faith, law becomes shallow and the dictates of the human self pre-empts everything else, though people know their harm like the shining sun in the sky. But so bullheaded is their resistance to a moral change that even when the rationalists' god named "science" is brought to them as witness, they refuse to listen. They take nothing as conclusive even when statistical evidence is piled before them or even when experimentation and observation establish its harm. This shows that to rebuild man's moral fibre, or to remake his conscience and enthuse it with resistance to evil is outside the realm of philosophy and science. Only belief in Allah the Exalted can accomplish it.

EDITOR'S COMMENTS

1. The induction of Roosevelt into the presidency did result in making the U.S. "wet" again. But he was only a vessel for a change that had long been brewing. A view attributes the lifting of

the ban on liquor to the 1929 stock market crash and subsequent businesses failing, which caused the Depression. Statistical studies, however, do not support this view. Deets Pickett, for example, cites a 1931 survey of the Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals, which reveals that "companies having more than 100,000 stockholders in 1930 showed an increase of 243 per cent in the number of stockholders between 1920 and 1930." He also cites George W. Ochs-Oakes, editor of *Current History*, saying that depression was the best argument for prohibition because "by placing accumulated savings and increased wages in the hands of those unaccustomed to them, people who had never participated in the stock market transactions, brought about the great bull market which pyramided prices to the heights from which they were bound to topple." See Deets Pickett's "Prohibition and Economic Change," *A National Experiment*, ed., James H. S. Bossard and Thorsten Sellin (Philadelphia: The Annals of the American Academy, September 1932), p. 100.

Antecedents of the movement against liquor

2. The movement against liquor was rooted in Christian religion. This was strange because today's Christianity not only approves it but also cites Jesus' practice in support when he miraculously turned jars of water into wine. Nevertheless, the prohibition campaign was led by the Reverend Lyman Beecher of Protestant denomination. In 1826, the pastor delivered a

series of six furious sermons denouncing liquor.

Women played an increasingly important role. In 1874, a group called the Women's Crusade swept through Ohio. Their technique was well honed. They would march on saloons, and make a scene while singing and praying. Besides, they would plead with the males to return to their families and saloonkeepers to cease selling liquor. In return they invited upon themselves ridicule, were doused with water, and sometimes even arrested but they stood unmoved.

Politically the prohibition movement first made itself felt in the 1893 election in Oberlin, Ohio, when the state's sitting governor Myron Henrick (Republican) lost the election by a landslide. The League organized 3,000 public meetings during the campaign, in which it distributed millions of pages of literature. Being smart, the politicians all over the country got the message and became anti-liquor. For this, see Daniel Cohen, *Prohibition: America Makes Alcohol Illegal* (Brookfield: The Millbrook Press, 1995), pp. 21-22.

3. To help enforce the new law against liquor, Congress appropriated \$6,350,000 for enforcement in the first year. "By 1923 the secretary of treasury asked for \$28,500,000 for enforcement and a few years later it was estimated that at least \$300,000,000 would be needed." (Ibid., p. 41.)
4. In their zeal to proscribe liquor, the Americans forgot their history as well as their psyche. Back in 1794, an attempt to enforce a tax on whisky led to a serious revolt against the new American government in western

Pennsylvania. The whisky rebellion was put down. "It was a dramatic example of just how seriously many Americans took their whisky as a source of revenue, and as a symbol of individual liberty," says Daniel Cohen, *Prohibition ...* p. 14

5. Prohibition in U.S. history is a complex problem. Some analysts, like Daniel Cohen, cite the following contributing factors: with the outbreak of World War I, anti-foreign sentiments erupted. Since anti-German sentiments were high and German-Americans manufactured and sold beer, liquor stores and speakeasies were described as the un-American saloons.
6. Saloon is essentially a city institution; it was a fight between growing urban centres and small towns. This betrays itself in the voting pattern on the 18th Amendment August 1, 1917.

In the Senate, rural districts held the balance of power – 65 to 20 votes. While in the House of Representatives a large number of urban areas gave a vote of 232 to 128 on December 18.

The ratification was equally overwhelming: 36 states ratified while only 2 refused.

7. Congress enacted the Volstead Act, October 28, 1919 to create a mechanism for the enforcement of prohibition.

The law came into effect on January 16, 1920 one minute after midnight, which closed breweries and distilleries and 177,000 saloons. See Cohen, *Prohibition...* p. 98

8. In April 1932, the New York Prohibition Administrator made a survey of speakeasies in the Borough of Manhattan. Result: 3,494 places of this nature were found. Among them 2,182

speakeasies, 927 restaurants, 266 cordial shops and 119 nightclubs sold liquor.

Likewise, in the cross-town belt between 35th and 59th Streets, there are many hundreds of the 32,000 speakeasies, which the police admit are operating in New York City. See Daniel Cohen, *Prohibition...* pp. 44, 107.

Prohibition's negative impact on the youth

9. Prohibition strangely had a negative impact on America's youth. To study drinking among children, the Wickersham Commission was instituted. "Anyone who has his eyes open," says Rufus S. Lusk, "knows that young people are drinking more today than prior to 1920. A coming-out tea at which tea is served instead of cocktails is considered a 'flop', and the stupid 'deb' who permits such a *faux pas* is branded a complete 'wash out'. Hip flasks flourish at dances, picnics, and excursions."

The Commission records nearby South Dakota's Attorney General as saying: "There is a strange psychology about this liquor problem that makes it doubly significant. It is beginning to affect a different type of person than it did before. Now it is the youngster of the family of means who is toting the bottle to do it. And they rush about in cars. It is one of the most menacing phases of the whole situation."

The Chief of Police of a small Indiana town reports: "Boys and girls under the age of sixteen years are lectured and sent home and there are many cases of boys and girls drinking alcohol, mule, Jamaica ginger and some home-made concoction." And a Pennsylvania police

head of a city of about 100,000 population had this to say: "This drinking by young folks is carried on at private dances and parties where it is usually brought in hip flasks. I also know of mere schoolboys having been taken from the schoolroom intoxicated.

"They've just got to think that it is the smart thing to do. They don't think they are regular unless they are half shot. The girls simply won't go out with the boys who haven't got flasks to offer or don't know where they get intoxicants, and the real popular fellow is the fellow who knows most places where it can be obtained." See Rufus S. Lusk, "The Drinking Habit," in James H. S. Bossard and Thorsten Sellin, eds., *Prohibition A National Experiment*, pp. 50-51.

Even today, the majority of highway deaths is liquor related. For instance, the figures for 2000 released by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration show 41,812 deaths as compared to 41,717 in 1999. Out of these figures, 40 percent relate to alcohol, up from 38 percent or 15,976 the previous year. In 1986, 24,045 people died owing to liquor while driving. See *Washington Post* (September 25, 2001).

10. This figure of 200 million gallons is rather on the lower side. Lusk quotes it on the authority of Colonel Amos Woodcock as 800 million gallons while the Association Against the Prohibition cites it as 1,100 million gallons. The preceding figures are based on the data compiled by the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences dated September 1932, which chronicled the period of the 30s. Bossard and Sellin, p. 46.
11. That particular individual was Colonel Amos W. W. Woodcock and not Ames. He served as

director prohibition and not as the head of the National Crime Council. For this see "The Drinking Habit," Rufus S. Lusk ... p. 46.

12. In New York City, there was a popular little rhyme that showed the drifters' attitude toward the law against liquor:

Mother's in the kitchen
 washing out the jugs;
 sister's in the pantry
 bottling the suds;
 father's in the cellar
 mixing up the hops;
 Johnny's on the front porch
 watching for the cops.

After the ban, the Americans went after liquor with a lust. On the first day that beer was made legal a million and a half barrels were consumed, resulting in a nationwide shortage. See Cohen, *Prohibition...* pp. 43, 57.

The healthy impact of the liquor ban

13. True, prohibition had caused an increase in the crime rate. But on the whole, the liquor ban had a healthy impact on the American economy. For example, Professor Paul H. Nystrom, School of Business, Columbia University has estimated that the amount of money spent on alcoholic beverages and taken out of productive business was not less than \$5 billion a year. "Returning this to more healthful uses, prohibition has increased the buying power of the nation and the productive capacity of our mills and factories." See Harry S. Warner,

"Prohibition a Step in a Process," in James H. S. Bossard and Thorsten Sellin, eds., *Prohibition A National Experiment*, p. 157.

Milk consumption increased by 11.75 gallons per capita annually between 1920 and 1925. This was almost double the consumption of the period between 1917 and 1920. The U.S. food became richer in nutritive value. Housing also improved. Building and loan assets grew. In 1910, these totalled \$945,569,000; in 1920, \$2,534,320,000; in 1929, \$8,695,154,000. American labour improved its efficiency. The United States Bureau of Prohibition quotes the statistics of a powder manufacturer in the state of Delaware. The absentees because of "Blue Monday" showed a marked decline. In 1907, the percentage was 7.41; in 1913, 6.17; and in 1929, 2.35. The average wage showed an increase of 43 percent from 1918 to 1929. See Deets Pickett's "Prohibition and Economic Change," p. 99. Likewise, alcohol-related sickness in the armed forces declined considerably. "The annual admission rate to sick care per 1,000 officers and men per annum ... has fallen from 23.86 in 1903 and 13.10 in 1913, to 7.89 in 1923 and 7.17 in 1929." See Haven Emerson, "Prohibition and Mortality and Morbidity," *Prohibition A National Experiment*, p. 58.

14. This attitude showed itself even among lawmakers, who publicly supported prohibition but their hearts were not in it. Congressman M. Alfred Michaelson of Illinois an enthusiastic "dry" always called for harsher penalties. But behind his stern dry look, he was an incorrigible "wet". In January 1928, while coming from a West Indian cruise one of his

trucks had a leak and it was found to contain 13 bottles of whisky. Another truck held a ten-gallon keg of rum. He was fined \$1,000. For this incident see Cohen, *Prohibition ...*

It may be of interest to note that though the prohibition era ended a long time ago, the ban on making beer in homes continued until 1978 when Senator Alan Cranston (D) from California sponsored the law allowing it.

Updating Islam: the Faultline

THE JUNE 1933 *Nigâr* carried a review article on *Tarjumân al-Qur'ân* by Niyaz Fatehpuri for which I am grateful to him. Although it is unconventional to make a response to the critique offered by journals, but since his comments are reflective of his thoughts on recasting Islam [to conform to modernity], I feel constrained to add to the discussion. Niyaz says:

The journal [*Tarjumân al-Qur'ân*], as its name suggests, reflects the Qur'anic teachings and its meanings in their right vein to the people. For sure, nobody can dare deny its usefulness. But as its learned editor himself admits, the present age makes this task rather difficult. In the past, when religion was nothing more than ancestor worship and conservative attitudes, it was not difficult for someone to assume the role of a *dā'iyyah* (caller) and a reformer. The advent of new disciplines and scientific discoveries, however, has endowed humans with freedoms that have fostered an altogether different tradition of thought. Now religion cannot survive by sanctifying the elders' way of thinking and invoking their practices.

[A qualitative change has taken place.] Before if humans sought ways to establish God's unicity, the present questions His very existence. Second, if in the past the prophetic guidance validated itself in the miracles, the today's

sciences can produce a myriad of prophets by using the same argument. Again, in the past a sermonizer would look up in the sky and invoke help from the God of the heavenly throne but now with the concept of the sky dissipated, his invocations have become meaningless. In short, belief in empiricism and observation has replaced belief in the unknown. Thus, to work for religion in this era of doubt is an uphill task, especially when the concept of religion itself is not tenable any more.

Further along, he says:

In its [topical arrangement] the Qur'an has three parts: the first relates to ethics, the second to beliefs, and the third to stories and allegorical representations. As to the first, there is hardly a need to justify it, for all religious narratives carry the same moral teachings. Likewise, there is no bar to concede that when it comes to ethics, Islam is neither different from others nor inferior to them. However, part two and three merit greater attention as the new sciences and discoveries has seeded doubt in the people's minds. For sure, any person who succeeds in removing these doubts will be hailed as the *mujaddid* (one who revives religion) of this century.

My suggestion is that all those Qur'anic *ayahs* which relate to stories and beliefs should be discussed under a specific heading and their real meanings established with an attempt to clear up objections levelled by modern-day scholarship.

Last, he says:

For the future, I invite him to talk first on the phenomenology of the revelation, for its

understanding will help determine the genuineness of the Qur'ān as a divine book. He should also take up the issue of *ma'ād*' (life after death), for its resolution will decide the fate of the conflict between religion and atheism. I would like to see what meaning does he assign to *ma'ād* and the Word of Allah. Only then, will I submit my doubts. If he succeeds in blotting them out, I would be immensely pleased, for compulsive Muslimness is mainly attributable to the belief in life after death.

Leaving aside the peripheral problems that Niyaz has talked about, I will confine myself to the issues relating to foundational principles.

He has divided the Qur'ānic postulates into three, but I will reduce them to only two parts. One pertains to matters that we can hardly cognize for they lay outside the realm of our knowledge, nor can we say with precise import about their validity. This embraces the existence and the attributes of Allah the Exalted, the angels, the revelation and the divine scriptures, as well as the nature of prophethood and life after death. Within this falls also things which cannot be cognized because of the limitations of our humanity, and which the Qur'ān narrates in the form of stories and allegorical representations.

The second pertains to matters which are within the reach of our knowledge, and as such, we can reckon them as rational probability. Under this fall all those matters that deal with Islamic teachings like the purification of the self and the restructuring of human life.

Ironically, Niyaz does not consider the second part important enough to discuss for in his view an equation on such issues already exists between Islam and other faiths. He, however, desires the

first part to be a moot point because, as he says, people have doubts about the things entailed therein.

In the past, he claims, people believed in the unseen because of their old-line beliefs and ignorance. But lately new disciplines and scientific discoveries have brought about a different tradition of thought, endowing the human mind with freedoms inaccessible to humanity before. Thus, in his view, the present age of empiricism and observation has supplanted the old age of belief in the unseen.²

SECULARISM AND RELIGION

The opinion thus expressed carries a couple of fallacies. The first is his failure to understand the real difference between the past and the present ages. Like others, he has accepted the mistaken notion that religion could only have glistened in the darkness of the past, and that it fails in the face of new sciences. The fact though remains that reason-based knowledge, which such people describe as light, is not exclusive to the present age. Even in the past, speculative thought seduced people's minds, inclining them to believe in the mortality of religion. They also considered the then sciences as a fresh tradition vigorous enough to challenge belief in the unseen. For example, one can cite the period between the second

The absolute negation of belief in the unseen and the absolute affirmation of sensory experience is neither feasible today nor will it be in the future - no matter how scientific or enlightened the future is.

and fourth centuries of *hijrah* when Muslim people came under the siege of "fresh ideas". Did not the spread of Plato's thought, as well as that of Aristotle, Epicurus, Zeno, Pericles, and others usher in a new era of philosophical reflection and rational constructs in Muslim countries? And did not people at that time think the way they do today – the same cynicism and doubt toward religious beliefs? But what happened then? The philosophers' speculative thought turned false. The same majestic sun of ascending knowledge that they thought would eclipse the flickering wax candle of religion became lightless with a single move of time. Their "modern-day concepts" became obsolete; their "latest scientific thought" became gaunt, losing power to fire new traditions of thinking and feelings. Their newfound truth in which they saw permanence proved to be just fads – easily forgotten with the passage of time. So much so that their rationale built on time-fostered ideas and the emanation of the corresponding philosophical schools have lost their faces of modernity.³

Thus, history repeats itself when someone says that religion endured itself in the "darkness" of the past but fails in modern times. In the same vein, things described today as the new frontiers of knowledge and as an inevitable turn in human progress sound like a boom from the past. I am certainly convinced that these thoughts will have the same fate. One has only to look at the current corpus of thought, or check with those who have fathered these concepts, and he knows that like the past, only a few may reach the status of certitude with people. It is also possible that they become untenable in the coming days. For most of them are conjectural, hypothetical or at best tentative. Besides, as the wheel of progress moves, these modern-day concepts will

wear the shamed garments of antiquity, leaving space for some other "advanced" ideas.⁴

That being the case, why should anyone be terrified at the advent of new thought and the attending possibility of religion being phased-out? Instead, why not probe into the emergent intellectual scene to determine if the things in conflict with religion are real or false. Should they turn out to be real, he may decide to shift his loyalty to new thought. Or, he may prefer to stay with his "old" religion. Nevertheless, in case they are of a suppositional nature – doubt inducing – he had better not be afraid of the emerging conflict between the two. For if religion is faith and certitude, which it is, then conjectural knowledge has no legs to stand before it. On the other hand, if religion is mind emanated and thus hypothetical, as modern thought is, then there is hardly any point of departure between the two. In that case, why should one be preferred over the other?

MODERN TIMES ARE NOT FREE FROM BELIEF IN THE UNSEEN

To change religion in the wake of new thought is the hallmark of those who think that every development is constitutive of knowledge, and that it is in synch with time to embrace it. Whether the emergent thought is of a conjectural and conceptual nature, or whether its soundness has been probed with academic rectitude does not bother them. Superficial as such, they get carried away with the "blazing trails of new thinking," even though they know little how new thought crystallizes and which ways are wise and which childish.

Likewise, freedom of expression has seemingly become a jargon for people who know little that unless it has behind itself a seasoned mind capable of thinking properly, it may turn into a precarious enterprise, undermining civilization itself. Ironically, a seasoned mind is a rare commodity not generously dispensed by Allah the Exalted.

The second concept, a spin-off from the first, says that observation and experience have replaced the age of belief. I tried my best to understand its thrust. It would be pathetically absurd if this means that nothing is acceptable in the world unless it reveals itself through sensory experiences. This amounts to saying that in "modern times" people have narrowed their sources of knowledge to sensory experiences alone and whatever is outside their pale can neither be reflected upon nor formalized through analogical reasoning. Setting aside philosophy and metaphysics, which are the children of speculative thought, we take up science, especially physics that prompts some people to exalt their belief in sensory experiences alone. It may surprise some that there is not a single aspect of this science that does not affirm the unseen presence of energy, matter, causal relations and so forth. Besides, there is not a single physicist who knows their real nature, or who has seen and directly experienced them, or who

To change religion in the wake of new thought is the hallmark of those who think that every development is constitutive of knowledge, and that it is in synch with time to embrace it. Whether the emergent thought is of a conjectural and conceptual nature, or whether its soundness has been probed with academic rectitude does not bother them.

can attest to their real presence.⁵ If this does not amount to belief in the unseen, what does?

Another meaning implies that only those things are acceptable which people observe and experience. But absurd as it is, no person would dare make such a claim, as not all knowledge is accessible to everyone. A large part of knowledge is the prerogative of scholars for whom it has the status of the seen while for the rest it is of the unseen. This means that the majority of people will have to believe in specialists' wisdom and skill.

A still other meaning could be that present-day humans accept things, which they experience through their senses while they refuse to accept things which belong to the unseen. But this would be the most absurd thing to have ever come from a human mind. I do not think that a person of such proclamations exists. If he does exist, they should bring him forth, for among present-day discoveries this would be the singular most important one.

Thus, there is little truth in saying that sensory experience alone is trustworthy. Modern times are as much about belief in the unseen as were the past. In fact, humans have never been free from belief in the unseen nor will they be. For example, we accept ninety-nine percent of the things in life on the presumption that they exist. If we decide to rely on sensory experiences alone as our source of knowledge, then every bit of information that we have accumulated over the years by our trust in others will have to be flushed out from our minds. This would surely jeopardize our very existence, not to talk of upsetting our daily conduct of business. In fact, the absolute negation of belief in the unseen and the absolute affirmation of sensory experiences is neither feasible today nor would it

be in the future – no matter how scientific or enlightened the future is.

For sure, in every age humans have been constrained to accept a great deal of things on face value from others. Some they had to accept because of their being repetitively stated. We accept, for example, poison as a death-causing agent, although we have not tasted it ourselves nor has everyone seen people dying of it. The same is true of court witnessing where the validity of an event is judged on a single or more than one credible witness. If the court avoids this procedure, the wheel of justice would stop rolling. Likewise, in some cases we accept things because of their emanation from a specialist's mouth. Every school-going student faces this situation. For example, if students deny themselves the research-based concepts of scholars, they would not learn a thing, nor would they succeed in mastering knowledge, and nor would they ever qualify with sufficient proficiency to probe and acquire scholarship in different disciplines.

THE FINAL ARBITERS – THE PROPHETS OR PHILOSOPHERS?

Thus, one may say that in all those matters that have not been cognized by us through our own observation but by others, and which we acquire from them, there is a traffic of trust. The only question that remains unanswered is who should decide what? As a rule, a person who inspires confidence in us about his knowledge in a discipline

There is not a single aspect of modern physics that would not affirm the unseen presence of energy, matter, and causal relations.

and about the medium that helped him acquire it, should receive our trust and belief. That is why a patient goes to a physician for his ailment and not to a lawyer. Following the same logic, a litigant would not ditch his counsel in favour of an engineer. Important as this rule is, it receives scant regard in dealing with the complex issues of metaphysics and spiritual sciences. Whether the final opinion should come from scholars of speculative thought or from the leading lights of religious knowledge continues to gyrate. In the contextual sense, the disputation still lingers, namely, that when it comes to the unseen, who should have a final say on God, revelation, and the afterlife. Should one go to Herbert Spencer, Immanuel Kant, Albert Einstein, Henri Bergson and their likes or to Ibrāhīm, Mūsā, 'Īsā and Muhammad (peace be upon all of them)?

The upholders of "freedom of thought and conscience" are inclined toward the philosophers, whom they regard as the final arbiter of the revelatory guidance. To them, it is not the prophetic but the philosophers' consent that matters. As opposed to this, the so-called "dogmatists" and "reactionaries" hold that since the two belong to conflicting realms, they must stay apart. The spiritual sciences are esoteric, peculiar to the prophets who hold their secrets as well as the means of their verification. While scholars of speculative thought may be great in their discipline, in revelatory-based knowledge their status is no higher than a commoner.

Thus, in matters pertaining to the unseen unqualified faith must be given to the prophets once they have the proven status of being bearers of truth and specialists in spiritual sciences. In that case, we have to accept what they say. To deny

them and to argue against them is similar to the blind man's argument that the sun does not exist. Such a blind man may attribute to his self all the scholarship in the world, but he would not make any impression with people who have eyes to see.

The Liberals may claim that modern sciences have undermined the prophetic proclamations about the unseen. And in consequence, people now have doubts about the validity of religion. In converse, we may ask them to produce those established truths, which are counter to Islam so that we may decide whether we stay with the Qur'ān, or believe in modern sciences and their new-found truths. If there is no such thing, the new sciences will be fighting a vain war against religion – that too with the dull weapons of conjecture and whimsied opinion. Mere denial of the presence of a thing does not constitute an argument for its non-existence. The Liberals will have to come up with something else, for if they think religion will cower before the inflated might of the new sciences, they are mistaken.

Modern sciences have no character in the realm of the unseen or in affirming life. At best, their untested assumptions may throw some people into the embrace of doubt, giving them an uncertain state of mind that wobbles on the phenomena of revelatory knowledge, life after death, angels, accountability and God's presence. That this leaves humans in a gasping uncertainty⁶ is a fact of secular life, and needs no elaboration.

Belief in the unseen is the only thing that can really save us from this tragic void. For sure difficult, but once we take someone as genuine in their revelatory knowledge, who speaks nothing but the truth, our belief in the unseen becomes easy. We receive an unassailable foundation to

build our lives on it, which no amount of new thought can shame. It is to this reason that the Qur'an says, "this is a book of guidance for those who believe in the unseen" (al-Baqarah: 2-3). If we forsake this foundational value, we fling ourselves into a situation that might dilute the religious bases about which we certainly have no other means of verification. Thus, the whole exercise may wreck us for neither can we reach a satisfying conclusion, nor can we convince others as to its truthfulness. And that would be terrible.

A question that still calls for an answer is how would we know that a certain individual is Allah's prophet, and that he has mastered the divine sciences? Besides, how would we know that he is a truthful person? Likewise, he must be so convincing that even when he tells us about the things unseen, which may sound beyond our intellectual grasp of reality, we can still believe him.

The resolution of this issue is contingent on two things: one, that we prove his personal credibility by a stringent scale. Two, we make a critical review of his teachings, especially the part which is within our intellectual grasp, verifiable by a rational discourse.⁷ If he clears both of these tests – his name unsoiled and his teachings perfect in all departments of life – we may not have reason to withhold our trust from him. Nor would we view his knowledge of God and afterlife accountability

There is little truth in saying that sensory experience alone is trustworthy. We know through our experiences that modern times are as much about belief in the unseen as were the past. In fact, humans have never been free from belief in the unseen nor will they be.

as if it were the greatest fraud ever practised on humans.

Niyaz's third error is that he does not consider the first part of the Qur'ān, which we named as the second part in our scheme, worthy of discussion. Added to this, he holds that "all religious narratives carry the same moral teachings. Likewise, there is no bar to conceding that when it comes to ethics, Islam is neither different from others nor inferior to them."

Contrary to this, we say why do you not put the Prophet's life and the part of the Qur'ān that pertains to the seen to fair scrutiny? Why do you not subject Islamic teachings to impartial scrutiny in order to determine its status to other religions?⁸ Unless we settle this part of the debate, it is futile to talk about the things relating to the unseen, for in the resolution of the former lies the latter's settlement.

Niyaz wants us to discuss the Word of Allah, life after death, and the *āyahs* that relate to beliefs and *qasas* (stories). But we will not, because corresponding to the two groups this debate has two aspects. The first does not believe in the prophethood of Muhammad (*Rasūl Allāh*) and thus carries doubts about the unseen world. While the other group believes in his prophethood but still teeters on the nature and the inevitability of after-death resurrection. Obviously, the two do not equate, and this calls for treatment on separate levels. Unless we know the camp in which it falls, our communication would yield no fruit.

However, with the first group [of disbelievers] our discussion about the Word of Allah and life after death is inconsequential because unless there is a matching of minds on the fundamentals, quibbling on details would not lead to an agreement. Even our belief in the Qur'ān, Allah's existence, and His attributes owes not to our own scholarly probe or to

conclusions drawn from our sensory experiences but to the Prophet. If that were not the case, we would have overthrown the concept of prophethood, and talked on other issues. But since our belief in the unseen is tied to Muhammad's truthfulness in what he claimed and the Qur'ān as the Word of Allah, we urge them to first accept his God-given status and later talk on other things.

As to the second group of people [Muslims], we deny them the right to dispute the matters relating to the unseen while they still profess belief in the integrity of the Prophet's person. For the simple reason, that the moment they embrace this posture, they regress to disbelief. If they really belong to the community of believers, their profession of belief in the correctness of the Qur'ānic content – every word of it – and the Prophet's message to humanity has to be univocal. They, however, may talk on two aspects of Islam. One, to find out if a particular saying is rooted in the Qur'ān or not? Did the Prophet really say it? Two, is this what the Qur'ān says? What is the precise import of a particular injunction? [Anything short of this is meaningless quibble.]

EDITOR'S COMMENTS

Denying life after death is not modern

1. Etymologically the term *ma'ād* has its root in *'awd*, which means return to the place of origin. In this 105 *Updating Islam: the Faultline* | sense, the concept is basic to all religions. The Qur'ān rivets around it, using other expressions like *ba'th*, *al-qiyāmah*, *hisāb*, and so forth. The word *ma'ād* though has come only once: "*Innal-ladhī farada 'alayka al-Qur'āna la-rādduka ilā ma'ād Surely, He who*

has given you the Qur'ān (for a law) will bring you back to a place of return." (al-Qasas: 85.)

Some exegetes think the place alludes to Makkah, others hold it stands for Judgement Day. Abu'l A'lā Mawdūdī says that the context of al-Qasas does not allow the restrictive sense of the *āyah*. To him, the term *ma'ād* is applicable to the successful culmination of the Prophet's effort in this world and the life to come. See his *Tafhīm al-Qur'ān*, Vol. 3, pp. 666-667.

The scholar al-Tahānawī, however, links it with *ba'th* and *hashr* (assembly and punishment).

As for its usage as a concept, even before the advent of the twentieth century, "*al-falāsifah altab' iyyūn*" (physical philosophers) denied *ma'ād*. In fact, they go as far back as to the first century Christian era. The most notable among them is Claudius Galenus, Greek anatomist, physiologist, and physician. Pre-Islamic Arabs, because of their secular minds, found it difficult to conceptualize after-death resurrection. A Bedouin poet considers it *hadīthu khurāfātīn* – as an absurd tale. Strangely enough, Mawdūdī's addressee (Niyaz) gives the impression that it is a new concept whose time has come.

For a comprehensive exposition on the subject, see item "*ma'ād*" by R. Arnaldez in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, C. E. Bosworth et al. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), pp. 892-894.

Science can be a companion of religion

2. The existence of God is the greatest reality as well as an all-time mystery. Maybe one can reach Him through human intellect but it is impossible to grasp Him in totality. This is

especially true with pure reason, which "is tiring in its long pursuit of objective truth."

But while pure reason might be tiring, scientific thinking supported by experimental method is not helpful either in solving the riddle of life. It is fashionable to say in the science community that the laws of physics made it all happen. Gerald L. Schroeder, himself a scientist, raises the ultimate question: "Did they [the physical laws] precede the universe? That would mean laws of physics existed without the physical material upon which to act. Now that sounds a bit bizarre, physics without the physical." Schroeder concludes by saying that "it is the only solution that we scientists can offer." See Schroeder, *The Hidden Face of God* (New York: The Free Press, 2001), p. 44.

That said, what is the status of philosophy and science in relation to the material world? It does not comfort us to know that the two are still grappling with the basic epistemological problems of "how can one be sure that the physical picture, so utterly different from our experience of the world, describes reality as it is in itself? How can the mind get outside itself to know nature? Does science describe the world as it is, or yield only a convenient ordering of our experience?" See Ian Barbour's *Issues in Science and Religion* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971), p. 28.

But imperfections aside, science, which is being wrongly portrayed as opposed to religion, can help in the pursuit of God's existence. In this respect, physics and biology are throwing up a lot of evidence useful in the search for God. The emergent argument carries a respectable weight and operates at six levels:

- Natural forces that hold everything together show a variant character – gravity, the electromagnetic force, the strong and weak nuclear bonds – and still they merge to form a unity mediated by a single type of entity named photon. The seemingly fractionated existence is a unified order of great symmetry reflected in space and time, even in space-time reflection, and in the intrinsic properties of matter. Everything from atoms to molecules and from nuclear particles to all objects made from them exists in pairs. See Abdus Salam: "Symmetry concepts and the fundamental theory of matter," *Scientific Thought – Some Underlying Concepts, Methods, and Procedures* (Paris: Mouton- UNESCO, 1972), p. 78. Besides, scientific research confirms that the elements that constitute the world are interdependent. The Gaia hypothesis, formulated by Lovelock and Epton, suggests that living matter, the air, the oceans, the land surface are part of a giant system which control temperature, the composition of the air and sea, the pH of the soil and so on so as to be optimum for survival of the biosphere. The system, they say, behaves like a single organism, even a living creature. For this, see J. Lovelock and S. Epton, "The Quest for Gaia", *New Scientist* (February 6, 1975), p. 304.
- The new cosmology based on the big bang or instantaneous creation theory suggests that at a certain point in time the universe came into being and can go out of existence, according to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, in a finite time span (increasing entropy). The idea of God as Creator is now in. For this, see

William Pollard, *The Cosmic Drama* (New York: National Council of the Episcopal Church, 1955).

- The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle gives evidence of causality dissolving at the subatomic level and brings in the notion of a world ruled by a great thought as opposed to the Newtonian concept of reality being a giant machine. This makes it possible for reality to be interpreted in a spiritual context. At the same time, it is now possible to defend the idea of human freedom. See Arthur Compton, *The Freedom of Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935); also Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Physics* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).
- Twentieth-century physics has undermined the old notion of solidity of matter and a mechanistic worldview. Niels Bohr's work in quantum mechanics established that the subatomic particle could appear both as a wave and as a particle in different contexts. Reality is thus not objective but phenomenological – that it is man's relation with nature, the way he looks at it. This has brought back the notion that reality is mental. See Arthur Eddington, *Science and the Unseen World* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1929).
- The great advance in molecular biology suggests that biological life is not individualistic and competitive as classical Darwinian evolution maintained but directional nudging evolution prenatally through invisible determinants. Such discoveries are opening up new ways of

looking at evolution in an entirely fresh light of purpose, not random but creative evolution. Second, species have a regular pattern, not easily given to change. Last, the sudden burst of emergence of species like in the Cambrian explosion seems far more plausible than gradual evolution through adaptation and natural selection. See C. Lloyd Morgan, *Emergent Evolution* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1923); also Samuel Alexander, *Space, Time and Deity* (Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith, 1979).

- The growth of depth psychology has opened up a new window on the unravelling of the unconscious, especially in the work of Stanislav Grof, which has revolutionized the psychodynamic theory with profound implications for religion. Now it is possible for humans under the catalytic psychoactive substance to go back to the time of their birth and recount the trauma of their separation from the mother's womb and the deathlike experience of their passage through the contracting uterus, the birth canal and eventual liberation. In other words, this perinatal cycle replicates at a lesser level the whole process of the beginning of humanity: the creation of Adam and Eve in Paradise, their separation from their Creator, and the beginning of life on earth. See Richard Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), pp. 427-429.

C. S. Lewis' observation in his *Miracles* is equally pertinent to the subject. "In the arcane world of subatomic physics, for example, science is apparently approaching its last frontier," he

says. “[It is] a strange twilight realm where particles seemingly both do and do not exist, where ‘matter’ and ‘energy’ are both describable only in mathematical formulae, where time dwindles to a mere perspective from which we see reality. In 1977, Berkeley physicist Henry Pierce Stapp asserted that ‘everything we know about nature is in accord with the idea that the fundamental processes of nature lie outside space-time but generate events that can be located in space-time.’

“It is probable that nature is not really in time and almost certain that God is not. Time is probably (like perspective) the mode of our perception.... To [God] all the physical events and all human acts are present in an eternal Now.” See C. S. Lewis, *Miracles* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 2001).

The Muslims rejected Greek-based modern ideas

3. Some of the “modern ideas” derived from Greek cosmology and philosophy that the Muslim *ummah* rejected included, among others, the following:
 - The world has no end. That the several heavens are living creatures and move by will.
 - Miracles or deviations from the course of nature are impossible.
 - God’s knowledge is in universal categories and not in particulars.
 - That God has no attributes distinct from His essence. He is bare existence without definite character.
 - Resurrection is bodyless; it is purely spiritual, with no bodily pains or pleasures.

Small wonder the collective consciousness of the Muslim peoples rejected both the Greeks' cosmology as well as their philosophical views and accepted instead that the Qur'ānic categories of thought prevail. Watt calls it "the remarkable features of the situation." See his *Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al- Ghazali* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971), p. 63.

Likewise, calling oneself modern and denying religion is not new to this century. Imām al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) had this kind of sickness before him when he wrote in his *magnum opus Tahāfut al-falāsifah*: "There are some people in our times who entertain the notion of being superior to others in their mental faculties. They slight religious injunctions and prohibitions. The reason being that they have heard the high placed names of Socrates ... Plato, and Aristotle and their exaggerated praises and panegyrics from their followers" (translation ours). For this quote see Abu'l Hasan 'Alī Nadwi, *Ta'rikh d'awat wa 'azimat* (Karachi: Majlis Nashriyat-i Islām, 1978), Vol. 1, p. 177.

The non-definitive nature of science

4. Speculative by their very nature, philosophical views can phase out with the passage of time. This should not be surprising. But people who belong to the world of science and who claim to know more than others, because of their dealings with material phenomena and experimental methods, should have had more durability and their predictions be more reliable than others. This much is expected from

them. The following statements coming from some extraordinary people are now laughable:

"This telephone," said a 1876 Western Union internal memo, "has too many shortcomings to be seriously considered as a means of communication. The device is inherently of no value to us".

"Heavier-than-air machines," said Lord Kelvin, president Royal Society (1895), "are impossible".

"I think there is a world market for maybe five computers," said Thomas Watson, chairman of IBM, 1943.

In science as well, it is the law of instability that rules. Where is the Newtonian physics today with its "absolute motion, straight line and right angle?" Or what happened to the categories of mass, space, and time, which were unimportant to scholastics but central to Galileo whom he described as primary qualities and independent of the observer? In relativity theory mass and velocity are not independent of the observer.

Likewise, the material world viewed once "as an essentially static structure of immutable forms" is now considered fluid and dynamic. With the emergence of the theory of relativity, comprehensibility of the Newtonian world as deterministic is out and uncertainty is in. "It was as though," says Paul Johnson, "the spinning globe had been taken off its axis and cast adrift in a universe which no longer conformed to accustomed standards of measurement." See Paul Johnson, *Modern Times* (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), p. 4.

Or, for example, take the case of evolution once the defining paradigm of biology. From all counts, the biochemical discoveries behind

human vision, the immune system, and blood clotting have swallowed it. These systems are said to be so complex "that you can see they were designed by an intelligent agent and did not evolve according to Darwinian theory", says Michael Behe, associate professor of biochemistry at Lehigh University. He is author of *Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution* (New York: Free Press, 1996).

The structuralist school of biologists has almost buried Darwinian evolution. According to it, see for example, George Johnson's *Fire in the Mind*, it is not natural selection but laws of complexity or the principle of self-organization inherent in the natural world that governs evolution.

To imply, however, that religion is now obsolete or that it does not work is outlandish. Twentieth-century science in fact has gone beyond so-called physical reality. "In creating the space," says John Hedley Brooke, "for a less scientific view of science, the development of subatomic physics has played a central role. In a famous dialogue with Einstein, the Danish physicist Niels Bohr (1885-1962) argued in 1935 that recent developments in quantum mechanics demanded a complete renunciation of the classical ideal of causality and a radical revision of attitudes toward the problem of physical reality. A British astronomer and Quaker, Arthur Stanley Eddington (1882-1944), even made the extraordinary remark that religion first became possible for a reasonable scientific man about the year 1927." See John Hedley Brooke, *Science and Religion - Some Historical Perspectives* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 327.

American Mind – From Morse to McLuhan (The University of North Carolina Press, 1982), p. 163.

The substitution of God by science or some other flapdoodle was neither easy nor comfortable. Since then modern man has become anchorless and adrift in the sea of despair. Writing on the fall of “manmade gods”, Wallace Stevens is profound: “To see the gods dispelling in mid-air and dissolve like clouds is one of the greatest human experiences.... It was their annihilation not ours, and yet it left us feeling that in a measure, we too had been annihilated.” See Richard Ruland and Malcolm Bradbury, *From Puritanism to Postmodernism – A History of American Literature* (New York: Viking, 1991), p. 371.

Alienation, homelessness, nihilism, homosexuality, boredom, and the theatre of the absurd are the byproducts of a life without belief.

The Qur’ân speaks of the Prophet’s integrity

7. For example, see the following *ayah* on the Prophet’s integrity:

Say: “By Allah, it is not my invention. If Allah had so willed I should not have recited it to you, nor would He have made it known to you. (After all) I dwelt among you a whole lifetime before it (came to me). Have you then no sense! The Holy Spirit (Gabriel) has revealed it from my Lord with truth that it may confirm (the faith of) those who believe, and guidance and good tidings for those who have surrendered (to Allah).”

al-Nâhl: 102

Also see *āyah* 16 from *Sūrah Yūnus*:

Say: "If Allah had so willed, I should not have rehearsed it to you, nor would He have made it known to you. A whole lifetime before this have I tarried among you. Will you not then understand?"

For the Prophet's life and his message, see Tarik Jan's *The Life and Times of Muhammad Rasūl Allāh – Universalizing the Abrahamic Tradition* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies and Islamic Foundation, U.K., 1999), second revised edition.

8. Talking of Islam's superiority (*al-Qur'ān*), H. R. Gibb says: "Logical perfection, most brilliant essay in human reasoning." See his *Mohammadanism: A Historical Survey* (Oxford University Press, 1950).

The French historian Alphonse de Lamartine in his *Histoire de la Turquie*, 1, pp. 276-280 reasserts the same sentiments about Islam's rationality when he describes the Prophet Muhammad as "philosopher, orator ... legislator, warrior, conqueror, restorer of rational dogmas ..." For this, see Dr. Hamidullah, *Le Prophet de l'Islam*, 11, *Son Oeuvre*, 1959, pp. 688-689.

The Finitude of Rationalism

FOR THE PAST two centuries, the West has projected itself as a believer in rationalism and naturalism, which the rest of the world took seriously because in make-believe who can deny the power spread of a billboard approach? Anything perceived repetitively has an assured stay in our memory, and thus may engineer our thinking toward its acceptance. Small wonder, we now believe that Western civilization rests on the twin concepts of rationalism¹ and naturalism,² though in essence it seeks the validity of its mental attitudes in sensory experiences and the impulsion of desire. For some, it may be news that even the much talked about Enlightenment³ in the West was essentially a mutiny against rationalism. And so was the case with naturalism when it overthrew nature-based guidance and embraced desire and empiricism as its guide.⁴ In other words, anything that failed in the scale of utility was worth contempt.

Initially, Westerners knew little about their default. Lulled by the thought that the new era of Enlightenment, inaugurated by them, had anchored itself in naturalism and rationalism, they felt smug about it. But just as chickens come home to roost, the people in the West eventually realized the mess they were in. The Enlightenment had little to do with reason or naturalism. At best, it was a ruse, while materialism, self-exaltation, and unbridled consumption

were the real engine of their life. That is why from the sacred knowledge precincts to the arenas of society, economy and politics, the nineteenth-century battle cry of nothing-but-reason, as opposed to revelatory belief, has now been ditched. Other than a group of conservative hypocrites, the leaders of the New World acknowledge the pursuit of desire and the imperative of necessity as their lodestar.⁵

Still a few steps behind, their Muslim disciples, because of their liberal upbringing give a similar response, bragging that their attitude toward life is rational and that they accept nothing but reason, and that they do not believe in things that lack support from nature. Nevertheless, the cat that they carry in their bag is neither rational nor natural. Evaluate their writings and one finds their minds incapable of rational thinking or of intuitive understanding. What they call mind-based utilitarianism is in reality positivism – that is, reality is tangible, weighty and calculable. Thus for them, things that cannot be seen, touched, and measured bear no existential worth nor are they believable, for they fall within the realm of irrationality.

Likewise, nature-based guidance is fragile. By nature they do not mean human but animal nature, which has an inherent problem in making use of intuitional evidence. In their estimation, things that come into sensory experiences, or satisfy their biological and other self-related desires, and whose usefulness is justifiable in the immediate are value-ridden. Conversely, things that are near to human nature, which find relevance in one's intuition⁶ and which may not be materially consequential but carry spiritual value, they describe as superstitions and meaningless. Any importance endowed to them, in their view, is the moral equivalent of backwardness and mental degeneration.

VIOLATING REASON

Making claim of reason-based life notwithstanding, our so-called rationalists violate its dictates every inch of the way in its application to life. Mentally wanting, they fail to grasp the ungraceful union of opposites and their consequential contrariness. Education could have helped by favouring them with the basic implements of a rational mind and freeing them from a tangled speech.⁷ But unfortun-

Thus for them, things that cannot be seen, touched, and measured bear no existential worth nor are they believable, for they fall within the realm of irrationality.

nately our educated, exceptions allowed, are short on the essentials of a rational mind. They conveniently gloss over the fact that as a preliminary to discussing issues the need for deciding one's spot, its corresponding imperatives and posturing are a must. Inconsistent in their premise and their argumentation, it is chaos that rules their minds. Worse still, the civilizational context, which situates the human self, is not helpful to them either, as it is given to sensuality and material pursuits.⁸ For it can make humans voracious consumers; it can also create a sensory self entangled with the known but gifting them a trained mind that shies away from dabbling in superficialities is beyond its genius. Mostly in their case posing as rational is an affect and not reality.

Again, it is on Islam alone that their much-paraded rationalism comes into play, for it is in the spiritual, moral, and societal postulates of Islam that Western concepts run into problems. To such people, a small rationality test can be given.⁹ Draw them into discussion on a subject, ask them to affirm their

essence [would they be participating in it as Muslims or non-believers], and then cite the religious injunction applicable to the subject. Probably, they will shrug their shoulders and say in the vein of their assumed rationality: "Keep your mullaism to yourself, and give us a reason-based answer not a textual citation." These may be a few words, but it surely reveals their irrational broth.¹⁰ It gives them no credit that they neither know the essentials of demanding attestation nor the true posturing of a seeker. With failing as large, where do they fault?

TWO BROAD POSSIBILITIES

In relation to Islam, reason suggests two broad possibilities: either a person is a Muslim or a *kāfir* (disbeliever). If he is a Muslim, it implies that he believes in Allah and His Prophet. Besides, it suggests that he measures life as wished by Allah's messenger. He neither questions Islamic injunctions on slight pretences nor does he acquiesce in the *sharī'ah* with conditionalities as that would be illogical. Islam colours his situation.

As a believer, all he has to do is to seek the source verification of an injunction. When confirmed, he must abide by and not question it,

Worse still, the civilizational context, which situates the human self, is not helpful to them either, as it is given to sensuality and material pursuits. For it can make humans voracious consumers; it can also create a sensory self entangled with the known but gifting them a trained mind that shies away from dabbling in superficialities is beyond its genius. Mostly in their case posing as rational is an affect and not reality.

though for his satisfaction he may still seek its rationale. Such a quest is not only welcome but also wholesome. Conversely, once he surrenders to Islam, his insistence on reason-based evidence or his refusal to accept a particular rule of the *shari'ah*, if it fails to satisfy him, will result in negating the authenticity of the Prophet's person as a law-giver. A bad situation, his negation will throw him out of Islam making him a *kāfir*. At least, he should have the moral courage to renounce the faith that he seemingly holds but which he in fact disbelieves. Out of its pale, he would have the logical legs to stand upon and be worth the respect of an answer.

This rule of thumb is within the realm of rationalism. If not followed, it can disallow any civilized existence. For example, no state would survive if its citizenry continually asked for rational validity to its decrees as a corollary to compliance. Nor would an army be really functional if its soldiers asked for justification of the general's orders as a prelude to following them. In this sense no school, no college, no collective system could be furthered if individuals bonded with them added conditionalities to conform to its business rules.

Civilization presupposes that when a person agrees to a system, he must have approved its basic presumptions. Belief in the sovereign command of that system, and submission to its dictates are an essential mix of collective life. As long as an individual stays in a setup, he has to follow the sovereign will, even though he may encounter some structural problems. Criminal neglect or rule violation is another thing, for he can still live within the setup after infracting its rules. But if every now and then he seeks justificatory explanation to a rule as conditional to its compliance, he can be charged with rebellion. If

such a person were in the army, court martial would be his fate. If he were enrolled in an educational institution, he would be thrown out of it. If he were already in the fold of a faith, he would invite the charge of disbelief. For such seekers of justificatory explanations, the right place is out of the pale and not inside. To merit an answer, one must step out and then question.

As a rational faith, Islam prioritizes its scheme of preferences. First, it invites humanity to believe in Allah and His messenger. Every possible rationale is made to persuade people to believe in Allah as their Creator and Sovereign, and in Muhammad (peace be upon him) as His messenger. This invitation is not under duress. Free from compulsion, it asks the called to feel it out first with its essence and to ask as many questions as they want. Before this, nobody will coerce them to follow its injunctions.

But after having declared their belief, they will have to go beyond rhetorical acceptance and embrace its message for they are now believers (those who have surrendered). For them justificatory explanations are now senseless. Nor do they need to make conditions for following the *sharī'ah*. With Allah and His messenger anchored in their souls, they embrace their commands in earnest, without reservation.

The answer of the believers when summoned to Allah and His messenger, in order that He may judge between them, is no other than this: they say "We hear and we obey". It is they who will attain felicity.

al-Nūr: 51

FAITH DEMANDS OBEDIENCE WITHOUT ANY CONDITIONS

Strictly speaking, *īmān* (faith) and the demand for rational validity, a precondition to obedience, are in

conflict with each other. Hooking them up is averse to sanity. For he who is a Muslim cannot, because of his station, seek rational validity to a *sharī'ah* rule as a condition for its compliance. He who asks for it is neither Muslim in letter nor in spirit.

And it is not fitting for a believer, man or woman, when a matter has been decided by Allah and His messenger, to have any option about their decision: if anyone disobeys Allah and His messenger, he is indeed on a clearly wrong path.

al-Ahzāb: 36

It was because of the believers' willingness to accept it that a great civilization of unsurpassed beauty and order came into being. With faith seeded, a mere wave of a hand could restrain people from pursuing wrong. Likewise, millions would instantly carry out what was right. Thus, if the believers had tied up their compliance of the prophetic teachings with explanations and rational justifications, Muhammad (*Rasūl Allāh*) could not have accomplished any societal development in a brief span of twenty-three years.

This does not, however, mean that the Islamic injunctions are untenable to reason or empty of wisdom. Nor does it imply that Islam calls for blind obedience in its followers or opposes the search for reason to its edicts. Far from it, Islam encourages reflection and the intellectual grasp of its teachings so that they are embraced with robust conviction.

Nevertheless, there is a big difference between the post-obedience search for reason and the justificatory explanation to rules as a condition for their compliance. A Muslim first gives unconditional obedience and later seeks understanding of the rational basis of his faith. Understanding every Is-

lamic decree, however, is not necessary. In fact, a Muslim's absolute belief in the core value of Allah's sovereignty and the prophethood of Muhammad (*Rasūl Allāh*) is enough to carry him through hardships in life. If later, he seeks a rational basis to a value and succeeds in comforting himself, he praises Allah. If he is denied reason-based belief, he still lives in the *shari'ah* without a grudge. This kind of rational search bears no resemblance to demanding justification for every decree that says "give me a satisfactory answer or I quit."

Lately, we came across a write up penned by a group of educated Muslims who professedly believe in Islam. Among its reformatory efforts, every year it tries to stop Muslims from slaughtering animals on *'Īd al-Adhā*, suggesting instead that they create jobs for the poor. Rightly upset, a certain person objected to it. We do not have the dissenting text with us, but we do have the response made:

Except for citing [the text] or imitating [the practice], nobody has rationalized sacrificing animals on the occasion of *'īd* and its empirical usefulness.... If someone educates us on the rational aspect of his belief in slaughtering [animals on *'īd*], we would be obliged.

The preceding lines speak of an educated mind. On one level, there is an effusive claim to rationality and on the other, an absurd demonstration of irrationality. Obviously, the author is confused about his station: if he is a Muslim, he should first accept the Qur'ānic text and later ask for a rational basis to the slaughtering injunction. But that again will be for his personal comfort and not for his obedience. If the latter were the case, he would cease to be a Muslim.

Put differently, for a demand like that, he would have to cast Islam aside first. Later, he can ask any question, make any criticism he likes. It is logically inconsistent to embrace two opposing stances. Those who do it insult reason. How can they be believers and even jurisconsults, while they depreciate the Qur'anic citation? That by doing so they throw all norms of scholarly research to the winds is conveniently disregarded, and they forget in their frenzy that sacrificing animals has its validation in the original source. Calling for rational justification to an injunction as a precondition to obedience is thus absurd.

“Keep your mullaism to yourself, and give us a reason-based answer not a textual citation.” These may be a few words, but it surely reveals their irrational broth.

In other words, such people would avoid a divine injunction and instead mind it only when its rational and consequential benefits are shown to them. If not shown, they use every device to prove the medieval and the money spoiler nature of the injunction. They insist on calling their attitude rational, even though they uphold opposing stances. All we have to say is that there is nothing wrong in asking for a reason-based explanation to Islamic injunctions, but the individual has to prove himself rational first.

THE RELATIVITY OF UTILITARIAN BENEFITS

By definition, a rational and utilitarian benefit is incapable of precise import because of its relative nature. A person may consider something as useful while others may perceive it as injurious. A third person

may hold it partially useful but of less significance, while regarding something else as profitable.

In judging utility, the chances for disagreement abound as every person can have a different perspective on it. A person may crave for the immediate gain while avoiding injury in it. For sure, his choice will be at variance with others who have their eyes set on its functional utility. Likewise, there are things, which may occasion both benefit and harm. A person may go for it because he is willing to engage harm for the sake of its long-term benefit. Others may shy away from it for they think it entails more harm than benefit.

Again rational and utilitarian benefits may disagree with each other. For example, experience may suggest harm in a thing but our rational mind can summon up bigger gains in the future. Besides, experience may prove a thing useful, but our rational mind insists on discarding it. Such being the high ground of subjectivity, a thing varies in its value according to the individual.

This is not peculiar to sacrificing animals. Do we perform *salāh* (prayer), fasting, *hajj* (pilgrimage), *zakāh* (poor due) and abide by the prohibitions in the *sharī'ah* because someone has demonstrated to us their rational and empirical benefits? If this had been so, perhaps nobody would have discarded offering *salāh* or denied *hajj* and *zakāh*. This is why Islam has not left its injunctions to reason and empiricism but to faith and obedience. A Muslim embraces Islam because of his belief in Allah the Exalted and the Prophet and not because of its rational and empirical benefits, nor does he measure his faith in the scale of reason and utility. A Muslim derives his validity from his conformity to the original sources of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. What is attributable to them is worth obedience and what cannot be, stands rejected.

Thus, what determines our faith? Is it reason and utility or Allah and His messenger? If it falls to the first postulate, we disclaim Islam, pre-empting our right to speak as believers. Nor can we invoke reason while we are abusing the basic norms of rationality. And if it falls to the second postulate, our pivotal issues must not be rational and empirical benefits. Rather, a better area to dig into will be to find out if sacrificing animals on *'Īd al-Adhā* is a conventional act forged by Muslims? Or is it worship chosen by Allah, and upheld by Muhammad (*Rasūl Allāh*) for his *ummah*?

EDITOR'S COMMENTS

1. Rationalism is "the theory that the exercise of reason, rather than the acceptance of empiricism, authority or spiritual revelation provides the only valid basis for action or belief and that reason is the pure source of knowledge and of spiritual truth." Perhaps this is the most concise definition of rationalism and is available in the 1969 edition of *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*, a Houghton Mifflin publication.
2. Naturalism means "the system of thought holding that all phenomena can be explained in terms of natural causes and laws, without attributing moral, spiritual, or supernatural significance to them." *The American Heritage ...*

An obvious result of naturalism was that it became the focus of feelings in the West. Baron d'Holbach replaced God with nature; but while denying God the perpetuity beyond time and space, he gave matter the self-existent attribute of divinity, which, as he said, was alone

worshipable. "O Nature! Sovereign of all beings! And you, her adorable daughters, virtue, reason, and truth! Be ever our only Divinities." See Franklin Baumer, *Religion and the Rise of Scepticism* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1960), p. 64.

3. Enlightenment: An eighteenth-century philosophical movement that examined the past doctrines and institutions in the light of rationalism. Ironically, the age that nurtured it ended up as against reason. "In its treatment of the passions, as in its treatment of metaphysics, the Enlightenment was not an age of reason but a revolt against rationalism," says Peter Gay in his excellent work *The Enlightenment An Interpretation: The Science of Freedom* (London: Wildwood House, 1973), pp. 188-189.
4. By the end of the nineteenth century the critique on naturalism emerged with the following salient features: First, the social contract, in particular, was said to be palpably false, historically untrue. Second, it was asserted that deductive reasoning from *a priori* assumptions was incapable of yielding solutions to the problems of complex societies. Third, pure reason had been a slogan of the French Revolution with all its attendant excesses, and the reaction against the Revolution caused a reaction against using reason as the exclusive guide to social reform. See p. 865, item "Natural Law", *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th edition.

Reason the slave of passions

5. Reason, David Hume (1711-1776) insisted, has no part in producing those associations of ideas

by which men think and live. "Is it likely," he asked rhetorically, "that reason will prevail against nature, habit, company, education, and prejudice?" He put it more formally in the *Treatise*: "We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." This sounds strange as coming from someone who seeded positivism.

Denis Diderot (1713-1784) came out rather forcefully in favour of passions as the mover of life. "People ceaselessly proclaim against the passions," he said, "people impute to the passions all men's pains, and forget that they are also the source of all his pleasures.... People think they do reason an injury if they say a word in favour of its rivals. Yet it is only the passions, and the great passions, that can raise the soul to great things." Diderot even went to the extent of glorifying passions when he said: "I forgive everything that is inspired by passion." And further: "The language of the heart is a thousand times more varied than that of the mind, and it is impossible to lay down the rules of its dialectics."

Talking about this paradox of the Enlightenment, Peter Gay says: "[T]he dialectics of history confronted the Enlightenment with an apparent paradox which was, in actuality, a magnificent opportunity; as the power of conscience had grown, the passion had become safer; as reason tightened its hold, sensuality improved its reputation. It was precisely the growth of the superego in Western culture that made greater sexual freedoms possible". Gay, pp. 204-205.

In the postmodernism era, history repeats itself. Passions and not reason is again being stressed as the wellspring of human action. This may also be a rehash of Freudianism because the argument is the same. Existentialists decried reason and instead privileged the emotions and imagination. Enlightenment modernity has been pejoratively termed as an "iron cage" and a "disciplinary archipelago".

Mawdudi's analysis also receives support from another reputed Western scholar Will Durant. Talking about the Renaissance, he says:

Men were delighted to rediscover a pagan civilization whose citizens were not worried about original sin or a punitive hell, and in which the material impulses were as forgivable elements in a vibrant society.

For all this a price had to be paid. The brilliant enfranchisement of the mind sapped the supernatural sanction of morality, and no others were found to effectually replace them. The result was such a repudiation of inhibitions, such a release of impulse and desire, so gay a luxuriance of immorality, as history had not known since the Sophists had shattered the myths, freed the mind, and loosened the morals, of ancient Greece.

To what extent, morals became lax, Will Durant has astonishing facts to mull over: "As for homosexuality, it became almost an obligatory of the Greek revival. The humanists wrote about it with a kind of scholarly affection, and Ariosto judged that they were all addicted to it. Politian, Filippo Strozzi and the diarist Sanudo were reasonably suspected of it.

Michelangelo, Julius II, Clement VII were less convincingly charged with it; San Bernardino found so much of it in Naples that he threatened the city with the fate of Sodom and Gomorrah. Aretino described the aberration as quite popular in Rome, and he himself, between one mistress and another, asked the Duke of Mantua to send him an attractive boy." See Will Durant's *The Story of Civilization: The Renaissance* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1953), pp. 566-567, 576.

The role of intuition in knowledge

6. Intuition is a theory whereby the reality of the objects of perception and basic truths is known by intuition – immediate grasp and understanding – rather than by reason. This may include anything from sensation to knowledge and knowledge to mystical rapport. In philosophy, intuitive and noninferential knowledge is acceptable without questioning. Likewise, there is a strong case for prelinguistic knowledge as opposed to those who maintain that the evolution of language precedes awareness, perception, and consciousness.

For a thorough discussion of the concept of intuition, see Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 204-212.

Intuition, as understood in the religious tradition, emanates from the heart. Contrary to the secular formulated concept of intelligence and its seat in the human mind, religion holds the heart as the fount of profound emotions, will, and intelligence. This intelligence is nevertheless different from dialectical

intelligence associated with the mind. Professor Nasr makes a neat distinction between the two when he says: "Dialectical intelligence identified with the mind is not negative; in fact, human intelligence in its fullness implies the correct functioning of both the intelligence of the heart and that of the mind, the first being intuitive and the second analytical and discursive." Do the two function separately? Nasr's answer is no. The two, says he, work in confluence and thus "make possible the reception, crystallization, formulation, and finally communication of the truth. Mental formulation of the intuition received by the intelligence in the heart becomes completely assimilated by man and actualized through the activity of the mind. ... Symbolically, the mind can be described as the moon [that] reflects the light of the sun which is the heart. The intelligence in the heart shines upon the plane of the mind which then reflects this light upon the dark night of the terrestrial existence of fallen man." See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Knowledge and the Sacred* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 151-152.

Among the thinkers, Immanuel Kant has used the word *intuition* as a core concept. Dispelling the impression that he considered only the inner self as real and the outside as unreal, he writes: "It is identical with the empirical consciousness of my existence, which is determinable only through relation to something, which while bound up with my existence, is outside me. This consciousness of my existence in time is bound up in the way of identity with the consciousness of a relation to something outside me, and it is therefore

experience not invention, sense not imagination, which inseparably connects this outside something with my inner sense. For outer sense is already in itself a relation of intuition to something actual outside me, and the reality of outer sense, in its distinction from imagination, rests simply on that which is here found to take place, namely, its being inseparably bound up with inner experience, as the condition of its possibility. If with the intellectual consciousness of my existence, in the representation I am, which accompanies all my judgments and acts of understanding, I could at the same time connect a determination of my existence through intellectual intuition, the consciousness of a relation to something outside me would not be required. But though that intellectual consciousness does indeed come first, the inner intuition, in which my existence can alone be determined, is sensible and is bound up with the condition of time." For the preceding extract from Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, see Houston Peterson, ed., *Essays in Philosophy* (New York: Pocket Library, 1959), pp. 102-103 fn.

According to Kant, there are three kinds of intuitions: intellectual intuition, inner intuition, and intuition of the universals like time and space. All of these are important in understanding the world outside and the self inside us.

Bergson supported the cause against bloated intellectualism by his stress on intuition, which he thought was superior to reason.

Hamilton A. R. Gibb is critical of the fact that the West has lost the faculty of intuition. "Religion", he writes, "requires the exercise of

the faculty of intuitive perception, the leap of the mind across and beyond all the data and methods of rational and logical analysis to grasp directly and in concrete experience some elements in the nature of things which reason cannot describe or identify. Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen. In the typical Western man, who has inherited English rationalist thought and values of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and who has become mentally conditioned by it or by German thought and values of the last century and a half, the intuitive faculty has been starved and neglected that he has the greatest reluctance to admit even its existence and cannot imagine how it operates. Our religious judgment has become in consequence seriously unbalanced." See his "Structure of Religious Thought in Islam," *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, ed. Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk (Lahore: Islamic Book Service, 1987), p. 178.

Those who are opposed to intuition, like Hahn, define intuition as a "force of habit rooted in psychological inertia." To such people, it is logic and not intuition, which is behind great mathematical discoveries. His "Crisis of Intuition," in *The World of Mathematics*, ed. J. R. Newman (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1956), p. 1976, pleads for logical positivism and the distancing of physics from metaphysics. The supporters of intuition talk about the modern physics of Planck and Einstein, which has its roots in metaphysics. They also say great mathematical discoveries owe credit to intuition, not logical positivism.

The rational era does not produce a rational mind

7. For an appreciation of Mawdudi's point of view, read the following from R. W. Paul's *Critical Thought Essential to the Acquisition of Rational Knowledge and Passions*:

A passionate drive for clarity, accuracy, and fairmindedness, a fervor for getting to the bottom of things ... for listening sympathetically to opposition points of view, a compelling drive to seek out evidence, an intense aversion to contradiction, sloppy thinking, inconsistent application of standards, a devotion to truth as against self-interests - which are essential components of the rational person.

For this quote from R. W. Paul, see Harvey Siegel, *Educating Reason* (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 40.

8. Do people turn rational in their attitudes and behaviour in a rational era? Far from it so-called rational societies become voracious in easy morals. Mawdudi is sound in his observation. Will Durant quotes Nathan Chytransin (1578): "Now that we have slipped the yoke of ancient laws and statutes from our necks ... it is no wonder that we find among the larger part of our young people such unbridled licentiousness, such boorish ignorance, such ungovernable insolence, such terrible godlessness. Others thought that not the least among the cause why the young lapse into immorality and lasciviousness are the comedies, spectacles, and plays."

A rational society also becomes a glutton for it pleases the senses. "Eating and drinking,"

says Will Durant, "were major industries. Half the day of a well-to-do German was consumed in passing edibles from one end of his anatomy to the other." He quotes: "Owing to immoderate eating and drinking there are now few old people, and we seldom see a man of thirty or forty who is not affected by some sort of disease either stone, gout, cough, consumption or what not." Durant, *The Story of Civilization: The Age of Reason Begins* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1961), pp. 544-545.

9. Mawdudi rightly questions the rationality of the educated in the 1930s. His question can easily be repeated at the advent of this twenty-first century. The rationality situation is still far from being desirable. In fact, how to make students think rationally is not a problem specific to the Muslim world or for that matter Pakistan, it is common to humanity. The West, which claims itself to be rational, is still facing it and several commissions have been charged with the task of making education in the West a vehicle for making people rational. For example, see Harvey Siegel, *Educating Reason* (London: Routledge, 1988).
10. What is reason? Who is rational? Does reason abide by principles? Is there a consistency to it? Mawdudi answers these valid questions. Dr. Israel Scheffler's observation is equally poignant. "Reason", he says, "is always a matter of abiding by general rules or principles ... reason is always a matter of treating equal reasons equally, and of judging the issues in the light of general principles to which one has bound oneself ... if I could judge reasons differently when they bear on my interests, or disregard my principles when they conflict

with my own advantage, I should have no principles at all. The concepts of principles, reasons and consistency thus go together.... In fact, they define a general concept of rationality. A rational man is one who is consistent in thought and in action, abiding by impartial and generalizable principles freely chosen as binding upon himself." *Philosophical Models of Teaching*, p. 76.

Some people think that for reason to operate no boundaries are essential. Besides, reason can act independently of a social given. But this is a mistaken notion for the following reasons:

First, reason has a human vessel, which has a psycho-temporal construct. What affects humans also affects reason.

Second, reason cannot be the arbiter for everything. It does not function in a trajectory of linear progression; often it has to move in a web, and is likely to get bogged down. Michel Foucault even doubts its reliability for he thinks history and media have deformed it. He considers rationalization as an aspect of power to discipline society.

Third, it has problem areas in which it finds itself exhausted. For example, rationality and morals: an act could be rational but if carried through could infringe a moral norm; pleasure and reason: people seek pleasure not because it is rational but because it is sense driven. A conflict between the two is mostly resolved in pleasure's favour; the rationality of theory choice in science: scientific pursuits, which are mostly viewed as reason-based, are not wholly rational. In fact, science is the sum of the incremental drop over a period of time, which

progresses by accepting the fundamentals of science in the past. According to Thomas S. Kuhn, there is no critical discourse in it: "Most important, scientific laws are a reflection of our conceptual frame of thought into which, as Eddington says, our observational knowledge is forced by our method of formulating it." In other words, there is no neutral observer of scientific data. Kuhn even calls it dogmatic and relative.

A good reading on the problems of rationality is available in Siegel's "Towards a theory of rationality" in his *Educating Reason*.

It is easy to agree with Scheffler that "[r]ationality cannot be taken simply as an abstract and general ideal. It is embodied in multiple evolving traditions, in which the basic condition holds that issues are resolved by reference to reasons, themselves defined by principles purporting to be impartial and universal." See his *Reason and Teaching* (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973), p. 59.

For reason to be healthy and free Max Horkheimer and Theodore W. Adorno suggest its release from scientism, capitalism and the culture industry. On the contrary, Jürgen Habermas speaks of communicative action or rationality within an intersubjective context to achieve consensus on moral and policy issues. See Steven Best's *The Politics of Historical Vision* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995).

The Case of a Rationalist

THE WESTERN IMPACT on our immature youth is indeed telling. One has only to read what they write, or listen to what they say, and an overly confused mind is uncovered. Lately, my hand fell on the travelogue of an educated person. Recounting his visit to China and Japan, he writes:

Our Chinese fellow voyagers are great gobblers of food. They are also proverbial wine guzzlers. Pork is high on their menu, which eventually gave me the clue to Christianity's spread. The Chinese hold their old faith unpaired with secular education. Islam could have been their choice had they understood it. But since Islam deprives them of their favorite food, they go over to Christianity. I would not be surprised if in the years ahead, Christianity becomes China's official religion. I prefer to give concessions on eating pork to Chinese and Europeans, for I doubt if the Qur'an has ever forbidden it.

Perhaps for some specific reasons, it was proscribed to the Arabs. But I suggest that in countries like [China, Japan, and Europe] where a ban on eating pork could create a difficult situation of *idtirār* (compulsion in this sense), its use should be allowed.

Anyway this is one Qur'ānic injunction that I fail to understand. In principle, there is hardly any linkage between our culinary habits and

morals. If religion has to select our menu, it should teach us blacksmithery, gold making and tailoring as well. I firmly believe that Islam's growth in the world is held back as it clogs the expression of human rights, reducing its adherents to a lifeless entity. This also shows itself in their stunted material growth. In fact, religion should not be more than what Christians take it to be.

After this prefatory statement, he describes conditions in Shanghai:

Having seen this large mass of rich and exuberant humanity, it is difficult for me to believe that they would be eventually thrown into hellfire as if that was the reason of their creation with Allah. Would they be consigned to hell because they made the mistake of beautifying this planet? After all, they neither kill pilgrims nor do they have the gay syndrome of Lût's people. Nor would they appropriate other's wealth, and nor would they legitimize it by spurious reasoning. Even then they will be consigned to hell. What for!

True, polytheism is a hopeless pursuit. But tell me, would we consider a person as our enemy because of his faith in a [polytheistic] deity that causes death and harm to him and which he is as incapable of understanding as we our own. Or that he refuses to take Arabic as God's language and for that we are as opposed to him as he is averse to us. But maybe this is of least concern to us. All we care for is to dress ourselves in a particular style, eat a certain kind of food, wear sixmillimeter-long beards, and avoid going to such schools, which do not teach us our religious language and faith.

Describing economic conditions in Kobe, he says:

I spent two hours in Kobe. Not a single beggar or a person in shabby, worn out clothes I saw. This is the extent of a nation's economic growth that knows of no God or religion.

In summation he gives a pep talk on what Islam should be:

Listen! *Ihsān* (beneficence) is the core religious value, which is not obliged (for its expression) to any particular language or art form. It seeks to achieve a sense of accountability in this life and the life to come. This is real Islam. Anything besides it that we call religion is a deception fastened on us – an induced mental state. The day we restrict Islam to these two things (i.e., self-accountability in life and the life hereafter) and free ourselves from the shackles of the *sharī'ah* we will progress along with other nations. In fact, we will force others to think that we alone are on the right path for if we can have this world, we will also have the heavenly kingdom.

THE SECULAR MINDSET

The preceding extract objectifies our new generation's mental makeup. Born in a Muslim ambience and still stuck with their faith, their education in English-medium schools has nevertheless bared them of their Islamic moorings. The final product is overcharged with Western thinking, which views everything through alien eyes. To think independently free from Western cultural influences is almost impossible for them. They parade their rationalism, but it is not theirs.

Borrowed from Europe – it is a conditioned state of mind, neither homegrown nor free. They also acculturated themselves with Western criticism, which they consider sacrosanct – the only valid truth to judge things by.

Equipped thus when they enter life, they find their minds and hearts ranged against each other. While Islam tugs at their hearts, their minds bear the stamp of infidelity. Perhaps they would have preferred to live in the West, but compelled by their “condemned” existence, and influenced by local ambience, their herd instinct still makes them empathize with their people ranged against the nonbelievers. But all said their faculties of understanding and reflection are badly mired in Western concepts. In consequence, anything that fails to measure against Western values, whether of a peripheral or core nature, or of social attitudes and conduct, is pegged as faulty and worth changing.

Some of them did make a partial study of Islam but through blinkered eyes, which distances their convoluted minds from Islam’s straight message. Thus when they talk on religious subjects, they give the impression of speaking from their empty heads. Neither their postulates are correct nor are they arranged in a logical sequence. Worse, while presenting their views, they are careless in identifying themselves. Shaftless, they continue changing their posture from one base to another – often contradicting themselves in the process. Their religious stuttering, in short, is characterized by loose thinking.

As opposed to this, when they speak on subjects other than religion, they are discreet to their bones, for they know that any lapse would slight them in the eyes of academia. But since they

view religion as small fry, they throw all precaution to the winds while discoursing on it. To them, it is a post-lunch chatter in which they can afford to be frivolous with the rules.

Second, the travelogue betrays a superficial mind. The author shows no regard for scholastic integrity, his expression is waywardly and his knowledge of the subject matter is scanty. He is least pushed about inviting censure from others, knowing well that only a religiously educated person could have taken him to task. But since the latter has already been cast by the secularists into the perverse mould of an "obscurantist", a "bigot", and a "narrow-minded" individual, the presumption is that his opinion would least matter with the audience. So why care!

THE CAMOUFLAGE AND THE IDENTITY CRISIS

Equally problematic is the person of the presenter and the form. The text confuses the author's identity. Whether he is writing as a believer or a non-believer is not clear. This is important for the two in their essence are dissimilar. A person who writes as a believer – whether he is an orthodox, a liberal or a reformist – must authenticate himself at the touchstone of Islam. In other words, the Qur'ān should be his final arbiter, and its laws and values must be accorded sanctity by him. This is called for because if he does not let the Qur'ān sit in the judge's chair and decide, he invites the charge of apostasy upon him. An upshot of this will be his loss of right to cite the Qur'ān in his support.

Nevertheless, if he chooses to be a non-believer, he would then have the full right to question the Qur'ānic scheme of change and its value system for

in that case he is free to discard the Qur'ān as the final arbiter of human destiny.

So what are the prerequisites for a rational discourse? A rational person would decide about his identity before he speaks. But no matter what he decides, he will have to subject himself to the logic of his identity: he cannot profess to be a believer and yet insist on criticizing Qur'anic injunctions. Nor can he lecture Muslims to listen to the cadence of his self-prompted urgings in violation of the Islamic *shari'ah* and still believe in the Qur'ān. That a person could be a Muslim as well as a non-Muslim, or that he could be inside as well as outside of Islam surely amounts to summoning contradictions with one voice. An impossible situation that only our "new rational person" can live with.

Logically absurd, I am almost sure that the author would dare not adopt similar converse positions while discoursing on a subject other than Islam. For example, would he venture to criticize Anglo-Saxon laws while presiding over an English court? Likewise, would he question the rationale of a school of thought that he subscribes to? But there is a touch of irony when it comes to Islam: he hugs two converse positions and does not even feel the bite of repeatedly shifting his stand. On the one hand, he carries a Muslim name and suffers the pangs of his people's depraved situation, seeks ways to elevate them, and even lectures them to come to the "real" faith. But on the flip side, he criticizes the very book that embodies the Islamic value system, and which one has to accept as the ultimate authority, prefatory to embracing the faith.

On at least four occasions, the Qur'ān characterizes pork as *harām*¹ (forbidden) and yet the

author suggests leniency on the issue – that too for his favoured cause of Islam's spread. Expressed differently, his concern about the growth of Islam is even greater than the Qur'ān's. This sounds bizarre, for Islam is not exterior to the Qur'ān. As to the menu taunt, the Qur'ān does prepare a food list for human consumption by its splitting things into edibles and non-edibles on its preferred scheme of *halāl* and *harām*, *rijs* and *tayyib*. Likewise, as a sequel to this, it clearly says that the believers have no right to declare things as *halāl* and *harām* (Yūnus: 59). Still, the author assumes such a right for himself. It is painfully obvious that he is grafting Saint Paul's approach² onto the *shari'ah*.

THE PAULINE ANALOGY

Let it be said at the outset that the Qur'ānic scheme is altogether different from Pauline Christianity: the former extends into secular areas by prescribing food and dress limits, marriage and divorce, inheritance and interpersonal dealings, trade and politics, criminal and civil laws of justice.

The followers of Saint Paul (not Jesus) conversely restrict Christianity to a private faith. The author, however, considers the Qur'ānic intrusion into lawmaking as wrong and shamelessly floats it as opposed to progress.

So what does he really propose? He thinks Islam, as practiced, is opposed to the

That a person could be a Muslim as well as a non-Muslim, or that he could be inside as well as outside of Islam surely amounts to summoning contradictions with one voice. An impossible situation that only our "new rational person" can live with.

celebration of life. To change it into a life-giving faith he suggests that religion should end where Pauline Christianity begins. In his adoptive zeal, he labels the *shari'ah* laws of criminal and civil justice as shackles, which he would like to see broken so that Islam can grow. The Qur'an, however, speaks of them as Allah's boundaries, observable and binding. Belief in the Qur'anic content is, nevertheless, preliminary to salvation and for those who withhold it, the Qur'an univocally describes them as fuel for hellfire. Whether such people are few or more, rich or poor is beside the point. The author, however, disagrees that the materially affluent and numerically ascendant non-believers will eventually go to hell. To him, since they have populated the earth and made it materially likeable, their absolution and not perdition is called for, forgetting the awkward situation he has tumbled into. For example, how can one stay a Muslim after having disputed with the Qur'an? Or how can one dispute with the Qur'an, and still be a believer? Logically speaking, if he is a Muslim, he has no merit to get cross with it. And if he still prefers to argue with the Qur'an, he must first discard it as the source of his faith.

There is still a third course for him to follow. If he thinks he has developed a problem with his faith, then instead of posing as Mr. *Mujtahid* (jurisconsult) and digging its roots, he should show a little humility and while lowering himself to the level of a student seek clarity to his mind. Other than that, he has no option. To recapitulate there are three options for such people:

- Renounce the faith, and then question.

- While in doubt check with someone who knows.
- Be a believer (improve yourself) and stop improving Islam.

Our secular educated, exceptions allowed, perhaps have no moral courage to renounce their faith in public. Nor would they assume the humility of a student, for it is an ego-stripping act. To overcome this dilemma, they have selected a median, though irrational, course for themselves: identifying with mainstream Islam, they wish for its spread; they also show their concern for Muslims in general. Still, they verbalize all the horrible things that a non-Muslim would say against Islam. In their jibes at the *shari'ah*, they spare neither *hadith* nor *fiqh* (jurisprudence) nor the Qur'an. To add to their absurdity, they claim they are rationalists and thus would accept nothing but reason. Ironically, their tirade against the religious people is based on the assumption that they are reason shy. But one may ask: Are they rational when they talk savagely contradictory things about religion, or when they conveniently gloss over their converse positions on Islam, shifting effortlessly from one posture to another? Perhaps it is some new kind of rationality that these "enlightened souls" have the privilege to invent, and which others do not know about.

While manuring Muslim growth, the author recommends the Christian way of abolishing the *shari'ah* and reducing Islam to a private faith, for in his view Christianity ascended by blotting out prohibitions and moral sanctions from its religious corpus. Unlike Islam, Christianity has not sapped human life of its rhythm by baring people's rights; rather, it has given them freedom to pursue what

they want. All they have to do is to affirm their belief in Jesus Christ, and the magic will happen. In other words, he holds that conforming to moral norms and observing restraints are abusive of human rights.

He, however, fails to understand that the thing named Islam is contained in the Qur'ān, which defines it as the combination of belief and good works. Likewise, the Qur'ān draws the parameter for good works, legislates laws, and chalks out a whole life system. So thoroughly are these embedded in the Qur'ānic scheme that without them Islam cannot survive nor can it be concretized into a civilization. Thus, to abolish this system or to tamper with its laws would amount to undoing the Qur'ān and Islam itself. I am at a loss to understand how one can think of helping Islam grow by the very act of blotting it out. If the writer had wished, he could have invented a new religion for himself. But naming something opposed to the Qur'ān as Islam and promoting it has no moral sanctity.

ACCOUNTABILITY CARRIES FOUR ASPECTS

So what is his vision? According to him, Islam allows freedom to humans by making them accountable for their deeds. Perhaps he hopes that by restricting Islam to one's self, it will be easier for others to accept it and thus will it grow. If he reflects on his formulation, he may find that even when he reduces

How can one stay a Muslim after having disputed with the Qur'ān? Or how can one dispute with the Qur'ān, and still be a believer? Logically speaking, if he is a Muslim, he has no merit to get cross with it. And if he still prefers to argue with the Qur'ān, he must first discard it as the source of his faith.

Islam to this narrow base, it would not work. For, this kind of Islam would still suggest holding faith in the Hereafter. Added to this, the accountability concept by definition calls for four things.

- First, identify one before whom accountability has to be given.
- Second, acknowledge his supremacy.
- Third, determine the nature of accountability, which implies determining the kind of works that would qualify as success or failure.
- Fourth, establish separate consequences for success and failure, for if the consequences are the same for both of them, or there are no consequences at all, it will make accountability meaningless.

These are the logical undertones of his "real" faith. Ironically, his formulation would still invite the same problem that he wanted to avoid in the first place. He would have to believe in the same God that the Japanese have overthrown in their effort to scale progress. It would also bring in the same shackles (the *shari'ah* and morality) that he aspires to break and which in his view attribute to Islam's poverty. Should that happen, the same issue of reward and punishment will surface; and again, his heart will deny their eventual return to hellfire on seeing God's creation affluent and happy.

THE NEW IJTIHAD - PROHIBITION WAS FOR THE "ARABS" ONLY

In his understanding, the Qur'an does not establish the absoluteness of prohibition. He thinks that for

some specific reasons, eating pork was proscribed for the Arabs only. Before making up such a story, he could have checked with the Qur'an. But perhaps he had no heart for it. The Qur'an clearly says:

Say: "I find not in the revelation received any (meat) forbidden to be eaten by one who wishes to eat it, unless it is dead meat, or blood poured forth, or the flesh of swine – for it is an abomination – or what is impious (meat) on which a name has been invoked other than Allah's." But (even so), if a person is forced by necessity, without willful disobedience nor takes more than needed, your Lord is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.

al-An'am: 145

In this *ayah*, for every diner (*tā'im*), pork is prohibited. The causal element in the prohibitory rationale is the impurity of the pork. The word *tā'im* here does not carry a restricted connotation – the Arabs only – for it is just not possible that the same thing could be impure for the Arabs and pure for others. That being the case, would he give license for eating dead animals as well? If he wants to be lenient on eating pork, he may do so but not at the expense of the Qur'an, which is clear on its prohibition.

Among the rules for *ijtihād* crafted by today's new *mujtahidīn* (jurisconsults), a rule suggests that when you desire violating a *shari'ah* edict, say it was specific to the Arabs. This kind of perverse attitude, if allowed, could set aside the whole Qur'an for the Arabs alone.

His deduction from *fa-manidturra ghayra bāghin walā 'ād* is so delectably ethereal that one feels like applauding his scholarship. Perhaps he translated this *ayah* in the following vein: "When you feel the

compulsion of eating pork, take it. But do not eat in the garden nor make a habit out of it."

Only an untaught person who knew nothing of the word *idtirār*, nor of *bāghin* and *'ād* could have had the guts to make allowance from the diction even for those who were not "forced by necessity." Otherwise, for the educated it would have been difficult to venture that far. The *āyah* does not say that those who are given to dead meat or blood, or eating pork, or who are accustomed to eating animals slaughtered in a name other than Allah's come under the umbrella term of the helpless. In that case, the prohibition edict would be rendered meaningless. For if the prohibition were restricted to such encumbered people, they would have continued eating the disallowed by making use of the exemption clause. On the contrary, the injunction would be redundant if the prohibition were for those who already avoided such things. By pegging *idtirār* with *ghayra bāghin walā 'ād*, the Qur'an allows exception to people who have nothing to eat but dead meat or pork and are dying. However, even in that case such a person still would have to be careful lest he exceeds the limit of necessity and compulsion. In other words, he can eat dead meat or pork to save his life and nothing beyond.

The same theme spills over into al-Mā'idah. While talking about the prohibition of eating dead meat and pork, the wordings in the *āyah* are "*famanidturra fī makhmasatin ghayra mutājanifin li-ithm* – but if (a person) is forced by hunger with no inclination to transgression, Allah is indeed Forgiving, Most Merciful" (al-Mā'idah: 3).

This permission is entirely different from his plea that since eating pork is high on Chinese and European menus, the scope of the *āyah* "*fa-*

manidturra ..." should be extended to their case – that too for his noble cause of bringing them into Islam. This is not feasible because once margin is allowed to the people by diluting Islamic laws, it will end up in legitimizing usury, fornication and other social evils. One may ask why bother about such people's embrace of Islam if they are reluctant to accept the divine dictate and reform themselves? When should Islam bend itself to placate them? What is the compulsion to cut a deal with them on their terms?

As a starter, he makes an unguarded denial of a causal link between food and morality. From there – using it as a launch pad – he takes a leap and says that religion has no right to split edibles into *halāl* and *harām*. Little knowing that his ruling has unwittingly exposed his knowledge base, which is poor in both the Qur'ānic as well as physical sciences. Maybe for the

Among the rules for *ijtihād* crafted by today's new *mujtahidin* (jurisconsults), a rule suggests that when you desire violating a *sharī'ah* edict, say it was specific to the Arabs. This kind of perverse attitude, if allowed, could set aside the whole Qur'ān for the Arabs alone.

"enlightened secular person", ignorance of the Qur'ān is not a big deal, but lacking scientific knowledge is surely a shame. He does not know the linkage between the human self and the body it inheres nor of the body's constituents and the foods, which replenish and help replace worn out cells and tendons. Perhaps he also does not know that after every few years the human body adjusts itself to the ongoing wear and tear inside, replacing the old one. To think this process of readjustment would have no effect is amazingly naïve.

Lately, research on dietetics has confirmed that food does have a bearing on human conduct and mental faculties.³ The coming years may throw up fresh evidence on how the human self and its thinking patterns are affected by different foods. It appears that our secular friend has yet to familiarize himself with the emergent horizons of science.

EDITOR'S COMMENTS

1. This citation was present in the original text. But since it was long, I preferred to place it here. On more than one occasion, the Qur'an talks about it. See for example, al-Baqarah: 183; al-Mā'idah: 3; al-An'am: 40; al-Nahl: 115.
2. On the nature of Pauline Christianity and its attitude toward religion without law, see the following passages from the Bible:

For as many as are of the works of the law are under a curse: for it is written, cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them.

Galatians 3: 10

Further:

Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us: for it is written, "Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree..." Galatians 3: 13

For a discussion of the subject, see Tarik Jan's *The Life and Times of Muhammad, Rasūl Allāh – Universalizing the Abrahamic Tradition* (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies and Islamic Foundation, UK, 1999), second revised edition, pp. 2-29.

3. The old-time linkage between the human body and food and the effect that it has on one's attitudes in life still stays unchallenged. "The liver, perhaps because of its size," says Isaac Asimov, "commanded particular respect among the ancients, who often considered it the particular seat of life. (The similarity between "liver" and "to live" may not be entirely accidental.) As recently as Shakespeare's time, common expressions used the liver as a symbol of the state of emotions. "Lily-livered", that is, a liver poorly supplied with blood, was a synonym for "coward", to give the most common example.

"For example, the secretion formed by the liver is called gall ("yellow" AS) because of the yellowish cast of the fresh juice, or bile, from a Latin word of uncertain derivation. The Greek term for the juice is "chole" and is used in many medical terms. All three words are used in common expressions, testifying to the old belief in the great importance of the fluid. The Greeks considered it to be two of the four important fluids of the body, for they felt it consisted of two verities, one coloured black and one yellow. (This is not so; there is only one bile, though it may be differently coloured, depending on the state of its freshness.) The Greeks felt a person who suffered from an overproduction of black bile was "melancholic", and one suffering an overproduction of yellow bile was "choleric". The supposed connection of the liver and emotions is clear, for we still use those words to indicate dispositions that are given to sadness or anger, respectively. Isaac Asimov, *On the*

Human Body and the Human Brain (New York: Bonanza Books, 1985), pp. 231-232.

Mawdudi is right about the regeneration of the skin, especially epidermis. Isaac Asimov, a professor of biochemistry at Boston University School of Medicine says: "Skin is divided into two main regions: dermis and epidermis. The epidermis is dead. The cells at the base of the epidermis are alive, and are constantly growing and multiplying so that cell after cell is pushed upward and away from the blood supply of the dermis. Without a blood supply, the cell dies and much of it, aside from the inert keratin, atrophies. The vicissitudes of existence are constantly rubbing away some of the dead material from the surface of our body, but this is constantly being replaced from below, and we retain our epidermis ever fresh." (p. 269.)

Besides, every year 20 percent of our bone structure changes. It is now well documented that a lack of certain nutrients causes mental and physical diseases, which modify human behaviour, even leading one to criminal pursuits. First proposed by the "organic theory", biochemical causation of mental diseases is now scientifically established. What we "call the mind", says Asimov, "is the interplay of the nerve cells of the body, and the mind is therefore, at the very least, indirectly subject to the ordinary physical and chemical laws that govern those cells. Even if mental disorder arises from an outside stress it is the neurons that respond to the stress either well or poorly, and the varying ability to respond to the stress healthfully must have its basis in biochemical differences.... Pellagra, a disease once endemic in Mediterranean lands and in

our own South, was characterized by dementia as one of the symptoms. It was found to be a dietary-deficiency disease, caused by the lack of nicotinic acid in the diet." (p. 669.)

At least two viral diseases have been traced to eating pork. Also, it is said to have a particular kind of glucose that is not compatible with the human body. But whether some kinds of animal meat, like pork, can have a bearing on a person's morality is definitely a new area of inquiry. The Qur'ānic scheme of *halāl* and *harām* may have moral and physiological aspects that we still do not know. It is, however, to the credit of the revelation that it always stays ahead of humanity. Maybe one day the latter catches up in its understanding of the *sharī'ah* wisdom.

Darwinian Evolution: Theory or Law?

A READER OF the *Tarjumān al-Qur'ān* has asked the following:

Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory is a known fact of knowledge in the present-day world. But when we read the Qur'ān, the divergence between the two views comes across. The most obvious is that of man's origination. In the Qur'ān, he is human from his inception, the progenitor of all humanity, and brought into being through an act of creation at a particular moment in time. The sciences, however, state the opposite. According to their conception of life, man has gradually grown out of his animal mould.

But at what point in history did he lose his animal mould and assume humanity, [they say nothing]. The Qur'ān, however, makes an emphatic statement on this aspect of the problem:

"And when I have fashioned him and breathed into him of My spirit, then (the angels) fell down before him prostrate."

Sād: 72

This is a first-glance example of divergence between the Qur'ān and evolutionary theory, though there are other places as well in the Qur'ān where the two do not see eye to eye on the issue of man's creation. How can a science student save his

faith? Do you have an answer to this dilemma of our existence?

For an answer to the preceding question, one need not delve into the rationale of the Darwin theory. All we have to do is ask ourselves whether his theory is a proven law or a hypothesis.¹ Suppose it is a theory, which it is, then why take it seriously as a substitute for the Qur'ān?

Thus as a starter, let us understand that Darwin's mid-nineteenth-century theory is still a hypothesis and not a proven law. The difference between hypothesis and law is very important for a theory that does not cohere with facts has no stay, but truth has.² The question of reviewing one's faith rises only when it comes into conflict with a proven truth. A faith that cowers before speculative thought and unproven theories is not worth the claim of faith but is rather a fond hope that decays by mere rumours.

Having said that, let us look at the theory's intellectual thrust. It begins with the spiny issue of life, which is for sure the most difficult terrain of biology.³ It should thus come as no surprise that scientists are at loggerheads with each other on this crucial issue. The Qur'ān says the origin of life owes itself to the commandment from Allah who said "be" to dead matter and it began to kick. The post-Renaissance West denies this. Wedded to the effort of denying God His place in this universe, it probed the natural world for the counter permeating force that runs it. Wrong as the approach was it brought out those difficult questions, which can only be answered through a speculative fling at them. For example, how did life originate? Second, what is the reason for complexity and divergence in nature?

To Darwin goes the credit of examining these issues and coming up with an answer.⁴ He never claimed that he had comprehended the secret behind reality. Even among the scientists who accepted his formulation, nobody affirmed it as the truth. Ironically though, people who have only a smattering of scientific knowledge are behaving as if reality stood unmasked before them.

A faith that cowers before speculative thought and unproven theories is not worth the claim of faith but is rather a fond hope that decays by mere rumours.

Let me put it in this way. To begin with, Darwin set out on his evolutionary voyage on the wrong foot, as his premise was false. If he had started with the Qur'ān as his compass, he would have reached a radically different summation. In that case, he would have said that the complexity and variance in life was not accidental or random but rather had an exceptional order behind it – from the unicellular molecule to a full-blown human form.⁵ Besides, the Qur'ān would have told him that the universe is the outcome of a master-mind who helped different organisms grow in a correspondingly compatible environment and then gradually nudged them toward species of differentiated characteristics. Further, if in God's plan some species became unwanted, He phased them out. But as I said, since the West saw things through a blinkered vision of a godless mind, it explained to itself that it was the self-organizing ability of atoms that gave us life on earth. Darwin's theory became handy for such a mind. European atheism by then, though under full steam, still lacked a solid scientific base. His theory of

evolution written in scientific jargon and seemingly plausible received a ready embrace as it provided atheism its wooden legs.⁶ Suddenly it made them understand the so-far-elusive reality. Without much reflection, they fixed the theory's wooden legs to every discipline from the sciences to philosophy and from ethics to the humanities,⁷ although it carried serious flaws in its interpretation of physical phenomena.⁸

Avoiding complex scholarly wrangling over the subject let me explain the basic weaknesses of the Darwin theory.

Suppose a science professor from Mars along with an entourage of students lands on earth to conduct some research. Also, presume that these aliens from outer space suffer from an eyesight problem, which clouds them from seeing human beings, although they can see their handmade products and the implements and means of their civilization. The visiting professor can also see qualitative variations in structures and their functions among manmade things. Besides, he finds that some of these things were of later origin, while others had their beginning in the past and some existed before but now had become extinct. He continues taking note of this fractious scene and then one day, he categorizes them into different slots. A few days later, he moves further in his work and wants to know how these things originated with so many permutations in shape and colour. Second, what are the patterns of differentiation? Third, what are the regulating principles behind obsolescence and the continuance of one group of things over others?

Certainly a problematic situation, the professor could have resolved the complex scene by

attributing it to a master creator who made things according to his plan and for ends he knows best.

Then looking at things long gone out of sight, the professor could have said that the creator stopped making things which outlived their utility and substituted them with better formulations. But for some reason, the alien scientist avoids this course and shifts his focus instead

European atheism by then, though under full steam, still lacked a solid scientific base. His theory of evolution written in scientific jargon and seemingly plausible received a ready embrace as it provided atheism its wooden legs.

to an imaginary first seed from which everything sprouted. The next phase followed by proliferation through evolution, giving birth to a myriad of shapes and colours. Then further up the evolutionary ladder, things clashed with each other for survival and adaptation. In this conflict some perished some survived, leaving behind the fittest to stay and dominate.

Once he shaped up his theory, he was not far from his conclusion. The "two-wheeled cart specie" kicked itself into motion followed by the survival exercise, until some of its ablest members started showing change in their composition and eventually turned into a horse carriage. Then the carriage specie struggled and some of its ablest members began to show change in their composition and turned into an automobile. Then on seeing some of the tall trees and buildings, a few automobiles fired with ambition began hopping in the air until wings grew on them and eventually turned into airplanes.



Now, let us carry this analogy a little further. Fascinated by his story, the students ask the Martian professor: "Sir! The evolution from the cart to the carriage and carriage to the automobile and from automobile to airplane necessarily implies that the transition from one form to another had a series of transmutations. And that some of them per force must be in the visible process of change moving along the evolutionary track like the elements of a caravan – one following the other. For example, the students said, between the carriage and the automobile, there must be a large number of such automotives with both the forms and characteristics of the carriage as well as the automobile. Likewise, during this phase of evolution, there must be some such species metamorphosing themselves into airplanes with wings growing on them."

The question throws the professor into reflection for a while. Then he perks up. "You see that carriage in front of you," says the scientist with a pointer aimed at the object. "This must have turned into carriage-car and subsequently into car-carriage and later into an automobile. Still later, evolution nudged the automobile into a machine with wings and eventually into an airplane which you now see flying in the air. These middle links that I named for you must be lying somewhere. So go and find them in the sand dunes."⁹

Having said that, the professor falls silent. With prejudice against humans, the Martian students readily believe in what he said. But while reporting their professor, they incidentally drop the probability clauses of "perhaps" and "must have happened" from his speech and add definitive words like "is" and "certainly". They also mention the cooked up carriage-car and the winged car in

such a way as if the things exist in a museum; though, what exist are the carriage, automobile, and airplane.

This analogy sits perfectly well with the Darwin theory and its followers. The entire corpus of literature on evolution has its base in "must-have-existed",¹⁰

which is contrary to the scientific attitude marked by the verifiable presence of a thing in space and time. My submission is that if science gives weight to "must-have-existed", then why treat one "probability" differently from the other. Especially so, when one probability has more chance than the other does. Thus, my postulate that the origin of life and the differentiation in living organisms owes to the creative power of a master creator is far more plausible in explaining reality than Darwin's. Besides, it has a strong support of credible witnessing from scores of upright people whose lives are untainted by lies. They say emphatically that what they have seen is there. That being the case why do science students bring to the sciences the traits of a believer?¹¹ Is there a reason other than "theophobia", their legacy from the Middle Ages? If it is true, then how did they dare name "emotions" as knowledge?

Setting aside the scientific and rational problems of the theory, the harm caused by this savage concept insofar as its influence on philosophy, ethics, and humanities is concerned is

Suddenly it made them understand the so-far-elusive reality. Without much reflection, they fixed the theory's wooden legs to every discipline from the sciences to philosophy and from ethics to the humanities, although it carried serious flaws in its interpretation of physical phenomena.

so immense that it falls short of a measure.¹² For one, it has convinced humanity that it is like other animals. Because of this perception of reality, the children of Adam are treating each other like beasts. In the absence of guidance from a superior moral source, they have their noses in the dirt looking for its clues in animal life.

Darwin's perspective on nature is a bloody one, fermenting with conflict and war. The moral dimension is out; people view the stronger not only as successful but also as the bearer of goodness and truth. As opposed to the strong, the weak are worthless and have no stake to claim life or respect.¹³ Unleashed thus from the moral grid, individuals, classes, and nations have pushed our planetary existence into hell. Strife is the order of the day; instead of respecting each other's rights, the gunboat dictates international relations. If this makes Darwin's theory the fount of all evil, then it should surprise none.

EDITOR'S COMMENTS

Reducing Darwinism to a dogma

1. In 1958, when the fifth volume of *Encyclopedie francaise* carrying the peak scholarship of the French biologists saw print, the Darwinians had the shock of their lives. So far the Darwinians took refuge in biology, especially at the micro level, but when the prominent French biologists from Claude Bernard to Lucien Cuénot said "the theory of evolution is impossible," they lost their steam. Worse, the biologists reduced it to the status of a dogma. "Evolution," they said, "is a kind of dogma in

which its priests no longer believe but which they keep presenting to their people. So much about a matter which it takes courage to spell out so that men of the coming generation may orient their research in a different way."

The year 1958 is also important in another sense. For the first time, Darwin's work *The Origin of Species* had an introduction written by the distinguished scientist W. R. Thompson whose weighty critique almost demolished the Darwinian evolution. The fact that he was asked by the publishers to contribute a critique of Darwin replacing Sir Arthur Keith's pro-Darwin introduction speaks of the cleft that had already occurred in the hegemonic Darwinian doctrine. Thompson dismissed Darwin's theory as "unproved suppositions". Using de Quatrefages' words, he called it an amalgamation of "personal convictions" and "simple possibilities". See Thompson's introduction to Charles Darwin's *The Origin of Species* (London: Everyman's Library, J. M. Dent & Sons, 1958).

In Britain, the home of Darwin's theory, Dr. James Gray from Cambridge University described it as orthodoxy, zealously defended by its followers as if it were a religion. "No amount of argument, or clever epigram, can disguise the inherent improbability of orthodox [evolutionary] theory; but most biologists feel it is better to think in terms of improbable events than not to think at all." See Stanley L. Jaki, *The Road of Science and the Ways to God* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978), pp. 288-289.

To Sir Karl Popper, a prominent scientist, Darwinism is not a scientific theory. "Neither

Darwin, nor any Darwinian, has so far given an actual causal explanation of the adaptive evolution of any single organism or any single organ. All that has been shown – and this is very much – is that such an explanation might exist – that is to say, they [sic] are not logically impossible.” Conference on the Mathematical Challenges to the Neo-Darwinian Theory of Evolution (1967) chaired by Sir Peter Medawar, a Noble Laureate.

Popper is also on record to have said: “Darwinian evolutionary theory is not scientific but merely a metaphysical research programme.” See Stephen G. Brush, *Fruitful Encounters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 97.

Murray Eden, MIT’s Professor of Electrical Engineering, proceeded to show that if it required a mere six mutations to bring about an adaptive change, this would occur by chance only once in a billion years – while, if two dozen genes were involved, it would require 10,000,000,000 years, which is much longer than the age of the earth.

Richard Goldschmidt, Professor of Genetics, University of California, discounts natural selection as nature’s order of things: “I may challenge the adherents of the strictly Darwinian view ... to try to explain the evolution of the following features by accumulation and selection of small mutants: hair in mammals, feathers in birds, segmentation of arthropods and vertebrates, the transformation of the gill arches in phlogeny including the aortic arches, muscles, nerves, etc.; further, teeth, shells of molluscs, ectoskeltons, compound eyes, blood circulation,

alternation of generations, statocysts, ambulacral system of echinoderms, pedicellaria of the same, cnidocysts, poison apparatus of snakes, whalebone and finally primary chemical differences like haemoglobin versus haemocyanin, etc. ... Corresponding examples from plants could be given." See Gordon Rattray Taylor, *The Great Evolution Mystery* (London: Sphere Books, 1984), p. 5.

Goldschmidt's book *The Material Basis of Evolution*, a Yale University Press publication, makes an interesting study.

2. The Darwin theory was held as scientific because it could interpret observable facts as well as explain them. Second, it offered a solution to the problem of the origin of the species in an orderly, rational manner. Third, it was workable. In this sense, it became satisfactory and true. In science, true does not mean that which is not false, but that which works. This perhaps explains why the Darwinians upheld it.

Besides, the theory, as noted by Michael Negus, survives "because the imagination of modern man readily transforms one animal form into another. This is so because the modern psyche is dominated by time, matter and change and is relatively blind to Space, Substance and Eternity. To oppose one's thoughts to the theory of evolution is to think in a way which is contrary to the common tendency of the modern psyche." See *Studies in Comparative Religion*, Michael Negus' article "Reactions to the Theory of Evolution," (summer-autumn 1978 issue), Vol. 12, Nos. 3 and 4, pp. 188-194.

The probability of creating life is not possible

3. Biochemists are grappling with the problem of making proteins, the building blocks of life, through molecular evolution. In this respect, two interesting ideas have emerged. One came in 1928 when J. B. S. Haldane proposed that pre-life atmosphere was ammonia-based and not oxygen. The other came six years later from a Russian scientist, Aleksandr Oparin who saw lighting and ultra-violet light as synthesizers of biologically interesting molecules in his imaginary primitive ocean.

It took, however, another twenty years before an actual experiment could take place. Harold Urey and his student Stan Miller succeeded in producing biotic molecules by creating the supposed primitive condition (that is: a mixture of ammonia, methane and water) as envisioned by Haldane and Oparin.

So far, they have made amino acids and some organic molecules. But they are far behind in making proteins or the elementary cell. "You cannot make proteins without DNA, but you cannot make DNA without enzymes, which is a protein. It is a chicken and egg situation," says Gordon R. Taylor in his remarkable work *The Great Evolution Mystery*.

The guess is that biological life originated from enzymes by chance, though it would not make sense because it calls for a very long gestation period. The inference, as suggested by Taylor, is that "life emerged rather promptly the moment conditions were tolerable." (p. 201.)

But before science could congratulate itself on the possibility of creating life in laboratory conditions, H. Quastler, a great name in biochemistry, dampened rising spirits by calculating the odds against it as 10^{-301} (ten followed by 301 zeros to one). The verdict being that to create life is impossible.

In the case of the universe, the figure is 10^{-415} to 10^{-600} . "In short," sums up Taylor, "the mechanism falls short of plausibility by hundreds of orders of magnitudes." (p. 202.) There is no chance behind evolution.

The present theory about the origin of the universe, as espoused by the astronomers, creates further problems for the Darwin theory. The Big Bang theory postulates that about 12 billion years ago the universe exploded into existence in a process known as 'inflation', expanding from subatomic dimensions to the width of a football in less than one-million-billion-billion-billionth of a second. For a plausible account of the origin of the universe, see Steven Weinberg, *The First Three Minutes* (New York: Basic Books, 1993), pp. 101-121. NASA's new program the Microwave Anisotropy Probe, started May 2001, may help us know more about the process.

Evolution did not originate with Darwin's theory

4. Here perhaps Mawdudi is crediting Darwin more than he deserves. Darwin is certainly not the originator of the idea of evolution. Among the Greeks, Anaximander hypothesized that the sea is the mother of life, and that man is the evolved form of fish life through certain

processes of adaptation. The Qur'ān talks about evolution though in a different frame of thought. Almost ten centuries before Darwin, the renowned Muslim scholar 'Amr ibn Bahr al-Jāhiz in his extraordinary work *Kitāb al-Hayawān* came out with the notions of struggle for existence, adaptation, and animal psychology, followed by Ibn Rushd, Ibn Tufayl and others. Their context though was religious and not secular atheism.

Miskawayh (932-1030) elaborated the notion of evolution and the moving of life from simplicity to complexity. "Allah the Exalted," he says, "is single, eternal, and brings into existence all the material phenomena from nothing." His argument is that if the phenomena were from the existing things, then creativity and innovation would become meaningless. In the continuation of the creation, its sustenance and growth, Miskawayh (not Ibn Miskawayh; his full name is Abū 'Alī Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Ya'qūb) has a unique view. He holds that the entire life form pulses through a series of phases governed by the principle of continuity. Every bit of life has its genesis in a simpler form and continues progressing until it becomes complex reaching the far end of its potential and the beginning of the emerging species. Thus, he says botanical life grows out of inorganic life and continues to grow until it reaches its full potential. As it grows further, it assumes the animal form. Likewise, the animals came out of a simpler form to come close to humans in their likeness. Miskawayh falls short of building up an evolutionary link between the animals and the humans. Instead,

taking humanity as a creation by itself, he proceeds to prove that humans are not static in their endowment of intelligence, reasoning, and decision making but keep moving on the scale of evolution until they reach their highest point. Here, they face a divergence in development and follow either of the two courses. In the first case, man's ability to conceptualize, synthesize, and reflect is enhanced to the extent that he begins to understand reality behind the creation through intuition. In the second case, he receives directly from Providence the ability to grasp reality. The first phase of growth is acquired by the philosophers; the second by the prophets. For this summary of Miskawayh's views, see al-Shaykh Nadīm al-Jasr, *Qissah al-īmān bayn al-falsafah wa al-'ilm wa al-Qur'ān*, Urdu version, *Falsafah, Science, aur Qur'ān* by Khuda Bakhsh Kalyar (Lahore: al-Faysal Publishers, 1999), second edition, pp. 77-78.

The *Ikhwān al-Safā* (the Brethren of Purity), a brotherhood of Muslim scientists in the tenth century, also talked about evolution. But they were strikingly different than the later-day evolutionists in the West, for as opposed to Godless chance selection, they believed in the gradation of beings (*marātib al-mawjūdāt*). "The species and genus," they say, "are definite and preserved. Their forms are in matter. But the individuals are in perpetual flow; they are neither definite nor preserved. The reason for the conservation of forms, genus and species, in matter is the fixity of their celestial cause because their efficient cause is the Universal Soul of the spheres instead of the change and

continuous flux of individuals, which is due to the variability of their cause." See Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines* (Boulder: Shambhala, 1978) p. 72.

Perhaps it would not be wrong to say that both Nasr (*Knowledge and the Sacred*) and Titus Burckhardt (*Cosmology and Modern Science*) have based their enchanting metaphysics of conjunction between "form" and "matter" on al-Ikhwān al-Safā's gradation of beings. For example, read this from Burckhardt:

The individual world is the formal world because it is the realm of realities constituted by the conjunction of a "form" with a "matter", or plastic substance, that "form" plays the part of a principle of individuation; in itself, in its ontological basis, it is not an individual reality but an archetype, and as such it lies beyond limitations and beyond change. ... [An archetype] is nonetheless as real and indeed incomparably more real than [a species is].

In the West, Buffon (1707-1788), almost a hundred years before Darwin, came up with his sensational three-volume work *Histoire naturel*. Darwin knew about Buffon's work and used to ridicule him as one who had no knowledge of evolution. ...When at Huxley's urging, he finally read him, he remarked: "Whole pages are laughably like mine." See Darwin's letter to Huxley in *The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin*, quoted by Stanley L. Jaki, *The Road of Science* ... p. 284.

As Darwin's precursors, some notables are Linnaeus (for his great taxonomic system), Laplace (for his nebular hypothesis that the

solar system must have had a prior state), Lamarck (for his organic, slow transformation), Cuvier (that there are fossil species without living isomorphs), and Lyell (for stressing present forms with the past). The first man in the West to have used the word evolution was Charles Bonnet. Nevertheless, precursors do not mean that there was "a linear succession of scientific insights, inexorably culminating in Darwin's theory of natural selection." For this view, see John Hedley Brooke's *Science and Religion – Some Historical Perspectives* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 227.

Thus, evolution as an idea was known and gaining acceptability. Earlier theories such as nebular hypothesis in astronomy, uniformitarianism in geology, and the discovery of extinct species in paleontology had already proposed a changing universe. But it still called for a Darwin to explain change with a scientific coating. "The sciences," wrote Will Durant, "were reaching a stage of complexity which would make a bewildered world welcome a synthesis." Tracing the intellectual antecedents of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), Will Durant says: "But above all these intellectual influences that stirred England in the youth of Herbert Spencer was the growth of biology, and the doctrine of evolution. Science had been exemplarily international in the development of this doctrine: Kant had spoken of the possibility of apes becoming men; Goethe had written of the metamorphosis of plants; Erasmus, Darwin and Lamarck had propounded the theory that species had evolved from simpler forms by the inheritance

of the effects of use and disuse: and in 1830 St. Hilaire shocked Europe, and gladdened old Goethe, by almost triumphing against Cuvier in that famous debate on evolution which seemed like another *Ernani*, another revolt against classic ideas of changeless rules and orders in a changeless world." See Will Durant's *The Story of Philosophy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), p. 354.

Darwin's contribution was preponderant in the sense that he tried to validate the idea of evolution by the data he laboured to collect and then presented it with the skill of a scientist.

5. The Qur'ān says every living thing has come from water. Further, the heavens and the earth were together before they were separated from each other, and that creation has purpose in it. The Qur'ān also says that different aspects of life complement each other.

Do not the unbelievers see that the heavens and the earth were joined together (as one unit of creation) before We clove them asunder? We made from water every living thing. Will they not then believe?

al-Anbiyā': 30

For example read the following:

And Allah has made for you mates (and companions) of your own nature, and made for you, out of them, sons and daughters and grandchildren, and provided for your sustenance of the best: will they then believe in vain things, and be ungrateful for Allah's favours?

It is He who brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers when you knew nothing; and He gave

*you hearing and sight and intelligence and affection:
that you may give thanks (to Allah).*

*Do they not look at the birds, held poised in the midst
of (the air and) sky? Nothing holds them up but (the
power of) Allah. Verily in this are signs for those who
believe.*

*It is Allah who made your habitations homes of rest
and quiet for you; and made for you out of the skins
of animals, (tents for) dwellings, which you find so
light (and handy) when you travel and when you
stop (in your travels), and out of their wool, and their
soft fibres (between wool and hair), and their hair,
rich stuff and articles of convenience (to serve you)
for a time...*

al-Nahl: 72, 78-80

*That He has created pairs in all things, and has made
for you ships and cattle on which you ride, in order
that you may sit firm and square on their backs, and
when so seated, you may celebrate the (kind) favour
of your Lord, and say, "Glory to Him who has
subjected these to our (use), for we could never have
accomplished this by ourselves."*

al-Zukhruf: 12-13

*What! Are you more difficult to create or the heaven
(above)? (Allah) has constructed it; on high has He
raised its canopy, and He has given it order and
perfection. Its night does He endow with darkness,
and its splendour does He bring out (with light).
And the earth, moreover, has He extended (to a wide
expanse); He draws out there from its moisture and
its pasture; and the mountains has He firmly fixed
for use and convenience to you and your cattle.*

al-Nazi'at: 27-33

As to the purpose behind creation, an interesting observation has come from Thomas S. Kuhn while explaining one of his theses "the

resolution of revolutions". He quotes A. Hunter Dupree's *Asa Gray* that the Darwinians' greatest difficulty stemmed from Darwin himself. "All the well-known pre-Darwinian evolutionary theories – those of Lamarck, Chambers, Spencer, and the German *Naturphilosophen* – had taken evolution to be a goaldirected process. The 'idea' of man and of the contemporary flora and fauna was thought to have been present from the first creation of life, perhaps in the mind of God. That idea or plan had provided the direction and the guiding force to the entire evolutionary process. Each new stage of evolutionary development was a more perfect realization of a plan that had been present from the start."

Kuhn says, "For many men the abolition of that teleological kind of evolution was the most significant and least palatable of Darwin's suggestion. The origin of species recognized no goal set either by God or nature. ... The belief that natural selection, resulting from mere competition between organisms for survival, could have produced man together with the higher animals and plants was the most difficult and disturbing aspect of Darwin's theory. What could 'evolution', 'development', and 'progress' mean in the absence of a specified goal? To many people, such terms suddenly seemed self-contradictory." See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), third edition, pp. 171-172.

6. They not only accepted the Darwin theory but also made sure that nothing opposed to it was

accorded credibility. In this regard, Professor Rupert Riedl's statement is quite revealing: "Most of the unexplained phenomenon in macro-evolution was first minimized, then swept under the carpet and finally forgotten." See Taylor's *The Great Evolution...*

So pervasive was the hold of evolutionary theory that eminent physicist Ludwig Boltzmann (1844-1906) described the nineteenth century as the century of Darwin.

7. Herbert Spencer perhaps was the first person to have brought the social sciences in line with evolution. The *Principles of Psychology* in 1855; later two volumes under the same title in 1873; His *First Principles* came in 1862; *Synthetic Philosophy* appeared in 1872 under the title of *Principles of Biology*; *The Study of Sociology* in 1873 and an expanded version in 1876; and in 1893 his *The Principles of Ethics* appeared. All these works have evolution as their guiding spirit. For example, writing on ethics, Spencer says: "Acceptance of the doctrine of organic evolution determines certain ethical conceptions." It is because of his expounding evolution as a synthesizing idea that the West hailed him as the philosopher of universal evolution.

It may surprise many that Spencer was also the first to have coined the now famous phrase – the struggle for existence leads to the survival of the fittest. This he wrote in his 1852 essay on the "Theory of Population". See Will Durant's *The Story of Philosophy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), p. 361.

Even biology suffered the grotesque when a large number of zoologists under the

Darwinian spell tried to prove that the vertebrates evolved from the invertebrates despite the two belonging to separate groups.

Chance occurrence, the complexity of biological life

8. The twentieth century has thrown up a lot of exciting material that placed Darwin's theory in an ugly situation. One of the best critiques on Darwinism is available in Gordon Rattray Taylor's *The Great Evolution Mystery* (1983).

What is life? Taylor asks and then answers it as life's ability to repair itself. For example, the wound heals itself and so does the microscopic cell when punctured. The body replaces the blood lost within hours. "The efficiency," says Taylor, "with which organization restores the original plan when damage has occurred, has so impressed many observers that they have concluded that some exterior, vitalistic force was needed to explain the phenomenon." (p. 203.)

To explain his point, he cites the case of an insect known as *Hilaria*. *Hilaria*, a fly, makes a silk balloon and "offers it to the female of its choice. The female accepts the balloon she likes best and then permits copulation. How did *Hilaria* get this light degree of perspicacity? When we ask ourselves how many instinctive patterns of behaviour arose in the first place and became hereditarily fixed we are given no answer."

He quotes Ernst Mayr who says, "[a] shift into a new niche or adaptive zone is, almost without exception, initiated by a change in behaviour. The other adaptation to a new niche,

particularly the structural ones, are acquired secondarily."

Taylor dismisses Darwin's claim that behaviour is independent of instincts. He thinks that there is a programmed behaviour pattern. For example, to prove his point, he cites the case of the chicken in the egg. "The chick which, while still encased in the eggshell, pecks to get out cannot have learned to do so. Moreover, it does not peck at random, but aims for just the part of the egg where an air-space has been provided." (p. 220.)

"The well-known case of the bowerbirds looks very much like the kind of 'overshoot' which we noted in the evolution of morphological features. These birds build towers as much as nine feet high, with internal chambers, in the middle of circular lawns. These they embellish with flowers, which they replace as soon as they are withered. They may dye the wall with the juice of berries, or decorate the bower with snail shells, bits of grass or spider silk. One bower contained, it was found, nearly a thousand pebbles, more than a thousand strands of grass."

G. Evelyn Hutchinson, Yale University, considers birds' engineering, architectural and decoration skills, like their courtship displays, constitutes behaviour "that in its complexity and refinement is unique in the non-human part of the animal kingdom." (p. 222.)

Taylor also raises questions on the fascinating phenomenon of male selection in animals. "How, one asks, have they come to the conclusion that brightly coloured feathers or a booming cry are desirable? And why do hens mate, not with the victor, but with the cock

which has been defeated by another cock? That does not seem very Darwinian."

Similarly, "[t]he urge to find new habitats might be explained away as simply a search for some plentiful food supplies in some cases. But no such easy explanation can be advanced when we consider the truly mysterious urges of migrants. Salmon and eels return, not merely to the same area, but to the same river after their periodic trips to the Sargasso Sea. Why? The salmon, in order to make such a trip (or is it the reverse?), has to modify its entire physiology to do so. What is the origin of this compelling necessity?"

The biological life is so complex that mere chance occurrence alone cannot explain it. "We know the mix of the cells (protein, fat and fibres)", says he. "But we don't know how these raw materials are arranged in the complex structure." To build up his case, he cites the Austrian biologist W. E. Agar who argues that the organism produced from relatively formless components is "the great enigma of history". (p. 243.)

Again, there is random division of the cell in a plant leaf, but from it emerges the organized structure of the leaf (p. 24). Likewise, genes do not work all the time. The majority of them are regulatory. How and when genes express themselves is central to the problem of evolution. For example, the flowering phenomenon or the withering of leaves and subsequent greening of the trees. Taylor sounds like a mystic when he says: "What has happened at the genetic level? Clearly a messenger has arrived in the appropriate cells and has said: 'Leaf genes and

flower genes get going. Do your stuff.' The evolutionists talk about mutation favoured by selection, but it does not explain the whole thing."

Talking of chance mutation, Dr. Gerard L. Schroeder has an interesting story to tell. "When Lawrence Mettler and Thomas Gregg," he says, "decided to add a few chapters on the mathematics of evolution in their book *Population, Genetics and Evolution*, they brought Henry Schaffer on board. The maths Schaffer brings to this totally secular text states clearly that evolution via random mutations has a very weak chance of producing significant changes in morphology. Of course, this is exactly why you will search long and hard to find rigorous studies of probability in the works of Dawkins, Gould, or any other spokespersons for random evolution."

Schroeder accuses the evolutionists' approach of being "atavistic, a throwback to the time of Darwin, when cellular biology was assumed to be a rather simple affair of slime within a membrane." Molecular biology has shown that life is extremely complex. The fossil record contains a puzzle. "For three billion years, between the oldest fossils of life (bacteria and algae) at some 3.5 to 3.8 billion years and the first evidence of animals in the fossil records, 530 million years ago, the fossil record reveals a flow of life that remained one celled or at most groups of cells clustered into structureless communities. No appendages, no evidence of mouth or limbs or eyes. And then with no hint in the underlying (older) fossils, an explosion of complex animal fossils appears bearing the basic anatomical structures of all

phyla extant today. It is what is termed by the scientific community the Cambrian explosion of animal life. Among those structures are eyes. The earliest eyes arrived with stereoscopic positioning and with lenses that by their fossilized shape appear optically perfect for seeing in water, the habitat of those early animals..."

Taking eyes as an illustration, Schroeder says: "Especially confounding is the current similarity of the genes that regulate the initiation of eye formation among all five phyla that have visual systems. Were there in the fossil record any hint of a common ancestor of these five phyla that showed a nascent eye, the similarity would be explained as having arisen in that early animal. But there is no animal, let alone an animal with a primitive eye, prior to these eye-bearing fossils." Schroeder, a MIT scientist, says, "Random reactions could never have reproduced this complex physiological gene twice over, let alone five times independently. Somehow it was preprogrammed." See Schroeder's *The Hidden Face of God* (New York: The Free Press, 2001), pp. 120-121.

Besides, the Darwinians may see chance and suspect design in nature, but Darwin himself doubted his much-celebrated conclusion of "chance". Making a personal confession in his *Autobiography*, he says: "Can the mind of man which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animal, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions? May not these be the result of the connection between cause and effect which strike us as a

necessary one, but probably depends merely on inherited experience?" Professor Jaki, a distinguished scientist, made a stunning comment on it: "Darwin was not enough of a philosopher to realize that if there was merit in his question, then his claim about natural selection could well be considered merely an effect of hereditary experience, and therefore void of objectively valid intellectual merit." See Stanley L. Jaki's *The Road of Science ...* p. 285.

The absence of intermediate forms

9. The absence of intermediate forms is really the heart of the problem with Darwin's theory. Prof. G. G. Simpson, an ardent Darwinist, says: "The absence of transitional form is an almost universal phenomenon. True of invertebrates as well as vertebrates and of plants. The line making connection with common ancestry is not known even in one instance."

The rodents appear suddenly with specialized gnawing teeth. "In all 32 orders of mammals, the break is so sharp and their gap so large that the origin of the order is speculative and much disputed." Whales and dolphins are fully found in the fossil record.

"These [Groeberidae] highly specialized animals appear in the fossil record without any antecedents and then immediately – geologically speaking – disappear again for ever." See *The Great Evolution ...* p.78.

We do not know about the ancestry of angiosperms, like the flowering plants, the grasses, cereals, potato and well-known trees, from beech to palm. In all of them, the seeds

have protected layers as opposed to gymnosperms, like the conifers, in which the seeds lack protection. But where is the intermediate form between this type of seed mechanism and the flowering-plant kind? There seems to be no answer for it.

The fossils' record on which Darwin depended and expected that it would support him in the future turned out to be a great disappointment. The nine phyla so far discovered, as read by Dr. John Challinor – an evolutionist himself – pushes the Darwinians back to square one:

Foraminifera: “[T]he morphological series shown do not always seem to have very strong claims to being evolutionary series.”

Anthozoa: “Any suggestion is welcome in the attempt to find some evolutionary scheme into which the corals may be fitted.”

Echinoidea: “Their number (the unanswered questions) is a measure of our ignorance.”

Brachiopoda: “Such is the imperfection of the geological record of evolution.”

Mollusca: “No very coherent picture emerges when we trace the lammelibranchs and gastropods through the stratigraphical systems.”

Trilobita: “The Cambrian record ... reveals very little of the evolutionary paths they followed.”

Graptolithina: “The links in the supposed evolutionary chains are not so secure as was thought.”

Vertebrates: “The origin of the vertebrates is no more clearly revealed than the origin of any other phylum...”

Plants: "[M]eagre evidence ..."

See R. M. Morrell's "Evolutionary Contradictions and Geological Facts" in Osman Bakar's edited work *Critique of Evolutionary Criticism – A Collection of Essays* (Kuala Lumpur, The Islamic Academy of Science and Nurin Enterprise, 1987), p. 71.

Small wonder, many scientists like Bertrand-Sernet, Grant-Watson, Clark Caullery, Louis Bounoure, Paul Lemoine, Douglas Dewar, W. R. Thompson, R. M. Morrell and others declare Darwin's theory as scientifically impossible for the following reasons:

- The palaeontological evidence, often used by evolutionists, denies support to Darwinian evolution. The fossils' record shows no time sequence. It may sound ironic as it comes from an eminent evolutionist, Dr. John Challinor, that the fossils' record supports creation.
- The geologic record shows sudden explosion of new species radiating into numerous variants, each fauna arises with all its essential characteristics.
- The evolutionary hypothesis, which believes in an unending evolution toward perfection, is opposed to the law of entropy, which holds that the universe is gradually running down.
- Evolution, even if conceded, has a space-time context: it is a historical process and thus must have accumulated evidence, which the Darwinians fail to present.

- The theory fails to explain the chasm between Pre-Cambrian and Cambrian species.
- The occurrence of parallel and convergent evolution, in which similar structures evolve in quite different circumstances.
- The existence of long-term trends (orthogenesis) that continue to appear.
- The appearance of organs before they are needed (pre-adaptation).
- The acquired characteristics of specie cannot be inherited.
- The puzzle of how organs, once evolved, come to be lost (degeneration).
- The failure of some organisms to evolve at all.
- The evolutionary hypothesis rests on confusion between species and simple variation.

The massive evidence so far piled up shows that there is no progressive evolutionary ladder; instead, it is cyclic reproducing the same permanent forms – creation *par excellence*.

Applying dialectic to evolution

Richard Weaver challenges evolutionary theory on the dialectical level and considers it as a question-begging fallacy, for it “demands an initial acceptance of the doctrine of naturalism before any explanation is offered.”

Weaver gives the example of differentiation and specialization in nature, which the Darwinists explain as caused by the proximate

method used by nature. Biologists admit that complete empirical data for the descent of man from the lower animals is missing. To overcome this problem, they try to fit man "into a scheme where nothing is allowed to appear except through natural causation." Thus, Weaver says, "It is presumed that if man possesses the largest brain found in nature, it is because it must have been utilitarian for him to develop a large brain. But how can this be proved except by reference to the *a priori* postulate that nothing develops except through organic need?"

Weaver makes an important distinction between what the evolutionists describe as necessary and what he calls as fact. The evolutionary text views differentiation in nature as "necessary" because it comes from this assumed natural cause of organic need. This does not make it proven because for that it has to come from a known cause. Darwinists, says Weaver, assume that "evolution is a fact and then use it as both cause and effect in describing the phenomenon of nature. It is an ascertained truth that species do undergo change. But it is not in the spirit of free inquiry to hold the cause of that change down to a pattern of response between the organism and its environment in the interest of life. Here is where the theory slips in the questionable premise we have mentioned."

Having said that, Weaver urges that environmental pressures alone do not explain the wide proliferation of the species into so many forms and kinds like the giraffe, the centipede, the butterfly, the orchid, and the sunflower. Invoking the theory of mutation

(i.e., chemical alterations in the genes which produce genetic variants) is not of much help either, for the biologists have no answer to the mechanism of those changes taking place in the genes. Second, there are species containing mutants, which are unrelated to their present needs for adaptation. This makes a powerful suggestion for a "provided" ability to adopt in case of a crisis.

The Darwinians' insistence on using the theory of mutation in explaining natural selection exposes them as poor in the science of dialectics, for to hold mutation with belief in mechanical causation is an impossible act. That being the case, does it mean there is a causal link somewhere that we do not know?

Weaver's third point is equally sobering. He says: "It is easy to perceive the usefulness of an organ like the fully developed wing or eye. But of what use was this when it first began to develop, when it was rudimentary and perhaps microscopically small? Could its usefulness then have been decisive enough to make the difference between survival and extinction? Given the broad nature of the forces that living organisms are up against, would these early tiny modifications spell the difference between survival and extinction?"

Last, Weaver raises the complex issue of the origin of language. To him there is no anthropological or naturalistic account, which is more convincing than the mythological one that speech is a special gift. All language is metaphorical. "A metaphor," he says, "implies the world of symbolism, which is a world of transcendence over the merely natural. We cannot say whether man came into possession

of this world gradually or suddenly or whether he had full access to it from his 'creation', because the history of his attainment is veiled from us."

One can still seek refuge in the idea of emergence – the supposition that there was a cause, which gravitated man toward language. But as Weaver says, this would be asking to make concessions in preserving the "integrity of the theory". See Richard Weaver, *Visions of Order – The Cultural Crisis of Our Time* (Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1995), pp. 139-142.

Another interesting argument on the dialectical level has come from Titus Burckhardt whose "Evolution and the Traditional Idea of the Immutability of Species" challenges the evolutionists' rationale that the intermediate forms must have gone extinct owing to their unstable structures. Burckhardt thinks it contradicts the evolutionists' basic principle of selection as functional in the evolution of species. "These sketchy attempts," says he, "should be more numerous than the ancestors having already acquired a definitive form. Besides, if the evolution of species represents, as is declared, a gradual and continuous process, all the real links in the chain – therefore all those that are destined to be followed – will be at the same time resultant and intermediaries, in which case it is difficult to see why the ones would be much more precarious and more destructible than the others." See Osman Bakar (ed.), *Critique of Evolutionary Theory ...* p. 157.

The enormity of supposition in evolution

10. Julian Huxley used more or less the same words in his Introduction to the Mentor edition of *The Origin of Species* (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, 1958), p. x. Says Huxley: "Why is *The Origin of Species* such a great book? First of all, because it convincingly demonstrates the fact of evolution: it provides a vast and well-chosen body of evidence showing that existing animals and plants cannot have been separately created in their present forms, *but must have evolved* from earlier forms by slow transformation." (italics added).

Darwin himself knew about the problems with his theory. Chapter VI of his book under the heading "Difficulties of the theory" talks about, among others, the non-presence of transitional forms. Repeating the objections of his critics, he asks: "Why, if species have descended from other species by fine gradation, do we not everywhere see the transitional forms?" He also considers these difficulties as "fatal to his theory". Nevertheless, his response is that the fossil record is not yet updated. "Hence we ought not to expect at the present time to meet with numerous transitional varieties in each region, though *they must have existed there, and may be embedded there in a fossil condition.*" (p. 158.)

Again, at page 163, he makes a similar statement that "if my theory be true, linking closely together all the species of the same group, *must assuredly have existed.*"

This must-have-existed attitude runs through the so-called science of evolution. Dr. R. Broom's account of the mammals evolving from the Ictidosaurians, as told by Douglas Dewar in his

remarkable work *The Transformist Illusion* (Tennessee: Dehoff Publications, 1965) is indeed instructive and echoes Mawdudi's analogy of the two-wheeled cart turning into an airplane: "Some reptile scrapped the original hinge of its lower jaw and replaced it with a new one attached to another part of the skull. Then five of the bones on each side of the lower jaw broke away from the biggest bone. The jaw bone to which the hinge was originally attached, after being set free, forced its way into the middle part of the ear, dragging with it three of the lower jaw bones, which, with the quadrate and the reptilian middle-ear bone, formed themselves into a completely new outfit. While all this was going on, the organ of Corti, peculiar to mammals and their essential organ of hearing, developed in the middle ear. Dr. Broom does not suggest how this organ arose, nor describe its gradual development. Nor does he say how the incipient mammal contrived to eat while the new jaw was being rehinged, or to hear while the middle and inner ears were being reconstructed." Who says evolution theory is free from miracles? Dewar asks.

11. That the science community could reflect a religious attitude despite the mounting evidence against Darwinism is obvious from the following statement by Charles B. Beck, University of Michigan: "We do not yet know when the angiosperms originated, although we may be getting close to an answer. We do not know exactly where they originated."

Admitting problems with evolution theory, Beck says: "[w]e are even less certain of the ancestral group from which they originated." He was responding to botanist Tom Harris who

had said in 1960: "I ask you to look back on an unbroken record of failure." He dubbed Tom Harris's statement as pessimistic. "Certainly there have been many failures," he conceded. "[B]ut I am optimistic about future successes." See Taylor's *The Great Evolution ...* p. 77.

Commenting on this state of mind, Shute rightly says: "For in its turn evolution has become the intolerant religion of nearly all educated Western men. It dominates their thinking, their speech and the hope of their civilization." See E. Shute, *Flaws in the Theory of Evolution* (New Jersey: Nutley, 1976), p. 228.

Darwinism turned humanity into beasts

12. Disciplines like Eugenics (i.e., the study of hereditary improvement, especially of human improvement by genetic control) underwent a flip; evolutionary ethics talked about expediency and self-interest; wars became instruments of domination and improvement of the races. Besides, evolution, as Marx extolled, ended teleology in the natural sciences. Philosophy itself was badly bruised and even became retarded, materialism took over metaphysics. The idea of the survival of the fittest became the guiding star of the West.

It was because of such mental antecedents that Nazi Germany could kill more than 100,000 ailing senior citizens without any compunction, and that T. H. Huxley could get away with his shocking remark that biological evolution did not justify yielding to compassion.

The Origin of Species provided philosophical support for the class struggle in history. See

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Selected Correspondence 1846-1895*. Small wonder, class conflict killed almost 15 million people (for these figures see Paul Johnson's *Modern Times*).

Darwin himself best defined post-Darwin ethics: "A man," he wrote, "who has no assured and no present belief in the existence of a personal God or a future existence with retribution and rewards, can have for his rule of life, as far as I can see, only to follow those impulses and instincts which are the strongest or which seem to him the best ones." That this would bring down humans to the level of dogs, Darwin knew well. See his *The Autobiography of Charles Darwin* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), p. 94.

Race and supremacy

13. Andrew Carnegie in his autobiography glorified evolution as a panacea for the race because it ensures the survival of the fittest in every department. John D. Rockefeller Jr., talked "of consolidations and of the crowding out of some" as it would lead to "the greatest good to the greatest number."

Richard Hofstadter's *Social Darwinism in American Thought* is a compelling work, tracing militarism and racism in American character under Darwin's impact. He alludes to John Fiske's lectures of 1880 in England. "With characteristic Darwinian emphasis upon race fertility," says Hofstadter, "Fiske dwelt upon the great population potential of the English and American races. America could support at least 700,000,000; and the English people would within a few centuries cover Africa with

teeming cities, flourishing farms, railroads, telegraphs, and all the devices of civilization. This was the Manifest Destiny of the race. Every land on the globe that was not already the seat of an old civilization should become English in language, traditions, and blood. Four-fifths of the human race would trace its pedigree to English forefathers. Spread from the rising to the setting sun, the race would hold the sovereignty of the sea and the commercial supremacy, which it had begun to acquire when England first began to settle the New World." See Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), p. 177.

History as Viewed by Hegel and Marx

MODERN CIVILIZATION HAS brought in its fold a horde of problems for humanity that have their roots in Hegelian historiography. Karl Marx added to the human travail by building his materialist interpretation of history on the dialectical process envisioned by Hegel.

So what is this Hegelian historiography? To him, a civilization moves upward when contradictions, conflicts and amalgamations surface in the human situation. He held every historical epoch as an organic whole like a living body system, in which all aspects of human existence – economic, political, social and moral – are in a measured proportion, marked by a relationship of symbiosis and pulsing with a similar rhythm. Taken together, each epoch objectifies the spirit of the age.

When a great epoch reaches its full potential because of its life-giving ideas, then something unusual takes place. From within its womb an opposite force emerges in the form of new concepts and thought, and these begin to take on the old thought.

For a while this conflict between the old and the new eras continues. But eventually they agree to a marriage giving birth to a newer civilization. And thus begins the fresh phase of history.

Hegel describes this process of evolution as dialectical. To him, in the flow of history there is a perpetual exchange and conflict, which is not haphazard but logical: First thesis comes and then as a counter to it antithesis comes. The strife invites the "World Reason" or "Absolute Spirit" to move in for a patch up by taking the best from both of the rivals to create a synthesis. In due course, the new synthesis itself turns into thesis and thus the cycle of conflict as well as resolution continues.

To Hegel, the dialectical process is collective by its essence and total in its embrace. This means that an epoch is like a single living unit while individuals and groups are its organs. None of them is free from the epoch's collective temper, including great historical figures that are nothing but pawns on the chessboard. In the turbulent flow of this mighty river, the "Absolute Idea" surges magisterially in an unstoppable stride to produce thesis, antithesis, and finally synthesis.

In this process as Hegel visualizes it, there is a manifest irony. The "Absolute Idea" or "World Reason" gives to individuals and groups an illusion of participation in the dialectic of change, making them believe that they are the real movers and shakers in this historical play. But in fact, the "World Reason" uses them in the realization of itself. For world reason, it is an act of becoming.¹

Fascinated by Hegelian reason, Karl Marx picked up its dialectical process minus its spiritual or ideational aspect and replaced it with material stimulants as the basis of historical evolution.²

In this Marxian vision, the sole determinant of human life is the economy. The economic system shapes the whole civilization of an era, its laws, ethics, religion, arts, and philosophy. The dialectical process, says Marx, expresses itself in

history when under an economic system a class of people takes hold of the means of production and reduces it to abject dependence. When this happens, the oppressed classes gradually grow restive and, in consequence, ask for a counter system of property relations and distribution of goods that serves their interests. This development of a festering schism in the existing body politic is the antithesis of the old system.

Both Hegel and Marx tried to grasp reality through intellection, but they partially succeeded. They found a part of reality and inflated it as if it were the whole. In consequence, they not only stumbled into grave error but also left others balled up in this web of error.

As the conflict intensifies, the current corpus of law, religion and other concepts finding themselves in jeopardy become supportive of the oppressive system. While the emergent classes, which seek the replacement of the existing economic system, reject established "truths", and seek to impart new values.

In brief, this sums up Marx's materialistic interpretation of history known as historical or dialectical materialism. To him, all the changes of history and the evolution of human civilization are attributable to the means of production and their distribution. What gives impetus to this process is class conflict. Marx also argued that there are no enduring values of human civilization, religion and ethics describable as objective truth. Rather, it is in human nature to first choose for itself a model to further its material interests and then to justify its continuance, manufacture a new religion and a new philosophy of ethics. To him, this self-centred

conflict is in line with nature. If there is a basis for accommodation, it is in the confluence of economic interests. Those who are opposed to such a confluence, call for strife.

In this short piece, I do not aim at making a fullblown critique of Hegel's and Marx's concepts. I only want to show that their ways of looking at things have sabotaged the thinking pattern of educated people regarding religion, ethics, and sociology. Impressed by Hegel, modern man has two things in his mind:

- Every civilization is an integrated whole. Religion and ethics, the arts and sciences are its reflections.
- When a civilization matures, a new array of biases, concepts and thoughts emerge from it, which engages old ideas until a new civilization comes into being. The latter carries onward the positive elements and replaces the negative ones by the new. This cycle of change continues improving upon the previous civilization.

It is, thus, obvious that with such ideas anchored in people's minds the chance for belief in a revealed value system is extremely dim. They will consider Ibrāhīm (Abraham), Mūsā (Moses), 'Īsā (Jesus), and Muhammad – peace be upon them all – as the antitheses of their ages, who after a prolonged struggle succeeded in bringing about a syntheses. Obviously, while discarding everything old they will say: "So many new syntheses have come into being since then, culminating in our age. We are not what we used to be in the past. We admire the prophets for they advanced the civilizational cause but nothing besides it. We do not think there is space for an old discourse."

The Marxists agree with Hegel on this score, but then they add a spin to it, saying that when a system of production and distribution changes, it turns religion, ethics and law into dated concepts because of their reduced relevance to the new system. With this kind of Marxist claim, who can say that a person who subscribes to Marxism would still believe in any religion or ethical system?

A little objectivity would have helped Marx know that the enduring values of civility, ethics, and justice are the legacy of those individuals who tamed their animal selves to increase the human capital.

Lately in an article entitled "What is not Socialism", the writer has tried to prove that there is no feud between socialism and Islam. It is also possible that some other Marxists suffer from the same misimpression. I urge them to reconsider Marx's materialistic interpretation of history and reflect on its implications. Doubtless, a person has the right to choose his faith. But to be a Marxist and a believer are two different things. To believe in Islam as well as its opposite Marxism is a super contradiction and shows a confused mind. It certainly makes for a pathetic situation.

Both Hegel and Marx tried to grasp reality through intellection, but they partially succeeded. They found a part of reality and inflated it as if it were the whole. In consequence, they not only stumbled into grave error but also left others caught up in this web of error.

Hegel's philosophy of history is right only on one score, that the evolution of human civilization has been possible because of the conflict between contradictory ideas and their subsequent

resolution. But along with this brilliant grasp of history, he introduces other concepts, which have no legs to stand upon.

For example, he describes God as the "World Spirit" and then adds that God is using humans to complete His self. Furthermore, that the history of human development is God's quest for becoming. This aspect of Hegel's dialectic is pure fantasy and calls for validation.

Again, he considers humans as mere actors in the theatre of history without consciousness or will; that it is God who makes them fight with each other, and then reconciles them within a new synthesis of thought. These construe a baseless hypothesis, which has no academic merit.

The preceding flaws in the Hegelian system have the colour of a jigsaw puzzle. Even his dialectical process, despite its aspects of truth, is highly speculative. For example, he does not substantiate it from history. Nor does he show us the precise nature of the conflict between opposites, and how the resolution takes place between the two warring sets of ideas. He is equally short on telling us why the new amalgamation of thought gives birth to a fresh enemy entity. This calls for an exhaustive treatment of the subject, but he hovers over it like a bird and then flies to other pastures.

But if Hegel lacks solidity, Marx is superficial. He makes no effort to understand human nature and its makeup. Admittedly, he is quick in comprehending the exterior animal that has economic needs, but he does not break into the inside of man, his human core for which the outer animal is the implement. Nor does Marx understand the demands of human nature, which

are different from the temperament of the outer animal.

This aspect of his work is extremely shaky and exposes the falsity of his sociology. He thinks that the human self is the slave of the outside animal self. The power of his rational faculties and observation, creativity and intuitive apparatus are all in the service of the exterior animal. To

God empowered humans to strive so that they can live by the sweat of their brows, realize their potentials, and obtain for themselves what they want. Man is the name of that ability to strive as an autonomous self.

Marx, the inside human can do nothing but submit to the will of the outer entity – make laws as he wishes, cook up religious concepts and lay down the course of his destiny as he dictates. How corrupt is the Marxist view of humanity? How lowly is his civilizational concept?

That for sure does not mean that the impulsion of the animal self has no effect on the human self. Nor would it be sane to deny that the animal self strives for supremacy over the human self. But Marx is wrong when he says that the animal self is free from the influence of the human self.³ His reading of history is totally wrong when he comes up with the statement that civilizations owe their growth to individuals ruled not by their humanity but by their animal self. A little objectivity would have helped him know that the enduring values of civility, ethics, and justice are the legacy of those individuals who tamed their animal selves to increase the human capital.

If Hegel and Marx had read the Qur'ān, they would have known true human nature as well as the laws that govern the growth and decay of

civilizations.⁴ This would have saved them from their stumbling and waywardness.

According to the Qur'an, "man" is not the name of the biological self alone that houses hunger, sex, greed, fear and wrath, but is also the carrier of a spiritual essence that pulsates with moral impulses.⁵ Unlike other animals, he is not instinct bonded but has been endowed with intelligence, discretion, and the ability to acquire knowledge and make decisions as an autonomous being.⁶ God does not force him to walk on a predetermined path. Nor does God take full charge of human subsistence. On the contrary, He has empowered them to strive so that they can live by the sweat of their brows, realize their potentials, and obtain for themselves what they want. Man is the name of that ability to strive as an autonomous self.

As for the exterior animal self, God has placed it in the service of the inner human – an uncouth agent that has nothing but desires and lusts to pursue. When charged, it tries to reverse the order and takes hold of the human self so that it serves baser demands through harnessing mental endowments. It attempts to weigh down the human ability to soar, limits its vision, and stokes the fire of *jāhiliyyah* (paganism) in him.

In response to the cadence of his soul, the human self asserts his domain over the animal self.

Both Hegel and Marx knew the thin convoluted line across the historic landscape, but they failed to see the eternal straight line, which has a natural pull on humans. Humanity knows in its heart that such a path does exist among the mishmash of crooked paths.

In this respect, he has at his disposal the revelatory knowledge of justness and piety, right and wrong. Even when he responds to the urging of his instincts, he seeks rightful ways of satisfying them. His aspirations are far higher than the earthly pulls of his animal self. He wants to be good in his own eyes and in the eyes of his God. His intuition prompts him to excel as a moral being.

The whole history of humanity is a reflection of this conflict between the human self and his counterpart animal self. He wants to follow the prompting of his intuition, while the animal self pulls him downwards in directions that are harmful, laden with self-indulgence, discord, lust and iniquity. Once derailed, he tries to haul himself up but in the process selects some wrong solutions under the influence of the animal self. He seeks sanctuary in monastic life, in the rigours of denying self, and in escape from civilizational responsibilities. But his uncalled-for withdrawal from life instead of increasing his hold on the animal self again sets him on wrong paths. This time the animal self makes sure that he stays astray forever.

The two forces of extremism (that is monasticism and materialism) continue in a tug of war tearing apart the human fabric of existence. Under each impact, some new concepts and thoughts generate, carrying part truth part falsehood. For a while, humanity tests these amalgams of thoughts until it tires itself out. Man's true nature, which longs for the straight path (*sirāt al-mustaqīm*), surfaces again and after a reflective phase of contrition, while retaining the right elements, flushes the false ones out.

Thus Allah coins (the similitude of) the true and false. Then as for the foam, it passes away as scum

upon the banks, while as for that which is of use to humans, it remains in the earth...

al-Ra'd: 17

But after the defeat of one composite of extremes, another composite of extremes jumps into the arena. Again, human nature revolts against its compound character for the same reason that piqued it in the past.⁷

Thus viewed, the evolution of human civilization has followed the uneven course of a thin line that has repeatedly rambled on the straight line.⁸ Illustrated, it should look something like the following:



In this example the straight line represents the natural path, which the Qur'ān variously describes as "*sirāt almustaqīm*", "*rushd*", "*hidāyah*", "*sawā' al-sabīl*", and "*sabīl-I rabb*". In the beginning, humanity lived in its natural state (al-Baqarah: 213), which later underwent distortion and manifested itself in deviation and excess. Once formed, these tendencies revealed a capability to resurface, taking humans away from the straight path. However, after each deviation, the bitter taste of their experience and the discontent of their disposition meant that humans would deflect and return to their true nature. Hegel's thesis and antithesis are the same extreme attitudes that make humans straddle along the path. What Hegel describes as syntheses are those same dots where the thin convoluted line crosses the straight path.

Both Hegel and Marx knew the thin convoluted line across the historic landscape, but they failed to see the eternal straight line, which has a natural pull on humans. Humanity knows in its heart that such a path does exist among the mishmash of crooked paths. But what are the precise dimensions of that straight path and how to build a noble civilization on its foundational values only the prophets could tell. Repeatedly, they asked people to come back to that middle path and follow it for the good of their lives.

We surely sent Our messengers with clear proofs, and revealed with them the Scriptures and the Balance, that humans may observe right measure ...

al-Hadīd: 25

EDITOR'S COMMENTS

1. Perhaps the clearest statements on this aspect of Hegelian thought come from Will Durant and Richard Tarnas. "God," says Durant, "is the system of relationships in which all things move and have their being and their significance. In man the Absolute rises to self-consciousness and becomes the Absolute Idea – that is, thought realizing itself as part of the Absolute, transcending individual limitations and purposes, and catching, underneath the universal strife, the hidden harmony of everything." Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization – The Age of Napoleon*, Vol. IV (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974), p. 655.

To Richard Tarnas, "Hegel's overriding impulse was to comprehend all dimensions of

existence as dialectically integrated in one unitary whole. In Hegel's view, all human thought and all reality is pervaded by contradiction, which alone makes possible the development of higher states of consciousness and higher states of being. Each phase of being contains within itself a self-contradiction, and it is this that serves as the motor of its movement to a higher and more complete phase. Through a continuing dialectical process of opposition and synthesis, the world is always in the process of completing itself. Whereas for most of the history of Western philosophy from Aristotle onward, the defining essence of opposites was that they were logically contradictory and mutually exclusive, for Hegel all opposites are logically necessary and mutually implicated elements in a larger truth. Truth is thus radically paradoxical.

"... Hegel saw human reason as fundamentally an expression of a universal Spirit or Mind (Geist), through the power of which, as in love, all opposites could be transcended in a higher synthesis." See Richard Tarnas, *The Passion of the Western Mind – Understanding the Ideas that have Shaped Our World View* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1993), p. 379.

This mixing of Greek and Christian notions of Absolute Idea and Spirit shows Hegel's seminarian background as well as his mystical tendencies, though a class of his followers either by choice or owing to their faulty reading of his philosophy took him as a priest of atheism. According to Albert Camus, "[i]mmanence, of course, is not atheism. But

immanence in the process of development is, if one can say so, provisional atheism." Camus seeks support from Søren Kierkegaard's criticism of Hegel: "To base divinity on history is, paradoxically, to base an absolute value on approximate knowledge. Something 'eternally historic' is a contradiction in terms." See Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (Victoria: Penguin Books, 1965), p. 114.

In fact, Hegel belonged to an idealistic tradition, which as Jürgen Habermas describes, "upheld the claim of metaphysics in a transformed shape, and completed the philosophical appropriation of the Judeo-Christian tradition as much as was possible under the conditions of metaphysical thinking. Hegel's philosophy is the result of that great experiment, crucially defining European intellectual history, which sought to produce a synthesis between the faith of Israel and the Greek spirit – a synthesis that, on the one side, led to the Hellenization of Christianity and, on the other, to the ambiguous Christianization of Greek metaphysics." As Habermas elsewhere says, "Hegel's central concern was to set basic metaphysical concepts into dialectical motion within the medium of *Heilsgeschichte*, the history of salvation." See Jürgen Habermas, *Religion and Rationality – Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity*, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002), pp. 73, 156.

2. Marx admired Hegel for his dialectical theory as it gave him the much-needed philosophical base for his worldview. But before he took it, he

pruned it so that it matched his materialism – materialism powerful enough to stand its own against the ever- creeping idealism. He sought to discard the old mechanical view of the universe because other than a causal relationship with the first cause and its related determinism, it offered no real freedom to the individual or place to society that to begin with creates the individual's consciousness. He hated its implied metaphysics as well as materialism's perennial enemy idealism. Hegel's dialectical philosophy, which studied things in their rise and decay, suited Marx; but it still carried the same mystical elements that he disliked.

Marx sought to bury idealism forever. He criticized the idealist's method of picturing the universe through ideas and concepts. The growth of new physics and the picture of the universe it presented facilitated the shape of his new materialism, which had a set of irreducible dialectical opposites in wave and particles, matter and energy. "The dialectical model," as Steven Best says, "made it possible for Marx to overcome the reifying approach of positivist science that sees social reality as static and given." He also saw in it revolutionary implications as it helped overcome fatalistic resignation to the eternal reality of the sensuous empirical world. See Steven Best, *The Politics of Historical Vision – Marx, Foucault, Habermas* (New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 1995), pp. 34-35.

Second, Hegel believes in the human agency as the shakers and movers of magnificent happenings. At the same time, he also holds that by themselves, no matter how

great such individuals may be, they cannot succeed unless they embrace the "Spirit" of the Time or become the instrument of the "Absolute". In the Hegelian context, time is a mental as well as a social construct shaped by various forces. That is why it has a spirit or a temperament, which all great men have to understand. Praising such men, Hegel says: "Such individuals had no consciousness of the general Idea they were unfolding, while prosecuting those aims of theirs; on the contrary, they were practical, political men, who had an insight into the requirements of the time - *what was ripe for development*. This was the very Truth for their age, for their world, the species next in order, so to speak, and which was already formed in the womb of time." Hegel: *Philosophy of History*, translated by J. Sibree. (New York: Dover Publications, Inc, 1956), p. 30.

Marx did not like this aspect of the Hegelian thought either. To him, history is a "process of development and not a chapter of accidents". In this process, whether they become the instrument of the Absolute or not, heroes have no effective role. Rather, it is the economic environment or the contradiction between the implements of production and the relations of production that drives the engine of change.

Thus, Marx turned the dialectic of Hegel "on its head or rather turned it off its head, on which it was standing before, and placed it upon its feet again." From now onward, Marxism would use Hegel's dialectical philosophy of history as "the science of the general laws of motion both of the external

world and of human thought." For a concise exposition of the dialectical materialism, see David Guest's *Lectures on Marxist Philosophy* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1963).

In his second German edition of *Capital*, Marx frankly proclaimed himself "a disciple of that great thinker [Hegel]" and admitted that he "toyed with the use of Hegelian terminology when discussing the theory of value." But having said that, he boasts that his dialectical method is opposed to Hegel's. For Hegel, the thought-process is the creator of the real, whereas in Marx's view, "the ideal is nothing more than the material when it has been transposed and translated inside the human head." Thus, for him it was important "to discover the rational kernel hidden away within the wrappings of mystification." *Capital* (London: Everyman edition, 1930), p.873.

Marx himself sums up his theory in the slogan: "Life determines consciousness, not consciousness life." For this quote, see Anthony Kenny's *The Oxford History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p.211.

Could history be dialectic and economic at the same time? The question is important as Marx affirms historic materialism, which Albert Camus thinks are two different entities. His argument is interesting. Dialectic, he says, pertains to the mind and thus cannot be reconciled with materialism for the obvious reason that "there is something more in the world than matter alone." He applies the same criticism to historic materialism. "History," he says, "is

distinguished from nature precisely by the fact that it transforms, by means of will, science, and passion. Marx, then, is not a pure materialist ..." Camus supports his argument by saying that there is neither a pure nor absolute materialism. Thus, for Marx he suggests historic determinism in place of historic materialism because, as he argues, Marx does not deny thought, though he "imagines it absolutely determined by exterior reality." See Albert Camus, *The Rebel* ... p.166.

Again, in the case of religion, Hegel did not believe in the triad Gods of Christianity, though he spoke very highly of religion in general. As opposed to him, Marx was a confirmed atheist. "Religion," said Hegel, "is Reason's highest and most rational work. It is absurd to maintain that priests have thought of religion for the people as a fraud for their benefit." Admitting religion's role in nation building, he said it would be "folly to pretend to invent and carry out political constitution independently of religion." Further, "Religion is the sphere in which the nation gives itself the definition of that which it regards as true.... The concept of God, therefore, constitutes the general basis of a people's character." It is, however, on individual morality that he comes down hard. Morality, says he, must be a common bond not an individual preference. See Hegel's *Philosophy* ... pp. 50, 68, 71.

All said, despite its scientific posturing, Marx could not free his consciousness from the religious doctrine of hope nor from the salvation creed. Says Steven Best: "While

rejecting the theological interpretation of history, Marx nevertheless retained the narrative code of salvation within the secular context of progress." See Steven Best, *The Politics ...* p. 36.

3. A similar statement comes from Richard Weaver. "Man," says Weaver, "is a special creature in the respect that he has to live with two selves. One of these is his existential part, his simple animal being, which breathes and moves and nourishes itself. This is man without qualification or adornment, an organism living in an environment. In this existence he is a very predictable animal – or would be except that the second self can have effects upon his somatic appearance and behaviour."

"The second self," Weaver says, "is an image which he somehow evolves from his spirit. It is made up of wishes and hopes, of things transfigured, of imagination and value ascriptions. It is a picture to which the subjective part of our being necessarily gives a great deal, and hence the danger of trying to read it literally from external facts." See Richard Weaver, *Visions of Order – The Cultural Crisis of Our Time* (Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 1995), p. 9.

4. On the human nature, see for example, the following Qur'anic *āyahs*: al-'Alaq: 6-14; al-A'rāf: 10; al-Isrā': 11. For the rise and fall of the nations, see al-Ra'd: 11; and al-Isrā': 2-8.
5. "It is He who has made you (His) agents, inheritors of the earth..." For the complete *āyah*,

see al-An'ām: 165 in the Qur'ān. Also, al-Baqarah: 30. Besides, God has breathed His spirit into mans. For this, see al- Hijr: 29.

6. "And He taught Adam the names (the nature of qualities and things and feelings and emotions)." See al-Baqarah: 31. Also, "We have indeed created man in the best of moulds..." al-Tin: 4.
7. P. Ehrenfest's observation about Hegelian dialectics makes sense when he said it is a "succession of leaps from one lie to another by way of intermediate falsehoods." For this see W. E. Hocking, *Science and the Idea of God* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 96.
8. Mawdudi's concept of the crooked path is certainly derived from the Qur'ānic "*sawā' al-sabil*". But when Hegel talks of the crooked path the question is where did he get it? Is it from the Qur'ān? Nevertheless, it will be of interest to note that Hegel as paraphrased by Engels did speak of "zigzag movements". For example, read the following from Engels' *Ludwig Feuerbach*, chapter 4:

According to Hegel, therefore, the dialectical development apparent in nature and history, i.e., the causal interconnection of the progressive movement from the lower to the higher, which asserts itself through all *zigzag movements* and temporary setbacks, is only a miserable copy of the self-movement of the concept going on from eternity, no one knows where, but all events independently of any thinking brain. (emphasis added)

The difference between Hegel and the Qur'an however remains critical: while Hegel views the zigzag movement as reflective of a society's conflict within itself to overcome contradictions, the Qur'an considers this waywardness as a consequence of the conflict between Islamic and non-Islamic ways of life.

CHAPTER EIGHT

The Problem with Western Civilization

THE PRESENT CIVILIZATION, which engineers today's intellectual, moral, cultural, social and political aspects of organized human existence, rests on three strands of thought:

- Secularism
- Nationalism
- Democracy

Secularism insists that God and His guidance should be rolled back to the confines of one's private life while earthly affairs should be left to the individual self, which may deal with problems through the worldly prism. Expressed differently, it suggests that God should make no intrusion in the secular realm.

Clergy-made theology, which bore heavily on the West by manacled its freedoms and growth, has had much to do in the reactive formulation of secular attitudes. Although its growth was slow in the beginning, it gradually developed into an enduring concept of life, becoming the first brick of the new civilization.

You might know the cliché that "religion is a private matter between God and man." This short one-liner, in fact, is the *kalimah* (the creedal declaration) of present-day civilization. What it

implies is that if a person's conscience allows for God's existence, he or she may worship Him in private but must keep the secular realm free from the tiptoed influence of religion. In consequence, every form of temporal relations – education, business, law, politics or international relations – have torn themselves from the religious grid. Decisions made are free from value input mostly situational, mediated by one's self. Whether God has laid down certain rules for them is now held unsuited – a regression into the past.

Worse, even individual life because of non-Godly education and irreligious social thrusts has been increasingly fashioned into a secular mould. Personal testimony of God's existence and His worship is no more in the coming, especially from those who are the real shakers and movers of this new civilization.

Nationalism, the second principle, began to gel in response to Papal hegemony. Its contours became sharper under the impact of an increasingly tyrant Roman Empire. In its innocent origin, it stood for the nations' right to control policymaking instead of being pawns in the hands of some spiritual force or military power. Unfortunately, it soon lost its innocence.

With nationalism replacing God in the public space, religion found itself sitting on the fence, allowing national interests the status of the highest moral value.¹ Anything profitable for one's nation, even if it violated justice, or what old religious traditions considered as cardinal sin, became desirable and thus good. Likewise, anything that hurts a nation's interest, even though it may be truth, justice and fair play or what was once considered as the summit of morality was taken as bad. In the same vein, asking a person to surrender

his life, money, time, even conscience and beliefs without reservations perfected the measure for an ideal citizen. The management of such collective efforts gyrated around educating the citizenry so that they could work for the greater glory of their nation.

The third principle – the people’s sovereignty – formulated itself in the conflict between the nexus of the kings and nobility on the one hand and people on the other. In its contextual thrust, the concept held high moral grounds by maiming individual and dynastic rights to rule over a large mass of humanity. It also had the right nuance of empowering people to shape their destiny.

With nationalism replacing God in the public space, religion found itself sitting on the fence, allowing national interests the status of the highest moral value.

These developments, undoubtedly positive, formalized themselves into democracy, which gave rise to another concept – that is: nations have their writs of jurisdiction that must bloom into full expression and not be curtailed. This had its obvious spin off. With people seated in the public space everything from morals to lifestyle, societal structure and politics became fluid. As the sole arbiters, the majority decided the underlying ethos. Likewise, anything spurned by the people became wrong by definition. Law is now the expression of the people’s will, which they can make or unmake with sovereign exuberance.

Small wonder, this reconfiguration of political relationships around [the human axis] is now taken as the most charitable and progressive form of societal living. Aside from their merit, all of these three concepts carry a serious problematic. One

may ask here what are our objections? Why do we oppose them? This certainly calls for a long discussion, though I will make a brief statement to help you understand our opposition to these principles as well as impel you toward the seriousness of the situation. It is my considered view that most of humanity's ailments have their roots in them.

SECULARISM AND ITS TOLL

To start with, take secularism the foundation stone of this system. To say that God and religion have nothing to do with the public space is an irrational notion as human-God relations have a dual range. For example, either God is the master-creator of humans and the universe or He is not. If He is neither the creator nor master nor sovereign, then why have Him even in one's private life. But if He is our Lord as well as the creator and the sovereign of this universe, it makes little sense to slash His jurisdiction to the private sphere and thus oust Him from the authoritative public space. Likewise, if God has made this demarcation, it must go back to Divine provenance for proof. In case it is human drawn, the act would be seditious against their creator and sovereign. In other words, could there be anything more absurd than to say that every individual in his private life is God's creature but when the same individuals come together in a social melding, they stop being His creatures? Again as separate units, each individual is God's creature but when together in fusion, they are not. Only an insane person can conceive this kind of deviation.

Absurd as this mental posturing is, one may still ask if we do not need God and His guidance either in our family life, or in our neighbourhoods and our cities, then why stay with Him? Likewise, it is equally absurd to believe in Him if His guidance is of no consequence to us either in work or in the marketplace, in the courts and government corridors, or in peace and war. Why should we be pushed into accepting Him? Why should we worship a God who is incapable of guiding us in our existential complexities? Expressed differently, God is so short on brains (Allah forgive us) that in not a single matter does His guidance make any sense.

Intellectual aspects apart, worse still are its consequences in real life for when a person breaches relations with God, he connects himself with Satan. Added to this what people call private life is a nonentity, for humans are born in a civilized ambience with an inescapable collective shade. As products of a social union between a mother and a father, they eye their first daylight in the lap of their parents. And as they grow into manhood, they find themselves dealing with society and its body corporate. Thus, the countless linkages, which connect humans with others, have to be sound in their constitution for it is a prelude to their well-being. Crucial as they are, their source has to be divine for such fair values of interconnectivity can come from God alone. When seduced by the mediation of the self, humans detach themselves from Divine guidance, they face their own chaotic desires; the social ethos suffers from instability, while justice and fair play surrender to turmoil.²

Small wonder, a society that binds itself to secularism recedes into a valueless fluidity in which desires rule, pushing every aspect of human relations under the shade of inequity and distrust, with an overlay of class and ethno-national considerations. From relations between two individuals to relations between nations, not a single link is distortion free. Unmindful of repercussions on others, individuals as well as

Could there be anything more absurd than to say that every individual in his private life is God's creature but when the same individuals come together in a social melding, they stop being His creatures? Again as separate units, each individual is God's creature but when together in fusion, they are not. Only an insane person can conceive this kind of deviation.

nations have framed rules in their realms of authority. Thus in this jungle, if there is a force that can restrain exaggerated self-interests to a reasonable margin, it is the might of the club wielded by another bully, though the irony is manifest. A club is not the name of a judicious being named God – it is a blind force incapable of establishing moral equilibrium. The wielder of a bigger club does not tailor its use to the excesses committed by the other bully but uses it as a ruse so that he can enlarge his own domain of influence. It goes hand in hand with secularism that one who embraces it will float free, sinking into a reckless idolater of the self. A nation-state or a union of nations equally acquires this mental frame.

NATIONALISM AND ITS DEMERITS



My describing nationalism as high risk for humanity³ may cause apprehension among others as if we oppose the nationality concept. Far from it, we hold one's nationality as natural. Nor are we against national feelings, provided these are free from hatred for others. We also care for national independence because we believe in a nation's right to make decisions in its own interest unencumbered by outside interference, though we disapprove of imperialism in all its forms. So, what is it that we really oppose? In fact, rabid nationalism bothers us, which we think is another name for a nation's adventure into narcissism. This may sound weird but our experience bears us out. In our daily life, we hate those who are captive to their egos and follow their self-centred pursuits. We also oppose those who violate moral and legal norms in obtaining their clannish interests. Likewise, we repudiate any cartel of unscrupulous hoarders that chases its material interests by raising prices, and in return invites social blame. By the same measure, we see no reason why we should not consider a nation as a curse for humanity that gives godly status to its interests and pursues any means to achieve them.

Obviously, like all other egoistic indulgences, a nation's self-centred attitudes deserve contempt. For because of this, humanity has fallen into the wicked ways of usurping others' rights, turning the world into an amphitheatre where wrestlers flex their muscles at each other. Ironically, after having fought two world wars and with the participants' sweat still wringing-wet, the air pulsates with clamour for a third war.

DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISRUPTIONS

With secularism and nationalism, democracy completes the triangle of calamity that shadows humanity today. So what is democracy? In the present civilizational context, it means the government of the people where law expresses them. In other words, it is the crowning of the cumulative will of the people specified to a geographical location where the administrative setup is the vassal of their wishes.⁴ Now take a look at all this. First, secularism unfettered them from the moral grid, reducing them into irresponsible idolaters of the self. Then came nationalism, which blinded them with territorial considerations and hate for others. Now democracy saddles them with lawmaking while the administrative machinery helps them fulfil their utilitarian goals.

That being the case, how could a nation with that kind of a mindset be different from a powerful rogue? What a rogue does on a smaller scale, a nation does it on a much larger scale. This obviously takes our comfort away, for almost every civilized nation is organized around secularism, nationalism and democracy, which have pushed the world into the embrace of wolves, ready to bite and eat each other.

This should explain our opposition to a system that has its brew made of these three principles. Whether those who uphold them belong to the West or the East, are Muslims or non-Muslims, is immaterial. Our job is to remind humanity of the peril of secularism, nationalism, and democracy.

THE THREE MORALLY RIGHT PRINCIPLES

In response to secularism, nationalism and democracy, we offer three alternative concepts. We urge humanity to examine these alternative concepts and decide if it wants to haul the world up from its tragic situation by the application of these peace-giving concepts or by the disruptive concepts of secularism, nationalism and democracy. The alternative concepts are:

- Submission to God in place of secularism.
- Humanity (brotherhood) as opposed to nationalism.
- God's sovereignty and the people's caliphate as opposed to people's sovereign will.

GOD WORSHIP

By the first concept, we mean that all of us should accept God as our master-creator and sovereign, and that we should spend our planetary existence in deference to His will. We should not only worship Him as the deity but also lead our lives in servitude to Him. Our bondage to Him is not only in private but also in our aggregate social life extending into civilization, culture, economy, law, war, peace, and international relations. Our freedoms must stay within the divine parameters drawn up for us by

With secularism and nationalism, democracy completes the triangle of calamity that shadows humanity today.

our creator. These parameters are not subject to our discretion.

HUMANITY

By the second concept, we mean that a God-based system of life must not allow the intrusion of nation, race, colour and language to corrupt it. Instead of a nation-based system, it should be ideational, flinging the door open to all those who agree with its foundational principles. In this system, domicile, race or geography are not the defining elements of citizenship but rather belief in its principles. As for those people who for some reason are disinclined to accept these principles, we make no effort to compel them into submission. They can have their constitutionally defined rights and stay in the safe confines of this system until they choose freely to become part of this ideational community.

What we describe as the humanity principle does not negate nationality; rather, it gives a proper perspective to it by keeping it within natural bounds. This redefinition of nationality has a place for love of one's nation but not national prejudice, which is a blot that we seek to banish from human consciousness. Put differently, we uphold a nation's right to be

First, secularism unfettered them from the moral grid, reducing them into irresponsible idolaters of the self. Then came nationalism, which blinded them with territorial considerations and hate for others. Now democracy saddles them with lawmaking while the administrative machinery helps them fulfil their utilitarian goals.

free but oppose its hegemonic desire to seek control over others. We also resent the notion of rabid nationalism that splits humanity into hardcore geographical islands. The humanity principle means that although nations have the right to manage their affairs free from the shadow of others, once they bond themselves to the humanity principle, they should become partners in the cause of human welfare. Cutthroat competition and confrontation should give way to cooperation and coexistence between them. Instead of withholding citizenship from others owing to hate and prejudice, there should be free traffic of goods as well as civilization so that the world becomes humane enough to draw people out of their narrow nationalities. People should have international citizenship so that they can proclaim every country as their own, for the land belongs to Allah.⁵

The present situation qualifies for our hatred as it erodes our humanity. For example, once a person steps out of his birth geography, he faces obstructions everywhere. Treated like a suspect, he is checked at every point of entry; his movement is restricted and his speech muffled. As opposed to this, we aspire for a universal order that can ensure our suggested agenda and reconfigure the present system into a federation of nations in which citizenship should be common and equitable, with a free flow of traffic between nations. Our eyes hope to see once again Ibn Battūtah travelling from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, without his identity being impugned. They accepted him as if he was their own and appointed him as judge, ambassador, and minister.⁶

POPULAR VICEGERENCY

The third concept stands for our belief in popular vicegerency instead of people's rule.⁷ We are as much opposed to monarchy, one-man rule, oligarchy, and élitism as could be anyone else. In collective life, we favour people's equal rights and equal opportunities as much as the greatest democrat in the West would do. This should not create the misimpression that we oppose democratic dispensation. We affirm that we believe in elected government with people's say in it. Likewise, we oppose a system that provides no freedom for expression, assembly and work or which discriminates on the basis of birth, race, and class. In such essentials, which are the core of democratic dispensation in the West, we find no qualitative difference between them and us.

Added to these, there is not a single aspect of democracy that the West could claim to have taught us. We are familiar with democratic norms and practised them in their best form when democracy in the West was still hundreds of years away. Our disagreement with the young democracy in the West is that it exemplifies the principle of people's unbridled authority, which in our estimation is problematic in its conception and devastating in its consequences.⁸ Whether one likes it or not sovereignty belongs to God alone, who has created humans, who sustains and helps them grow, and who supports ecological systems so that

This obviously takes our comfort away, for almost every civilized nation is organized around secularism, nationalism and democracy, which has pushed the world into the embrace of wolves, ready to bite and eat each other.

life can endure itself on the planet. Whose physical, chemical, biological and other laws run everything in the universe. Thus, whoever claims himself to be the sovereign – whether a person, a family or a nation within God’s real kingdom – does so at the expense of his sanity. This surely does not demean God’s authority but invites scorn for the person who gets confused about his own identity and fails to cognize the essence of his being. That being the case, it should serve humans better if they try to build society on the concept of vicegerency and delegated authority.

Doubtless, this restructuring should result in a caliphal polity with a democratic outlook. In it, people should elect their *amir* (ruler) as well as their representatives in the *shūrā* (consultative assembly or parliament). They should have the right to hold their rulers accountable, with a say in the affairs of the state.

At the same time, they would be empowered to elect their own

Whoever claims himself to be the sovereign - whether a person, a family or a nation within God's real kingdom - does so at the expense of his sanity. This surely does not demean God's authority but invites scorn for the person who gets confused about his own identity and fails to cognize the essence of his being.

rulers and send representatives to the *shūrā*, with freedom to criticize and hold state officials accountable for their misdeeds. Nevertheless, these freedoms should be exercised with the concern that the final authority belongs to God and not to them who are merely custodians, and that one day they will stand in the Divine tribunal and answer for their every single deed. Besides, we should take God-given moral and legal norms as eternal and

immutable. Our parliament should embrace the following foundational concepts:

- In matters that Allah has decided for us we will not legislate but will derive laws for our needs from His guidance.
- In matters left undecided by Allah we presume we have the discretion to make laws. But even in discretionary lawmaking we will abide by the cumulative spirit of the God-given laws.

Besides, it is important that the responsibility for running the suggested system must go to those who fear Allah most and seek His consent in their lives, whose deeds speak for their belief in the inevitability of facing the Divine tribunal for their wrongs. And who unlike the horse broken loose, which grazes in every pasture and violates every perimeter, feel tethered by the rope of Allah – their run trammelled by its length.

EDITOR'S COMMENTS

1. A similar statement comes from Hans Kohn. "In the age of nationalism," says he, "some nations have claimed for themselves a 'mission' here on earth: the divine right of kings was replaced by the divine right of nations. Messianic dreams with the nation as their centre put the nation into immediate and independent relations with the absolute." Hans Kohn, *Prophets and Peoples* (London: Collier Books, 1969), p. 17.

2. Once a society discards eternal norms and subjects itself to mediation by the human self, then what we are left with are expediency and its concomitant instability. Russell Kirk describes well the problem that secularism creates for the individual as well as society: "The sanction for obedience to norms must come from a source higher than private speculation: men do not submit long to their creations. Standards erected out of expediency will be hurled down, soon enough, also out of expediency." Russell Kirk, *Enemies of the Permanent Things - Observation of Abnormality in Literature and Politics* (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1969), p. 17.
3. Nationalism and its consort irredentism are an early eighteenth-century development in Europe that came rapidly once monarchies began to smatter under the impact of changes accumulated during the past centuries.

Mawdudi is right in deprecating nationalism for the ills that it has brought to humanity. "The opposite aspect of nationalism," Davis says, "is indeed fearsome to contemplate. In its name the most advanced countries plunge into aggressive war against each other and against weaker peoples; and supposedly moral and upright persons find themselves justifying and even committing crimes against humanity more terrible than any that ancient history records." Horace B. Davis, *Nationalism and Socialism - Marxists and Labor Theories of Nationalism to 1917* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p. xiii.

Aggressive nationalism caused great damage to its proponents as well as its victims.

The Second World War cost Britain alone \$30 billion, a quarter of its net worth. It further accumulated \$12 billion of foreign debt.

The two World Wars took a toll of 102 million people. Nationalism and its attendant irredentism caused 5.8 million Jewish deaths in Germany. In two days, the U.S. alone killed 274,800 people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Before using the nuclear device, the U.S. conventional bombing of Manchuria had reached 10,000 tons of TNT a day. "From March to July 1945, against virtually no resistance, the B29s dropped 100,000 tons of incendiaries on sixty-six Japanese cities and towns, wiping out 170,000 square miles of closely populated streets." For these figures see chapter "Superpower and Genocide" in Paul Johnson, *Modern Times* (New York: Harper & Row, 1983).

The devastation of nationalism has brought out the human dimension rather forcefully. "Experience," says Cedric Belfrage, "leads many to the conclusion – especially after Nazism and its nightmares, and the postwar witch hunt – that the only treason one can now commit is to oneself as a member of the human race." For Cedric Belfrage's quote, see Horace B. Davis, *Nationalism ...* p. 209.

4. Walter Lippmann calls it "the prevailing ideology of democracy: whatever the mass of the people happen to think they want must be accepted as the right." (p. 4.) See Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, eds., *The Essential Lippmann – A Political Philosophy for Liberal Democracy* (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 4.

5. Mawdudi was not the only one who dreamed of unity and cooperation among states. Even some non-Muslim thinkers have lamented the loss of cohesiveness in humanity. For example, Hans Kohn says: "The age of nationalism brought to Europe a sense of conscious and growing differentiation. The great voices of former ages - Aquinas, Erasmus, Voltaire - spoke for Christendom or Europe; Bentham, Rousseau and Kant were concerned with mankind; but in the nineteenth century the European society and the European mind lost the oneness of the preceding age and dissolved into conflicting groups and cultural patterns. Yet even in the age of nationalism an underlying unity survived: though Europe no longer spoke with one voice, the polyphony of its leading national voices carried on a dialectic conversation in which a new European personality was revealing itself." Hans Kohn, *Prophets ...* p. 15.

Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872) is yet another person, among others, who thought of a unified humanity under a resurgent Italy. Hans Kohn summarizes Mazzini's view: "Unity of man was to overcome the dispersion of modern man in an industrialized mass civilization through an identity of thought and action, fused into wholeness by a faith which would give a new heart and centre, meaning and end, to man's manifold activities and self-contrarities. Unity of nation was to bind all the free individuals of democracy into a community of liberty and equality and by the unity of feeling and thought counteract the atomization, the egoism, and the competitive struggle, which threatened to undermine

modern society. Unity of mankind was to assure the peace and collaboration of all nations working in harmony under a common law of progress toward the common goal of a better world." Kohn, *Prophets ...* p. 80.

6. His name was Abū 'Abdullāh Muhammad ibn Battūtah. Born February 24, 1304 (Rajab 17, 703 A.H.) in Tanjier, Algeria, he left for *hajj* at the age of twenty-two on June 14, 1325 and then stayed in transition for the rest of his life. His travel plans were as exhaustive as was his love to see different lands and peoples. Wherever he went he found himself welcome. Like all other Muslims, he preferred *hajj* (pilgrimage) to anything else. Thus, he first went to Makkah, performed *hajj*, went to Madinah for worship in the Prophet's mosque and then set off on about a 75,000 mile journey. His passion for travel took him into Africa, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Turkistan, Balkh, Bukhara, Badakhshan, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Constantinople, present-day Pakistan, India, and China, among others. He represented the Sultanate of Delhi as ambassador to China in the reign of Muhammad Tughluq. He also served as a *qādi* (judge) under the Tughluq administration and in the Maldive islands. His travelogue showed him greeted by every country as one of its own; they showered him with gifts, fed him well, gave him their daughters in marriage, and felt sorry when he said farewell to them. Despite the fact that Ibn Battūtah's travelogue chronicles times that cannot be characterized as the best in Muslim history yet one finds a highly mobile people, with the same old nobility in them – their compassion, their sense

of generosity for each other no matter which land they had come from. For this see *Ibn Battutah: Travels in Asia and Africa* (Rawalpindi: Services Book Club, 1985), reprint.

7. Mawdudi derives his concept of popular vicegerency from the Qur'an (al-Baqarah 2: 30):

Your Lord said to the angels: Look! I am about to place a viceroy on the earth.

While elaborating upon the preceding *āyah*, Mawdudi says, "Khalifah (the caliph) is a person who enjoys certain rights and powers, not in his own right but as a deputy of his master, Allah. His authority is not inherent but delegated. Nor is he free to seek what he wants but has to follow the directives of his principal. If he disobeys by arrogating powers to himself which are not his, and violates the directives of his sovereign, then his behaviour exceeds his [God-given] mandate and amounts to rebellion."

"This vicegerency (deputyship)," says Mawdudi, "is popular, not exclusive to a particular individual, family, tribe, class or sect. But since it implies acceptance of God as Sovereign, only those who accept Him can have a share in it, no matter which class or clan they might have come from. Thus in an Islamic state, vicegerency is not confined to the Muslims alone, but is enjoyed by all." For the quote see Abu'l A'lā Mawdūdī's *Islamic Law and Constitution*, translated and edited by Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1992), eleventh edition, p. 178.

8. Major problems with democracy are now well established. For example, in any dispensation, the locus of authority is important as it implies the idea of decision-making. The democratic cliché of government by the people, the Lincoln formulation, can be faulted as the decision-making rests with the elected few and not with the people. To dismiss it that eventually it is the people who matter is not helpful as they only give consent, which detracts from the all-encompassing notion of sovereignty. Likewise, majority decisions and the decision of the whole people are two different things. "The majority-nearer-to-being-all-argument rapidly loses its plausibility as soon as the majority ceases to be overwhelming: 999 people out of a group of 1,000 is indeed very nearly the whole group, but there is no sense in which 501 people can be counted as the whole." Barry Holden, *Understanding Liberal Democracy* (New Jersey: Philip Allan, 1988), p. 40.

Again, the notion of people running democracy is mostly absurd for they are neither well-informed on issues nor do they vote out of policy considerations. Holden who himself stands for liberal democracy cites those who question the masses' ability to vote correctly. A large number of voting-behaviour studies reveal lack of knowledge as well as interest. "Many voters," a U.S. study shows, "knew the existence of few, if any, of the major issues of policy... there seems to be widespread ignorance and indifference over many matters of policy. And even when opinions are held, many persons are not motivated to discover or unable to sort out the relevant positions adopted by the parties." Ironically, this is about

America where social, economic and education indicators are higher than elsewhere. (p. 95.)

Another important concern is the presence of a large number of interest groups. "Since the government has been elected to implement the people's decision about what is in the general interest, to the extent that a pressure group successfully influences the government it is frustrating the will of the people," says Holden. The lobbyist problem has come under sharp criticism in Elizabeth Drew's book. According to her, there are 11,500 lobbyists wandering the halls of Congress (p. 63.) She cites Charles Lewis' book *The Buying of the Congress* (1998) whereby from 1991 to 1996 at least fifteen percent of former Senate aides and at least fourteen percent of former House of Representatives aides became registered lobbyists. "The main sources of this pool of access-sharks were the 'money committees' such as the House and Senate Commerce Committees, which handle such issues as banking and telecommunications. Sometimes the former aides so draw on their expertise and are so drawn into the legislative considerations that they in effect still act as staff members, writing legislation, except for a lot more money." (p. 64.)

A classic case is that of NATO's expansion, which Elizabeth Drew aptly describes as a "freighted issue". In the spring of 1998, the U.S. Senate took up the matter. Clinton bought the idea to counter certain ethnic-American voting blocs from going to the Republicans. He also used these groups to shore up support in the Senate. The Pentagon established a \$15 billion fund as loan money for the new member states

in NATO. The six largest defence contractors were behind the idea of expansion and spent about \$51 million on lobbying between 1996 and 1997. These companies also increased their funding to the congressional committees (\$32.3 million) after the collapse of communism in 1991. The Senate approved the proposal by a vote of 80-19. Drew says the debate lasted only a few hours spread over four days (pp. 66-68.)

The leadership aspect in democracies is also wrenching the souls of its supporters. The quality of leadership that democracies have thrown up has seldom been capable and upright. This may be attributable to inherent problems in the selection process as well as to the secular temper of this age, which robs societies of an objective criterion to help make decisions on men and societal issues. "Leon Panetta," a capable young man in the Clinton administration, "was worn out by the chaotic nature of Clinton's indecisive decision-making and management, and the thinly experienced White House staff.... [and] Clinton's lack of dignity, not to mention his sexual recklessness, was an assault on the office itself," says Elizabeth Drew, *The Corruption of American Politics – What Went Wrong and Why* (Secaucus: Carol Publishing Group, 1999), p. 160.

Richard Wirthlin, the Republican pollster, saw another consequence of Clinton's lack of leadership. Wirthlin argued to me that the fact that Clinton had changed course so many times meant, "the public does not react strongly with his changes. He is adroit enough. He is more able to smooth gaps and contradictions than anyone before him. But there is a price: the

whole concept of us as a nation has been eroded."

He also argued that the lack of presidential leadership had intensified the Balkanization of Washington. "There always were interest groups, but the drive for self-interest – whether you're a senator, a House member, or an interest group – has been intensified. When there is no agenda, everything is up for grabs."

The total effect, said Wirthlin, was an "increase in people's cynicism about the system, and that weakens the system in terms of participation – not just in voting but also in expressing opinion and seeing how things work out." (p. 158.)

Low voters' turnout is a perennial problem plaguing democracies. "The 1996 presidential election," says Drew, "saw the lowest turnout since 1924; in the 1998 congressional elections overall turnout was only thirty-six percent." She quotes Andrew Kohut's study. "A study by Andrew Kohut [p. viii] for the Pew Charitable Trusts, released in March 1998, in the midst of an economic boom, showed that only thirty-four percent of the public basically trusted the government. Disillusionment with political leaders is essentially as important a factor in distrust of government as is criticism of the way government performs its duties."

Even in the U.S. Congress, people show little interest in the debates on vital issues. "There are almost no great debates in the Senate any more. ... Arkansas Democrat Dale Bumpers was one of the last of the great orators. Bumpers' eloquence caused Clinton to call on him to sum up his case in the Senate impeachment trial. As he began his speech,

Bumpers remarked, 'It is especially pleasant to see an audience which represents about the size of the cumulative audience I had over a period of twenty-four years.'" See Elizabeth Drew, *The Corruption ...* p. 27.

Index

- Absolute Idea 33, 192, 201, 202
 Agar, W. E. 176
 Agassiz, Jean Louis R. 66
 Alexander, Samuel 105
 Allah is sovereign and
 creator 118; has made
 mates 170; constructed the
 heaven 171; birds are held
 up in the air by Him 171
 Aretino 127
 Ariosto 126
 Aristotle 91, 107, 202
 Asimov, Isaac 150, 151
 Atheism 55, 56, 155, 156, 166
- Bakar, Osman 181, 185
 Barbour, Ian 102
 Baumer, Franklin 124
 Beck, Charles B. 187
 Beecher, Lyman 79
 Behe, Michael 109
 Bellah, R. N. 18-19
 Bergson, Henri 96, 129
 Berkeley 56
 Bernard, Claude 29, 160
 Bernardino, San 127
 Best, Steven 134, 204, 207, 208
 Bohr, Niels 104, 109, 110
 Bonnet, Charles 169
 Bossard, James H. S. 79, 83, 85
 Bradbury, Malcolm 111
 Brooke, John Hedley 61, 63,
 65, 109, 169
 Büchner, Ludwig 57, 63
- Buffon, Georges 168
 Burckhardt, Titus 168, 185
- Cabanis, Jean 56, 65
 Camus, Albert 202, 203, 206, 207
 Carnegie, Andrew 189
 Cartesian-Newton vantage 29
 Challinor, John 180, 181
 Cohen, Daniel 80, 81, 82, 84
 Compton, Arthur 104
 Comte, Auguste 3, 57
 Copernicus 55
 Cox, Harvey 1, 8, 18, 19
 Cranston, Alan 86
 Cuénot, Lucien 29, 160
 Current thought: most are
 conjectural, hypothetical or
 at best tentative 91; only a
 few reach the status of
 certitude with people 191;
 may not be tenable 91;
 conjectural knowledge has
 no legs to stand on 92;
 philosophy and
 metaphysics are speculative
 thought 93
 Cuvier 169, 170
- Darwin, Charles 5, 22, 23, 29
 30, 31, 57, 58, 63, 66, 109,
 153, 154, 155, 156, 159,
 160, 161, 162, 165, 166,
 168, 169, 170, 172, 173,

- 174, 175, 177, 178, 179,
180, 181, 184, 189
- Darwin theory 154: became
handy for atheism 155;
reduced to status of a
dogma 160; held as
scientific because it could
interpret observable facts as
well as explain them 163;
accepted and made sure that
nothing opposed to it had
credibility 173; turned
humans into beasts 188;
provided philosophical
support for the class
struggle 188
- Davis, Horace B. 225
- Descartes, René 43, 54, 61
- Dewar, Douglas 181, 186, 187
- d'Holbach, Paul 56, 64, 123
- Dialectical process: collective
by its essence 192
- Diderot, Denis 56, 125;
came out in favour of
passions as the mover of
life 125
- d' la Mettrie, Julian Offray
56, 64, 65
- Drew, Elizabeth 231, 232
233, 234
- Dupree, Hunter A. 172
- Durant, Will 126, 127, 131, 132
169, 170, 173, 201
- Eddington, Arthur Stanley
104, 109; religion first
became possible about the
year 1927, 109
- Eden, Murray 162
- Edwards, Paul 65, 127
- Ehrenfest, P. 209
- Einstein, Albert, 96, 109, 130
- Emerson, Haven 85
- Engels, Friedrich 45, 48, 209
- Enlightenment 127; paradox of
enlightenment 113, 125
- Epicurus 91
- Erasmus, Desiderius 3, 169,
227
- Evolution: did not originate
with Darwin's theory 165;
ten centuries before
Darwin, the notion of life
moving from simplicity to
complexity was known to
the Muslims 166; fails on
the dialectical level 182
- Al-falāsifah al-tab'iyūn*
(physical philosophers) 101
- Fatchpuri, Niyaz 87, 89, 99,
101
- Feuerbach, Ludwig 63, 64
- Final arbiters: prophets or
philosophers? 95; the status
of scholars in revelatory-
based knowledge is not
higher than a commoner 96
- Fiske, John 189
- Freedom: the right to self-
expression is a precarious
enterprise 93; may
undermine civilization 93;
only a capable mind can
make use of it 93; should be
exercised as God-given
trust 223
- French Revolution 124
- Freud, Sigmund 6, 7, 19, 126

- Gaia hypothesis 103
 Galenus, Claudius 101
 Galilei, Galileo 55, 108
 Gay, Peter 124, 125
 Al-Ghazālī, Abū Hāmid 10, 107
 Gibb, Hamilton A. R. 112, 129
 God's existence: new
 Cosmology based on the big bang or instantaneous creation theory 103; the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and human freedom 104; Second Law of Thermodynamics (increasing entropy) indicates a finite timespan for the universe 103; the abstract mathematical character of the twentieth-century physics 104; the directional advance of evolution 104; the growth of depth psychology and the unraveling of perinatal experiences 105
 Goldschmidt, Richard 162
 Gray, James 161
 Grof, Stanislav 105

 Habermas, Jürgen 134, 203
Hadīthu khurūfātīn (a fictitious tale) 101
 Haldane, J. B. S. 164
 Hartley, David 56
 Hegel 32, 33, 35, 45, 46, 56, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210
 Hegelian historiography 191

 Henrick, Myron 80
 Hobbes, Thomas 16, 55, 62, 63
 Hofstadter, Richard 189, 190
 Holden, Barry 230, 231
 Hume, David 56, 65, 124
 Hutchinson, G. Evelyn 175
 Huxley, Julian 31, 168, 186
 Huxley, T. H. 188

 Ibn Battūtah, Abū
 ʿAbdullāh 221, 228, 229
 Ibrāhīm (Abraham) 96, 194
Ijtihād 145, 146
Ikhwān al-Safā (the Brethren of Purity) 167, 168
Īmān and the demand for rational validity, a precondition to obedience, are in conflict with each other 118; *salāh*, *sawm*, *hajj*, *zakāh* are not offered because someone has demonstrated to us their rational and empirical benefits 122
 Intuition 127, 128, 129, 130; a theory that the reality is known by immediate grasp and understanding 127; superior to reason 129; religion requires intuitive perception, over rational and logical analysis to grasp directly 130; a force of habit rooted in psychological inertia 130; great mathematical discoveries owe credit to intuition not logical positivism 130; difference between intuitive and

- analytical and discursive reasoning 128; West short on intuitive reasoning 129
- Iqbāl, Muhammad 16, 17
- ʿĪsā (Jesus) 4, 18, 144, 194
- Islam: prioritizes its scheme of preferences 118
- Jāhiliyyah* 37, 198
- Jaki, Stanley L. 62, 161, 168, 179
- Al-Jasr, Nadīm, al-Shaykh 167
- Johnson, George 109
- Johnson, Paul 108, 189, 226
- Kant, Immanuel 43, 56, 96, 128, 129, 169, 227
- Keith, Arthur, 161
- Kelvin, Lord 108
- Kenny, Anthony 62, 206
- Kepler, Johannes 55
- Kierkegaard, Sören 44, 203
- Kirk, Russell 41, 48, 225
- Kohn, Hans 224, 227, 228
- Kuhn, Thomas S. 134, 171, 172
- Lamarck 169, 172
- Lamître, Georges 110
- Laplace, Marquis de 168
- Leibniz, Gottfried 55
- Lewis, C. S. 105, 106
- Lewis, Charles 231
- Liberals: if they think religion will cower before the inflated might of the new sciences, they are mistaken 97
- Linnaeus 168
- Lippmann, Walter 226
- Locke, John 16, 55
- Lusk, Rufus S. 82, 83, 84
- Lūt (Lot) 136
- Lyell 169
- Ma'ād* 89, 100, 101
- Malthus, Thomas 5
- Marx, Karl (Marxists) 4, 22, 23, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208
- Materialism 52, 55, 56, 57, 60, 63, 64, 65
- Mayr, Ernst 174
- Mazzini, Giuseppe 227
- Medawar, Peter 162
- Mettler, Lawrence 177
- Michaelson, Alfred M. 85
- Mill, James 57
- Miller, Stan 164
- Miskawayh 166, 167
- Moleschott, Jacob 57, 63, 65
- Montesquieu 56
- Morgan, C. Lloyd 105
- Morrell, R. M. 181
- Muhammad, the Prophet 72, 96, 99, 100, 112, 118, 119, 120, 123, 149, 194
- Mujaddid* 88
- Mūsā (Moses) 96, 194
- Nadwī, Abu'l Hasan 'Alī 107
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein 128, 168
- Naturalism 24, 25, 54, 55, 56, 66, 113, 123, 124, 182
- Negus, Michael 163
- Newman, J. R. 130
- Newton, Isaac 55, 104, 108
- Newtonian physics: not

- believed anymore 108;
theory of relativity has
ousted the deterministic
Newtonian world 108
- Nietzsche, Friedrich 7, 19
- Ochs-Oakes, George W. 79
- Oparin, Aleksandr 164
- Panetta, Leon 232
- Park, Robert 110
- Paul, R. W. 131
- Pericles 91
- Pickett, Deets 79, 85
- Planck, Max 130
- Plato 91, 107
- Polk, William R. 130
- Pollard, William 104
- Polytheism 136
- Popper, Karl 161, 162
- Popular vicegerency 222, 223,
229
- Positivism 23, 25
- Priestley, Joseph 56
- Pure reason 102
- Quastler, H. 165
- Quinton, Anthony 62
- Qur'ān 88, 89, 97, 98, 99, 100,
101, 111, 122, 135, 139,
140, 141, 142, 143, 144,
145, 146, 147, 148, 149,
153, 154, 155, 166, 170,
197, 198, 200, 209, 210,
229
- Qutb, Sayyid 16, 17
- Rational mind:
prerequisites for a rational
discourse 115; identify
one's self 114, 115; in
relation to Islam two broad
possibilities 116; rational
societies become gluttons
as it pleases the senses 131
- Rationalism 23, 113; reason as
the slave 124, 125
- Renaissance 52, 59, 154
- Riedl, Rupert 173
- Rockefeller, John D. 189
- Roosevelt, Franklin 67, 78
- Rousseau, Jean Jacques 16, 56,
227
- Ruland, Richard 111
- Sabīl-i Rabb* 200
- Saint Paul 141; Pauline
analogy 141
- Salam, Abdus 103
- Sawā' al-sabīl* 200, 209
- Schaffer, Henry 177
- Scheffler, Israel 132
- Schiller, F. C. S. 3
- Schroeder, Gerald L. 102,
110, 177
- Secularism: irreversible
historical process 2;
functions like a new
religion 8; a closed
worldview 8; more than a
utopia 9; manifests itself in
almost all isms 9; seeks
total space and time 10;
valueless fluidity in which
desire rules 41; no intrusion
by God in the secular realm
211; reactive to clergy-
made theology 211; the



creedal declaration of present-day civilization 211; with nationalism and democracy a triangle of calamity 218; unfettered people from the moral grid 218

Secular life and uncertainty 97

Shakespeare, William 150

Shaw, Stanford J. 130

Shute, E. 188

Siegel, Harvey 131, 132, 134

Simpson, G. G. 179

Sīrāt al-mustaqīm (the straight path) 199, 200

Socrates 87

Sophists 126

Spencer, Herbert 4, 19, 57, 96, 169, 172, 173

Spinoza, Baruch 55

Spirit of the Time 205

Stapp, Henry Pierce 106

Stevens, Wallace 111

Strozzi, Filippo 126

Al-Tahānawī 101

Tarnas, Richard 105, 201, 202

Taylor, Gordon, R. 163, 164, 165, 173, 174, 175, 176, 188

Thompson, W. R. 161, 181

Tindal, Mathew 1

Toland, John 56

Tughluq, Muhammad 228

Unseen belief: physics affirms the unseen 93; modern times not free from belief in the unseen 92; negation of the unseen is not feasible

94; mere denial does not constitute non-existence 97; there is more to the physical world 110

Urey, Harold 164

Utilitarianism: by definition, a rational and utilitarian benefit is incapable of precise import because of its relative nature 121; in judging utility disagreement abounds 122

Voet, Gisbert 61

Vogt, Carl 57, 63, 65

Volstead Act 69, 81

Voltaire 4, 56, 227

Warner, Harry S. 84

Watt, Montgomery 107

Weaver, Richard 182, 183, 184, 185, 208

Weinberg, Steven 165

Wellhausen, Julius 5

Western civilization: entails refrain from God 52; born out of conflict between Christian religion and the natural sciences 52; claims it rests on rationalism and naturalism 113; sees things through the blinkered vision of a godless mind 155

Woodcock, Amos W. W. 71, 83

World Reason 33

Zeno 91



