

Strengthening National and Provincial Legislative Governance Project

PROCEEDINGS

SHORT
COURSE ON

THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS IN PAKISTAN

April 12 - 15, 2004
Hotel Pearl Continental
Bhurban, Murree

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Prepared By

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And
Transparency - PILDAT



As a Part of
Pakistan Legislative Strengthening
Consortium - PLSC



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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Brig.	Brigadier
CENTO	Central Treaty Organisation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (USA)
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
DG	Director General
Dte	Directorate
ECOTA	Economic Cooperative Organisation Trade Agreement
FIA	Federal Investigation Agency
IB	Intelligence Bureau (Pakistan)
IRS	Institute of Regional Studies (Pakistan)
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence (Pakistan)
ISS	Institute of Strategic Studies (Pakistan)
JIB	Joint Intelligence Bureau
JIC	Joint Intelligence Committee
JSH	Joint Staff Headquarter
JUI-F	Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl)
LoC	Line of Control
Lok Sabha	Lower House of the Parliament of India
LUMS	Lahore University of Management Sciences
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MI	Military Intelligence
MNCs	Multi National Companies
NSC	National Security Council
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
PPP	Pakistan People's Party
R&D	Research and Development
SAFTA	South Asian Free Trade Area
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organisation
TPS-OIC	Trade Preferential System under Organisation of the Islamic Conference
US	United States (of America)
UK	United Kingdom
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	World Trade Organisation

Acknowledgments

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency - PILDAT wishes to acknowledge the active participation of the MNAs and Speakers and Session Chairs of the Short Course for their invaluable time and quality of interaction that made the Short Course on Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan a success.

The short course enjoyed the distinction of being addressed by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri, and four (4) Former Foreign Ministers including Mr. Abdul Sattar, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali and Senator S. M. Zafar. In addition, a galaxy of subject specialists, former foreign secretaries, independent analysts and officials of the Foreign Office were speakers and session chairs at the course including Prof. Dr. Hassan Askari Rizvi, Defence & Political Analyst; Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain; Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani, Additional Secretary Foreign Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi, Former Director General ISI; Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir, Former Vice President Islamabad Research & Policy Institute; Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh, Former Foreign Secretary; Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, MNA and Former Federal Minister; Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani, Chairman Gallup Pakistan; Dr. Ayesha Saddiqua; Defence Analyst; Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin, Visiting Professor at LUMS; Mian Abdul Waheed; Former Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly and Dr. Asad M. Khan, Director General, Economic Coordination, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

PILDAT offers its special thanks to H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon; Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan; H. E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant; British High Commissioner to Pakistan, and Mr. Larry Robinson; Political Counselor, US Embassy (speaker on behalf of the US Ambassador to Pakistan) for their time and sharing of their thoughts on the issue of Pakistan's Foreign Policy with a select group of Parliamentarians participating in the Short Course.

PILDAT, in particular, acknowledges the interest, active participation and passionate interaction of the select group of Parliamentarians throughout the intense schedule of the short course.

Disclaimer

PILDAT has made every effort to ensure the accuracy of views, discussions and presentations in compiling and editing of this report. However, PILDAT and its supporters do not take any responsibility of any omission or an error since it is not deliberate. The views expressed at the short course and presented in this report are those of the Speakers, Session Chairs and participants and do not necessarily represent the views of PILDAT or its supporters.

Executive Summary

The Short Course for parliamentarians on Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan, held from April 12-15, 2004 at Bhurban was an intense and comprehensive exercise for building the knowledge of parliamentarians and politicians on the process of formulation, review and analysis of foreign policy. Facilitated by expert diplomats, renowned subject specialists, veteran politicians and policy makers, the course covered a comprehensive array of issues such as formulation and review of foreign policy including Major Foreign Policy Issues facing the country; Overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policies in historical perspective; Process of Foreign Policy formulation in theory and practise; Security considerations influencing foreign policy in Pakistan and other countries; Role of Parliament in shaping and reviewing Foreign Policy as compared to developed democracies of US, UK and India; Economic Diplomacy and Appraisal of Foreign Policy of Pakistan from the British, Indian and American perspective. Special emphasis was placed on the use of relevant case studies of shaping of Pakistan's Foreign Policy during the Gulf Crisis, Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits and Recognition of Taliban to identify major actors and influencing factors in shaping foreign policy.

Actively participated by the select group of parliamentarians, the course highlighted that the process for the formation of Pakistan's foreign policy needs to be re-analysed and the role of foreign office needs to be restructured. The role of security agencies, currently dominating, needs to be re-analysed in keeping with norms of democratic government. The major theme of interaction at the course included the need for a pro-active role of Parliament in shaping and reviewing foreign policy of the country, for which Parliament and Parliamentary Committees dealing with foreign affairs need to be strengthened. The address by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, followed by a candid exchange of views with participating Parliamentarians at the Course, also stressed the need for a multi-partisan approach and ownership of the foreign policy of the country. It was felt that lack of independent research support to foreign office as well as the lack of a meaningful consultation process resulted in the weakness of Pakistan's foreign policy in many instances in the past. Participants stressed that for an effective foreign policy towards India, given the recent *détente*, as well as the US and other countries of the world, it was necessary that input of independent analysts and that of the Parliament be incorporated in the policy. The foreign policy of the country, it was stressed, should not be dependent on a single institution and its peculiar considerations.

The participants, through detailed feedback at the end of the course, said that the course was an ideal platform through which not only their knowledge about foreign policy was enhanced from the basic to the exclusive, but it also provided them with an opportunity to interact and share views with a wide array of subject specialists, current and former policy makers and academicians. The exclusive setting of the course with only speakers and a select group of Parliamentarians improved a candid sharing of views. Participants largely felt that the course was an insightful experience.

Profiles of Speakers, Session Chairs and Resource Persons

Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri

MNA (NA-140, Kasur-III, PML)
Foreign Minister of Pakistan

Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri was elected to the National Assembly in 2002 and serves as the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. He graduated with a B.A (Hons.) degree from University of the Punjab in 1961, followed by a tripos degree from Cambridge University and qualified as Barrister-at-Law at Gray's Inn London.

During his political career, Mian Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri was elected as First Secretary General of Peoples Democratic Alliance and was appointed Federal Minister for Parliamentary Affairs in the interim government of Prime Minister Mir Balakh Sher Mazari.

Mr. Sartaj Aziz

Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs & Finance

Mr. Sartaj Aziz was born in February 1929 and received a Master's Degree in Development Economics from Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., USA. He was Minister for State for Food, Agriculture and Cooperatives (1984-1988), Minister for Food & Agriculture, Local Government and Rural development (1988), Minister for Finance, Planning and Economic Affairs (1990-1993), Secretary General of the Pakistan Muslim League (1993-1990), Minister for Finance, Planning and Economic Affairs (1997-1998), and Minister for Foreign Affairs (1998-1999).

Mr. Sartaj Aziz was elected to the Senate of Pakistan on three occasions (1985, 1988 and 1994). He has published several works on development, agriculture and politics.

Mr. Abdul Sattar

Former Foreign Minister

As a Foreign Minister, Mr. Abdul Sattar served in President Pervez Musharraf's cabinet, 1999-2002, and in Prime Minister Moeen Qureshi's interim cabinet, 1993. Mr. Sattar holds a degree of B.Sc. (Hons) and M.A. in Geography. He has also attended Fletcher School of Law and a series of instalments in Diplomacy in USA and received the degree of M.A.

In a 39-year career, he held posts of Foreign Secretary, 1986-88, Additional Foreign Secretary (South & East Asia) Director General (South Asia) and Director (Arab Affairs), in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was Ambassador to India, 1978-82 & 1990-92, USSR, 1988-90, and Austria, 1975-78 when he was also Representative to IAEA and UNIDO in Vienna. Earlier, he worked as Political Officer in embassies in New Delhi, Jeddah, Washington and Khartoum, and as Vice Consul in San Francisco. He was a member of the delegation at the Simla Conference, 1972, and participated in the Agra Summit in 2001 as Foreign Minister.

Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali

Former Foreign Minister

Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali graduated from St. John's College, Oxford, UK in 1966. He served as Adviser to Governor of West Pakistan (1969-71), and Vice President of the Punjab Cooperative Bank (1984-87). He was elected to the National Assembly on three occasions (1985, 1990, and 1993). Mr. Ali was appointed Minister of State (Economic Affairs) from 1990-93, Federal Minister Narcotics Control in 1993, and Foreign Minister from 1993-96. He served as Chairman of the OIC Foreign Ministers' Conference (1993-95), and as Chairman OIC Contact Group on Bosnia-Herzegovina (1993-95).

A skilled painter and writer, Mr. Ali contributes regularly to daily newspapers, journals and magazines.

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Defence & Political Analyst

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi is an independent Defence and Political Consultant. He was Quaid-e-Azam Professor of Pakistan Studies at Columbia University, New York (December 1995-July 1999), and Allama Iqbal Professor at Heidelberg University, Germany (February 1998-January 1991), and Research Scholar at University of New Mexico and Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque (2002). He was also on the Faculty of Political Science, Punjab University, Lahore, (1971-2001) including Professor and Chairman Department of Political Science.

Dr. Askari is a widely published scholar in national and international journals, contributes regular columns and has authored four books. He also serves on the Board of Advisors of PILDAT in an honorary capacity.

Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain

Ambassador Javid Husain holds a Masters Degree in Economics from the Government College, Lahore. He retired from the Foreign Service of Pakistan in March 2004 after a distinguished diplomatic career during which he served as the Ambassador of Pakistan to the Netherlands (1992-1995), to the Republic of Korea (1995-1997) and Iran (1997-2003). He has also served on diplomatic assignments in Pakistan Embassies/Missions in several important capitals including Paris (1969-1971), Tripoli (1971-1974), Washington (1974-1978), New York (1982-1985) and Beijing (1985-1988). He was First Secretary (Political) during his posting at the Pakistan Embassy, Washington, D.C. At the Pakistan Mission to the UN at New York, he served as Counsellor and later as Minister. From 1985 to 1988, he served as Minister and the second highest ranking officer in the Pakistan Embassy at Beijing.

Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani

Additional Secretary, Foreign Policy Planning
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani was born on October 10, 1948. He holds a Master's Degree in Political Science (with specialisation in International Relations). Mr. Gillani joined the Foreign Service of Pakistan on December 1, 1973, and also served in Pakistani Diplomatic Missions abroad including Jeddah (1977-80); Dhaka (1981-83); Geneva (1986-90) and Nairobi (1990-94). He served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad as Desk Officer (1975-77); Director (1983-86); and Director General (1994-98), served as Ambassador of Pakistan to Hungary (from February 1998 to February 2001) and High Commissioner of Pakistan to the Republic of South Africa (from February 2001 to December 2003).

Mr. Gillani is presently serving as Additional Secretary (Policy Planning) with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad.

Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi

Former Director General ISI

Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi has an M.Sc. in War Studies and an M.Sc. in Strategic Studies. He served as Director General Military Intelligence (1990-91), Master General of Ordinance (1991-92), Director General ISI (1993-95), and Corps Commander Gujranwala (1995-96). Senator Qazi was appointed Federal Secretary Science and Technology (1996-97), Secretary and Chairman Pakistan Railways (1999-2000), and Federal Minister for Communications and Railways (2000-2002).

He was awarded the Hilal-i-Imtiaz for meritorious services for the nation, and the Sitara-i-Basalat (on two occasions) for display of exceptional leadership and valour during peace time. He was elected to the Senate of Pakistan in 2003.

Mr. Najmuddin A. Sheikh

Former Foreign Secretary

Mr. Najmuddin A. Sheikh spent 38 years in the Pakistan Foreign Service before retiring in 1999. In the course of his career, he served as Ambassador/High Commissioner in Canada (1987-89), Germany (1989-90), USA (1990-91) and Iran (1992-94). He was Foreign Secretary from 1994-97. In 2002, he served as the President's Special Envoy, and met with leaders in Russia, Iran, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Japan to explain Pakistan's point of view.

He is currently a member of the Board of Governors of the Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. He writes a weekly column on foreign affairs in the "Dawn" newspaper and is a commentator on the same subject on various TV and radio channels. He regularly attends unofficial international conferences on issues of importance to South Asia.

Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir

Former Vice President Islamabad Policy Research Institute

Brigadier Shaukat Qadir graduated with an M.Sc. in War Studies from Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He joined the Armed Forces of Pakistan in 1968. Brigadier Qadir has conducted strategic analysis of various national and international laws, strategies and policies and their effect on the developing world in general and Pakistan in particular, and coordinated with national and international organizations regarding peace and development initiatives (Pak-India peace forum, dialogue on Kashmir, Nuclear South Asia and others).

Brigadier Qadir has extensive training experience. He was on the visiting faculty of the regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka, and the Fatima Jinnah University, Rawalpindi, and taught courses on Conflict Resolution, Conflict and Crisis Management, Geopolitics, Social Decision Making, Pakistan Studies, Islam and Ethics. He was Vice President of the Islamabad Policy Research Institute and has attended several national and international lectures, conferences and seminars.

Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani

Chairman Gallup Pakistan

Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani is the Chairman and Chief Executive of the Gallup Pakistan. He is also associated with the International Islamic University Islamabad as honorary Dean of Social Sciences. He has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), USA. He has also served as adviser to Prime Minister and Chairman Prime Minister's Committee for Research and Analysis from 1991-93. Dr. Gilani has directed electoral studies for all local body and national elections since 1979. He also serves on the Board of Advisors of PILDAT in an honorary capacity.

Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi

MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)

Former Federal Minister

Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi returned to the National Assembly in October 2002 on a PPPP seat. He completed a B.A degree in 1978 from University of the Punjab followed by an M.A in 1983 from Cambridge University. During his political career, he has been elected MPA Punjab from 1985 to 1988, 1988 to 1990 and 1990 to 1993. He has also been elected Chairman District Council Multan from 1987 to 1991, MNA from 1993 to 1996 and District Nazim Multan from 2001 to 2002. He served as Provincial Minister of Finance Punjab from 1990-1993 and Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs from 1994-1996.

Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin

Visiting Professor

Lahore University of Management Sciences - LUMS

Dr. Tahir Amin holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, United States. He has been on the Iqbal Chair (1997-2001) at the Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK. He has also been a Visiting Scholar at the Harvard University (1992) on Fulbright Fellowship and has been a Visiting Fellow (1996) at the Watson School of International Studies, Brown University, USA. He has also taught at the Boston College, Boston as an adjunct Prof. in the Department of Political Science. He has been the Prof. and Chairman of the Department of International Relations at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Dr. Tahir Amin has written several books and articles on International Relations and South Asian politics.

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua

Security Analyst

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua is working as a visiting fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute and correspondent Jane's Defence Weekly. She has a Ph.D. in War Studies from King's College, London and has also been a civil servant for eleven years including a two years' stint as Director of Naval Research at Islamabad. She is also the author of a book on Pakistan's military decision-making titled: 'Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Build-up, 1979-99. Dr. Siddiqua has written in several international journals.

Dr. Asad Majeed Khan

Director Economic Coordination, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Asad Majeed Khan completed doctoral studies in International Economic and Business Law from Kyushu University, Japan (LL.D - 1998-2002). Earlier, he worked as an Attorney at Law in Lahore (1986-1988) and later joined the Foreign Service of Pakistan. In addition to working in various sections and directorates of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he also served in the Pakistan Embassy in Tokyo. He has attended several national and international meetings and seminars on international trade and security related issues including WTO and regional free trade agreements.

Dr. Asad Majeed Khan is presently working as Director Economic Coordination in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is a visiting lecturer and resource person at the International Islamic University, Islamabad, Foreign Trade Institute of Pakistan and Foreign Service Academy on international trade and WTO affairs.

Mian Abdul Waheed

Former Chairman Foreign Affairs committee of the National Assembly

Mian Abdul Waheed, Former MNA and Chairman National Assembly Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, holds a Masters in International Law and Diplomacy from Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, United States. He has a long career in the Foreign Office of Pakistan from 1960 to 1984 during which he has served as Pakistan's Ambassador to Italy and West Germany amongst other key posts. His political career began in 1987. He has been elected to the National Assembly in 1991, 1993 and 1997.

H. E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant

British High Commissioner to Pakistan

Mr. Mark Lyall Grant arrived in Pakistan in May 2003 as British High Commissioner designate. Throughout his career he has worked extensively at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, and more recently as Director for Africa. From 1996-1998 he was Deputy Head of Mission in Pretoria. He has also served in Paris and in Islamabad from 1982-85.

H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

Born on July 5, 1949, Mr. Menon is an MA in History from Delhi University. He joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1972 and has since served in various appointments in the Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi and in Indian embassies in Beijing, Vienna and Tokyo. He has also worked in the Department of Atomic Energy. Mr. Menon was previously Ambassador in China and Israel and High Commissioner in Sri Lanka.

Mr. Lawrence K. Robinson

Counselor Political Affairs
US Embassy

Mr. Larry Robinson is the Counselor for Political Affairs at the United States Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan. His section is responsible for reporting on political developments in Pakistan, explaining U.S. policy to Pakistani government officials and other opinion leaders, and coordinating foreign policy initiatives with the Government of Pakistan.

Mr. Robinson was born in Honolulu, Hawaii. He graduated from Yale University with a major in History, the Arts and Letters. He served in the U.S. Navy from 1970-78. Mr. Robinson joined the Foreign Service in 1978. He has served overseas as consular officer in London and Belfast, and political officer in Muscat, Shanghai, London and Seoul. He has also served four tours of duty in the State Department, the first two working on East Asian issues and the most recent two in the Bureau of South Asian Affairs.

Background

PILDAT, an independent, not-for-profit and non-partisan research and training institution working for strengthening democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan, has been actively engaged with building the capabilities of elected legislators towards an effective discharge of their duties. The PILDAT programme of legislative strengthening has been formulated in consultation with present and veteran legislators, opinion leaders, analysts and academicians to cater to the specific policy-making and analytical needs of Pakistani legislators at all levels.

PILDAT has recently joined Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Consortium - PLSC which is implementing the programme of Strengthening National and Provincial Legislative Governance funded by USAID. PILDAT is responsible for the segment of legislative training in the PLSC.

The Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan

In a democracy, Parliament, as the institution representing public and public's interests, plays an important part in shaping and reviewing foreign policy, which, before the evolution of democratic government, used to be the exclusive domain of diplomats and soldiers. In democratic set up, the executive is answerable to public which exercise their control through the democratic institution of the Parliament.

In order to strengthen Parliament and Parliamentary Committees in Pakistan to provide an active input into foreign policy making and oversee the implementation of policy by the executive, PILDAT organised the Short Course on the Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan. Inviting only a select group of parliamentarians, with foreign policy as their area of interest, the course was designed to enhance the knowledge of parliamentarians about the process of foreign policy formulation as well as present various case studies, foreign policy issues and role of other state institutions in foreign policy formulation in sharp focus for the benefit of parliamentarians.

Appendix A carries the detailed programme of the short course. The course was attended by a group of 20 parliamentarians. A list and profile of parliamentarians is given as Appendix B.

Components of the Short Course

In order to provide documentary support and background information to parliamentarians, PILDAT prepared Dossiers of the course that included two (2) especially prepared briefing papers: Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Overview 1947 - 2004 and The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan in addition to four (4) case studies on the Formulation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy with special reference to Gulf Crisis-1990; Recognition of Taliban Regime; Comparison of Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits and Parliament's Role in Foreign Policy with special reference to the US, UK and India. The dossier also carried papers and copies of presentations/speeches of all speakers and resource persons at the course.

The course, especially held at the Pearl Continental Hotel, Bhurban, Murree was designed to provide the right



combination of leisure and learning away from the busy life of the cities.

The course incorporated a social programme in addition to the learning aspects. On the first night of the course, participating parliamentarians participated in a get-together and introductory dinner. The second evening hosted a live musical night while on the third evening, a documentary 'Situation Room' was played for the participants at the hotel theatre. As a special feature of the programme, an evening was set aside for Trekking and Tea at the picturesque Golf Club adjacent to Hotel Pearl Continental.

Course Dossier and Special Publications

As is PILDAT's practice, a special Course Dossier was prepared which included advanced copies of speeches/presentations of each resource person in addition to special publications of PILDAT developed for this course.

These publications included:

- Briefing Paper on *An Overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947 - 2004*
- Briefing Paper on *The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan*
- Case Study on *Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits*
- Case Study on *Gulf Crisis-1990*
- Case Study on *Recognition of Taliban*
- Case Study on *Parliament and Foreign Policy: A Comparative Analysis of the US, UK and India*

The course dossier contained these publications for each participant in addition to a copy of the programme, profile of participants and speakers, feedback forms and other useful reading material relating to foreign policy process of Pakistan.



Special Session

Executive Summary

In a Special Session held on the evening of April 12, 2004, Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi; Former DG ISI, delivered a lecture to the participants on the topic of How Security Considerations influence Foreign Policy in Pakistan and How this Practise Compares with other Countries of the World?

Senator Qazi believed that the security agencies, primarily ISI in Pakistan, have a major impact on the formulation of foreign policy through briefing to the cabinet; regular reports to foreign office and interaction between various echelons of ISI and MOF both at home and abroad and input at JSHQ, Defence Council and Defence Committee of the Cabinet. He compared the system of Pakistani security agencies with those of the USA, Israel and India.

A lively Q&A following the presentation of Senator Qazi served to highlight themes such as security agencies' enhanced role in political arena of the country as well as foreign policy formulation.

Welcome Remarks

Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob
Executive Director, PILDAT



Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob began the session with the recitation of selected verses from the Holy Quran. He welcomed distinguished participants and resource persons to the Short Course.

Presenting an overview of the short course, Mr. Mehboob said that facilitated by expert diplomats, renowned subject specialists, veteran politicians and policy makers the course is an effort to orient parliamentarians with the process of foreign policy formulation and the constitutional role of legislators in influencing foreign policy of the country.

Welcome Remarks were followed by a brief introduction of all participants of the course. After the introductions, Mr. Mehboob invited Senator Qazi to make his presentation.

How Security Considerations Influence Foreign Policy in Pakistan: the Role of Security Agencies and how this practise compares with other countries of the World

Senator Lt. Gen.
(Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi
Former Director General, ISI



In the beginning Senator Qazi elucidated that nation states live and prosper within secure borders in accordance with their chosen ideologies and systems. He said that the national security rests on defence, economy and internal security. The government has to formulate a number of policies to achieve its national objectives and aims. These policies are a) Foreign Policy; to win friends and allies and to support other government policies and to ensure their success to enhance national security. b) Economic Policy; to provide sound base for development. c) Defence Policy; to ensure security of the state d) Psychosocial Policy; to ensure internal harmony and development and the more recent one, e) Media Policy; to win minds and to project the success of one's own policies. The manifestation of this can be observed in Iraq war Gulf War etc.

He continued that all these policies are interdependent and it is imperative for a government to formulate all these policies for the successful attainment of national aims. Ministry of Foreign affairs is primarily responsible for the formulation of these policies. It is to formulate foreign policy options based on various factors and in accordance with changing environment and requirements. Cabinet approves a policy and the Ministry of Foreign affairs then oversees its implementation. Major input into the formulation is provided by the intelligence agencies, primarily by the ISI. This information is conveyed by ISI formally by three means:

- i) Briefing to the Cabinet in which DG ISI briefs the Cabinet.

- ii) Regular reports to foreign office and interaction between various echelons of ISI and MOF (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) both at home and abroad. Each embassy has ISI personnel. For successful interaction, the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Minister should have very close interaction with DG ISI, he believed.
- iii) Briefing at JSHQ which the DG ISI gives to all the service chiefs. Similarly DG ISI gives his input to Defence Council and Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Apart from this, informally the Prime Minister is at liberty to ask for a paper on any topic to be formulated by the Intelligence or the Foreign Office can require any information from ISI.

Senator Qazi illustrated the types of information provided by the Intelligence to the Foreign Policy. It is believed that there is no permanence in relation within states. The only factor that dominates all considerations is national interest. Friends and allies of today can be enemies of tomorrow and vice versa. Therefore as far as Intelligence is concerned, intelligence needs to be acquired about all neighbours, allies and other countries in the world of interest. It relates to a total picture along with current developments and future likely developments. Hence information about other countries is acquired in the areas of political systems, personalities and historical perspective of the target countries, Economic strength and future prospects, defence policy, strength weapon acquisitions and future plans and relations with other states.

Senator Qazi also explained the factors affecting security considerations and foreign policy in the current milieu emphasising that in the era of globalisation and common market economies, national security concerns transcend the geographical boundaries of a nation. The ensuing threats are no more confined to military manifestation alone but also present themselves in a non-military fashion. The developed world urges for greater improvement in social indices and quality of life has lead to intensive competition for shrinking resources. The resultant conflict of interests is, therefore, likely to revolve around the energy resource centres. Various power centres around the globe, therefore, articulate their

policies and forge regional global alliances to harvest optimum advantage amidst competing forces.

Senator Qazi was of the view that in the prevailing global milieu of increasing inter-dependence and awareness of social ethos, the use of force for conflict resolution will often invoke international recrimination. Economic, diplomatic and political coercion will instead form part of the security calculus and are likely to be used more aggressively to achieve the stipulated objectives remaining short of war. Since economy remains the major determinant of viability and power potential of a nation, geo-economics is therefore, attaining dominance over geo-political alliances. He believed that media also has a very effective impact in today's world.

Talking of the role of UNO, he said that it is increasingly manipulated by the major powers to promote their own interests and its influence as a neutral mechanism to enforce measures for greater peace and stability is slowly diminishing. He said that nations across the globe, due to intermingled interests, remain averse to conflict and escalation that has the potential to upset the status quo and jeopardise collective interests. The smaller nations will, therefore, witness growing resistance to the acquisition of technologies, which can disturb the balance of power in a region. Describing the changing patterns of conflict, Senator Qazi said that conflict pattern is shifting from inter-state to intra-state.

Discussing the role of security agencies, Senator Qazi said that Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) is mainly tuned to the collection of strategic intelligence, which is the knowledge pertaining to enemy's capabilities, vulnerabilities, probable courses of action, plans and other related aspects that may affect Pakistan's national interests directly or indirectly. ISI's charter includes: i) Procurement and coordination of external strategic intelligence. ii) Advice to Federal Government on matters of national security, and counter-intelligence relating to the armed forces. iii) Some aspects of internal security. Similarly Military Intelligence (MI) is dedicated to the collection, analysis and dissemination of tactical intelligence about enemy designs. The primary role of the MI is to keep the General Staff updated about enemy arms build up, movement of troops especially of strike formations, enemy operational plans, frequency and

direction of surveillance activity. A similar role is performed by the Naval Intelligence and the Air Intelligence for Navy and Air force. He said that the Intelligence Bureau (IB) mainly concentrates on the internal dynamics of Pakistan. Besides monitoring the emerging political scenario, it also keeps a constant watch on the law and order situations, ethnic and sectarian trends.

As far as the Role of Intelligence in National Policy in Pakistan is concerned, he said that intelligence inputs provide a vital basis for policy decisions particularly on national security and foreign policy as national security is fundamental to all facets of state policy and strategy, he added.

Talking about Pakistan's role in the war against terrorism, he said that due to Pakistan's frontline role in this, this burden has to be borne by ISI. He said that "our restructuring efforts and development of a national counter-terrorism network proved timely and have enabled ISI to maintain its reputation as an effective intelligence service."

Discussing the role of other international intelligence agencies, Senator Qazi said that over the years Indian Intelligence Agency RAW has emerged as an important instrument of India's national power and has assumed a significant position in formulating the country's domestic and foreign policy. He believed that today, RAW's tentacles have spread from Maldives to Afghanistan, Central Asia, Middle East, Europe, USA, Canada and Australia. RAW enjoys active collaboration with the leading intelligence agencies of the world including CIA, M16, Mossad and FIS (Russia).

Describing the American Intelligence Agency CIA, he said that CIA is by far the most powerful and resourceful intelligence agency with base stations and presence in almost all parts of the world. In its over 50 years of existence, CIA has played a variety of roles in pursuit of US domestic and global aims, which could be the envy of any intelligence agency. CIA has its own R&D network designed to develop computer surveillance, high-tech electronic intelligence gathering and photographic reconnaissance facility.

Discussing Israel's main intelligence agency Mossad, he added that it is the external intelligence network of Israel, which operates directly under the Prime Minister. Its opinions especially those relating to Israeli Security, are given due consideration by the political leadership. Over the years, this organisation has acquired notoriety for its thoroughness and ruthlessness in planning and executing its operations mainly against the Palestinians. Main responsibilities of Mossad include: gathering external intelligence, providing information on all projects which require decisions concerning Israeli security, recruitment of agents, counteracting Palestinian suicide operations, fomenting racial and ethnic conflicts as in Lebanon and portraying a negative image of Palestinian people and Arab countries especially in Europe and USA, he said.

Concluding his talk, Senator Qazi said that contrary to the belief that ISI is a state upon itself, 72 % of the manpower in the ISI consists of uniformed people who join ISI for a fixed tenure of maximum three years at the end of which they return to their earlier positions. Therefore, they cannot form their own agendas. At the same time, this poses a disadvantage to ISI that its expertise is lost.

Similarly, he believed that the Intelligence Agencies are attacked for their involvement into political arena. The major internal role of intelligence agencies such as ISI is guarding against law and order disturbances, terrorism, enemy agents, etc., but governments have increasingly relied on the ISI because of its effectiveness. ISI has been generally receiving very negative media coverage because of misperception of its role and unfortunately ISI officials, being in uniform, cannot indulge in public debate. Hence they lose an opportunity to present their perspective and have to bear the onslaught of the media.

Please refer to **Appendix D** for his detailed paper and presentation.



Q&A / Comments Session

Question

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Defence & Political Analyst

I would like to draw your attention to two historical facts and would like to have your comments on them.

- i) Before 1979, ISI had very limited role in foreign policy formulation and it was during Afghanistan War that most of the assistance to Mujahideen was processed through ISI which placed enormous resources at ISI's disposal.
- ii) The failure of democracy and the establishment of the military rule (especially during General Zia-ul-Haq's military rule) have contributed to strengthening the role of intelligence agencies in foreign policy. Had there been democracy in Pakistan, do you think that the intelligence agencies could have played the role which they are playing now? Given the expansion of the role of intelligence agencies, especially ISI, what is the scope of action left for the elected representatives? And when you say that the government mostly relies on the ISI, what do you mean by the "government" as there is a civil government and a military government in Pakistan. As you mentioned that 72 % officials of the ISI are in uniform whose decisions of promotion are in the hands of the

Army Chief, then wouldn't the ISI be serving the Army rather than the civil government?

Answer

Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi

Former Director General, ISI

You are right that the ISI was a very modest organisation before the Afghan War and it was expanded during the Afghan War. After the success of Afghan War, government decided that this agency is essential for safeguarding the national interest of Pakistan. A lot of successful missions of the ISI are not disclosed most of the times and the ISI operations more than once have combated security threats. If the ISI was allowed to be actively involved during 1971, perhaps we could have avoided the 1971 tragedy of separation. Secondly, elected representatives are not intelligence agents and their role is strictly demarcated. Elected representatives are supposed to formulate policy and present their advice to the Prime Minister. ISI functions directly under the Prime Minister. DG ISI is appointed by the Prime Minister from a panel of officers given by the Army Chief. The Prime minister can remove the DG ISI if he/she is dissatisfied with his performance. Gen. Asad Durrani was removed from the DG ISI's job by Prime Minister Nawaz

Sharif. DG ISI is supposed to report to the Joint Service Headquarter. At the same time, I would not deny that since he is an officer in uniform belonging to the Army, therefore, the Army Chief does have a great influence over him. I believe that if DG ISI plays a positive role, he can act as a bridge between the political government and the Army.

Question

Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi

MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)

Former Federal Minister

There is a general perception that the role of ISI has become so overbearing vis-à-vis foreign policy that the input of foreign office has become secondary and practically there is a feeling that the foreign office has become redundant. Because of the enormous clout of this organisation, very competent people at the foreign office are too scared to give their input and as a result we are unable to gain from the expertise of the foreign office into the foreign policy.

Answer

Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi

Former Director General, ISI

It should not be so because primarily foreign office is responsible for formulating the foreign policy and if there is a competent Foreign Secretary or Foreign Minister, they would not let the ISI to be overbearing. The ISI would be overbearing if they are allowed to be overbearing. However, as far as inputs are concerned, there are always two channels through which the foreign office receives information: Ambassadors send their reports to the foreign office and the Defence Attachés and ISI cover officers send their reports to the DG ISI. In the past, the ISI did not receive a copy of what the ambassadors were writing to the foreign office and vice versa. This was a cause of a lot of friction and in Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's regime, it was decided that ambassadors' reports would be shared with the DG ISI and the Defence Attachés' reports would be shared with the foreign office. I handed over the Afghan Policy to the foreign office. Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto asked President Leghari to preside over meetings concerning Afghan Policy where the foreign office, ISI, the NWFP government used to

meet and discuss the policy and the rest was left to the foreign office to further give directions and implement the policy.

Question

Ms. Fauzia Wahab

MNA (NA-311, Women Sindh-IV, PPPP)

Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in one of her interviews to the monthly magazine Herald, shared that Brig. Imtiaz and Major Aamir were captured and the tapes that were received from them were forwarded to the ISI. According to her, they should have faced court martial but the ISI did not do so. Is it not a contradiction then that the DG ISI is directly answerable to the Prime Minister?

Answer

Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi

Former Director General, ISI

Let me clarify this. On recommendation of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, with her consent, both the officers were retired from the service. It is a different matter that both of these officers were later subsequently employed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in IB.

Question

Ms. Samia Raheel Qazi

MNA (NA-301, Women Punjab-XXIX, MMAP)

We have already been divided once through a foreign supported insurgency. What precautions can we take so that such unfortunate incidences do not occur again? Similarly with our involvement in the Afghanistan, a lot of casualties occurred and still there was no output.

Answer

Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi

Former Director General, ISI

After the Afghan war, a lot of Arabs did not return to their homelands, instead they came to Pakistan, especially to Peshawar. In Peshawar, they made a base and they started operating against their own governments. There was a very big anti-Egyptian cell in Peshawar and an anti-Algerian cell operating from Peshawar because of which in 1991-92, Pakistan was put on the "terrorism watch

list” on demands by the Egyptian and the Algerian governments. The killers of Anwar Saadat, Khalid Islamboli and his brothers and others were also in Peshawar. One of the tasks given to me as the DG ISI was to take Pakistan off this “terrorism watch list”. As a result, we realised that we should have good relations with all Islamic countries. So we recommended that these Arabs should be asked to leave Pakistan and in 1994, the government ordered them to leave or else they would be arrested and handed over to their respective governments. Majority of them left and settled in Afghanistan. Some of them disappeared, some settled in the tribal areas of Pakistan and some went back to their own countries and some also went and settled in Sudan. Those who had gone to Afghanistan formed an organisation which subsequently came to be known as Al-Qaeda. If our government had not acted in 1994 and cleared Peshawar, perhaps Al-Qaeda's base would have been Peshawar and instead of Afghanistan we would have been the main target which India was demanding.

Most people in Wana today are Chechens and Uzbeks. During the Afghan war, they were fighting against the Mujahideen. They were part of the Soviet Army. When Soviet Union was disintegrated, Russia became a separate state and Chechnya revolted. Some Chechen rebels escaped to Afghanistan to avoid Russian atrocities. After Uzbekistan's independence, there was an Islamic movement in Farghana Valley and this movement was crushed ruthlessly by Islam Karimof who has been compared to Stalin. These Uzbeks also took refuge in Afghanistan. When Americans came into Afghanistan, the majority of the people in Wana escaped from Afghanistan and took refuge with this tribe in Waziristan with whom they had been interacting while they were in Afghanistan. Most of these people which the Army has arrested speak very fluent Pushto as well as Dari. Thus it is not true that we invited them and now we are throwing them out, as we never invited Chechens and Uzbeks. Expelling them was necessary as we cannot allow them to wage their war from Pakistan. The government had allowed them to stay on but only on the condition that they give away their weapons and live peacefully. A number of jirgas were sent to them but they did not accept the offer. As a result there was no option left but to undertake an army operation. Most of them have escaped to Afghanistan or hidden in North Waziristan. But as far as my personal

opinion is concerned, I do not think that we should allow Pakistan to become a base for any foreign nationals of any type at all. Here I am not referring to Kashmir as Kashmiris are not foreign nationals.

Question

Ms. Sherry Rehman

MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)

What do you consider an Intelligence failure? Something like not finding any high value targets in Wana? On a more fundamental level, when the ISI is operating on the eastern and western borders, both the net effect of long inputs and resource diversions to these areas in one sense have resulted now in a lessening of your influence in the formal structure in Hamid Karzai's government, the Northern Alliance while in Indian-held Kashmir, you have lost the mainstream Huriyat Party who have now joined the Chief Minister of Kashmir. Considering that these two areas have been the main sites of the ISI operations for the geo-strategic interests of Pakistan, would you not consider the loss of influence in both these areas a larger more fundamental failure?

Another question is that where do you draw the line between intelligence gathering for foreign policy purposes for inputs in foreign policy and interventions that begin outside Pakistan and creep into the main political arena of Pakistan domestically? The ISI has had its share of bad press and it is not just seen as the main driver of foreign policy in Pakistan, making the Foreign Minister's office a largely ceremonial one, but it is seen now as the driver of domestic politics in Pakistan which is both dangerous for ISI as well as for Pakistan.

My third question is that you mentioned the creation of a higher intelligence organisation which should serve the purpose of coordination between various agencies and civil departments and ministries. It seems as if coordination is a key issue in the higher echelons of the security apparatus because security agencies have a Prime Ministerial and Presidential presence, despite that, why do you think we needed something as controversial as National Security Council which I presume would have a fair amount of bearing on Foreign Policy making? When you say that 70% of ISI staff would stay for three years then how do you explain the popular and well-

documented presence of political players like Gen. (Retd.) Hameed Gul who seems to be running a parallel government of Army and hence giving birth to terms such as 'rogue ISI' and 'parallel ISI' and 'three tiers of ISI'?

Answer

Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi

Former Director General, ISI

As far as the system is concerned, the day you leave the ISI, you are not even welcome to enter its premises. None of the ISI's ex-DGs have been allowed to step back inside even as visitors. Gen. (Retd.) Hameed Gul tries to keep his importance alive by giving these statements. I was DG ISI after him and nobody from ISI ever visited Gen. (Retd.) Hameed Gul. He was not allowed to visit the ISI but he kept on giving such statements like "My Boys in the ISI..." etc. He keeps himself alive in the newspapers through such statements and you publish such statements thinking that it will bring a controversial subject forward for people to discuss. But the fact is that the day you leave ISI, your influence and importance also finishes.

About Mehran Bank, Mehran Bank did not even exist at that time. Yes, money was distributed but it did not come from Mehran Bank. Mehran Bank was formed much later. It got the name Mehran because the person concerned was Mr. Younis Habib. Mr. Younis Habib at that time was in Habib Bank. He collected the money from the businessmen of Karachi at the behest of those who did not want to see Ms. Bhutto back in power and he distributed that money through the then DG ISI, who is just one man. The rest of the ISI did not even know about this. Neither was MI involved in it. It was solely a one man show. He was given that money by the President and with the tacit approval of the Chief of Army, he distributed that money amongst the various politicians for the election campaign. As far as the ISI being not effective in Wana is concerned, the ISI was not present in the tribal areas. We had always relied on the tribesmen themselves and their assurance that they will safeguard the interests of Pakistan. Lack of presence of the ISI in these tribal areas resulted in lack of information. While the ISI did report that there are some foreign elements in Wana, the numbers were underestimated and that is where they suffered casualties and that is where the

failure of intelligence comes in. As far as Afghanistan is concerned, once the Afghan Jihad was over we decided that our presence in Afghanistan was no more required. It was for this reason that Afghan Policy was handed over to the Foreign Office. As far as effectiveness with Hamid Karzai's government is concerned, Americans brought in the Northern Alliance and Northern Alliance inherently has been anti-Pakistan because of the Pakhtoon factor. If today the Americans pull out, Northern Alliance would not be able to stay in Afghanistan as a result of civil war. It is not the failure of ISI that Northern Alliance is against Pakistan. They have been against us ever since the days of Ahmed Shah Masood who hijacked the school children's bus. Let me tell you that later we realised that evacuating Afghanistan was not a wise decision and it is for this reason that there was a lot of intelligence about Afghanistan but they did not interfere. Similarly, ISI did get the blame for letting Taliban do as they will but Taliban were not immune to advise anyway.

Vis-à-Vis Kashmir, both factions of Huriyat Conference still consider Pakistan as their mainstay. They have internal differences and the ISI is not responsible for any animosity amongst the two factions.

Question

Mr. Omar Ayub Khan

MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)

India's strength is increasing in their value-added weapon systems. Keeping their military strength in perspective as well as the rapid increase in Indian economy vis-à-vis Pakistan's, and then bringing in the Kashmir issue, what in your opinion do you think the role of foreign policy input will be for the government fifteen years from now where India is looking at itself as the local power broker of the region? They are projecting their force in the ASEAN region as well. Where do we stand vis-à-vis Kashmir if there is some sort of dialogue on Kashmir with the rapid increase in Indian conventional forces?

Answer

Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi

Former Director General, ISI

You have counted a lot of our weaknesses but you have not counted any of our strengths. Our geo-strategic

location is our inherent strength. India desperately wants to trade with the Central Asian region and dominate it. Pakistan straddles all the routes which India needs. India cannot interact with any country to the west without Pakistan's co-operation. This has stifled its growth. India has to resort to sea routes for trade which are much more expensive. Our second strength is our nuclear power which guarantees our safety. Despite preponderance in conventional weapons, India will not dare to attack us. This does not mean that we need not have any conventional forces but at the same time there is no need for us to indulge in an arms race with India. I personally feel that we need to increasingly rely on the resistance by our civil population if they come in. Kashmir struggle has served Pakistan tremendously. It has engaged six to seven lakh Indian forces in that small valley and as a result, on the rest of the border we had parity. One of the reasons they retreated their forces from our borders was because of their lack of superiority to conquer Pakistan. However, Kashmir needs to be resolved in the interest of both India and Pakistan. The leadership in Kashmir is far more realistic than the leadership in Pakistan. In 1993-94 Syed Ali Gillani informed me that India will never give up entire Kashmir. We should be realistic as the solution lies in between and it is only after an honourable solution is reached that this arms race can end, trade can develop and economy can become better.

Question

Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin

Visiting Prof. LUMS

I thought that a lot of emphasis in your presentation was laid on the formal aspect of ISI's functions. But I feel that there is a huge gap between its theoretical functions and its practical behaviour. The ISI manipulates the political forces, formulates political alliances, and quite often monopolises foreign policy. There are a lot of things that the ISI does which we learn through the press substantiated by evidence.

My second question is that who determines the definition of national interest, the uniformed ISI officials or the elected representatives?

Answer

Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi

Former Director General, ISI

ISI is inherently not authorised to undertake any political work. Interference in politics by the ISI only takes place when a military government comes in. Military governments depend more on the ISI as they do not have a political force to carry out their work. During Martial Law, barely less than 5% of the army gets involved in this, the rest 95% are in barracks doing their duty. It is for this reason that exaggerated importance is given to the ISI. However this is not appropriate and is not the function of the ISI. DGs of the ISI are usually selected against the panel submitted by the Army; rather they are selected to fulfil the Prime Minister's political agenda. It is for this reason that more than the ISI, it is the Prime Minister who is to be blamed. Secondly, as far as the media is concerned, they also write what they perceive and sometime these perceptions are not true as the ISI officials in uniform cannot defend themselves by participating in any kind of debate.

Comment

Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali

Former Foreign Minister

I welcome you to a civilian life and I congratulate you for coming into the Parliament but let me repeat myself that there is an enormous kick in getting elected directly by the people and I will invite you to go through this wonderful experience. I also congratulate you on your comprehensive presentation. But my heart goes out to you in sympathy and I feel as if you are in the dock and we are the jury. We have worked together for two years and I want to share this with everyone that it was a very good period for extending Pakistan's influence in the world and protecting our national security. I give you a lot of credit for having played a very positive role for the success of this cooperation that came about. For the past three to four years, people have had to hold their noses to walk past the ISI because of all the political manipulations, all the political pressures, misuse of NAB and because of the artificial exile into which two principal leaders of Pakistan have been sent by the military regime. The kind of manipulation and interference that has taken place in the last three years has not been witnessed

before. If the ISI was indulging in politics in a covert manner in the past, this time it took off its fig leaf and it became a complete overt involvement and blatant interference in the politics and I myself am a victim to that. I cannot find any excuses in terms of national security for this. In apologies for the ISI, I am usually very proud of the work that the ISI did in Afghanistan and Kashmir but I cannot, for the life of me, find within the ISI's charter and morality, legality and legitimacy of having the ISI interfere in such a blatant manner and to serve not only the democratic institutions but also the constitutional institutions of state like the Election Commission, Supreme Court, and the Parliament. Speaker in the Parliament were elected because of the voice of a Major General Zamir. If this kind of overt interference in the politics keeps taking place, it would bring a very bad name to a very fine institution and I for one would like to see the ISI strengthen and its role to be much more effective.

Answer**Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi**

Former Director General, ISI

I do not deny the ISI's role in the last elections which you all have so vehemently pointed out. But at the same time, I would like to emphasise here that this role of the ISI is very minimal and due credit goes to the ISI for playing a major role in externally safeguarding the interests of Pakistan. Their inputs into the foreign policy are extremely useful. When it comes to its political role, I myself am against it and the ISI should not be involved in it.

Session 1

Executive Summary

Covering an Overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947 - 2004 by Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi, the session was chaired by Mr. Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali, Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Dr. Rizvi was of the view that the management of foreign policy is a very difficult and complex affair for a country like Pakistan which does not enjoy the option of isolation. He believed that unlike the past, Pakistan, as a major participant in the global efforts to curb transnational terrorism, stands at an enhanced level of its strategic relevance for the major powers, especially the United States. Despite pursuing a pro-active foreign policy, Pakistan does not have the ambition and capacity to assume the role of a global or regional power. Its activism reflects a realisation that such a policy facilitates the mobilisation of international support and resources for its domestic socio-economic development, helps to regulate the inputs from the external environment into the internal context, and contributes to strengthening security and territorial integrity which are the principal concerns of Pakistan's foreign policy.

Dr. Rizvi described major focus of Pakistan's foreign policy over the years to be security against external and internal challenges to its national identity, territorial integrity and independence and cultivation of close and brotherly relations with the Muslim states. The principal strategies and mechanisms to pursue these foreign policy goals have varied over time.

His presentation was followed by a Q&A Session which put emphasis on Pakistan's emerging relations with India and U.S. and internal dynamics of Pakistan bearing on its foreign policy options.

Introductory Presentation

Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob
Executive Director, PILDAT

Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob formally began the first session of the course by providing an overview of the course and its objectives. He emphasised that the major objective of the course was to enhance the awareness of parliamentarians and politicians on the foreign policy process in Pakistan and to help them determine as to what is their clear role in this formulation. He said that this course aimed to prepare parliamentarians and politicians to play an effective role in shaping, influencing and reviewing Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan and further to strengthen the role of Foreign Affairs Committees. Shedding light on the role of PILDAT as an organisation

dedicated to legislative strengthening, Mr. Mehboob said that PILDAT seeks to prepare and sensitise parliamentarians to take up a role of policy making which is constitutionally theirs.

He explained that PILDAT was set up as an indigenous organisation of likeminded individuals with seed money from overseas Pakistanis who wanted to contribute to strengthening of democracy in Pakistan. Since its inception in October 2001, PILDAT has indigenously developed its agenda and programmes. On the basis of this indigenously developed agenda, PILDAT has sought and received funds from international donor organisations such as UNDP, DFID, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, The Asia Foundation and the IRI, etc. He informed the participants that PILDAT has recently joined Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Consortium which has been set up to implement the USAID-funded project of Strengthening National and Provincial Legislative Governance SNPLG. Now many of PILDAT events and programmes are organised under SNPLG including the short course on foreign policy.

Mr. Mehboob highlighted that PILDAT exists in the capacity of a non-partisan and independent friend to legislatures and legislators and strongly puts its faith, devotion and energies in strengthening democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan.

Please refer to **Appendix C** for his detailed presentation.

**An Overview of
Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947 - 2004**

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Defence & Political Analyst



Dr. Rizvi began by quipping that it was not an easy task to cover 57 years of Pakistan's Foreign Policy in thirty (30) minutes. As the author of PILDAT's briefing paper on the topic of Overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policy, which was specially developed for this short course, he highlighted that the paper covers a historical overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policy.

Dr. Rizvi believed that management of foreign policy is a very difficult and complex affair for a country like Pakistan as it neither desires nor can entertain the option of isolation. Similarly, countries like Pakistan cannot be over active in pursuance of foreign policy goals. Pakistan has to be part of the international system because of issues that require a global and a cooperative approach such as issues of poverty, environment, drug trafficking, etc. Imperatives of economic development as well as

serious security problems with India require Pakistan to be part of the global system. In a security dilemma like this either one ends up in arms race which is not an advisable strategy for Pakistan or that deficiency can be compensated through astute diplomacy, he believed. Diplomacy is an important instrument to pursue national objectives in a situation of imbalance, similar to the one that exists between Pakistan and India. Pakistan's strategies to address these issues have changed over time, as they should have. The stability has to be in the goals and objectives that are pursued rather than strategies which are time and context bound. Pakistan's position in the global system also has varied over time, he added.

Pakistan is situated in an area which is close to the areas of importance to superpowers. For the past 57 years, Pakistan has been addressing the basic question of how to cash on this strategic importance i.e. how to make itself relevant to the international system, said Dr. Rizvi. In order for a country to be relevant to the international system, it needs to have (a) internal stability and a viable sustainable system (b) economic viability and the ability to attract investment from outside, (c) knowledge, academics and technology. He considered these to be the main instruments of power in today's world.

Dr. Rizvi explained that Pakistan developed primarily as a security state, where the overriding factor has always been territorial security against external threats. The major beneficiary in this has been the military for the allocation of resources and making input to the foreign policy. With the stronghold of military rule, the role of intelligence agencies also increased in Pakistan's foreign policy making. Therefore Pakistan's foreign policy, especially in the last thirty years has been a policy without a long term vision, where imperatives of diplomacy were often ignored and the imperatives of territorial security were over emphasised.

Dr. Rizvi said that in the past, (1980's and 90's) Pakistan used non-state actors to pursue its foreign policy agenda in Afghanistan and later in Indian administered Kashmir. For Islamic groups, this became a part of their ideology, whereas for the government, it was a foreign policy strategy. He said that it has become difficult for the government to change the ideology of these Islamic

groups which has now become a problem for Pakistan. After September 2001, international system has become more status quo oriented in terms of state boundaries and political divides, even though these boundaries are unjust. Pakistan's cause for Kashmir has not brought support from the international community, he added.

Re-capping phases of Pakistan's foreign policy, Dr. Rizvi said that initially Pakistan started with a policy of friendship with all countries. In the mid 50s, it leaned heavily on the West. Pakistan-U.S relations can be divided into three phases:


- i) Mid 50s to early 60s (when Pakistan was part of the Defence Alliance System)
- ii) The 80s (Afghanistan and revival of Pakistan-US relations)
- iii) After September 2001 to date.

All these three phases have certain distinguishing features. The first two phases, in terms of US-Pakistan relations ended with a series of complaints from both sides and sanctions against Pakistan. In September 2001, when Pakistan joined the global effort to contain terrorism, it was under four different types of sanctions which post September 11 were withdrawn. Explaining the reasons for the problems in Pakistan-U.S. relations, he said that this relationship cannot be that of equality as U.S. will always have greater options available to deal with Pakistan. U.S. operates from a global perspective and its South Asia policy depends upon its global policy. U.S. does not fully share Pakistan's concerns with India. The current relationship that Pakistan has evolved with the U.S. is the least problematic option for Pakistan. He was of the view that decision of not joining the coalition would have been very costly. Counterterrorism, he believed, will be a long-term policy for Pakistan and it will have long-term relations with the U.S. as along with costs there are also benefits for Pakistan. However, there will be differences but common grounds will facilitate their relationship, he believed.

Dr. Rizvi highlighted that the most troubled and difficult relationship that Pakistan shares is with India. Characteristic features of this relationship are mistrust

and acrimony. He opined that there has been a change to pursue a new framework and an attempt to try and resolve disputes, although solutions are not guaranteed. According to Dr. Rizvi this change is due to induction of nuclear weapons and it is for this reason that war is no longer a sensible option. It is for this reason that there is more global interest in managing Pakistan-India problem rather than solving it at the moment. He said that the expectations that India would surrender Kashmir were and will always be unfounded. Countries even if they are wrong, do not surrender territories. After 9/11, Pakistan's support to resistance in Kashmir has become untenable. On the one hand, Pakistan has been saved from being declared a terrorist state as demanded by India. This is a success but on the other hand, Pakistan, in the current scenario, will not be in a position to support the Kashmir militancy. Dr. Rizvi pointed out that Pakistan's policy towards India has also changed because of international pressure, hence the declaration of January 2004.

Dr. Rizvi concluded by saying that the issues of foreign policy have to be viewed as political problems rather than articles of faith and importance has to be given to diplomacy rather than narrow security considerations.



Q&A / Comments Session

Question

Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi

MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)

Former Federal Minister

The political leadership in Pakistan did realise that war with India was no longer an option and that other options should be tried. However when the political leadership presented this opinion, its loyalties were questioned. Today the same thing is being said by the military leadership, and they are being supported and praised. Is it a change of heart from within or is it due to external pressures?

Answer

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Defence & Political Analyst

It is a combination of both: change of heart as well as external pressures. There has been a lot of pressure on both the countries. Another factor is that military has reanalysed how to sustain its role in the domestic context. The role of military's survival now depends on Pakistan's economic development and economic viability.

Question

Sahibzada Mian Jalil Sharaquri

MNA (NA-132, Sheikhpura-II, PML)

We cannot have an independent foreign policy as we depend on other countries for various issues. However, in the past, it is seen that Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto pursued an independent policy and so did Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Why do we have to succumb to foreign pressures now?

Answer

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Defence & Political Analyst

We can pursue an independent policy. Even in democratic countries, decisions on foreign policy are taken by the government despite opposition and the viability of the government depends on whether it can mobilise support afterwards. I agree that we have been hiding our nuclear capabilities in the past but as far as Dr. A.Q. Khan is concerned, basically we got caught as there was concrete evidence against him available on the international level.

Question**Mr. Omar Ayub Khan**

MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)

You mentioned that diplomacy should be the primary tool which should be used by Pakistan and you also mentioned that the military's influence in society is now present in so many facets of society that they do not have to depend on the boogie of India alone and now the stakeholders of Pakistan are interested in economic progress of Pakistan. What in your opinion are the foreign policy options available to us in managing the Indo- Israel nexus that is coming up on the horizon?

Answer**Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi**

Defence & Political Analyst

This nexus will sharpen the imbalance of conventional security. We can mobilise more international support and neutralise our negative options. The nexus between India and Israel should not be seen as a conspiracy theory. Israel's consideration is economic; it wants to sell weapons. It is a commercial relationship.

Comments**Makhdoom Syed Ahmad Alam Anwar**

MNA (NA-192, R.Y.Khan-I, PML)

The foreign policy of a state is essentially an extension of a country's domestic goals. If we have not been able to develop a strong civil society, consequently, the performance of the diplomats and foreign office can also not be good. Our external image can only become positive if we become strong internally.

Question**Mian Shamim Haider**

MNA (NA-135, Sheikhpura-V, PML)

The situation has changed a lot in the last 5-6 years. Why are we not able to improve our relations with Israel?

Answer**Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi**

Defence & Political Analyst

As far as relations with Israel are concerned, we have made certain moves to interact with Israel, although on an informal basis. The problem with recognition of Israel is both domestic and international. If the Palestine issue moves towards a solution, we can perhaps recognise Israel.

Question**Ms. Sherry Rehman**

MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)

You mentioned inequality between U.S. and Pakistan in its defining eras of cooperation and alignment. I think we need to separate strategic decision-making from emotionalism. The problem is that this emotionalism has also crept into our relations with India. Can you advise us how we can start to understand that there is a basic asymmetry between India and Pakistan? How can we get out of this competitive paradigm? How can we make this shift sustainable? How do you make the foreign office a higher capacity organisation? With respect to the privatisation of our foreign policy since Zia's period, we have become familiar with the term fallout; blow back. How do we unlock ourselves from a situation where we are still suffering from the fallout while managing a new institutional shift on our western borders?

Answer**Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi**

Defence & Political Analyst

It is neither advisable nor practical to think that equality exists between India and Pakistan even though the state has tried to create this psyche. Pakistan should weigh its options in terms of its own strengths. It should try to play up these factors. We have highlighted our strategic importance, and this can only be achieved if we can control extremism. The foreign office needs to strengthen research work and more academic input is needed. They are more involved in justifying their policies rather than analysing them. The fallout has been a very serious problem for Pakistan. Pakistan is more intolerant now than it was 20 years ago. We have been socialised into a

particular type of mind frame since 1979 and an entire generation has been affected as a result.

Question

Syed Naveed Qamar

MNA (NA-222, Hyderabad-V, PPPP)

When we make Kashmir the core issue of India-Pakistan relations, how do you expect talks to go forward? Would this not sabotage the whole process? Knowing that the gulf between the two sides is so large, how will we find a solution in these circumstances?

Answer

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Defence & Political Analyst

For the solution, both sides will have to move from their traditional positions and look for alternatives. Kashmir will be a difficult issue to tackle and at the moment one cannot say how it will be resolved.

Question

Ms. Fauzia Wahab

MNA (NA-311, Women Sindh-IV, PPPP)

Three factors are important determinants for the strength of a country: knowledge, academics, and technology and Pakistan is pathetic in all these three. When we look at education, we see that the policy planners of this country, the elite, do not even send their children to state institutions. Similarly we do not have any check and balance in these three institutions.

Answer

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Defence & Political Analyst

Since the children of our elite do not study in state institutions, you are right that the condition of the education in these institutions cannot be improved. Higher education is a law and order issue and unless this law and order situation is corrected, this issue cannot be resolved.

Question

Ms. Aasiya Azeem

MNA (NA-285, Women Punjab-XIII, PML)

It is imperative at the moment that India-Pakistan relations should improve. But the kind of statements that Indian leadership are giving regarding the temporary nature of the border line and that it should not exist are difficult to accept. How can we deal with these statements? We have been brain washing our generation against India and Israel for so long. How can we expect things to change right away?

Answer

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Defence and Political Analyst

Yes it will take time for people to change their thinking about India and Israel. Indian leaders are giving such statements like "border khoon ki lakeer hai". We should not worry about such statements. These statements reflect their thinking that has been prevalent since independence and they never agreed with the two nation theory.

Question

Sayyeda Farhana Khalid Banoori

MNA (NA-323, Women NWFP-II, MMAP)

Pakistan was the only country that recognised Taliban and now they are considered to be our enemy. Were we wrong then or now?

Answer

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Defence & Political Analyst

That policy was pursued in a particular context. Policies cannot be absolute. There are always options available, given the range of possibilities in front of you.

Question

Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar

MNA (NA-194, R.Y.Khan-III, PML)

Former Federal Minister

India is emerging as a major player in South Asia as well

as globally because of its economic strengths. There is a constant tug of war between China and America regarding Indian markets and they are both trying to woo India. So the current initiative post January 6 (Declaration between Pakistan and India), needs to be time bound. It would be in India's interest to prolong this, and bring these issues for resolution when India is much stronger globally and is in a much stronger position to make negotiations.

Answer**Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi**

Defence & Political Analyst

From the point of view of diplomacy, I do not agree that this should be made time bound. If we make it time bound then we should consider the event if the solution is not reached by the deadline and what would be its repercussions. However, the negotiation process should continue.

Question**Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi**

MNA (NA-244, Karachi-VI, MQM)

What is foreign policy and what is a good foreign policy? How would you grade Pakistan's foreign policy over the last 57 years?

Answer**Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi**

Defence & Political Analyst

Good foreign policy depends on what role your policy has played in achieving your international objectives. Historically, we have a mixed track record. It has been a mixed bag of successes and failures.

Question**Mr. Naseer Muhammad**

Nazim Charsada

The main reason of a switch over from a policy of non-alignment to a policy of alignment with the U.S. was our inherited problems with India and especially the Kashmir issue. Was it wise to withdraw from Kashmir when a time frame was not given for plebiscite at the time when the

U.N gave its Resolution? Secondly, what do you think will be the fate of Kashmir, would it become independent or LoC would be accepted as a permanent border?

Answer**Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi**

Defence & Political Analyst

The final solution regarding Kashmir in my view would neither be what India wants right now and nor what Pakistan wishes it to be.

Comment**Mr. Abdul Sattar**

Former Foreign Minister

No country has revealed the truth about its nuclear capabilities. The question is not whether or not to accept Israel but when to accept it. We supported the Taliban, but we should not say that we changed our policy suddenly after 9/11. We had realised earlier that our policy towards the Taliban was unsustainable. We knew this would be harmful to us.

Question**Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira**

MNA (NA-106, Gujrat-III, PPPP)

We do not have a group of business class that can influence our foreign and domestic policies. The military is the only financial group that has emerged. When you say that this is military's business interest, does that mean it is in the economic interest of the country or is it an interest as an institution? Will the solution of Kashmir, which even Congress has rejected, be the beginning of the problem or a solution of the problem?

Answer**Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi**

Defence & Political Analyst

The military has a strong stake in our economic and industrial policies. It is difficult to say what the solution of Kashmir will be.

Session 2

Executive Summary


The second session consisted of the Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri's views on the Major Foreign Policy Issues Facing the Country as well as his informal and candid exchange of views with participating Parliamentarians on crucial issues of foreign policy.

Mr. Kasuri highlighted the need for a bi-partisan approach in the formulation and pursuance of foreign policy of Pakistan. He believed that the post 9/11 world has brought a host of challenges and opportunities for Pakistan which the Pakistani state is dealing with in a mature and effective manner. Touching upon major foreign policy issues faced by the country at present, Mr. Kasuri talked about the introduction of new angle in Pakistan's relations with India; Pakistan's relations with the Muslim World, especially Pakistan's views on the situation in Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine. He reiterated the government's view that despite being a frontline state against terrorism, Pakistan believes that the use of force is not an effective strategy against controlling terrorism but a comprehensive approach of resolving the root cause of terrorism needs to be adopted at the national level.

Mr. Kasuri's speech was followed by an intensive and candid exchange of views and Q&A between him and the participating parliamentarians. Some of the exchange was declared off-the-record and has therefore not been included in the proceedings. Edited Q&A are reproduced at the end of the text of Mr. Kasuri's speech.

Major Foreign Policy Issues Facing the Country

Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri
MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)
Foreign Minister of Pakistan



The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Kasuri, was of the view that Pakistan's foreign policy is guided by its history, geographical location and ethos of its people, hence maintaining a bipartisan approach in its foreign policy has been an important objective of the government. While there are elements of continuity in the foreign policy, as they should be, there is also a change of emphasis and nuance, he believed.

Pakistan is firmly committed to the promotion of peace and security at the regional and global levels. September 11, 2001 events, he believed, brought far-reaching ramifications for Pakistan on a global and regional level. These events placed Pakistan in the eye of the storm with core imperatives of Pakistan's foreign policy - security, Islamic identity and economic viability - put in grave danger of being compromised, he added. Like all defining moments, the situations in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, while posing enormous challenges, also offered Pakistan with an opportunity to reorient its foreign policy priorities in the light of the changed situation in order to promote its vital interests, he said.

Mr. Kasuri believed that Pakistan's support has enabled the global coalition to make important gains in the anti-terrorism campaign and brought Pakistan great appreciation and important stature as a key member of the international community. Pakistan's decision to join anti-terrorism efforts has not only dramatically improved relations with the US and the West but also with Russia, Iran and the Central Asian states. China is also very

appreciative of our stand against terrorism. There is wide appreciation of the fact that the reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11 was not an easy option, given its serious implications for Pakistan's internal stability and external security. The immediate economic benefit came in the shape of crucial debt relief enabling the country to avert a looming risk of default on its foreign debt service obligations, he explained.

Throwing light on the recent operations in South Waziristan Agency, he said that these are a part of Pakistan's effort to root out terrorism in all its manifestations from its territory. The Government's commitment to the Pakistani society and the international community to fight terrorism makes it incumbent on us to take on this menace frontally, he opined.

While Pakistan's commitment to combating terrorism remains firm, said Mr. Kasuri, Pakistan also believes that the menace of terrorism can be dealt with effectively only through a comprehensive approach and not just through use of force. This approach, he added, includes a consensus on defining terrorism, and a focus on the root causes of terrorism. At the same time, he added, Pakistan believes that the fight against terrorism should not turn into clash between the West and the world of Islam as this would have serious risks for world peace and stability. Of equal importance is the need to curb the tendency on the part of some countries to use the international sentiment against terrorism for advancing their own narrow agenda. This would deprive the international campaign against terrorism of its moral legitimacy. Pakistan rejects the canard of the so-called "Islamic terrorism." Terrorism has no religion, he added.

Speaking on the Nuclear Issue as one of the issues of foreign policy today, Mr. Kasuri said that the objective of our nuclear programme is to deter aggression, so that we can safeguard our national security and protect our sovereignty. Pakistan shall maintain the competitive edge of its nuclear programme through its national means, he emphasised. At the same time, he said, we also want a strategic restraint regime and conventional balance between Pakistan and India and not an open-ended arms race between the two countries. Pakistan has a National Command Authority (NCA) headed by the President of Pakistan with Prime Minister as its Vice Chairman. This

system was established in 1999 and operationalised in 2000. As such, there is no question of pilferage or leakage from our soil, he said.

Terming relations between Pakistan and India as another important issue, he said that Pakistan wants peaceful relations with all regional states particularly India. This quest is actuated by an enlightened sense of national interest. The long-standing Kashmir issue represents a challenge to the international community both in its political and human rights dimensions. Pakistan seeks the resolution of all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir through a peaceful process of dialogue and constructive engagement with India.

There is a realisation in India and Pakistan that war is not an option. Human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir also have to come to an end. We are looking for solutions, which can ensure peace and stability in the region, justice for the people of Kashmir, and a secure future for the people of South Asia, he said. The current India-Pakistan peace initiative enjoys the backing and support of the international community including USA, EU and China and Japan. There is a new momentum which is the outcome of the statesmanship shown by President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. This is a very salutary environment to kick-start the dialogue, he believed.

Speaking about the Muslim World, Mr. Kasuri said that Pakistan's position in the Islamic world is a matter of satisfaction and pride. At the same time Pakistan is aware that world order and global peace cannot be restored without addressing the conflicts which beset the Islamic world today. We reject the cycle of violence in the Middle East, which has a negative impact on the ongoing Middle East peace process. Pakistan strongly supports the Palestinian peoples' struggle for attaining statehood and political independence. We believe, he said, that concerted efforts by the international community should be initiated to stem escalation of violence as it is breeding extremism. Pakistan supports the two state formula, he added.

Mr. Kasuri said that Iraq remains an open wound on the body politic of the Muslim world. International approach must be guided by the objective of restoring Iraq's

sovereignty and political independence; ensuring its unity and territorial integrity; upholding the right of the Iraqi people to determine their own future and giving a central role to the U.N.

Speaking of Afghanistan, he said that it is moving gradually but inexorably towards a new disposition. An enabling environment would require rapid reconstruction of its physical and social infrastructure. Instability in Afghanistan has a direct bearing on Pakistan. A peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan is vital to our national security, economic and political interest. Pakistan supports the Bonn process and efforts of President Karzai for peace and harmony in Afghanistan. The international community must help Afghanistan generously in the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction. On our part we have pledged US\$100 million for this process. A stable Afghanistan is certain to have a positive impact on the politico-economic landscape of Central Asia as well as that of South and Southwest Asia. Politically, it will end the threat of religious extremism to this region. In the economic field, construction of road networks and implementation of the energy pipeline will bring development and prosperity, he said.

Mr. Kasuri believed that the current international configuration has immensely altered the traditional diplomatic functions and practices. The dispersal of authority away from states, the predominance of economics over politics, and the growing role of NGOs, social movements, and other transnational collectivities highlight the need for national governments to alter their modes of interaction with each other and with relevant actors in the multi-centric world. He was of the view that the best assurance for the consolidation of global peace lies in the economic development and prosperity of all regions and all peoples. Economic progress in one region supports and complements prosperity in an era of greater prosperity and peace. In this connection the agreement on SAFTA augurs well for the economic well-being of South Asia, he concluded.

Please see **Appendix E** for his complete paper.



Q&A / Comments Session

Question

Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin
Visiting Prof. LUMS

Thank you Foreign Minister. One of my major concerns is that our foreign policy appears to be very short term and adhocist in nature. It does not have a long term vision. For example, if we have moved closer to the United States because of our interest, we probably have not given much thought to the realities of the emerging multipolar world where there exist multiple centres of power and these centres of power have become very concerned in the wake of United States' declaration that Pakistan would be considered a major ally among the non NATO countries and here I would like to mention the concern of the Chinese. The recent visit by the Chinese delegation has expressed concern over Pakistan's relationship with the United States.

Secondly, I wonder if our government has given enough thought to the forthcoming US election. What if there is a change in administration from the Republicans to the Democrats, and possibly a reversal of US global rule the way we see it today?

Thirdly I would like to say that the US policy has serious

potential to create a conflict in Pakistan between the State and the Society. You mentioned North Waziristan; I think North Waziristan has a potential to create a serious conflictual situation between State and the Society. So keeping in view these factors, I wonder whether we really have thought about the transition that is taking place in the international system from unipolarity to multipolarity and its long term consequences.

Answer

Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri
MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)
Foreign Minister of Pakistan

Thank you very much. These are some very interesting and thought-provoking questions. I am grateful to you that you allowed me to clarify some of these issues. Well, I do not know which Chinese delegation you are referring to because there is hardly any Chinese delegation which does not call upon me. I have met the [Chinese] Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister three days ago and I quote, this information is not hidden, as it was telecast by Chinese Television, by New China News agency, by the APP: Not a word was mentioned about non NATO status, not one word by the [Chinese] Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister. When you say a visiting delegation, well

suppose journalists are visiting Pakistan and some of them did show concern, its part of their business to ask searching questions.

First of all let me make it clear that there is no official visiting delegation that does not call upon me. I make it a point to see all Chinese delegations. They are top priority of Pakistan. They understand this and they are trying their best to improve their own relationships with the United States. USA was the largest investor in China last year. After all Major Non NATO Ally's status is concerned, they understand as well as we do. This is even when we were members of SEATO and CENTO. We had incurred obligations under SEATO and CENTO. It was made absolutely clear to the United States that Pakistan can not be used against China. I said it this time also when I was in China when a reporter asked me this question on a programme which is the equivalent of Hard Talk programme in China. They [Chinese Government] understand when being members of SEATO and CENTO, Pakistan did not compromise on its relationship with China, it is not about to do so as MNNA. This is where I give credit to all governments of Pakistan, not just this government. As was the case in the nuclear issue, the credit does not belong to this government alone, it belongs to all the governments of Pakistan. They [Pakistani governments] have not compromised on vital and national interests of Pakistan. So even the thought does not occur to the Chinese or the Americans that Pakistan can be used. I had two hours of discussion with Chinese Foreign Minister and it was not brought forward because the Prime Minister did not think it was worthy of raising.

Secretary of State Colin Powell said that we are looking for a long term engagement and strategic relations with Pakistan, which is the reason why they thought it [MNNA] necessary. We listened to it and weighed the pros and cons. Those who say that US involvement with this country is limited to only terrorism, MNNA status is a response to that. It will give us some benefit. We have been under sanctions and it has been a problem for our military supplies and equipment. There are some benefits and we thought we are sending right signals and no question of annoying anyone. If Russia today has to tolerate Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia getting into NATO they are hardly in a position to object to our position as

non NATO ally. Russia does not even bother them; they are not even our direct neighbours.

China understands that in improving their relationship with the United States, their focus is in improving their own economic conditions. Pakistan is not simply a country you can kick around. It is a country that is economically growing. It is a nuclear power and a missile power, it is not internationally isolated. To an extent, it sends signal to India that it is not internationally isolated. It improves our chances of talks with India and we continue to place that as our top priority. We need to have a peaceful resolution of disputes with India. As far as Muslim world is concerned, no, it has not sent any such signals. I have been to many countries, in fact on the contrary, it has improved our stature in the Islamic world and it amazed me the degree of respect that Pakistan has gained as being the only nuclear Muslim power.

We have not over-estimated the fact that we are a Major Non-NATO Ally and the world will change because of it. We need to construct our foreign policy with due care and diligence but it does help us and sends signals that ours is not a short-term relation with the US based on the need to counter terrorism.

Second question was change of government in the United States. For the record, it is not our business, whether it is Indian or American elections. Let me tell you the state and the nation are not conducted on emotions, but on state interests. Geo-political reality and international scenario are not going to change due to any change in government in the US or India. There is not going to be radical change now or ever. United States and Pakistan need each other. I think United States has seen that after walking out on Pakistan. It has also seen that sanctions do not work. I have told this to America on their face that the fact that you moved away from Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal has created all the mess. It is not Pakistan alone that is responsible but jointly Pakistan and the United States are responsible for what has happened. I have said it to the Europeans and the Americans. They do not deny it. If we are guilty, then they are also guilty in various ways. As far as United States is concerned, if there is a change in government, it is none of my business. You can make your own guesses who we wish to win in the next election and everybody can have their

personal wish and personal priorities. But for the state to state relations, it makes no difference.

Third question was that the US policy has the potential to create conflict inside our own society. That problem is there but it has nothing to do with the US policy. We have to decide ourselves whether our development rests on modern mindset or not. Give me one example in history or contemporary world where with a mindset of a type you can try and achieve certain things including military parity with India. If not parity, having credible deterrence at least. Can you have terrorism in your country and expect even local investment let alone foreign investment? It is not an easy decision. We have to take our own people into confidence. This is what the government is trying to do. It will not handover certain people if they surrender before a certain date because we were told that some of them are married and have children over here. The writ of the state must prevail in the ultimate analysis. So, it is a difficult decision. United States may have been a catalyst. But wasn't there a debate in Pakistan on this issue before 9/11 that if our policies are right? I personally have taken part in such debates. People used to talk about creeping talibanisation in Pakistan. I am not commenting on that. But since there was a debate, it means it is nothing new. There are religious and political parties who disagree with our policies.

Question

Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi

MNA, (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)

Former Federal Minister

According to your statement that the foreign policy is formulated and conducted by keeping state interests in the forefront, which is absolutely right, we come to this conclusion that there should thus be a consistency in our foreign policy. For example, in the government of Mr. Jamali, the objectives of the foreign policy should be the same but a slight change in method can be expected. The reason why I say this is because like you earlier mentioned, during the formulation of our foreign policy, there is a key element called the bipartisan approach. My question is that ever since this government came into power major events happened like the Iraq war. What did your government do either before or after the event to

make the bipartisan approach prevail?

Second issue is the shift for the better in our relations with India that we all agree with. The question is that you are about to start a dialogue, and which can have results either way, how do you plan to reach and implement a bipartisan approach in these dialogues? Before October 2002, there was a military rule in the country and now we imagine it is a political government. In a political government, Parliament has a major role to play. Do you think Parliament has a role in foreign policy and how is your ministry helping create it?

Answer

Mr. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri

MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)

Foreign Minister of Pakistan

You have touched upon some painstaking but relevant questions relating to Iraq war and relations with India. On Iraq, Senator Prof. Khurshid Ahmad and I passed a joint-resolution from the Senate after considerable amendments and it took many days to get it passed after much debate. Pakistan Senate took precedence over the National Assembly. What could be done by the National Assembly was done by the Senate.

Now the question arises of dialogue with India. I want to state here for the record without fear of contradiction that not once but many times parliamentarians were called to the Prime Minister house but they did not come. I took the initiative to call everyone from the opposition to ask that if invited for discussion, would they come and the unanimous reply was that they would not come. So it was not considered appropriate to send out the invitations.

Pakistan's foreign policy's main points these days are: Iraq War and Relations with India. As far as PPP's connection goes, we live in this country and we were supported and I appreciate that these policies were right and we are doing it within the national interests and there is no contention that we are against nation's vested interest. As far as Iraq war is concerned, people have their own reservation as to what they wanted to see. Believe me, we were under tremendous pressure. Late during the night, many different countries would call me

up and ask what is Pakistan doing about this? Everyone was said to believe that Pakistan would vote it. The need was to complete the number of votes. We didn't let this happen. Resolution did not pass. Then there was the pressure to send the armed forces but that did not happen. The sentiments of the nation and its people were taken care of. But sometimes we have to make decisions where sentiments are not involved. A majority of political parties were in favour of peace with India including religious parties. JUI went to Delhi and met the Prime Minister of India and talks took place. When the Prime Minister of India Mr. Vajpayee came to Islamabad, the entire leadership was present in the reception that the Indian ambassador to Pakistan had arranged for them at Serena Hotel in Islamabad.

So I am saying that on major advancements in the foreign policy, I believe we have the backing of major political parties and we admit that there can be mistakes from either side. When the question is on War on Terror, where our religious parties believe that our foreign policy is wrong and we agree. But as far as PPP and PML (N) are concerned, the first Iraq war was during the time of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who adopted a particular policy which was definitely feasible and in national interests. But many opposed it as well and it lacked unity. But today, fortunately there is unity and as you rightly mentioned, the foreign policy has national interest and continuity. During the time of SAARC Conference, since 17th amendment was being passed, it was thought appropriate to have a briefing for Parliamentarians which was not attended by some parties. I have myself briefed them and I can name them. I did this in the Prime Minister's House. Major foreign policy thrust should have bipartisanship and fortunately the foreign policy that is being made has that spirit.

Question

Makhdoom Syed Ahmad Alam Anwar

MNA, (NA-192, R.Y.Khan-I, PML)

Former Federal Minister

My humble submission is that there have been phases when our importance to the US has been at the highest and phases when we were no longer required. Assuming that we are important now and the status of Major Non-Nato Ally has been given to us by the US and US has to

show its long term strategic interest; has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs done its homework in removing our sanctions? As far as I know, only three sanctions have been removed out of the four and one still remains. Our exports to America are also a source of foreign exchange. You have not managed the task of achieving our economic objectives because we are an important ally in the fight against terrorism and there is a cost involved for that. The US needs to compensate us for the damage done to the society. The development of infrastructure in Pakistan needs immense financial investment. So we need to develop a comprehensive strategy for this alignment.

Answer

Mr. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri

MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)

Foreign Minister of Pakistan

You are absolutely right that there is a cost for everything. There are no free lunches and this is what the Americans believe. You should have strength politically and economically. All of us are responsible for weakness in our political system. Americans are not responsible. Half the time we have military rule; military blames the civilians and the civilians blame the military and some civilians blame other civilians. In 1947, we developed a security state for the fear of India. The US did not beg Pakistan to join defence pacts. There is no permanent friendship in this state relationship. There was a time when US totally abandoned us and they learnt a lesson that they made a mistake by doing that. If they have not learnt anything from that, then there is nothing I can do about it. But the least I can do is to put my own house in order which requires much more than financial policy. Some of your questions are related to finance and commerce ministers. But let me tell you this that our macro economic indicators have improved. Not because Mr. Shaukat Aziz says so or Mr. Humayun Akhtar says so but the international credit rating says so. Pakistan is now in a position to float a bond and this is very positive.

Strengthening of Pakistan has to start from home and it would not be accomplished overnight. A strong Pakistan, economically, militarily and politically is the need of the day and we all need to work for it. India mobilised its forces which was the largest mobilisation since the

Second World War and for ten months those forces were on our border. I told American Secretary of State that I am grateful to you for the efforts you undertook at that time. But let me remind you that even during President Nixon's time Pakistan tried hard but India attacked. The entire international community was against it but still India attacked. India thought it could get away with it even now. Well we are grateful to the US, European Union and Japan for their efforts for no war. If India thought it could have made minced meat out of Pakistan, it would have done so. Reason is not that the war is not a viable option. We have many weaknesses in Pakistan and if we take care of those weaknesses, Pakistan would not have to depend on any one else.

Question**Mian Shamim Haider**

MNA (NA-135, Sheikhpura-V, PML)

Do you feel the time has come that we should start thinking about recognising Israel and offset India-Israel axis?

Answer**Mr. Khurshheed Mahmud Kasuri**

MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)

Foreign Minister of Pakistan

Pakistan took a bold decision to initiate a debate on the recognition of Israel. The President of Pakistan was wrongly criticised by everyone for doing that. We did not recognise Israel and we had no intention of doing that without thinking the issue through. We would have to face obstacles, not just this government, but any government of Pakistan, whether this Muslim League or the PPP, on the issue of recognition of Israel. We can not do it unless our public view is prepared for it. There is no fixed solution to this problem.

Question**Ms. Sherry Rehman**

MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)

You have given us a new briefing on the nuclear roll-back and proliferation situation and I wish you were present in the Parliament to answer these questions as well.

Firstly, it was clearly said by the US State Department that Pakistan has been temporarily forgiven for being a massive proliferator and a semi-rogue nuclear state.

Answer**Mr. Khurshheed Mahmud Kasuri**

MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)

Foreign Minister of Pakistan

This is absolutely wrong as the US State Department did not say any such thing. I am sorry, but this is without foundation.

Question**Ms. Sherry Rehman**

MNA, (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)

I understand this is an emotional issue and this is exactly what the people of Pakistan feel when these issues are discussed loosely and reported loosely. It would have been best if public consensus had been managed through a Parliamentary session on the issue as holding a briefing is not enough, nor is it enough to say the party leaders did not come to that briefing. I am just asking a question and it is best to discuss it with a cool temper. Pakistan has given over its nuclear assets to the IAEA, which basically allows going in consonance with the NPT treaty. Are we really doing what the NPT allows us to do?

Secondly, I am asking about the allegations of nuclear roll-back. It is a very important and high security question which is agitating the minds of the people. The Parliament has not been able to take the people into confidence and satisfy the people because the Parliamentarians themselves are not satisfied.

It has also been said that in this system, the President has been making the key decisions with regards to foreign policy. Vis-à-vis India, there has been emphasis on better relations and we have welcomed it. But in our minds, it is more of an institutional shift. What we see is President Musharraf talking about the possibility of reconsidering the United Nations resolutions vis-à-vis Kashmir which has been stated, rightly or wrongly, as the policy of Pakistan for over fifty-five years. So reviewing that policy, through this kind of informal channel, was a little insensitive. We would like your input on that? What

is your long term plan vis-à-vis India because one day twelve solutions for negotiations to Kashmir are in President Musharraf's pocket and the next day it is an entirely different thing. That may or may not be for public consumption but we would like to know what line you wish to pursue on it.

Answer

Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri

MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)

Foreign Minister of Pakistan

First of all, I am sorry as the idea was not to lose temper, but it was a provocative issue. You are a journalist and your words count much more that is why I asked you if it has really come from the State Department. There is no US State Department briefing that I do not know of. It will come on my table within five minutes of being released since I am the Foreign Minister of Pakistan today. I went to the Muslim League House at 9:30 AM and such a question was posed to me. Friendly states do not talk through the media. That is why I asked you this question and my response is no. The US State Department did not say anything of this sort.

Having said that, you are absolutely right that we have not come out scot free. We are under observation. That is why we need to conduct ourselves with great responsibility. If we feel that we are a super power, then we will be more like a bull in a china shop. We entertain no such foolish notions about ourselves. So how do we conduct our foreign policy? We feel that the nuclear weapons are absolutely essential for our security. Let me refresh your memory. Six or seven foreign ministers have visited Pakistan from European Union, France, Britain, United States, Netherlands, and Ireland etc. I am a politician more than a Foreign Minister. I cannot get over my instincts so the first thing I do is I state in front of them while they are standing next to me, and they are not prepared that I will say it but I do. I say that there is no roll-back and nothing is happening of that sort. They do not even raise it, by the way. Why? Because they know it is not negotiable. We will not tolerate it. We have told the US Senators and the Secretary of State that it is not negotiable. Sometimes I even ask a journalist to ask the Foreign Minister that we are a nuclear power and they have to respond on record. I am trying to acclimatise

them to the fact that we are a nuclear power and there will be no compromise on it.

As far as I am concerned, we are trying to tell the world that we are not a super power and we have to behave in a responsible manner. If we feel that we can do what we like and disregard what America, Japan and China say on terrorism, they will make mince meat out of us. We cannot run around with notions that we can do what we like. It is what foreign policy is all about that one has to pretend in some ways always that things are bigger than they actually are, which is what as Foreign Minister I am trying to do. We have many weaknesses. You can take care of the weaknesses by acting cautiously. On the one hand, we are saying that there would be no roll-back. On the other hand, we are saying that we will completely cooperate with the International Atomic Commission on its mandate. But then I cover it up by saying that we are not under pressure. So, the answer is there is no roll-back and no question about it. Let me give you the good news. The international community has come to terms with the fact that Pakistan has suffered sanctions; we have been called a rogue State and a failed State. Despite that, there were no compromises on the nuclear power we possess.

Now they are really worried about the safety of our nuclear weapons. They are worried about what would happen if President Musharraf is not there and religious parties come into power. I have told them that our religious parties are not the Taliban and they have experience in parliamentary practices in all form of reforms. They have gone through the democratic process and just because someone has a beard that does not make him a member of the Taliban. We are on trial and they know that we are a hard nut to crack and they know we will not give in. It does not mean that if you are a hard nut, then a stronger hammer can not crack you. Common sense tells you to avoid getting under that hammer. We have no intention of getting cracked and we have every intention of steering the course and we are cautious and watchful of the concerns the international community has about us. The reasons why I keep on equating ourselves with other countries like India and the Netherlands is because Pakistan alone does not make a good case. People do not trust us. When I add other countries it is to soften hard lobbies. I do it calculatedly. Some people

criticise me for it but I feel it would make Pakistan's case more credible. I have told everybody that we will not sign NPT. I have suggested to Colin Powell and to the European Union to have multilateral agreements with the three nuclear countries.

Our prime concern is non-proliferation and we have to satisfy the international community if we wish to save our nuclear programme. Otherwise they will have sanctions on us and they will do what it takes, whether it is an attack from India or any such measures, to buckle us down.

The second issue is terrorism. Western powers believe that Pakistan can play a key role and we are trying to say that yes, we will reform ourselves but you help on Palestine and Kashmir. So we are trying to push that as best as the Opposition would have done, if it had been in power. Everyone in this room agrees on the problems we face. I am not here in an adversarial capacity. I feel we have a common national interest.

One question was about the UN resolution on Kashmir. After knowing what the President said, without asking the President, I said that his statement was quoted out of context. I have so much confidence. Next day the President thanked me. I knew that he could have never meant that we would give up the very basis on which we lay our claim to Kashmir. Indians say that after the British left, it was up to the ruler to decide on the fate of Kashmir. Instead of going into a stupid debate, our claim rests on the fact that there is a UN Security Council Resolution in our favour. Otherwise, we have no locus standi. So as a politician I know we would have no leg to stand on if we ever said that. Now what the President was trying to say is that we are being flexible and we can think of solutions to the Kashmir problem other than the one stated in the resolution, but we can not ignore the aspirations of the Kashmiris. The President also corrected himself a day later as did the Prime Minister. But I did it on the same day. We are telling the Indians that if they want durable peace in South Asia, Kashmir needs to be resolved, not the resumption of flights, trains and rails. I think the Indians understand that because even in my private conversations with Mr. Birjesh Mishra who was here in Lahore during the time of cricket match, we made it very clear including the religious parties in Pakistan. He

asked me why there was a change in the religious parties' attitude towards India. I told him that because they hate America more than they hate you. Both the countries will be tested in their commitments to peace when the two foreign ministers meet in July/August 2004. We are keeping the cards very close to our chest; so close that even I do not know what I am going to say to him in August. I call in the foreign office people and go into a brain-storming session with them. Indians will also admit now that they will have to talk about Kashmir. Now what solution they have in their mind, we will see when we meet. Solution of Kashmir issue is vital; it is central, whatever word you may choose to use.

Question

Sayyeda Farhana Khalid Banoori

MNA, (NA-323, Women NWFP-II, MMAP)

When making the foreign policy in our country, why are the public and its representatives not taken into consideration? Is the foreign policy debatable in the National Assembly? And if it is, then why is it not discussed on the floor of the National Assembly? I would also like to ask why we are opening our borders and increasing the number of our enemies? Would it not be better if we resolve the issue through dialogue and peace without so much human and financial loss?

Answer

Mr. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri

MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)

Foreign Minister of Pakistan

I am a politician first, then a Parliamentarian and a political worker. The Foreign Minister-ship comes later. I see many former foreign ministers sitting here and I would not remain foreign minister after sometime. What you said has some stark realities to it. You say that there is a sudden shift in foreign policy and the Parliament has not been taken into confidence. Indian politicians also question Vajpayee for going to Srinagar and extending a hand of friendship to Pakistan while the Indian politicians and Parliamentarians were not made aware of this. Another example is of the US President Bush going to war on Iraq. Was the reason really the fear of terrorism and suspicious of Saddam Hussain's involvement with Osama Bin Laden or was the purpose to

take over the Iraqi oil fields? In democratic societies, certain things and the manner in which they are told, change when two people talk and then when 10 or a 100 or 300 people talk. Every minister is answerable to the Parliament. I will tell you about my record. The MMA leader Professor Khurshid Ahmad praised me on the Senate floor that the manner in which the foreign office answers questions is commendable. We cannot hide anything. I have never given a short answer. The reason is because a short answer is like avoiding the question. My desire is to convince you, not to avoid you. You have the complete right to ask me anything.

Tomorrow two genuine motions are coming into the Senate on foreign policy. The Senate Secretariat asked me yesterday that there are two motions from a Senator of the Peoples Party who wants these to be processed quickly. I told them to go ahead. They asked me to pick which one should be put forth. I said put both. Why do you need to hide it? It is not my personal matter. In fact it is the matter of foreign policy for Pakistan. You can ask for a debate on the foreign policy. We are answerable on the Parliament floor. How can we disregard the wishes of the public? We are elected people. We can not ignore the public wishes. I am not even a member of the Senate. I am a member of the National Assembly and I had to contest election and as my opponent, I had a member of a religious party and it was a close election. If I cannot satisfy the entire public and representation of the Pakistani people, I have to go back to my constituency as well. What happens if a particular decision is taken by Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto; there might be a section which is not happy and same goes in the case of Mian Nawaz Sharif. But to make a foreign policy decision by which the entire public is unhappy is not the manner in which things are done.

Question

Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi

MNA (NA-244, Karachi-VI, MQM)

The manner in which we have heard you speak here today is a matter of great joy for us. Whenever we have had a chance to meet with Indians and raise the issue of opening visa office in Karachi, they always place the ball in our foreign office's court. But what is your government doing for it now? We suppose you may not be interested

at the moment or may be using delay tactics the Karachi visa office or the Khokrapar Monabao Border. Can you give a certain time frame until when this can be resolved?

Answer

Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri

MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)

Foreign Minister of Pakistan

I am also interested in the opening of the border personally and I am putting pressure on it but the thing is that the government has different view points and even the institutions also do not think on the same wavelength. In a democratic government we try to look at the preferences of the people. As far as speed is concerned, there is one group that wants to go slow while the other wishes to proceed at a faster pace. But as far as this issue about the border is concerned, there should be a consensus on this issue. Many people have relatives there and I, myself am a member of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Under the issue of human rights that route must be open. The ball that they put in our court means that they have their own set of conditions attached to it. Their foreign office throws the ball in our court and our foreign office throws the ball in their court. Let me assure you that the present government is committed. We feel it is in the national interest of Pakistan to have good relations with India. The problem is that we want to take Jinnah House in Mumbai from them. They have opened some office there that does not want to shift. We want to open our embassy in the Jinnah House and we want our property back.

Question

Mr. Omar Ayub Khan

MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)

I have a very small question regarding the Siachin Glacier. What process is happening between resolving the geographical boundaries between the glacier and the de-escalation of the situation over there and Kargil as well?

Answer**Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri**

MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)

Foreign Minister of Pakistan

This is the question that Pakistan government should look into. My response is a careful response and I will give that to you. If we start talking and if we find that the Indians are serious on Kashmir, then we are prepared to discuss other things. Everything is linked. We need to look into things at once and come to a consensus. We have to resolve this Siachin issue. We have a loss of 10 rupees and they have a loss of 100 rupees. Details have to be looked into, but the fundamental issue is Kashmir and there will have to be talks on Kashmir.

Question**Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira**

MNA (NA-106, Gujrat-III, PPPP)

It has really been a very nice briefing by you. I want to know if by administrative measures, by war, by army or by any other means, this terrorism can be over.

Answer**Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri**

MNA (NA-140 Kasur III, PML)

Foreign Minister of Pakistan

You asked if we can curb terrorism by administrative control. The answer is, no we cannot. That is why we keep stressing that Kashmir, Palestine and social development should be the concern. But like they say, if wishes were horses then beggars would ride. What we have got to do is to find space for ourselves in the environment that exists. We continue to say what we believe in the hope that some people will get convinced. European Union is actually very convinced that what Pakistan is saying is right. You need to tackle Palestine and Kashmir. It does not mean that the European Union entirely agrees with our stance on Kashmir. They do feel that Kashmir needs a resolution and so does Palestine and global poverty. But there is the sole super power that is determining the agenda. The American electorate is in a position to move its leaders towards resolving this issue. Pakistan is not in that position.

Session 3

Executive Summary

Third Session of the Short Course focused on the Foreign Policy Process of Pakistan where Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain, Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani, Additional Secretary, Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Sartaj Aziz, Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and Finance presented their view points. The session was chaired by Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh, former foreign secretary.

Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain, as the author of PILDAT's briefing paper on the topic of 'The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan', presented an overview of the process as it exists in theory. Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani, on the other hand, focused his presentation on the Foreign Policy Process as it exists with special reference to role of foreign office; Parliament and its Committees; Cabinet and Ministries; Military and Security Agencies; and Government Think Tanks. Mr. Sartaj Aziz, drawing upon his experience as the former foreign minister and a veteran parliamentarian as well as the former chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, emphasised on the role of Parliament in Foreign Policy and the formulation and implementation of a successful foreign policy in Pakistan.

Presentations of these speakers were followed by a Q&A while the Session Chair concluded the session with his remarks.

Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan

Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain



Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain was of the view that in this growingly interdependent world, the process of foreign policy formulation is becoming more and more complex in which, besides national actors, regional and international forces play an increasingly important role. He added that this was especially relevant in case of Pakistan because of its geo-strategic location.

Drawing an outline of the process of formulation of foreign policy in Pakistan, he said that constitutionally, the Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, is the supreme foreign policy making body in Pakistan. The Constitution requires that the President shall take advice of the Cabinet or the Prime Minister in the exercise of his functions and in this regard all important foreign policy decisions ultimately must be taken by the Cabinet or the Prime minister and formally communicated to the President.

Mr. Husain said that the Ministry of Foreign affairs is the focal point for the initiation of all proposals relating to Pakistan's foreign affairs with the expectation of any matters that may be assigned to other divisions or ministries of the government. Rule 13 of the Rules of Business lays down that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall be consulted on all matters which affect the foreign policy of Pakistan or the conduct of its foreign affairs.

Explaining the role of the Parliament, Mr. Hussain said that theoretically the Parliament can pass a law in respect of any aspect of Pakistan's external relations. In practice

however, an initiative for such a bill would normally come from the executive which, because of the support of the majority in the National Assembly, would generally succeed in getting it adopted by the Parliament. A private Bill relating to Pakistan's external relations can also be moved by any member of either House. But the possibility of its adoption by the Parliament without the executive's support is almost nil because of party discipline.

He opined that in general the formulation and implementation of foreign policy is considered to be the prerogative of the executive all over the world. Parliaments, at best, can influence this process by making known their views on important foreign policy issues. He also added that historically, Pakistan has failed to play its due role in the foreign policy formulation primarily because of frequent military takeovers.

Presenting an overview of this whole process, he said that normally the foreign policy proposal would be initiated by the foreign office and submitted to the Prime Minister for consideration. While making such decisions, the foreign office would consult other ministries and departments concerned. While formulating and submitting foreign policy proposals to the government, the foreign office would take into account:

- a) Views of the Parliament to the extent that they are known
- b) Views of the civil society, media, and think tanks, etc.
- c) Views and policies of other countries and non-state actors at regional and international levels
- d) Regional and international strategic environment.

He explained that once the foreign policy proposal is received by the Prime Minister or cabinet, it would be adopted keeping in view the country's best national interests.

Mr. Husain believed that Pakistan's foreign policy formulation process suffers from absence of a

mechanism to synthesise the political, economic and security aspects of foreign affairs in the consideration of foreign policy issues. Foreign Office has been undermined to a large extent by the tendency of the security/intelligence agencies to bypass the foreign office because of their easier access to the rulers especially during military regimes. Economic ministries often do not involve the Foreign Office in the consideration of important issues relating to the country's foreign economic relations. Foreign office is often accused of adhocism as it mostly relies only on the short-term perspectives and neglects medium or long-term perspectives. Foreign policy process also suffers from lack of coordination between foreign office and various think tanks established by the government for research on foreign policy issues. In actual practice, the two Houses of the Parliament and their Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs have not been as active in the consideration of foreign policy issues as they could or should have been.

Mr. Husain believed that Foreign Office must strengthen its Policy Planning Division by allocating more manpower and financial resources. He was of the view that it is imperative to activate the Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs of the two Houses. He also recommended that the executive should make a conscious effort to consult the Parliament and its leaders on foreign policy issues more frequently than has been the case in the past.

Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan

Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani
Additional Secretary,
Foreign Policy Planning
Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Mr. Gillani maintained that it is a universal principle that a country's foreign policy mirrors its national agenda, priorities, social attitudes and political structure. Foreign policy is a cumulative process. He said that even revolutionary governments have to worry about what their predecessors, whom they condemn, had or had not done or promised to do or not to do. The feedback from external environment is already in place before policy options are drawn, he added. For the foreign policy makers, the concept of state sovereignty, though paramount, is not a license for a free choice of action, particularly in the case of relatively less strong states.

The conduct and formulation of foreign policy is governed by the interplay of multiple determinants, explained Mr. Gillani. Some of these core determinants are geography, history, security and ideology. Describing the role of various government sector institutions, Mr. Gillani said that the foreign office is the core state institution without which a country cannot anticipate the reaction of other states and thus cannot formulate a considered foreign policy. The terms "foreign policy" and "diplomacy" are generally used

interchangeably. Technically, however, foreign policy can be seen in the 'legislative' term while diplomacy can be seen as the 'executive' aspect of the foreign relations of a country.

The Parliament, observed Mr. Gillani, serves as a policy-forming agent in direct proportion to the extent of its use of the constitutional powers which it possesses to support, modify or defeat the programme of the executive. Foreign policy, he added, must rest upon a basis of domestic law enacted through the legislative process.

Emphasising on the due role of legislative committees, he said that the committees gather data, listen to the views of specialised interest groups, hold public hearings on important issues and carefully weigh alternative courses of action in the formulation of policy. Parliament and the committees, by utilising the powers of investigation, carefully scrutinise the execution of policy by the executive. They can also instigate a nationwide public debate on controversial foreign policy issues, he maintained.

The cabinet and the relevant ministries own the primary responsibility for the formulation of foreign policy. He believed that military establishments of nations comprise the most explicit element of foreign policy as diplomacy and military strength go hand in hand.

Information gathering and processing is the initial stage of foreign policy formulation in the bureaucratic framework, explained Mr. Gillani. This role is performed by using the global news media, diplomatic missions and the secret service intelligence. Government Think Tanks such as the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) and Institute of Regional Studies (IRS) undertake serious research on a range of key issues.

Similarly the role of institutions outside the ambit of government, including political parties, pressure groups, media, think tanks and the civil society, is paramount in shaping public opinion and the formation of foreign policy of a country. No prediction about foreign policy trends can be made in a given country without a careful assessment of the relative strength of the political parties, trade unions, military, religious parties and business


groups, he added.

Mr. Gillani also presented an overview of the challenges confronting the formulation of foreign policy. These challenges included transformation of global landscape after 9/11, predominance of economics over politics, growing role of non-state actors such as NGOs, multinational corporations; hazier demarcation between domestic and foreign policy issues; social movements, etc.

His complete paper can be seen as **Appendix F**.

How Foreign Policy should be made in Pakistan?

Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Former Federal Minister
for Foreign Affairs & Finance



A former Foreign and Finance Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Sartaj Aziz believed that the formulation and implementation of a successful foreign policy depends on three major factors:

- a) A clear long term vision of the country's role in world affairs and a broad national consensus on the main elements of such a vision;
- b) An effective institutional framework to coordinate the three main dimensions of foreign policy; namely national security, defence policy and economic objectives; and to determine the relative priority of each at a given point of time.
- c) An efficient and professionally managed foreign office which can present well-considered options, whenever required, and can implement policies effectively, once these have been formulated by the Government.

Unfortunately, he continued, none of these prerequisites have been fully met in the case of Pakistan, which had to build the infrastructure of its foreign policy from scratch. The second pre-requisite, namely the evolution of an effective national security system, in which the consistency of the country's defence, security and economic policies could be ensured, also became a victim of the recurrent failure of the political process. As a

result, Pakistan has remained under direct or indirect military rule for more than half of its independence existence, he opined.

“When India went nuclear in 1974, Pakistan was forced to become involved in the nuclear arms race. Pakistan was faced with a paradox as it had to be watchful of the U.S.'s reaction to this nuclear acquisition. In order to maintain the strategic balance, one of the options for Pakistan was to privatise its foreign policy,” he added.

The third dimension of a successful foreign policy, i.e., a competent and professionally managed foreign office, with its network of embassies and consulates, has partly been undermined by the absence of a well-coordinated national security system and partly by a steady decline in the country's image. There has been a growing gap between the foreign policy perspectives and the security assessments of the military establishment and the elected or unelected political leadership of the country. As a result, no clear political consensus on the objectives of national security has been reached, he said.

Mr. Aziz believed that the current phase of Pakistan's history represents a new watershed in the country's foreign policy. The events of September 11, 2001, jolted the main foundations on which Pakistan's foreign policy was built for over two decades – namely unflinching support for the Taliban and their predecessors in Afghanistan; active assistance for Jihadi organisations fighting for the liberation of Kashmir from Indian rule; and the development of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to India's superior conventional weapons. Under strong international pressure, Pakistan has already revised the first two policies and is also on the defensive on the third plank, following embarrassing reports of nuclear proliferation by our scientists to countries like Libya, Iran and North Korea, he said.

In his opinion, the first important requirement in the formulation of a coherent foreign policy framework is to narrow the wide gap in thinking that continues to exist between the military establishment and the elected civilian set-up on different aspects of national security. At present, according to many independent observers, there is a state within a state, which regards itself as the ultimate custodian of the national interest and does not


accept any deviation from the established parameters. He said that the importance of bringing these varying perceptions together will become obvious if we recall that one of the main causes of political instability and frequent dissolution of the Parliament (in 1988, 1990 and 1999 for example) was this gap in perceptions on major security issues.

The second important pre-requisite, Mr. Aziz maintained, is the evolution of an effective national security system that not only provides a forum for narrowing the gap between the military and civilian establishments but also creates a much wider mechanism of analysis and consultation on policy options and their short and medium term implications. Criticising the current set-up of the National Security Council, he said that its main purpose is to monitor the political process in the name of strengthening democracy, but, in essence, this council will weaken the democratic process. He feared that the controversy over the National Security Council between the treasury and the opposition may, once again, result in the loss of an opportunity to create an effective forum for evolving a consensus on national security issues.

Mr. Aziz emphasised that Parliament and its Committees can play a major role in facilitating a wider process of consultation on major foreign policy issues. He lamented that such a role has been very scarcely played by the Parliament and its committees, although they are constitutionally empowered to oversee the executive as well as formulate and forward foreign policy options in keeping with the aspirations of the people of the country.

Concluding his speech, Mr. Sartaj Aziz said that one of the most important pre-requisites for the success of foreign policy is to end the religious, ethnic, provincial and political polarisation in the country. He believed that the damage of such polarisation is far more lethal to national security than outside aggression or subversion.

His complete paper can be seen as **Appendix G**.



Q&A / Comments Session

Question

Mr. Omar Ayub Khan
MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)

Where is the equation of institutionalising economic development in our policy decisions? Secondly, in the event of a conflict, what is the threshold that will cause us to launch the nuclear programme?

Answer

Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs & Finance

Defence expenditure has been a burden on our economy. It has increased our indebtedness. Unfortunately, our foreign policy and our defence requirements are not consistent with economic development. Though, in the current scenario, we have some breathing space, but this situation may not last for too long.

Comment

Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani
Additional Secretary Foreign Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

We need to have a balanced approach for our foreign

policy. Spending so much money only on defence immensely neglects other sectors of development.

Comment

Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain

We need to create a mechanism where political and economic imperatives are synthesised and in my opinion, the office of foreign policy should be under the Prime Minister.

Comment

Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh
Former Foreign Secretary

The time for the use of nuclear weapons should be kept at a degree that no red lines are identified. Calculated ambivalence is being maintained deliberately. It will not be used as long as no one is sure as to when it can be used.

Comment

Ms. Sherry Rehman
MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)

In the last year and a half, the topic of nuclear proliferation has never been debated in the Parliament.

The linkage of ideology with foreign policy has been detrimental to the national interest of Pakistan and in making rational decisions.

Comment**Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar**

MNA (NA-194, R.Y.Khan-III, PML)

The formulation of foreign policy cannot be divorced from history. Our government has been repeating what Mr. Sartaj Aziz has said that economic development and security are of paramount importance but it is seen more often than not that the foreign policy becomes a tool to promote specific party agendas. There is a need for consensus about what the right track is.

Comment**Mr. Sartaj Aziz**

Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs & Finance

We are in the middle of a new framework. We have to take advantage of this opportunity. There is no national consensus about the policies that have been made because they were made too suddenly. We have to get the Parliament in working order, only then can it assert itself. The role and influence of the military can only be reduced by an effective Parliament.

Question**Sayyeda Farhana Khalid Banoori**

MNA (NA-323, Women NWFP-II, MMAP)

Why is foreign policy the domain of only a few?

Answer**Mr. Sartaj Aziz**

Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs & Finance

Parliament, think tanks as well as research institutes, all need to be involved in policy making decisions.

Question**Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin**

Visiting Prof. LUMS

It appears that the root cause of the problems faced by Pakistan is due to the dominance of military. How do we

convince the military to step down?


Answer**Mr. Sartaj Aziz**

Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs & Finance

We have to wait for better times to make more fundamental changes. We should make the military establishment realise the single dimensional security dominance. It is seen that the military mind ignores political imperatives.

Comments by the Session Chair

Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh
Former Foreign Secretary



Mr. Shaikh maintained that the responsibility of the foreign office is to make recommendations about foreign policy and implement foreign policy. However, the Parliament is to present policy options as well as oversee the implementation of foreign policy. The Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate has a staff of its own which comprises hundreds of professional people who have spent their lives in the foreign policy apparatus. They bring this expertise to the Congress, he said, adding that the Parliamentary Committees in Pakistan need to be patterned after such committees to contribute effectively to policy making and oversight.

Foreign policy is the hand maiden of domestic policy, said Mr. Shaikh, hence, it must be determined by the requirements of the domestic policy. Our focus should be on two elements: territorial security, and economic development. These are the objectives that should be considered in formulating our foreign policy, he believed. He said that an independent foreign policy is based on shared interests. There are trade-offs in every element of domestic and external policy and there is a need to see what serves our national interest best and how we can collectively define our national interest, he concluded.

Concluding the session, Mr. Shaikh remarked that territorial security is an imperative requirement; however a question arises about how it can be achieved and if it can only be achieved militarily. Territorial security, he added, comes from internal coherence not just through military security.

Session 4

Executive Summary

The significant question of how security considerations influence foreign policy in Pakistan was the topic of the fourth session at the short course. Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir, Former Vice President, Islamabad Policy and Research Institute and Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh, Former Foreign Secretary, presented their analyses of the issue. The session was chaired by renowned Defence and Political Analyst Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi.

Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir was of the view that security agencies of all countries of the world play a significant role in foreign policy formulation. His presentation covered the formation of ISI and various phases of its relationship with the formulation of foreign policy. In foreseeable future, the ISI's role in foreign policy would not be diminishing, believed Brig. (Retd.) Qadir.

Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh was of the view that the practise of direct involvement of security agencies into the foreign policy formulation is not unique to Pakistan. However, he maintained that foreign policy formulation and implementation is not the domain of security agencies and instead the domain of Parliament and the Foreign Office with only intelligence input required from the security agencies.

The session concluded with a discussion on the issue by the participants.

Role of Security Agencies in Shaping Foreign Policy

Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir
Former Vice President
Islamabad Policy Research Institute - IPRI



Differentiating between the terms of security and intelligence agencies, Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir explained that security agencies are those that enjoy legal jurisdiction domestically: the FBI in the US is a security agency with domestic jurisdiction. It also has intelligence functions, but only domestically. Consequently, it has little influence over foreign policy formulation. Whereas the CIA, which is an intelligence agency, has considerable influence on foreign policy. In Pakistan, the ISI and the IB are intelligence agencies while the police, para-military forces, and the Army, when called out in aid of civil power, are security agencies.

Brig. (Retd.) Qadir said that intelligence agencies have a role to play in foreign policy formulation in all countries of the world. This role, he added, does not just include input, but it sometimes dictates foreign policy in certain domains as well. Intelligence agencies especially influence foreign policy in the areas of international terrorism and international drug smuggling, he added. The business of intelligence has four steps to it: collection, collation, analysis, and interpretation or prediction. Collection is the basic function and all

intelligence agencies collect information of all kinds. Collation implies establishing connections between sometimes totally unconnected pieces of information so that they can then be analysed and then be interpreted to predict an event or for appropriate response.

Tracing the history of ISI's involvement in domestic and foreign policy, Brig. (Retd.) Qadir said that the ISI was created in 1948 as an intelligence agency intended to provide information of relevance to defence matters to all three services. In Ayub Khan's time, ISI was tasked to gather information domestically on political figures of significance, but no major domestic role was assigned to it. Surprisingly, he added, it was in Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's tenure that it was formally expanded to include the "Internal Wing." He said that his purpose for using the word "surprisingly" was because Prime Minister Bhutto created the FIA which was intended to fill the vacuum of domestic intelligence and in his tenure there appeared to be a deliberate effort to eradicate the military's influence in politics.

He continued that it was in Gen. Zia-ul-Haq's tenure that the ISI began to acquire the standing that it still enjoys when he employed it extensively in the domestic arena to create his "democratic political setup." The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, following the Iranian revolution, brought the CIA in, and the natural ally of the CIA was the ISI, he said. He shared that according to a senior diplomat, "Between 1979 and 1984 the foreign office was slowly shifted to the ISI HQ and we were left twiddling our thumbs or acting as spokesmen of their policies, words of caution were to no avail." The Afghan policy took primacy as it had brought back the US; it was bringing in much needed military assistance including the F-16s, funding from the entire Muslim world while the US-led West was prepared to ignore Pakistan's nuclear programme. Consequently, all other issues and policies were relegated to suit the Afghan policy. Since the Afghan policy lay with the ISI, all other policies were also influenced by it, believed Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir. Soviet withdrawal was timed to coincide with the beginning of the Kashmiri freedom movement and the ISI only had to shift its vision from one front to the other, he added.

After the coup d'état of President Gen. Pervez Musharraf,

the ISI reached its zenith under Lt. Gen. Mahmood who considered himself responsible for bringing about the coup and therefore, specially privileged, opined Brig. (Retd.) Qadir. After his ouster, Lt. Gen. Ehsan, a far more amicable and far less aggressive person, said Brig. (Retd.) Qadir, has taken over, and the ISI has been purged of elements unacceptable to the current political milieu. However, the influence of ISI continues relatively unabated and in his opinion, it is unlikely that ISI's influence will diminish in the foreseeable future.

The complete paper of Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir is available as **Appendix H**.

How Security Considerations Influence the Formulation Foreign Policy?

Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh
Former Foreign Secretary

Mr. Shaikh believed that it was a sad fact that in the relatively short periods of democracy in Pakistan, our legislators have paid little attention to the area of foreign policy even while recognising its importance. For some of them it is a subject of such enormous complexity and delicacy that it is best left to the experts. More cynically others have chosen to ignore it because there is no real constituent pressure to take an interest in this area nor does specialisation in this field create the sort of influence that the legislator can use to advance his/her political ambitions or to solve the day-to-day problems of constituents, he opined.

However, he believed, Parliament has a crucial role to play in foreign policy formulation and implementation; not only to adopt legislation needed domestically to give effect to foreign policy decisions but also to ratify any agreements that the government in power reaches with other countries or groups of countries or international organisations. Currently in Pakistan the power to ratify agreements lies with the Cabinet and not directly with the Parliament but there should be no mistake that in such ratification the Cabinet is, at least theoretically, reflecting the will of the Parliament and that when these agreements are of consequence such ratification would normally be preceded by a discussion in Parliament or at the very least in the Foreign Affairs committee of both the National Assembly and the Senate.

Mr. Shaikh believed that domestic policy is the

determinant of foreign policy. One foreign policy goal is the protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. In the case of Pakistan, the preservation of territorial integrity became a major determinant. In Pakistan-India relations, he believed, a way must be found to build public opinion in favour of the friendship between the two countries. There is also a need to determine the magnitude of the threat size of weaponry, relationship of commanders with political leadership and the ability to deploy military forces rapidly, he added.

Mr. Shaikh believed that the role of security agencies is very important in terms of collecting information needed, particularly in the context of external security, for the formulation of a coherent foreign policy. The government would be failing in its duty if it relied solely on the ministry of foreign affairs for this purpose even while recognising that the primary responsibility for advising the government on foreign policy must rest with this ministry, but it would also be failing in its responsibilities if it does not expect the same ministry to analyse the information collected, he added.

Theoretically, said Mr. Shaikh, it is the ministry of foreign affairs that will be the recipient of foreign policy related information from the intelligence and other agencies of the government and will incorporate it, after analysis, in its recommendations to the government on how Pakistan's security and other interests could best be safeguarded. In practice however the situation has been very different. Pakistan has found itself, forced by the perceived threat to its security to devote a larger part of its limited resources to defence and as a necessary corollary to give the military a greater role in the political life of the fledgling democracy. This has also meant that the military and the intelligence agencies have had a much greater role to play in determining the policies to be adopted and equally importantly the measures to be taken on the ground through overt and covert operations to tackle these security threats or to pursue Pakistan's perceived national interests. It has also meant that both the intelligence agencies belonging to the armed forces and those theoretically under civilian authority view their function as going beyond the collection of information, analysed Mr. Shaikh.

Mr. Shaikh informed that all over the world, on questions

of security, the intelligence agencies tend to go beyond the narrow mandate of providing raw information or neutral analysis for their political masters without making policy recommendations. This is as it should be. Intelligence gathering, 90% of which lies in the public realm, has to be done, if it is to be done effectively, by educated and trained personnel and it is almost inevitable that such persons will draw conclusions from such information and wish to share such conclusions along with the information. The question is whether such conclusions or recommendations should by themselves become the basis of policy, he said.

Good intelligence agencies, with both an information gathering and analysis capability, try and ensure that the two functions are insulated from each other. Intelligence agencies can develop tremendous capacities for information gathering, but there are inevitably lacunae and large bodies of information, the analysis of which needs capabilities and experience that rest elsewhere in the government structure. In addition, an important role of gauging the reactions of other countries is the task of ambassadors and embassies, he emphasised.

The holistic manner required for formulation and implementation of successful foreign policy is through which intelligence agencies provide the relevant information alongside their own analysis, if necessary. Based on that and on other input, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should make recommendations, which, once accepted by the government, be subject to deliberation and debate either in open session or, if the subject is sensitive, in camera by the relevant committees of Parliament and become the basis of policy only after they have been approved, he concluded.

Please refer to **Appendix I** for Mr. Shaikh's detailed paper.



Q&A / Comments Session

Comment

Mr. Abdul Sattar

Former Foreign Minister

There comes a time when a stand needs to be taken. When you feel that the policies are epithetical to your own beliefs, you need to take a stand. There have been instances in our history where people have taken a stand, for instance, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1975. Certain elements of the foreign ministry were accused of being communists by the U.S. and they had to pay the price for voicing their views. Although taking a stand is not prevalent in developing countries, there are several examples in the developed countries, where several officials resigned in protest to certain policies with which they did not agree.

There is a lack of resources to bring in proper expertise even the foreign office suffers from this lack of resources. There was a time when candidates of competitive examinations viewed Foreign Service as the top priority but now people prefer other professions as compared to foreign policy services. This portends a dark future for the foreign office.

Comment

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua

Security Analyst

Our Intelligence Agencies do not have a proper capacity for analysis. We carried out some weapon procurement for which we needed input from the ISI and some of the analysis provided by the ISI was way off the mark resulting in wrong decision-making. This goes to prove that we do not have the capacity to analyse.

Comment

Ms. Sherry Rehman

MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)

The CIA is hardly a salutary example to take for emulating foreign policy inputs either for security agencies or intelligence agencies. CIA is one organisation with its own intelligence failures. For us to be holding it up as a model is not recommended.

Comment

Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir

Former Vice President IPRI

A common question lurking in many people's minds is

how to end military's involvement in politics. For this firstly it is important to understand the military. Secondly, the military intervenes time and again because of a weak political base in the country. Our election turnout is decreasing every year.

The last popularly elected leader in this country was Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto but he himself made a situation for the Army to make use of. Thus it was a result of his mistake that the Army got an opportunity to hold the reigns. If you serve your people well and effectively, such situations cannot rise.

Comment**Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi**

MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)

Former Federal Minister

The voters are apathetic. They believe that the real decisions are not in their control and thus voting does not empower them. We need to inculcate trust and credibility so that their belief in the power of voting and elections is revived.

**Comments by
the Session Chair**

Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Defence & Political Analyst

Wrapping-up the session, Dr. Rizvi thanked the speakers of the session for their in depth information and analysis on the topic. He also thanked the participants for their valuable contribution in terms of their analytical and concise comments.

Session 5

Executive Summary

Session 5 covered the presentation and analysis of three case studies of the Shaping of Pakistan's Foreign Policy, namely that of Comparison of Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits; Gulf Crisis - 1990; and the Recognition of Taliban. Mr. Abdul Sattar, Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan; Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua, Security Analyst; and Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin, Visiting Professor of International Relations at LUMS were the respective authors and presenters of these case studies. A panel comprising Mr. Sartaj Aziz; Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, former Federal Minister and MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP); and Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi analysed the case studies, followed by Q&A/comments of participants.

Mr. Abdul Sattar was of the view that occurring at different time periods the three summits between Pakistan and India highlight important phases of Pakistan's relations with India in which efforts were made to normalise relations between the two neighbours. However, the latest of the summits at Islamabad seems to augur well for the prospects of peace between India and Pakistan.

Dr. Siddiqua believed that the Gulf Crisis - 1990 as a case study highlights the lack of a cohesive foreign policy approach between the military and the civilian government of the time. Her thesis concluded that the military's apparent calculation of the situation was not far-sighted and it embarrassed the civilian government.

Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin maintained that the decision of the recognition of Taliban brings to light a lesson that if the pros and cons of significant decisions are not thought through, the country has to suffer the consequences of the policy. He believed that contrary to the widely held perception about the dominant role of the ISI in the making of the Afghan policy, the policy of the support of the Taliban was a civilian initiative possibly against the wishes of the ISI and the foreign office who wanted to continue the policy of seeking a broad-based settlement.

**Shaping of Pakistan's Foreign Policy:
Case Study on the Comparisons of
Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits**

Mr. Abdul Sattar
Former Foreign Minister



During the past five years, Indian and Pakistani leaders have met thrice to discuss the course of bilateral relations with the same purpose to provide the basis for a dialogue between the two countries, held Mr. Sattar.

In Mr. Sattar's assessment, the first of these summits, i.e., the Lahore Summit proved to be ephemeral. The statements of Indian leaders on return to Delhi making light of the Kashmir issue deepened pre-existing doubts in Pakistan. Mr. Sattar opined that although confusion and controversy surrounded the Kargil war, the policy detour and its depressing outcome aggravated the differences between the Prime Minister and the Army high command.

Two and a half years later, the Agra Summit also met similar fate and this time it was due to difference in opinion within the Indian political hierarchy and the terms of the agreement were vetoed by a cabinet committee on foreign affairs.

Tracing the period between Agra and Islamabad summits, Mr. Sattar said that after 9/11, India, instead of talking peace with Pakistan, decided to discredit Kashmir. Moreover, the attack on the Indian Parliament gave India a greater excuse to further dishonour Pakistan and the former deployed its forces on the border. Relations between Pakistan and India remained volatile throughout the year 2002 and then all of a sudden India announced a pull back of the forces to peacetime locations. In Mr. Sattar's opinion there were two reasons for India's withdrawal of its forces:

- i) Strategic balance
- ii) International environment. The Western powers exhorted the two countries to resume talks for peaceful settlement of bilateral issues.

The basis of Islamabad Summit 2004 were laid in April 2003 in which Prime Minister Vajpayee publicly hinted that India was prepared to consider resumption of dialogue with Pakistan. As a result, on January 6, 2004, the two leaders reached an agreement to recommence the composite dialogue for "peaceful settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir." Mr. Vajpayee emphasised on the prevention of hostility and terrorism and President Musharraf reassured that "He will not permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner." This agreement was greeted with worldwide acclaim, added Mr. Sattar.

Commenting on Pakistan-India relations and the future course for discourse, Mr. Sattar said that good wishes and good intentions are not enough. A provident approach requires understanding of the reasons and obstacles to the realisation of the objectives both countries have professed in every meeting and affirmed in every agreement.

Shaping of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Case Study on the Gulf Crisis- 1990

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua
Security Analyst



Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua believed that Gulf Crisis serves as an important study of the confusions in Pakistan's policy making and poses various questions such as what is the relevance of ideology in policy making; who makes Pakistan's foreign policy and what are the important factors of consideration in these policy decisions?

Dr. Siddiqua maintained that two factors highlighted by the Gulf War were Islamic Nationalism and Pakistan-US relations. She said that the way events of the crisis unfolded demonstrated how institutional mechanisms just did not work. Pakistan's government condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and these sentiments were also shared by people of other Muslim countries. Pakistan dispatched its forces in support of Saudi Arabia. At this time the debate in Pakistan was at two levels:

- a) Issue of assisting Saudi Arabia and providing for the security of its age-old Middle Eastern ally; and
- b) Question of responding to an American call for countering Iraq's invasion.

However, she believed, the major twist came from the Israel factor, when Saddam Hussain equated the situation of occupation of Kuwait to the occupation of Palestine. This mobilised the public opinion in support of Saddam Hussain in Pakistan. She said that it was important to point out that General Mirza Aslam Beg, the Chief of Army Staff at that time, had concurred to sending of the troops

during a meeting of the Cabinet Committee for Defence. It was only later that he changed his stance and embarrassed the government by issuing statements against America's war against Iraq. But the government had U.S. relations to consider as well as relations with Saudi Arabia. Pakistan's government tried to convince stakeholders that Iraq had never supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Another integral role during this time was played by the religious parties as well as the opposition, with the issue of Muslim Nationalism. Jama'at-e-Islami, in particular, targeted the government.

Any country has three options in such a situation of conflict: coordinate, capitulate or confront, depending on what the national interest is, said Dr. Siddiqua. Iran took a stance in favour of its national interest. Pakistan had to clearly analyse and re-analyse its position in the global scenario and determine whether it could propose the concept of strategic defiance based on its nuclear capability, analysed Dr. Siddiqua.

In conclusion, she said that the case study shows that there was a lack of internal dialogue; a very limited role played by the Parliament and constraints on the government due to Army Chief's perception. Interestingly, she said, the case study proves that in terms of decision-making, the political government eventually had an upper hand. Dialogue between stakeholders was a pre-requisite, she believed, in order to reach a consensus in the face of a crisis.

Shaping of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Case Study on the Recognition of Taliban

Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin
Visiting Prof. LUMS



Dr. Tahir Amin explained at the outset that his perspective and understanding of the subject was an outsider's perspective reconstructed from analysing the situation. He said that nonetheless his analysis has its usefulness and would be helpful in broadening the understanding of the participants of the formulation of foreign policy in Pakistan.

Setting the picture in perspective, Dr. Amin said that the Government of Pakistan officially recognised the Taliban regime on May 25, 1997 and this decision had serious consequences. The decision alienated non-Pashtun minorities in Afghanistan and Pakistan had to face serious repercussions on its economy, polity, society and foreign policy. The N.W.F.P and Baluchistan were deeply influenced by Taliban policies of Islamisation while Pakistan also faced isolation internationally.

In his view, the answer to the question of why Pakistan recognised the Taliban regime lies in the analysis of strategic interests that played an important role in making such a drastic decision. The general notion was that Afghanistan provides strategic depth for Pakistan against India. Taliban were viewed as a pro-Pakistan force and it was believed that a stable Afghanistan under Taliban would protect Pakistan's strategic interests vis-à-vis India.

The origin of Taliban, he explained, is from mujahideen and the madrassahs that were set up after the Afghan war. It was Pakistan's policy that Kabul should be in the

hands of a Pakistan-friendly government and hence the Taliban were supported. Economic interest was also foreseen as Pakistan wanted to open up into Central Asia, and Afghanistan provided the shortest route into Central Asia. Other economic interests included American multinationals' interest in a gas pipeline, a Saudi multinational delta, and an Argentinean company. Pakistan also thought that since Taliban were students of religious madrassahs, they would support Pakistan and never raise the issue of Pakhtunistan.

Dr. Amin said that the policy for recognition of the Taliban was formulated with the induction of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's regime. Moreover, JUI-F had an active interest in Afghanistan. According to Dr. Amin, the role of ISI and foreign office in the recognition of Taliban is a bit murky as neither was it a policy of the ISI to intervene nor was the foreign office keen to support the Taliban. In essence, he added, there was huge support for the policy from all walks of the society including deobandi sect; drug dealers, smugglers and transporters.

Dr. Amin concluded that the pros and cons of this decision were not thought through by the government. There was complete lack of coordination at policy making level. There was no input from the think tanks, and there was no role of the parliamentary committees on foreign affairs in advising the government as to what steps to take.

Summary of the Case Studies by the Session Chair



Before initiating the panel discussion, Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani, the session chair, summarised each case study.

Dr. Gilani said that Mr. Abdul Sattar presented three different but important Summits between India and Pakistan from year 1998 to 2004 saying that in all these three summits, the expectations were that the relations between the two countries should become harmonious. The results of these Summits, especially the first two Summits, were neither too positive nor encouraging. Mr. Sattar presented his viewpoint that the 90s were a futile decade in which no progress on Pakistan-India relations could be achieved. He also said that the current dialogues promise a better outcome. According to Mr. Sattar there are many such issues in which the cooperation should be more forthcoming and hurdles in this regard should be removed. Highlighting the questions that could be put to Mr. Sattar, he said that since Mr. Abdul Sattar has given his point of view on various foreign policy decisions and events, he should be asked as to what the different factors were in influencing our policy decisions; what role did the politicians and the Parliament play; and do politicians not have the required knowledge and tools to deal with foreign policy issues effectively?

Presenting an analysis of Dr. Siddiqua's presentation, Dr. Gilani said that she gave a succinct and clear picture of the multi-dimensional facets of the Gulf Crisis from Pakistan's perspective. The Gulf crisis showed that the institutional mechanisms for decision making were not

followed. He said that according to Dr. Siddiqua, Gen. Hameed Gul was involved in developing military's perspective of strategic defiance but in effect Gen. Gul had already been sidelined. Dr. Gilani added that what was important to note during that time was the role of the Parliament, its involvement in the decision-making process and its stance on Gen. Aslam Baig's alternative policy.

Commenting on Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin's presentation, Dr. Gilani said that it was an acute analysis of the Taliban regime. He said that Taliban regime has had a deep impact on Pakistan's foreign policy process and has had not only a geo-strategic impact but also economic, social and cultural consequences for Pakistan.

After the summary, Dr. Gilani invited the panel to present their views.

PANEL DISCUSSION

Views by
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Former Federal Minister
for Foreign Affairs & Finance

Mr. Sartaj Aziz believed that contrary to Mr. Abdul Sattar's remarks that substantial issues were not discussed in the Lahore Summit, it consisted of very serious discussions on Kashmir. Mr. Aziz said that it was basically the Kargil issue that derailed the process, and had the military not taken over, the process could have been revived. At that time there was no precondition that cross border terrorism should end. It was after 9/11 that cross border terrorism was no longer possible. He said that Pakistan today is in a weak position in relation to India because the Kargil issue and military takeover have destroyed a historic opportunity for peace with India.

Mr. Aziz emphasised that the key issue in resolving the state of affairs is public opinion; which, over the years, has taken the shape of a steadfast belief that Kashmir belongs to us. He said that today there is great public sentiment in favour of peace. However, he also addressed a question of whether India would allow this peace process to continue. He said that he did not see a national consensus emerging on peace with India without Kashmir.

He also pointed to what he termed a 'factual mistake' in the presentation of Mr. Sattar and said that it is not true that at the time of Lahore Summit, Pakistan stood internationally isolated due to friendship with Taliban, was overtly neutralized and was on the brink of financial insolvency.

PANEL DISCUSSION (Contd...)

Views by
Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi
Defence & Political Analyst

Dr. Rizvi said that the case studies serve to highlight the fact that the foreign policy making process in Pakistan is very elitist in nature, even more so than other countries. He pointed out that there are two things that are important in this elitist process: idiosyncrasies of the leaders and the sentiments of the ruling elite. He said that these two possibilities arise in countries like Pakistan which have weak institutions. It is important to analyse the decisions of the elite and see how much unanimity and division there is in these decisions and opinions.

He said that the Army, despite strategic defiance, considered relations with Saudi Arabia as important during the Iraq War. The Army had developed an impression of playing an oversized role in the region due to the war in Iraq. He also emphasised that Pakistan and U.S. relations were important and it was for this reason that Gen. Beg's strategy was not followed.

Dr. Rizvi said that in terms of Pakistan-India relations, January 2004 is a case of unanimity. This process will last as long as the dominant elite remain unanimous in this regard.

PANEL DISCUSSION (Contd...)

Views by
Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi
MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)
Former Federal Minister




environment of the Lahore Summit, the environment of Islamabad Summit was much better and more tension-free. Mr. Qureshi also said that hardliners on both sides have moderated their rhetoric and the change in the international scene has facilitated the whole process.

Commenting on the case study on the Gulf Crisis, Mr. Qureshi said that the study reveals a visible gulf between political and military leadership and lack of a mechanism for resolving the crisis. He said that the Gulf Crisis is a good case study to learn from and understand the complexities of foreign policy decisions. There was a functional Parliament during the Gulf crisis but it played no active role. Foreign policy decision making requires analysis, and according to Mr. Qureshi, that is seriously lacking and has, time and again, lead to a state of confusion for the government.

Discussing the third and the last case study he said that we did not think through the pros and cons of the recognition of the Taliban as we should have. He said that Pakistan made a mistake by alienating the non-Pashtun element. He advised that the mechanism for incorporating inputs from think-tanks should be made operational in the country so that better foreign policy decisions can be taken.

Mr. Qureshi was of the opinion that Mr. Sattar's statements were very cautious regarding Pakistan-India Peace Process. He said that the realisation that war is no longer an option is becoming prominent and was of the view that a delay in dialogue would weaken Pakistan's position. However, he was of the view that a positive element of the delay is that both sides have realised that we have to improve the environment in both the countries as well as increase the contact amongst people. He said that as compared to the



Q&A / Comments Session

Comment

Mr. Abdul Sattar

Former Foreign Minister

At the time of the Simla Agreement, the Indian newspapers reported that Pakistan's President had promised Ms. Indra Gandhi that LoC would be considered as an international border and the issue of Kashmir would be resolved on this basis. There is no such justification available that President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would have made any such commitment or promise. Indians claim that this promise was part of a secret dialogue. However, Pakistan's President clarified that no such promises were made. No such records of the Simla Agreement have been found.

If the Foreign Minister at that time found loop-holes in the Kargil war, he should have detached himself from this policy in the interest of the whole nation instead of defending it. As an MNA, Senator or any government official, it is your right as well as duty to say what is right and to direct the policy makers in the right direction. A person who does not have ample knowledge of economics is not fit to be the foreign minister of Pakistan as in policy-making in the international framework, the person in charge needs to be well aware of the economic

players as the decisions consequently affect the economic development of the country.

Comment

Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali

Former Foreign Minister

The relationship between the Army and the rest of the society has been a troubled one which has defined the course of Pakistan's foreign policy. During the Gulf War, the Parliament held a full debate in both the houses in which majority of the members supported Saddam Hussain and Iraq whereas the Prime Minister had decided to support the coalition. The Prime Minister took a wise decision, even though it was an unpopular one. Difference of opinion was also visible in PPP who supported Saddam Hussain, although its Chairperson Benazir Bhutto supported the U.S. Our Chiefs of Staffs have two modes; compliance or defiance. We did incalculable damage by not sending troops to Saudi Arabia.

The problem with the Lahore Declaration was that the two permanent establishments were not in tandem with the political leadership and even before the Lahore Declaration's ink became dry, Kargil episode took place.

We demolished our case and gave ammunition to the Indian Leadership. I believe Mr. Vajpayee had agreed that there will be a joint working group on Jammu and Kashmir but went back on his word as soon as he went back to Delhi.

I disagree that extending support to Taliban Regime was Gen. (Retd.) Naseerullah Babar's operation. I will not be so harsh in passing judgement in hindsight. I believe that at any given time, governments are under extreme pressure to take such decisions and the government of the time must have its reasons for the decisions it made. I have to add here that our government had to face a messed-up situation with Afghanistan which was not created by any political forces, rather created mostly by the ISI, in particular, Gen. Hameed Gul, who considered himself Alexander of Pakistan and was proud of the fact that he could extend Pakistan's power to Central Asia by subverting those countries. In turn we had to go through a lot of difficulties to change that image for Pakistan.

Question

Mr. Farid Ahmad Piracha

MNA (NA-121, Lahore-IV, MMAP)

It has been 56 years since Pakistan-India discussions have been in the pipeline, yet they have not progressed. Has there been any movement towards the resolution of Kashmir? Have we taken into account the Kashmiri point of view? Mr. Abdul Sattar, you were against the CTBT before. However, after coming to the office you supported it - how did that happen?

Question

Sahibzada Mian Jalil Ahmed Sharqपुरi

MNA (NA-132, Sheikhpura-II, PML)

From the discussions in this session what I gather is that our foreign policy has not been consistent from the beginning and has been influenced by many personalities. How can we improve the process of policy making, and what role can Parliamentarians play in this?

Question

Mr. Omar Ayub Khan

MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)

Had 9/11 not occurred, would we still be claiming that recognition of Taliban regime was a mistake and was disastrous? What factors and variables would have changed, had we not recognised the regime in the first place?

Question

Sayyeda Farhana Khalid Banoori

MNA (NA-323, Women NWFP-II, MMAP)

Indian and Pakistani foreign policies are designed to demean each other. Can they not make policies which would benefit each other? My second question is that in today's world, the word jihad is considered synonymous with terrorism and mujahideen are called terrorists. Do you think that a foreign policy can be formed in line with Islamic principles?

Question

Syed Nayyer Hussain Bokhari

MNA (NA-49, Islamabad-II, PPPP)

As far as year 1990 is concerned, it was a lost case for Pakistan-India relations. My question is that who pushed Pakistan into Kargil; and who bailed it out?

Question

Ms. Sherry Rehman

MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)

How can the Indus Water Treaty be looked at which was considered one of the successful treaties between India and Pakistan? I want to second Dr. Siddiqua's suggestion that Defence Committee of the Cabinet needs to be strengthened. Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin made a comment that the civilian government continued to process the Taliban takeover. In Mr. Ahmed Rashid's view the ISI and the U.S. were pushing for the Taliban's recognition and this was specifically for the UNICOL contract to win. Can this issue also be addressed?

Question**Ms. Maimoona Hashmi**

MNA (NA-302, Women Punjab-XXX, PML(N))

Regarding the agreement signed on January 6, 2004, I would like to ask if the Foreign office and the ISI were aware of what was going on and if they were they included in the formation of this agreement. Why was the Northern Alliance anti-Pakistan?

Question**Mr. Ishaq Khan Khakwani**

MNA (NA-168, Vehari-II, PML)

My question is to Mr. Sartaj Aziz that when did he, as a foreign minister, come to know that the war in Kargil was taking place and when was the government informed of that?

Question**Mian Shamim Haider**

MNA (NA-135, Sheikhpura-V, PML)

There are many countries in the world who have long term policies; why is our foreign policy always of short-term duration?

Question**Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira**

MNA (NA-106, Gujrat-III, PPPP)

What did Pakistan and India gain during the various dialogues held between the two countries? Secondly, why did Prime Minister Vajpayee announce early elections immediately upon going back to India? Moreover, both governments do not wish to solve the Kashmir issue. All military governments raise certain issues in order to take the focus away from their unjustified presence. Is this government doing the same?

Comment**Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh**

Former Foreign Secretary

There are lessons to be learned from the 1990 Gulf Crisis. Foreign policy is not a one-way street; you have to take into consideration the interests of other countries.

Foreign policy is made by the dominant elite, but it needs popular support. Pakistan projected an image of enormous fickleness, not on the basis of what the elite felt but on the basis of what the masses felt. We need to look at the cause behind this; that is what research and analysis mean. We need to focus not only on who has formed the foreign policy and how, but on what we have done as a nation.

Question**Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar**

MNA (NA-194, R.Y.Khan-III, PML)

On the foreign policy matrix, there appears a need to institutionalise the formation of the foreign policy process. Please throw some light on the process of formation of the NSC.

Comments**Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani**Chairman Gallup, Pakistan
Session Chair

Politicians have a great way of convincing the public that they stand behind their views. During the Gulf War, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's government was in tune with the public. At the height of the crisis, a public opinion poll was carried out asking public's opinion on Government's policy on the issue, and a majority voted positively. The same question was asked of Qazi Hussain Ahmed's policy, and the majority again voted in affirmation. When asked if they thought the policy of the two was similar, the public voted negatively. This shows that even the public opinion can vary and can be contradictory.

Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin

Visiting Prof. LUMS

A lot of questions were asked regarding the Taliban regime. The Taliban regime needs to be evaluated objectively. They were successful to some extent in dealing with drugs. However, their vision of Islam was extremely narrow and this created several problems. For example, their stringent restrictions on education and employment. The ISI was apparently divided on their decision for support of the regime. According to Mr. Ahmed Rashid's documentation, ISI took a long time to

decide who they wanted to support. It was only when the Taliban won spontaneous victories that they enjoyed such support from the ISI and it is true that Gen. Babar played a gigantic role in the Taliban issue.

As to why the Northern Alliance was anti-Pakistan, there was a high degree of mistrust amongst the Northern Alliance. They believed that Pakistan did not support Mr. Ahmed Shah Masood. Saudi Arabia and UAE initially only supported the Taliban regime after insistence from Pakistan and later they too withdrew their support and Pakistan was left isolated in its acknowledgment of the regime.

Mr. Abdul Sattar

Former Foreign Minister

What are the reasons that contentious issues between India and Pakistan have not been solved till now? The answer to this is that Might is Right. Both sides are not willing to compromise. Pakistan knows that it is weaker than India, but we still insist that law and justice should be the determinants in solution of such contentious issues. Throughout history, power has never remained the sole factor in determining crucial issues. The power disparity comes in the way of a solution through law and justice. The basic question that needs attention is whether we should accept everything dished out by India, or if we are still powerful enough to take a stand.

For the past two to three years, our relations with the Taliban were becoming increasingly tense. It was unimaginable in 1997 to envisage in what context the Taliban would drive their policy. There had been a gradual shift in Pakistan's position away from the Taliban soon after Pakistan's recognition of the Taliban. Our policy was not even popular among our own community (other Islamic States). It had gradually become clear that the Taliban had taken up a battle they could not win.

Answer to the question of whether our decision about the Taliban was taken independently or if it was a result of pressure from Washington is that we had not received any message from Washington till September 12. Therefore, all decisions taken on the night of September 12 were completely independent. However, we did start receiving calls from the US from September 13 to

September 14 - and these were curt calls, asking us to make a decision immediately.

Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua

Security Analyst

It is important to hold dialogues as the beauty of the policy making process lies in the dialogue that precedes a final decision. There is still a gap between the decisions and dialogue and the final policy adopted regarding the Gulf Crisis. Parliament needs to identify Pakistan's foreign policy issues. We also need to determine what kind of a country we wish to develop Pakistan into, 15 to 20 years from now. What are the threats and opportunities we have, and what kind of alignments and alliances do we need to get into? I contest the statement that Pakistan is in a vulnerable position and that India can exploit this situation. I believe that we can solve this issue favourably if we are able to cooperate, capitulate and confront the issues facing us.

**Comments by
Session Chair**

Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gilani
Chairman Gallup, Pakistan

Dr. Gilani termed the session as a 'very productive' one and congratulated the speakers, panellists and the participants for presenting, highlighting and discussing important facets and issues of foreign policy formulation in Pakistan. He also congratulated PILDAT on its successful efforts towards organising the short course and getting together an eclectic mix of speakers and participants.

The civil society, in his view, is much stronger on foreign policy issues today than it used to be a decade earlier. He concluded that it was the only strength on which a better foreign policy in Pakistan can be made in the future.

Session 6

Executive Summary

The discussion was brought to the crucial connection of Parliament and the Foreign Policy in the 6th session which was chaired by Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP) and Former Federal Minister.

An overview of the role of Parliaments of US, UK, and India in the Foreign Policy Process was presented as a starting point of the discussion by Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin. He analysed that the US Congress exercises considerable authority in shaping foreign relations as its committees oversee the country's foreign policy and authorise the international affairs' budget. The British and the Indian Parliaments, unlike the US, do not enjoy specific powers to restrain the executive but oversee the policies of the executive through committees and presenting their policy recommendations.

Mian Abdul Waheed presented his views on the role of Parliament in shaping Pakistan's Foreign Policy based on his experience as the former chairman of National Assembly's Standing Committee on Foreign Relations. He believed that though constitutionally the Parliament in Pakistan is empowered to review the policies of the executive, especially through its standing committees, unfortunately the Parliament or its committees have never exercised that role effectively and pro-actively.

Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali analysed the principle determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy presenting his views on the major factors that have contributed to shaping Pakistan's foreign policy so far.

Review and Analysis of Foreign Policy by the Parliaments of US, UK, and India

Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin
Visiting Prof. LUMS

Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin said that traditionally, foreign policy used to be the exclusive domain of the diplomats and soldiers. However, with the evolution of democracy, this pattern has changed and the policy process in a democratic system is shaped by the inputs of Parliaments, media, various interest groups as well as the public opinion. Executive branch of the government is no longer completely independent both in the formulation and implementation of foreign policies, he added.

Prof. Amin said that he has studied the role of legislatures of US, UK and India in their foreign policies on the basis of constitutional provisions governing the respective legislatures' control over foreign policy; the mechanisms used by legislatures to influence foreign policy; certain cases of effectiveness of legislatures in this domain and the advantages and disadvantages of the legislative control over foreign policy making, review and analysis.

The US Constitution divides the powers to conduct foreign policy among the three branches of the government: executive, legislative, and judicial. The executive formulates the policy, the legislature oversees the policy and judiciary interprets the constitution if a difference arises between the executive and the legislature. He said that US President is the head of the executive and formulates foreign policy with the Secretary of the State, his principle advisor and with the assistance of the National Security Council and his cabinet. The legislative control on foreign policy is

exercised through two committees: Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee. These two committees oversee the country's foreign policy and authorise the international affairs' budget. He said that there are other committees, which also share jurisdiction on foreign policy which include the Select Intelligence Committees of both the Houses which monitor the activities of the CIA and other Intelligence Agencies; the House National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committees which deal with the defence matters. It was important to understand, believed Prof. Amin, that although the President in US is immensely powerful but the Congress also exercise significant restraints on the powers of the President, creating considerable tensions in the foreign policy process.

Discussing the role of British Parliament in the foreign policy of UK, he said that unlike the US Congress, the British Parliament does not have specific powers to restrain the executive. The control of foreign affairs rests in the hands of the Crown and is shared with the Legislature only to the extent that the Crown deems this desirable. The basic function of the Parliament in UK is to examine the policies which cabinet has decided. However, Parliament can normally be consulted only after decisions have been made. Its control over foreign affairs results from its place in the government and the general legislative functions. There are several devices which enable the Parliament to exercise its control over the foreign policy. The Parliament has three committees dealing with issues of foreign affairs: Foreign Affairs Committee, Committee on European Legislation and the Committee of Public Accounts which exercise considerable check on foreign affairs. He said that on the one hand, compared to the US System, the principal advantage of British system is that the government is not paralysed in conducting its foreign policy vis-à-vis other nations. On the other hand, the governments may abuse the trust reposed in it or may make erroneous judgments which may harm the national interests. Offering the example of the present British Government's policy towards Iraq, he said the Blair government is facing a lot of criticism over its Iraq policy. The opposition is blaming the government for lying to the public about Iraq's possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in order to justify the war against Iraq when in actuality, the

WMDs were never found.

Discussing the constitutional space available to Indian Parliament in the domain of foreign policy, Prof. Amin explained that since India follows the British Constitutional model, making foreign policy decisions is the function of the cabinet, which, in turn, is responsive as well as responsible to the opinions expressed in the Lok Sabha. In the U.S. Constitution, the ratification of treaties and other international agreements by the Senate is mandatory, but in the Indian Constitution there is no such provision. The Indian Parliament also exercises its control over foreign affairs through three committees: Consultative Committee of Parliament for the Ministry of External Affairs, the Estimate Committee and the Public Accounts Committee. The Indian Parliament has, in general, supported its governments' positions on the foreign policy issues, believed Prof. Amin, although sometimes it has shown strong disagreement on some positions such as its strong criticism of the Indian government's policies during the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

Parliament and the Foreign Policy: the Role of Foreign Affairs Committee

Mian Abdul Waheed
Former Chairman
Foreign Affairs Committee
of National Assembly of Pakistan



Mr. Waheed believed that the principles of Pakistan's Foreign Policy have been Security and Economic Progress of Pakistan. To influence and review foreign policy of the country, standing committees are the major parliamentary tools comprising treasury, opposition and smaller parties. He said that the vitality with which the Committee on Foreign Affairs plays its role depends largely on the support it receives from the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the House.

On a dismal note, he continued, compared to most other democracies, the Parliament in Pakistan has never played a substantial role in influencing foreign policy of the country. On any crucial issue of foreign policy, the role of Parliament has merely been to allow emotional debates in the plenary. The standing committee on foreign affairs is a powerful committee if taken full advantage of by parliamentarians, he added, as the mandate of the committee includes the authority to review the entire working of the ministry of foreign affairs including its foreign policy process.

Relating from his own experience, Mr. Waheed said that when he was Chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs from 1997 to 1999, through this period, the views of the Committee on many issues, including the Afghanistan issue, were not taken into consideration by the government. He said that the committee advocated a policy of liaison with all the contending groups in

Afghanistan. As the events unfolded subsequently, it became clear that the Pro-Taliban policy was incorrect, he said.


He believed that for committees to function effectively, avenues of interaction with other best practises in the World are required through meetings, travels and study tours. Even though such visits from other countries were made to Pakistani Parliament during his chairmanship of standing committee, the Pakistani Parliament never reciprocated.

Apart from the disruption of democracy which has contributed in a major way to the lack of institution-building in the country and hence the lack of organised parliamentary input to policy-making, he believed that the delay in the formation of committees also contributes to the lack of effectiveness of committees as these are constituted practically after a year of the beginning of Parliament after elections. Moreover, the Parliamentary Committees, just like individual legislators, are not provided independent secretariats, staff and researchers which are needed for independent and effective functioning of committees. He concluded that the parties in power and opposition need to give the seriousness and importance to strengthening committees that they deserve as without effective committees, no serious public input and review of the executive and its policies is possible.

His complete Paper is attached as **Appendix J**.

Principle Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy

Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali
Former Foreign Minister



Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali congratulated PILDAT for holding the short course and initiating a process which he termed would 'greatly help in the capacity-building of the Parliamentarians.'

Presenting an overview of the major factors shaping Pakistan's foreign policy, he said that since Pakistan's inception, foreign policy has been largely determined by three factors: threat perception from India as a hostile State; the unresolved Kashmir dispute; the need for rapid economic progress. Since India was historically hostile and was in alliance with USSR, even though it professed non-alignment, Pakistan was obliged to seek strategic alliances with the West. As a consequence of these imperatives, Pakistan joined the anti-communist alliance of SEATO and CENTO. However, one of the conditions of military assistance from USA was non-use of weapons for any other purpose except for fighting communism.

It is, however, important to note, he added, that the West had not abandoned India even though India was receiving massive Soviet military and economic assistance. The western tilt was towards Pakistan but at no point was it anti-Indian. In the dispute of Ran of Kutch, Pakistan had

assumed that the western alliance of Pakistan would replenish Pakistan's military hardware during the war but it did not prove to be of any benefit to Pakistan during its conflict with India and eventually Pakistan was forced to sign the humiliating Tashkent Declaration. Post-Tashkent, Pakistan's foreign policy was in doldrums.

Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali was of the opinion that the Simla Accord signed by Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, as the then President of Pakistan, was one of the outstanding achievements of Pakistan's diplomacy. It was during Mr. Bhutto's government that Pakistan's Nuclear Programme was initiated and the construction of the Kahuta Uranium Enrichment Plant was started. He believed that two major events adversely affected Pakistan's foreign policy during General Zia-ul-Haq's dictatorship: Islamic revolution in Iran and Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan. He said that since Gen. Zia-ul-Haq as a military dictator was lacking in moral and political legitimacy, in both these events he saw an opportunity for self-aggrandisement.

Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali was of the view that Pakistan saw an opportunity to strengthen its relations with the West during the Soviet-U.S. war in Afghanistan. The war of liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet troops was fought from the soil of Pakistan in the name of Islam and Jihad. He said that with time Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan became deeper but unfortunately policy managers in Pakistan relied more on military solutions rather than political solutions. They failed to recognise that in the post-Najeebullah period, there was a political crisis in Afghanistan, not a military one. Consequently, Pakistan was sucked into a zero-sum game in Afghanistan. Another setback to Pakistan's Afghan policy was the withdrawal of the US and its allies from Afghanistan who simply walked away in 1988 while Pakistan was left to bear almost the entire burden of 3.2 million refugees.

Along with this major setback in 1990, sanctions were imposed on Pakistan by the Bush administration for covertly pursuing the nuclear programme. Pakistan experienced great economic hardship and isolation. In the meantime, due to uprising in Indian occupied Kashmir, Pakistan's relations with India started to become tense on several fronts and hence Pakistan's profile suffered many setbacks, he added. He believed however, that a few

developments took place in the first government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Important nuclear treaties were signed with India, whereas the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif pushed Afghanistan into further civil war. In the second government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan and eventually their take over of Kabul and three quarters of Afghanistan were major developments. He said that this period also saw Pakistan's quest for deepened relations with Central Asia. The second government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif saw significant foreign policy developments. India tested its nuclear weapons in 1999 and Pakistan historically followed reactive policies and tested several sophisticated devices, he added.

Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali said that not only did the events of 9/11 change the world, they also changed the fortunes of President General Pervez Musharraf. President Bush decided to combat terrorism all over the world and that required Pakistan's airspace and several bases and facilities in Pakistan to launch its attacks on the Taliban Government. He said that this was a godsend for Gen. Musharraf who conceded to these concessions readily and Pakistan became a key ally of the US war on terrorism.

He said that another significant event during Gen. Musharraf's regime was the Islamabad Declaration which was signed by Gen. Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee. He termed the declaration 'balanced' and containing the spirit of Simla Accord and the Lahore Declaration. He believed that it has contributed significantly in the reduction of tensions in South Asia since 2001 when a major terrorist event occurred in New Delhi.

Please refer to **Appendix K** for the complete presentation.



Q&A / Comments Session

Question

Ms. Sherry Rehman

MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)

My questions are to Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin. Is there a reason for your not mentioning the National Security Council (NSC) in the US? What is the purpose of the NSC in the US? How has civilian authority been paramount in the NSC and how has it often taken power away from the military especially during the Bay of Pigs Crisis? And lastly, please explain how the appropriation committee has become involved in the subtle subversion of the executive?

Question

Mr. Omar Ayub Khan

MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)

My question is to Mr. Abdul Waheed. In your experience, where was the resistance coming from in allowing the Foreign Affairs Committee and other committees to function during the time of civilian dispensation?

Comment

Ms. Samia Raheel Qazi

MNA (NA-301, Women Punjab-XXIX, MMAP)

Are we ever going to experience a time when facts regarding development, economy and military will be presented to us in their true picture? Will we ever present the public with truth for the sake of vital national interest? During this short course, facts have been presented by many speakers that are contrary to reality. We as parliamentarians face immense hurdles which adversely affect our performance. In order to overcome these hurdles, we all need to unite.

Comment

Mr. Ishaq Khan Khakwani

MNA (NA-168, Vehari-II, PML)

How do we bring Pakistan out of the dangers engulfing us presently? The solution to this lies in politicians sitting down and drawing parameters as to what extent politics can be taken to and how far can we extend our personal enmities. It is incumbent upon the leadership to provide personal sacrifices. You should be above any financial corruption.

Question**Sayyeda Farhana Khalid Banoori**

MNA (NA-323, Women NWFP-II, MMAP)

How independent is our country in formulating its foreign policy?

Question**Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir**

Former Vice President

Islamabad Policy Research Institute - IPRI

My first question is regarding the use of emergency powers by the American President under the principle of clear and present danger. When he does so, he has to go back to the congress to satisfy them as to why he assumed those powers according to the American Constitution. Secondly the 1965 War was no doubt a piece of idiocy which Mr. Ayub Khan undertook to create his legitimacy, but the Runn of Kutch was not our doing. We were attacked and we had to defend ourselves. My question is that are you recommending a change in our Kashmir policies?

Question**Sahibzada Mian Jalil Ahmed Sharqपुरi**

MNA (NA-132, Sheikhpura-II, PML)

Should not the basic goal of our foreign policy be based on our ideology of two nation theory? Secondly as far as our involvement in Afghanistan is concerned, we made a hasty decision and I believe that we could have asked for time before agreeing with the US and could have come up with a better solution. Why did we not do that? We could have said this is an international issue and we have to consult China, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Iran.

Comment**Makhdoom Syed Ahmad Alam Anwar**

MNA (NA-192, R.Y.Khan-I, PML)

We have to develop a strategy and examine our flaws. I do not think we have failed in war, diplomacy or insurgency. I think we should continue to pursue both. We must analyse our fault lines. The distance between the decision making elite and people must be reduced.

Question**Mr. Farid Ahmad Piracha**

MNA (NA-121, Lahore-IV, MMAP)

I feel that policies and agreements in Pakistan are signed without any involvement of the Parliament. My question is to Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali, that how responsible does he consider himself for the failures in foreign policy that he mentioned?

Question**Mr. Qamar Zaman Kaira**

MNA (NA-106, Gujrat-III, PPPP)

Pakistan has, for a long time, remained a part of countering the communism strategy. My question is that has the break up of USSR been an advantage or a disadvantage for Pakistan?

Comment**Ms. Fauzia Wahab**

MNA (NA-311, Women Sindh-IV, PPPP)

As political representatives, we need to be very cautious with our choice of words. It is very heart wrenching to hear when someone uses the expression "a failed state" for Pakistan. Usage of such terminologies creates dependency.

Comment**Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi**

MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)

Former Federal Minister

I would like to clarify a misunderstanding. No one called Pakistan a failed state. It was said that that we have had certain failures in our foreign policy.

Question**Syed Nayyer Hussain Bokhari**

MNA (NA-49, Islamabad-II, PPPP)

My question is to Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin. He has given a comparative analysis regarding foreign policy and Parliaments. My question is that in the current situation of Pakistan's defaced and disfigured Parliament, can the cabinet make any independent decisions? And what

benefits have we derived from aligning with the U.S?

Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin

Visiting Prof. LUMS

NSC is an extremely important body in the US but it constitutes a part of the executive. It is an advisory body to the President and reflects the civilian supremacy. The President and the Secretary play a vital role in the NSC. The appropriation committee is also very important, as it keeps a watch on funding and holds executive accountable.

Answer

Mian Abdul Waheed

Former Chairman

Foreign Affairs Committee of National Assembly of Pakistan

Committees are formed half way through the Assembly's life. Lack of infrastructure is an important reason for the ineffectiveness of the committees and the Parliament. Members should demand proper infrastructure for the committees.

Answer

Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali

Former Foreign Minister

Every country, no matter how powerful it is, has to deal with a lot of pressures of conflicting stand of stakeholders within the polity and public opinion, etc. A political government is more equipped to handle pressures because of its legitimacy. Military governments do not have legitimacy and thus they are more susceptible to external pressures.

There is a national consensus in Pakistan that we have to stand by our foreign policy and stand by the people of Kashmir and we must struggle for justice. My differences arise on the whole approach of letting loose jihadi organisations in Pakistan. That undermines our case. I have been requesting the military elites not to do this for a long time. We should let the Kashmiri people fight the war of freedom (jihad) as it is their right but not to privatise jihad by opening jihadi organisations in Pakistan. We have in the past endangered our own society and

created a bad image for ourselves in front of the world. Our case regarding the Kashmir resolve is a just case and we must stand by that case.

Comments

Mr. Abdul Sattar

Former Foreign Minister

No one is satisfied with the performance of the state. We all had higher expectations from the current governance. A process has been set into motion that is driving us into depression. We came close to becoming a failing state, but we escaped this despondent tragedy. Our country is on the road to development, but we must develop in each and every facet of life. We need to address questions such as how can we improve this rate of progress? In one of the questions it was said that we capitulated to even those demands that the US did not ask of us. I wish we could place our records before the people and clarify that we did not accept all their demands, which were six major demands, but only those which we, under our foreign policy, considered to benefit our national interest in the long run.

Comments

Sardar Asseff Ahmed Ali

Former Foreign Minister

I do not want to give a feeling of pessimism. I believe that there have been significant successes for Pakistan as well and the most important success is that we have constructed an economic infrastructure, a nuclear programme, missile programme and many such monumental structures in the past 57 years. Coming to diplomacy, I feel there have been many significant successes in diplomacy as well e.g. the Liaqat-Nehru pacts of 1951, Geneva Accord, etc. Similarly Simla Accord was Pakistan's diplomacy at its finest. In Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's term Pakistan played a vital role in Bosnia Herzegovina. In Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's term, Lahore Declaration is a success of Pakistan's diplomacy.

Coming to military governments: September 1965 war was a disaster. In 1971, under yet another military ruler, we lost half the country. Then in 1979-1980, we plunged into Afghanistan and we were given a pittance of \$4

billion and General Zia-ul-Haq placed the entire nation at stake. Under the next military General, we again faced the biggest disaster, i.e. Kargil. This is the record of military establishment versus the political leadership. The political leadership has been inclusive of the people's opinion as opposed to military governments who are exclusive of their policies. In summation, the more exclusive a country's foreign policy, the greater the dangers to country's interests whereas the more inclusive the foreign policy is, the greater the success of the foreign policy will be.

Comments by Session Chair

Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi
MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)
Former Federal Minister

In his concluding remarks, Mr. Qureshi thanked the honourable speakers and participants for their sharing of views and a valuable interaction on the issue in the session.

He said that in established democracies, Parliaments play a role in steering and guiding the executive in formulation of foreign policy. Parliaments keeps a check on the executive such is found in the examples of Hutton Commission and 9/11 investigations, etc. Similarly, he believed, India had set up a committee that made a report about the failures in Kargil and presented it to the Parliament. Such reports if presented to the Parliament help to clarify the issue and allow the Parliament to assert itself in a more effective manner, he added.

Mr. Qureshi believed that a time has come where we the Parliamentarians, through building a consensus, need to start an effective campaign towards strengthening the role of the Parliament and its standing committees. In many ways, this role is already defined in the constitution and the Parliamentarians by being united need to exert their powers and the responsibility that is enshrined in the Constitution, he concluded.

Session 7

Executive Summary

Session 7 explored the relationship between economic diplomacy and the role of foreign office. Chaired by Former Federal Finance and Foreign Minister, Mr. Sartaj Aziz, the session's main speaker was Director Economic Coordination, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Asad M. Khan.

The session highlighted the diplomatic role of the foreign office concerning the economic development of the country in relation to other ministries of finance and commerce. The realities of the new world demanded that a coherent, well coordinated negotiating strategy is required to effectively articulate and realise Pakistan's trade and economic objectives. To achieve these, intensification and institutionalisation of inter-ministerial coordination is required.

Economic Diplomacy and the Role of Foreign Office

Dr. Asad M. Khan
Director General
Economic Coordination
Ministry of Foreign Affairs



Explaining the role of the foreign office at the outset of his presentation, Mr. Asad M. Khan said that the foreign office acts as Pakistan's window to the outside world. He said that objectives of a foreign office include formulating of advice to the government on foreign policy issues and strategy, implementing the policy, promoting national interests abroad, countering hostile activities through external linkages, safeguarding and promoting Pakistan's political, economic and trade interests, projecting and preserving Pakistan's image as a progressive, moderate, democratic responsible nation and protecting and serving the country's compatriots abroad.

Diplomacy in general terms is the art of conducting international relations. A dynamic and vibrant economy is a critical and important determinant of national security. He said that in his context, a functional definition of economic diplomacy would imply the following: 'Securing enhanced and predictable access for national products to other export markets, securing greater Foreign Direct Investment inflows, reducing foreign debt and securing enhanced development assistance on concessional terms and lastly generating employment opportunities abroad for Pakistan's skilled and unskilled labour force.' He said that the key players in existing distribution of

work in the government to protect and promote Pakistan's economic interests abroad are: Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Revenue Division; Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, Investment Division and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Khan explained that the functions of the Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Revenue Division are to advise on economic and financial policies, negotiate and coordinate for external economic assistance and economic cooperation with other countries, secure technical assistance for Pakistan from foreign governments and organisations and deal with matters relating to Pakistan's technical assistance to foreign countries. Ministry of Commerce's functions include negotiating treaties, agreements, protocols and conventions with other countries and international agencies bearing on trade and commerce and promotion of foreign trade including trade offices abroad, trade delegations to and from abroad, overseas trade exhibitions and conferences and committees connected with foreign trade.

The role of the foreign office, as laid out in the rules of business, is that the foreign office is consulted on all matters which affect the foreign policy of Pakistan, or the conduct of its foreign relations which also include Pakistan's external-economic relations. He said that it is the overall responsibility of the foreign office to maintain relations and dealings with other countries.

In the post cold war era, there were new challenges and opportunities for the foreign office, said Mr. Asad M. Khan. There was an entire shift from geo-politics to geo-economics. Furthermore, the world saw the establishment of WTO and integrated treatment of trade, development and other related issues including finance, technology, investment and sustainable development. However, post 9/11 scenario has shifted the focus back to the political dimension of issues such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, furthering democracy and civil rights. He said that Pakistan required a coherent and well-coordinated negotiating strategy to effectively articulate and realise Pakistan's trade and economic objectives at the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Comparing regionalism versus multilateralism, he said that neither theory nor evidence provides a robust guide to the choice between regionalism and multilateralism, narrowing down the topic to Pakistan's regional pursuits which include agreement on SAFTA, ECOTA, TPS-OIC, etc. The objective of all these pursuits is to enhance the welfare of the people by ensuring that comparative advantage work to their advantage through reduction in consumer prices and with only limited trade diversion, he added.

Discussing the allocation of trade-related personnel in Pakistani missions abroad, Mr. Khan said that Pakistan has 103 representative missions abroad with the majority being two person missions. Out of the total cadre strength of 406 officers of the Foreign Ministry, 254 foreign service career professionals are deployed in these missions. He believed that there is a need to develop close partnership between the foreign office, the sectoral ministries and the private sector to optimally utilise Pakistan's limited resources.

Upon conclusion, Mr. Asad M. Khan opined that if need be, necessary changes should be made in the rules of business to reflect and take into account the new needs and demands on the government in general and Foreign Ministry in particular. Welcoming the establishment of the Task Force on Trade Diplomacy with representation from Commerce and Foreign Office and the creation of WTO Council which provides the necessary framework for inter-ministerial Coordination on WTO issues, Mr. Asad M. Khan still believed that there is a further need to intensify and institutionalise inter-ministerial coordination in the area of economic diplomacy.

Please refer to **Appendix L** for the complete presentation.



Q&A / Comments Session

Comment

Syed Naveed Qamar

MNA (NA-222, Hyderabad-V, PPPP)

There is a need for coordination amongst the various ministries, and more importantly, there is a need for capacity-building of the various ministries to deal with this issue. We need to determine if international agreements are indeed favourable for us. We need extensive research and analysis before we sign an international agreement. What is the progress regarding SAFTA and non-tariff barriers.

Question

Mr. Farid Ahmad Piracha

MNA (NA-121, Lahore-IV, MMAP)

For the past few years as well as at present, our foreign investments have decreased and Mr. Shaukat Aziz has admitted to this fact on the floor of the National Assembly. In Pakistan, over 54 million people are living below the poverty line. Our industry is in a deplorable state. I request you to identify what we have gained as a result of the shift in our policy after 9/11. Kindly also give your comments regarding anti-dumping.

Question

Ms. Fauzia Wahab

MNA (NA-311, Women Sindh-IV, PPPP)

I am glad that there is an economic coordination desk in the foreign office. What stand have you taken against the brain drain of our youth? Have there been measures taken to develop the skill of our manpower and to export this skilled manpower?

Question

Mr. Omar Ayub Khan

MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)

To date the data that comes out of the bureau of statistics is not analysed. We do not have the tools or the manpower to conduct studies. The commissions that have been instituted to carry out these studies (academic institutions) are not equipped with the quantitative background either. My question is that how can we send our trained manpower abroad in the presence of acts such as the Patriot Act in the US? The bureaucracy is not helping matters by being unwilling to export skilled manpower. Do you raise these concerns with your counterparts?

Question**Ambassador (Retd.) Javid Husain**

In view of our existing governmental system and rules of procedure, the role of the foreign office is that of coordination and providing a strategic perspective to the ministries. Is the foreign office performing these tasks, and what steps are being taken by the foreign office to build its capacity to enable it to perform these tasks?

Question**Makhdoom Syed Ahmad Alam Anwar**

MNA (NA-192, R.Y.Khan-I, PML)

The implementation of our decisions is extremely slow. We have not yet been able to decide the number of multinational corporations that would be operational in Pakistan; how many of these are willing to invest in Pakistan and how successful have our missions been to encourage them to invest here? Secondly, our foreign exchange earnings can increase tremendously if our agricultural products are developed and exported.

Comment**Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi**

Defence & Political Analyst

I feel that there are two main issues that need attention here. Firstly, we cannot only focus on the structure; we also need to focus on the dynamics. Moreover, we need to focus more on external dynamics instead of internal dynamics. The question here is that what has been the role of the economic diplomacy in our situation; was this diplomacy adopted by design or by default after 9/11. It is also important to understand the demarcation of roles of economic diplomacy and the military.

Question**Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar**

MNA (NA-194, R.Y.Khan-III, PML)

As you have rightly pointed out, my observation and question is that post-Cancun, our agricultural subsidy issue, which is one of our strengths in gaining market access for agricultural products, does not have a realistic and realisable time frame. Therefore the focus towards regional trade and bilateral trade order needs to be

stressed and for that the foreign policy has been used as a tool by most of these countries from which we require market access. Thus foreign office's role becomes paramount for Pakistan too. Is there any kind of a programme or funding requirement which the foreign ministry has requested the ministry of finance in its annual development plan in the forthcoming budget?

Question**Sahibzada Mian Jalil Ahmed Sharqपुरi**

MNA (NA-132, Sheikhupura-II, PML)

Are there any exports or any other targets set for our commercial attachés and labour attachés? What checks and balances system is present if they fail to meet their targets?

Dr. Asad M. Khan

Director General Economic Coordination

I agree with Syed Naveed Qamar's observation regarding the lack of capacity-building. I think we need to think seriously about how to go about building our capacity. We must remember that government alone cannot do all the research; the bureaucracy is not equipped nor meant to carry out the business of institutions. It is the academic institutions and the specific research institutions attached to the ministries which are responsible for carrying out this research. As regards SAFTA, I have attended every single meeting regarding SAFTA. The real negotiations regarding SAFTA have not even started yet. Once they commence, we will talk about non-tariff barriers. I agree that we need to have more research and that such input needs to come from everyone.

As I stated in the beginning of my presentation, I will not be passing any value judgment. I think that the speed of debt-reduction has been reduced. Our exports have increased, although the report of this quarter fails to live up to the standard created by previous reports. It is important for us to address the basic issues. Debt is not the only issue here. We can be a very weak country even at zero level debt or at higher levels of debt. I think we have improved our overall image, for example regarding terrorism, etc. As regards Basmati anti-dumping, let me clarify that anti-dumping against us has not been levied

against basmati, but against bed-linen. Anti-dumping is a technical process. We were able to extend our deadlines but we have not been able to meet these new deadlines either.

It is difficult to monitor and quantify the statistical results. Also, it is difficult to measure the role of our policies in the results achieved. The foreign affairs committee and our missions abroad have to play an important role regarding the foreign policy process. Pakistan has to respond to the needs for regional trade as opposed to international trade.

We need to evaluate the trade scenario and determine which countries will prove to be beneficial for us as trade partners.

We are assigning a very high priority to economic coordination issues presently. We should have a full-fledged director in the ministry, who should be assisted by two or more assistants so that coordination takes place effectively and professionally. We are trying to contribute positively to economic coordination. We are creating institutional linkages with other institutions. You cannot exclude the ministry of foreign affairs from the decision-making process. International trade is very open to everything that helps certain countries, but whenever we talk of agriculture or skilled manpower, they are not willing to discuss it.

Graduates and certificate holders from Pakistan are not recognised in other countries and this creates a problem when we think of exporting skilled manpower.

In answer to another question, you cannot make policies unless you have good input and data which is analysed by qualified people.

Comments by Session Chair

Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Former Federal Minister
for Foreign Affairs & Finance

Mr. Aziz thanked the speaker and the input of the participants on the issue.

He said that the issues discussed in this session related to several committees and discussion on this will be welcomed in the Parliament. He said that people in the foreign affairs recognise that the quality of manpower is not up to the mark because the recruitment is not based on merit. Similarly, in the ministry of foreign affairs, there is a need to train a large cadre of such people who will not leave after gaining their experience. India follows this policy rigorously. He said that there is an urgent need for better specialisation and more training. For this purpose the private sector must also be involved in this process. In the end he suggested that a large number of working groups of professionals and experts can be set up for these specialised subjects for the particular use of different ministries.

Session 8

Executive Summary

Session 8 was the last session of the short course and focused on the Appraisal of Pakistan's Foreign Policy. The session was moderated by Mr. Abdul Sattar, Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan. Appraisal of the policy was presented in a panel discussion by the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon, the British High Commissioner to Pakistan H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant and the Political Counselor US Embassy in Pakistan, Mr. Larry Robinson.

The panel of speakers analysed various aspects of Pakistan's foreign Policy with special emphasis on its relations towards India. Views of the three speakers carried a consensus that Pakistan needed to formulate its foreign policy through an improved and politically inclusive process to reflect multi-partisan support and internal dynamics. Moreover, their views echoed that Pakistan's policy needed an independent prism free of its India-centric approach.

The panel also answered questions of the participating parliamentarians that mainly related to various aspects of emerging détente between Pakistan and India relations and the pros and cons of the pre-emptive posture of the current US policy towards countering terrorism.

**Comments by
Session Moderator**

Mr. Abdul Sattar
Former Foreign Minister

In his opening statement, Mr. Abdul Sattar emphasised that the purpose of the short course organised by PILDAT has been to provide cutting edge training on foreign policy process for all participants. For the benefit of the panel of speakers, Mr. Sattar summed-up the three-day proceedings of the short course highlighting that in depth discussions on various aspects of the foreign policy have taken place over the period of these days which would benefit all the participants. The course has helped the opening and analysis of a lot of closed chapters for the benefit of parliamentarians, he added.

Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal

H. E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon
Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan



Mr. Shivshankar Menon thanked PILDAT for inviting him to speak at the short course commenting that the very fact that an Indian High Commissioner is invited to address Parliamentarians to give his appraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy indicates a welcome change and a spring time that the relationship between Pakistan and India is experiencing. He said that the topic made him think that how does one appraise another country's foreign policy. It would be easy to say that a foreign policy is good if it coincides with one's views and wishes, and bad if it does not. This is what many newspaper columnists do, he quipped. But on a serious note, foreign policy is judged by its goals and a broader set of objective criteria, he added, as at the most general level, all states seek the twin-linked goals of security and prosperity. Presumably, the goals a country sets for its own foreign policy should contribute to its security and prosperity, he said.

He believed that to answer the question of whether Pakistan's foreign policy has contributed to Pakistan's security and prosperity, Pakistanis themselves are the best judges of that. He believed that he does not consider himself qualified to answer that question as his view would reflect India's perspective of Pakistan's foreign policy.

Mr. Menon opined that as far as Pakistan's security is concerned, if Pakistan is today less secure than before, it is hardly due to its foreign policy alone. He said that we live in an increasingly dangerous world. "Unless you

posit eternally hostile neighbours for Pakistan, which for obvious reasons I do not, Pakistan has several locational and other advantages which could help her to achieve relative security in a web of cooperative political relations in her neighbourhood,” he added. Pakistan is a natural link between Southern Asia and Central Asia and with West Asia. He said that the question that arises is that whether Pakistan's Afghan and India policies leveraged those benefits to Pakistan's advantage. Most Indians find it hard to understand Pakistan's past support to the Taliban and obsession with Jammu and Kashmir. A single point or limited foreign policy goal may make for operational simplicity and therefore for some tactical advantage, but it is strategically limiting, he believed.

As for the second goal of prosperity, all South Asians have been guilty, to differing degrees, of missing out on the stimulating effects of regional integration and cooperation, he said. “Putting politics first has hurt our economies,” he said, but despite that it seems we are capable of learning from experience. During the 1990s, economic link and integration of the rest of south Asia increased exponentially. The exception to the regional trend was Pakistan, whose degree of integration with the region actually diminished. In the 1990s, India-Pakistan trade remained stagnant while India's trade was approximately 30% of total trade within SAARC. However, a decade later, though total trade between SAARC countries had increased 2.7 times, trade between India and Pakistan had not increased appreciably, he explained. “Nor have we managed to leverage Pakistan's position as the link between energy sources in central and west Asia and the growing demand in south Asia into long-term arrangements to mutual benefit,” adding that he hoped this mistake will not be repeated in this century.

In conclusion, he said that while he was not able to give a clear yes or no answer to evaluate the success of Pakistan's foreign policy, nonetheless he drew two lessons from the experience. Firstly, foreign policy is too often blamed for the results of internal and other actions and choices. He had often heard Pakistani friends bemoan Pakistan's image in the world as extremist and fundamentalist but “any foreign policy is only as good as the polity it represents,” he added.

Secondly, he expressed that even in democratic societies,

foreign policy formulation is often neglected, and left to a small group who think they know best. Foreign policy is one case where process actually affects substance and the wider and more democratic the process of policy formulation, the better it is eventually. Otherwise, there is a risk that people's wishes and expectations diverge widely from the regime's foreign policy.

Mr. Menon praised that Pakistan is fortunate to have diplomats and officials of the highest international calibre that Pakistan can choose to utilise to the best advantage. However, “The setting of foreign policy goals cannot be left just to the professionals, no matter how good, since policy decisions are essentially political choices, best made by parliamentarians like you,” he concluded.

Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal

H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant
British High Commissioner to Pakistan



Mr. Grant thanked PILDAT for inviting him to share his views with the group of participating parliamentarians. He believed that foreign policy of a country is a function of its internal dynamics including economic power, political consensus and internal challenges faced by it. He believed that one cannot be separated from the other and the UK experience has also been the same that the foreign policy challenges it faces are a direct reflection of internal challenges faced by the British society. As a simple manifestation of that, he explained, the British High Commission in Islamabad has 10 different British Government departments represented here as its is not just a foreign office embassy but a British Government High Commission. Likewise, he believed, the influence and power projection reflects the internal dynamics of a country.

Looking at Pakistan's foreign policy from this perspective, Mr. Grant said that there are certain inherent advantages of Pakistan in terms of its foreign policy included its geo-strategic position and size; nuclear capability and its professional arms forces.

However, Pakistan's vision shows an inconsistency as to what kind of country Pakistan wants to be and what are its policies and position in the global context, he said. This inconsistency, he added, is just not specific to Pakistan; rather this is an ongoing debate in Britain as

well. No individual or nation has a perfect, clear vision of its destination but this is a debate that needs to be discussed by all sections of the society.

To him, the second issue Pakistan faces is the lack of political consensus and democracy. In Britain, he said, it is a tradition that foreign policy is bi-partisan, which means that when the Leader of the Opposition goes overseas, he does not criticise Britain's foreign policy even though he may be fundamentally opposed to certain aspects of it, as otherwise, it weakens the country's influence overseas. The stronger the democratic political base of a policy, stronger the influence Pakistan will have overseas, he commented.

The third area, he said is economics. He quipped that the US is the most influential country in its foreign policy terms not because of its diplomats, or because of the quality of its foreign policy, but because it is economically the most powerful country. A country has to be economically strong in order to have international influence. Pakistan has to be economically strong and its international influence will increase directly in proportion to the strength of its economy.

Fourthly, he believed that coherence and consistency are important factors in foreign policy in terms of the decision-making process behind it. He believed that the UK is a better example than the US in terms of co-ordination of policies between different agencies and stakeholders. There needs to be input from the Parliament, the civil society, academia and the security agencies in formulating foreign policy. He said he was not fully convinced if this fully reflects the situation in Pakistan, where there are a number of different, possibly not competing but certainly not entirely coordinated, poles of foreign policy with the presidency, the Army, the intelligence agencies, the ministry of foreign affairs and now the National Security Council. Coordination is important so that different signals are not sent overseas that weaken the country's stance abroad.


Mr. Grant said that another important issue is of the image as Pakistan has certainly suffered from a poor image. That image is gradually being repaired but can more be done to tackle that, he questioned. He said he was not sure if the internal policy makers thought that

repairing Pakistan's image is made as a sufficiently high priority for embassies overseas. He believed that this issue could be tackled with more vigour and priority through using cultural manifestations, supporting links through government-sponsored visits by bringing influential opinion-formers such as journalists and travel agents, etc., to Pakistan to see the country for what it is. He said that he was always struck by the visitors from UK who come to Pakistan and they go away with a very different image than what they came with, adding that Pakistan needed to capitalise on this direct contact with the society which bridges the huge gap that is there about Pakistan in its image abroad and the reality on the ground.

In the end, he emphasised that there are five constant foreign policy priorities for any country: neighbours; trade and investment partners and donor partners for developing countries; international institutions; major World powers and the like-minded countries. Pakistan needs to focus on these priorities, he believed. The neighbours are absolutely vital and he said that he was surprised at the lack of coordination in the sub-continent which has been hugely damaging for Pakistan, more so than it has been for India. India-Pakistan used to be 60 per cent in the 1950s and is now less than 1 ½ per cent in Pakistan's trade. The fact that regional organisations in Africa are more powerful than the SAARC is really surprising, he added. Seen from the British Government's perspective, we see Pakistan's interest very strongly in de-hyphenating itself from India politically but re-hyphenating itself with India economically, he emphasised. He said that too much of Pakistan's foreign policy is seen through the prism of India: even Pakistan's Afghanistan and Iran policies are seen through the prism of India which is not right, he opined. It gives a distorted backdrop to the formulation of foreign policy and leads to a lack of self-worth. The fact that Pakistan is one of the 7th or the 8th largest countries of the world, does not come out self-evidently from the confidence of the political establishment and the foreign policy establishment as the country is constantly comparing itself with India which is second largest country with the world, he said.

Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal

Mr. Larry Robinson
Political Counselor,
US Embassy



Mr. Robinson said that he brought greetings from the US Ambassador Nancy Powell who had some long-standing engagements and he was representing her.

Endorsing the earlier views on Pakistan's foreign policy presented by the two high commissioners, Mr. Larry Robinson said that the process of emerging from colonial rule brings with it some baggage which the US also experienced for well over a hundred years after its independence from the British. He said he witnessed this in Ireland as well. His analysis of the countries which have been under colonial rule led him to believe that all such countries have a tendency to blame their problems on colonisation. Similarly, he believed, the trauma of colonialism and trauma of partition continues to play a part in the mindset of Pakistan and India. Reiterating what Ambassador Grant earlier said, he said that Pakistan has tremendous economic potential, human resources and military power and it should not constantly compare itself to India and feel small or inferior, believed Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Robinson said that in looking at the overall foreign policy of Pakistan, he sees very significant strengths and significant but remediable weaknesses. Agreeing with the earlier remarks of the two high commissioners on the quality of Pakistani diplomats, he said he has been tremendously impressed with the quality of diplomats he has interacted with over the last five years. He believed that the co-ordination of Pakistan's policy within the government is also good, but it leaves much to be desired in terms of its coordination with the Parliament. The single-mindedness and focus of Pakistan's foreign policy over the past few decades has been very impressive, yet in a broader sense, dysfunctional, he added.

Agreeing with the British High Commissioner, he said that Pakistan's foreign policy has been too indo-centric in nature which is an inhibition similar to that the Republic of Ireland had for many years thinking of itself smaller and inferior compared to its larger neighbour UK. Today, he said Ireland, has a higher per-capita income than the UK. He believed that despite the strained relations between US and the USSR during the cold war period, both countries had channels of communication intact between them but the hostility between Pakistan and India has resulted in the absence of communication over the past few decades which is debilitating.

Another aspect of post-colonial experience, applying to both India and Pakistan, is that while the two countries have excellent diplomats, the foreign services of the two countries, and Indian Administrative Services, look like a carry-over from the days of the British Raj in terms of very small number of administrators supervising a vast bureaucracy largely out of the loop of policy. He said that he was astonished by the small size of the foreign services of the two countries which need to be expanded by both the countries to play the role they aspire to play in the world. Every country rewards its diplomats for different qualities and it seemed that both Pakistan and India have been rewarding those diplomats who were most effective in denouncing the other, he said, adding that such a perspective works only if perpetual hostility is the ultimate objective in the relationship of the two countries.

Mr. Robinson believed that Pakistan needs a better

coordinated decision-making process whereby input of different agents of the political structure are sought and incorporated into policies.

Looking at the history of Pakistan-US relations, he said that the two countries have often enjoyed quite intimate, but never very easy relations. In the time of a crisis, Pakistan and US subordinated areas of disagreements to over-arching strategic exigency and when the crisis passed, the differences tended to always bubble-up. This created the perception in Pakistan that US always used Pakistan and then walked away, but the US saw it differently; as it always saw Pakistan doing a number of things that were thought to be unfortunate and bad decisions on the part of Pakistani governments. On a personal basis, he believed, US and Pakistani officials have always gotten along well and have had easier and more comfortable relations than those that US officials enjoyed with their Indian counterparts. But on an official level, the unfortunate syndrome developed in which US asked Pakistan that it would only be able to help Pakistan if it could assure US that it was not doing A, B or C. "Overtime, successive Pakistani governments have learnt that if they provided those assurances, whether or not the assurances were accurate, that they would get whatever they wanted or needed from the US," he added. The two countries need to work to develop a more, open, honest and candid relationship with each other overtime to overcome the unfortunate baggage of the past, believed Mr. Robinson.

Discussing the issue of US relations with Pakistan and India, he said that the current US administration has a very strong policy of de-hyphenating US relations with India and Pakistan. US will pursue each relationship on its own terms and merits while continuing to encourage India and Pakistan to find ways to normalise and improve their relations with each other. However, he added, US has a problem in doing this with Pakistan because of the confusion in Pakistan on as it is today and with where it is going. There is a perceptual lag in the US, reflected in the US and the British Media, of people in the West not appreciating how much Pakistan has changed over the past several years, he said. Agreeing with the British High Commission's viewpoint expressed earlier, he believed that there was a need in Pakistan both for the foreign office and the legislators, not just in terms of a public

relations exercise, but to explain to Western Media and Western legislatures how far Pakistan has come, what are the policies of its government and where does Pakistan see itself going. Whether or not Pakistan can achieve non-partisanship of its foreign policy overseas, as the United States is still grappling with this, he quipped, any time a legislator goes overseas, he or she represents the country of Pakistan as well as a political party; but there is a stronger need in the West to understand the country of Pakistan than the party a legislator represents, he advised.

Upon conclusion, he said that that the sense of what Pakistan is and what it wants to be is the source of all government policy. He said he watched with great fascination the debate going on within Parliament and the country on what Pakistan aims to be. He said it was necessary for Pakistan to continue this debate and come-up with best possible consensus from which it can derive the coherent and consistent policies that could best impress the world of what Pakistan is and can be.



Q&A / Comments Session

Question

Ms. Fauzia Wahab

MNA (NA-311, Women Sindh-IV, PPPP)

We have noticed from 1958 onwards that the US has been very supportive of non-democratic forces in Pakistan. It has been more supportive of the military rulers in Pakistan as compared to the political leadership. It is for this reason that we should put the blame of our current mess on the shoulders of the US.

Answer

Mr. Larry Robinson

Political Counselor, US Embassy

I have observed this myself and it seems that our overall relations with Pakistan do seem to have been better with military rulers than democratic governments. But this is not because US supports and approves of dictatorships. Our relations with Pakistan have been up and down over the decades. We lost interest in South Asia in the 1950s. However, we re-engaged in the 1960s. Then again we had poor relations with Pakistan in the late 1970s at the time of the military takeover but that was overwhelmed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. When the occupation ended, all the problems resurfaced. It is for

this reason that we had poor relationships with the democratic governments. Then again due to Kargil war and nuclear tests we were forced to re-engage with India and Pakistan. Coming to the present times, our relations with President Musharraf in the beginning were not good but due to changing circumstances and war on terror things changed. We have good relations with Pakistan not because its lead by a military ruler but in spite of that. Our top priority is to counter terrorism. Relations with military rules are a result of global imperatives.

Question

Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi

MNA (NA-244, Karachi-VI, MQM)

Under this new vision of Pakistan-India relations, the core issues of the well being of the common man are still uncertain. What is the real truth behind this new emerging relationship between India and Pakistan? What is happening on the Khokhrapar Monabao border?

Answer

H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

I feel that people should benefit from improved relations

between the two countries. On Khokhrapar Monabao border issue, it is a logistical difficulty. Each side will do what it has to. We have to build the roads and that will take time. We need to look at what we achieved in the last one year. We need to learn to work with each other, rather than blame each other.

Comment

Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi

MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)
Former Federal Minister

I'm somewhat disappointed to hear that the sole-superpower does not have a clear-cut policy vis-à-vis Pakistan. That the US foreign policy is dependent on international events that either force the U.S. to engage with Pakistan or distract US away from Pakistan.

I have also been asked to convey a feeling of my colleagues on their behalf. First of all, on behalf of my colleagues, I really appreciate the presence of High Commissioner Grant and High Commissioner Menon. But I would also like to highlight the disappointment we all share for the US Ambassador not being here. She is a good friend of ours and of our country and we feel her presence would have been very useful on this forum. We would like Mr. Robinson to convey this to her.

Answer

Mr. Larry Robinson

Political Counselor, US Embassy

I will be happy to convey that to Ambassador Powell and again express her regrets for not being able to be here today.

Question

Ms. Aasiya Azeem

MNA (NA-285, Women Punjab-XIII, PML)

Why is the dialogue between the governments of India and Pakistan so slow and not clear? Secondly, is the Chenab formula still under consideration?

Answer

H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

Within a month or so we will have a road map of the meetings between the two countries. As far as the Chenab issue is concerned, it is too early to comment on which formula will be considered and which will not be considered.

Question

Mr. Farid Ahmad Piracha

MNA (NA-121, Lahore-IV, MMAP)

My question is to H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant. Do you agree with the doctrine of pre-emption which is the cornerstone of US present foreign policy and do you justify this pre-emption under any jurisprudence of human rights? Secondly, to Mr. Shivshankar Menon, as Kashmir is a core issue, without solving the Kashmir issue how can we achieve peace between India and Pakistan?

Answer

H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant

British High Commissioner to Pakistan

There has been a change in international jurisprudence over sovereignty. The world has become a lot more inter-dependent in the recent times. We have realised the weaknesses of the old concept of sovereignty and one of its examples is Rwanda. You can argue about whether coalition in Iraq or coalition in Afghanistan is legitimate or illegitimate but as a British government we argue that those actions were justified. Afghanistan is a classic case where Taliban government was nurturing and supporting Al-Qaeda which is a terrorist movement and was threatening the interests of many countries, particularly America.

Answer

H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

We have not really addressed the issue of Kashmir properly. We are now committed to talking about the Kashmir issue and resolving it. The process of communication has to continue. It is important that the

Kashmiri people are satisfied with the decisions that are ultimately taken.

Question

Ms. Sherry Rehman

MNA (NA-309, Women Sindh-II, PPPP)

My first question is addressed to Mr. Mark Lyall Grant. The image of Pakistan is also a production of the western media. They always focus on the negative and never on the positive indicators emerging out of Pakistan. Secondly I would like to address Mr. Menon. Pakistan is now becoming India-centric in a more positive manner. We need to go beyond trade, travel and cricket in order to resolve serious issues between the two countries. My question is that is the peace process sustainable? With the elections in India, there may be a derailment of the peace process. Do you sense a consensus across the political divide in India regarding the commitment to the peace process? Kashmir is an issue and needs to be dealt with. Do you see a breakthrough on that front in the next year or so? Lastly, do you see the Huriyat Conference in Kashmir reuniting and emerging?

Answer

H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant

British High Commissioner to Pakistan

I agree about the media projecting a certain image of Pakistan. We need to use diaspora to project a positive image of Pakistan. High Commissioners and diplomats can also influence a country's image. The foreign policy machinery can invite influential journalists to improve the image of Pakistan.

Answer

H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

Yes the peace process is sustainable. The Indian elections will not affect this process. There is a consensus on this across the spectrum. Indians have more direct economic concerns. India's priorities have changed over the last decade. The people realise that there are economic benefits to peace in the region. We cannot set any time tables for the issue to resolve until we start engaging.

Question

Mr. Omar Ayub Khan

MNA (NA-19, Haripur, PML)

The draft of the Agra Summit was developed by the Foreign Service but the Prime Minister of India said that it was not the right time. Does the Prime Minister of India have the force to tip the balance on one side, so that some sort of the settlement can be reached?

Answer

H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

The Indian Prime Minister enjoys a popular mandate in the country, so he will have the mandate to reach peace with Pakistan. In our country, popular mandate is the most powerful force to reach on decisions.

Question

Syed Naveed Qamar

MNA (NA-222, Hyderabad-V, PPPP)

What is the benchmark by which the Indian public and the government see a solution of the Kashmir Issue? What solution will be satisfactory for the Indians?

Answer

H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

I cannot go through the solutions on this platform. However, our goal is a peaceful and durable relationship with Pakistan and that is the benchmark. We do not need a very rigid definition. We need to take responsibility for what we need to do. We need to give this whole process an environment where the process has a chance to succeed. People in India want peace and interaction with the Pakistani's. They share a lot of common factors which is clear from the fact that in most Indian cities, you can see Pakistani channels.

Question

Mr. Ishaq Khan Khakwani

MNA (NA-168, Vehari-II, PML)

It is unfortunate that external forces have to come and

help us resolve our issues. We must do it ourselves. Could you explain the response of New Delhi on the non-NATO alignment of Pakistan? Why was the reaction so negative?

Answer

H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

I do not know why you describe it as hostile. I will send you a copy of what was actually said. I can understand Larry feeling peeved about it because basically what was said was why didn't you [US] tell us [India] two days ago when you were here. Frankly what Pakistan does with the US is Pakistan's business and the US' business. The media perhaps exaggerated the whole reaction. You see I feel we should be talking about these issues. We have almost no communication. It is lack of communication that really is the source of the trouble. At the moment we take every opinion written in Indian media to be the Indian opinion and what's written in Pakistan as the Pakistani opinion. The Indian reaction was not terribly hostile.

Comment

Mian Shamim Haider

MNA (NA-135, Sheikhpura-V, PML)

Pakistan has done a lot to eradicate terrorism. We believe that Pakistan is going to be a moderate state. However terrorism can not be eliminated unless you remove its roots. I believe that the governments of UK and US have to play their role in order to remove this causes and roles.

Comment

Makhdum Khusro Bakhtyar

MNA (NA-194, R.Y.Khan-III, PML)

I would like Mr. Menon to reiterate that there is a realistic possibility that a time frame for the resolution of all outstanding issues including the issue of Kashmir will be formulated when the foreign ministers or secretaries meet in June-July 2004 so that the fear and suspicions on both sides are eliminated that both sides would not wait for a more opportune time vis-à-vis their bitter bargain positions. So a time frame should be set in the near future as this will create a better atmosphere.

Question

Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi

MNA (NA-148, Multan-I, PPPP)

Former Federal Minister

Does the government of India know that there is a huge constituency for peace in Pakistan? If there is no movement in talks, this constituency will be put at a disadvantageous position? Moreover, is there a realisation in the US that the gap between the people of Pakistan and the Government of Pakistan regarding the US is widening? Are you doing something to bridge this gap?

Answer

H.E. Mr. Mark Lyall Grant

British High Commissioner to Pakistan

I have been asked questions on terrorism and I think that no cause can justify killing innocent people. We as part of the international community have to take responsibility to deal with the roots of terrorism. It is very easy to fall into the culture of victimisation. It is important not to fall into this trap. It is inequality and injustice that cause terrorism.

Answer

H.E. Mr. Shivshankar Menon

Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

Regarding nuclear talks, we are ready to discuss these issues with the government of Pakistan. Furthermore, the government of India realises that there is a constituency for peace. We will work with that constituency in India as well as in Pakistan.

Answer

Mr. Larry Robinson

Political Counselor, US Embassy

The widening gap between people and the government of US is visible but I see that gap only in the media and the Islamabad elite. It is not really present in the rest of the country. Yes, I agree that there is dissatisfaction regarding US policy yet there is friendliness towards Americans. The opinion polls do not reflect a gap between the people and the government. As far as the role of the media is concerned, in most countries there is a media

conventional wisdom that is resistant to change. We encourage the media to report positive things.

Comment**Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua**

Security Analyst

Pakistan's India-centricity is definitely a problem. There is a concern here that a stronger India is a threat to Pakistan's survival.

Comment**Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin**

Visiting Prof. LUMS

President Bush has legitimised six Israeli settlements and in the process damaged the road map to peace. Moreover, the British government hailed this decision. Why do these governments suffer from internal contradictions? You want to eradicate terrorism, yet promote injustice.

Answer**Mr. Larry Robinson**

Political Counselor, US Embassy

The Israelis have for the first time decided to withdraw from the Gaza settlements. History is replete with actions that are unjust but have to be dealt with. We have to deal with reality, rather than deal with ideal solutions. For the first time ever, we have accepted and endorsed the concept of an independent Palestine State.

Comments**Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali**

Former Foreign Minister


I am very happy that our distinguished panellists in this session responded to questions exactly as I had expected. I noted with great interest their remarks and their observations. May I also add here that some very good relations and traditions have been established. One of these traditions is that the High Commissioner from Delhi becomes the foreign secretary in Islamabad and the High Commissioner from Islamabad becomes the foreign secretary in Delhi. This is all very wonderful and I wish the same could be said about the foreign ministers. What

I noticed was that there is a visible change in Delhi as regards to their attitude towards Pakistani delegates. We have come a long way in promoting enough political will in Delhi and Islamabad driving towards peace. President General Pervez Musharraf has shown a political wisdom as well as political will in moving forward. As soon as there was some normalisation of relations, the civil society of India and Pakistan has suddenly seen the value of peace in South Asia. One only hopes for this goodwill to stay on. I feel Pakistan has fulfilled its part of commitment of not supporting terrorism. I know there are no quick solutions but the two negotiating sides need to continue with the peace initiative.

The US' current policy of pre-emption is not only coming for Pakistan but towards the rest of the world as well and I am sure diplomats from the State Department have had many sleepless nights in explaining some of the policies of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair. But we do hope for better relations with United States of America whom we definitely admire. With Britain too, we do not have any kind of animosity. We are anglophiles and we have had a very good relationship with Britain. I thank all three of you to be here on behalf of the group of parliamentarians.

Synthesis of the Session

Senator S. M. Zafar
Chairman Senate Functional
Committee on Human Rights
and Chairman PILDAT
Board of Advisors



I share with Mr. Abdul Sattar the thanks he has given to the three illustrious speakers. These three diplomats represent three very important countries that have great significance for Pakistan: we have had one or the other type of either intimate or uncomfortable or comfortable and intimate relationship with these countries. All three speakers have shared with us their appraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy and we have seen and learnt that how a diplomat can convey a lot without saying much on an issue. In a matter of summary, what I'm carrying with me from their speeches are the following points.

Firstly, it was said that every country's foreign policy is as good as its domestic policy. Secondly, foreign policy is a result of the internal dynamics including its economic strength. Thirdly, foreign policy is generally seen as a bi-

partisan issue, meaning thereby that we have to develop our foreign policy through national consensus as it helps in creating its impact abroad. Fourthly, input from civil society on the national policy has to be institutionalised. Fifthly, in the candid appraisal, an Indian focus was considered the drawbacks of Pakistan's foreign policy. Perhaps it is true and the Q&A session indicated that had Kashmir issue not been there, maybe Pakistan's policy would not have been India-focused. It was also said that Pakistan has not settled for itself the role that it has to play in the world. It was also said that USA has been unjustifiably accused for having dropped Pakistan when the interest of America has been served.

It was also mentioned that the US has decided to get itself engaged with India and Pakistan in a manner that it has not done before. It was also said that USA intends to have a more open honest, workable and sustainable relationship with Pakistan. We thought it was like always but it is good to hear that this stance is there in the US now. Also gratifying was to hear that the solution of Kashmir issue is and will be on the negotiation table. We hope that the peace card in India in the hands of BJP government makes the party win the election.

Another important point was raised by the High Commissioner of UK about the doctrine of pre-emption and dilution of international sovereignty. Although he has left and I will privately also share this with him later, I would like to state that as a Pakistani citizen, I feel that the pre-emptive doctrine has made the world a much more dangerous and uncomfortable place. We believe if the US and the UK revises their policy keeping in view what Europe has to say on the issue, it will be far closer to what humanity can benefit from.

It has been good to hear all these comments. It was very pleasing that all three speakers have very profusely praised our foreign office boys. I am sure that Mr. Sattar must be very happy to have heard that. I would now present my perspective on some of the foreign policy areas that I believe, as a citizen of Pakistan, we have to offer.

Firstly, I believe that Pakistan's foreign policy has followed some constants since the independence of the country. Pakistan has shown consistency in friendship with Saudi

Arabia and siding with Muslim causes since its independence which clearly shows its steadfast approach in foreign policy. The same approach has been shown in our relationship with China. I was hoping some reference will be made to this particularly from our representative from the US as we have been instrumental in bridging the gap between China and the US at a very crucial juncture of history. Pakistan also constantly followed a close relationship with the US. Pakistan has also been steadfast in its desire and attempt to resolve the issue of Kashmir. I am happy to say that no government in Pakistan has ever staggered on this issue.

As was mentioned that a good foreign policy must look at two points: prosperity and security of a country. Pakistan has unfortunately been feeling insecurity from its neighbour. On account of that it adopted a policy by which it can secure itself. One of the reasons to be pro-US was due to that.

Lastly, an important point raised here was of the image of Pakistan. I would like to say that if any other country other than Pakistan kept 3 million refugees in such comfort as Pakistan did, allowing them to move anywhere, that country's image would have been soaring high internationally. Also the facts that Pakistan acted as a bridge between China and US and now it is an ally against terrorism; it is a moderate Muslim state, with constant evidences of the strong commitment of its people to democracy serve as good example of improving its image abroad.

PILDAT, through successfully holding this short course, has maintained its standard of excellence in conceiving and implementing a stimulating learning and experience-sharing exercise for legislative strengthening through getting the right speakers and participants. I sincerely thank the speakers and am grateful to all participants for their invaluable interaction on such a crucial issue. I am sure every one of the participants and the speakers joins me in conveying my special thanks to the PILDAT team that worked behind the scenes to make this course a success in every aspect. Of course, our special thanks and accolades are due for the moving spirit behind PILDAT and all its work, Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob under whose management the team excels in its drive towards strengthening democracy in the country.

**Comments by
Session Moderator**

Mr. Abdul Sattar
Former Foreign Minister

Upon conclusion of the Q&A/Comments Session, Mr. Abdul Sattar once again thanked the panel of distinguished speakers on behalf of PILDAT as well as the participating parliamentarians for their time and a valuable interaction with parliamentarians.

He especially thanked participating parliamentarians for bringing insight into the task that confronts them to contribute in the foreign policy process. He said that the dialogue has been largely convergent which is a very positive sign.

Praising the role of PILDAT as the initiator, organiser and the facilitator of this short course, Mr. Sattar said that it was an invaluable effort to provide such a platform where so many well-learned and competent people were present to discuss Pakistan's foreign Policy process.

Concluding Remarks

Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob
Executive Director, PILDAT

At the end of the three day short course on the Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan, Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob thanked all speakers and resource persons and participating parliamentarians for their keen interest, active interaction and participation that made the short course a success.

Mr. Mehboob, joined by the group of participants and the resource persons, also praised the efforts of the PILDAT team that worked towards the conceptualisation, organisation and effective facilitation of the short course.

APPENDIX A
Programme of
the Short Course

PROGRAMME

	Title	Time	Speaker
Monday April 12, 2004	Registration of Participants	06:00 - 07:00 pm	
	Welcome remarks and Introduction of the Resource Persons	07:00 - 07:15 pm	Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob Executive Director, PILDAT
	Introduction of the Participants	07:30 - 08:15 pm	By each participant
	Dinner	08:15 - 09:15 pm	
	Special Session How security Considerations Influence Foreign Policy in Pakistan?	09:15 - 09: 45 pm	Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Javed Ashraf Qazi Former DG ISI
	Q&A/ Comments	09:45 - 10:30 pm	
Tuesday April 13, 2004	Session No 1 An Over-view of Pakistan's Foreign Policy	10:00 - 10:45 am	Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi Defence & Political Analyst
	Session Chair: Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali Former Foreign Minister		
	Q&A/ Comments	10:45 - 11:35 am	
	Comments by Session Chair	11:35 - 11:45 am	
	Session No 2 Major Foreign Policy Issues facing the country	11:45 - 12: 15 pm	Mr. Khurshed Mahmud Kasuri Foreign Minister of Pakistan
Q&A/ Comments	12:15 - 01:30 pm		
Lunch & Prayer Break	01:30 - 02:00 pm		
	Session No 3 The Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan		
	Session Chair: Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh Former Foreign Secretary		
	Presentation on the Process of Foreign Policy Formulation	02:00 - 02:10 pm	Mr. Javid Husain Former Ambassador

PROGRAMME

	Title	Time	Speaker
Tuesday April 13, 2004	How Foreign Policy is made in Pakistan	02:10 - 02:40 pm	Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani Add. Sec. Foreign Policy Planning Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	How Foreign Policy should be made in Pakistan	02:40 - 03:10 pm	Mr. Sartaj Aziz Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs & Finance
	Q&A/ Comments	03:10 - 04:10 pm	
	Comments by Session Chair	04:10 - 04:20 pm	
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	Session No 4: How security Considerations Influence Foreign Policy in Pakistan?		
	Session Chair: Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi Defence & Political Analyst		
	Role of Security Agencies in influencing Foreign Policy in Pakistan and How this practice compares with other countries' practices?	04:20 - 04: 50 pm	Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir Former Vice President IPRI
		04:50 - 05:20 pm	Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh Former Foreign Secretary
	Q&A/ Comments	05:20 - 06:00 pm	
	Comments by Session Chair	06:00 - 06:10 pm	
	Dinner & Entertainment	08:00 - 10:00 pm	
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Wednesday April 14, 2004	Session No 5: Shaping of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Three Case Studies		
	Session Chair: Dr. Ijaz Shafi Gillani Chairman Gallup, Pakistan		
	Case Studies on:		
	Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Comparisons of Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits	09:00 - 09:15 am	Mr. Abdul Sattar Former Foreign Minister
	Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Gulf Crisis-1990		Dr. Ayesha Siddiqua Security Analyst

PROGRAMME

	Title	Time	Speaker
Wednesday April 14, 2004	Pakistan's Foreign Policy: <i>Recognition of Taliban</i>	02:10 - 02:40 pm	Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin Visiting Prof. LUMS
	Panel Discussion: Mr. Sartaj Aziz Prof. Dr. Hasan-Askari Rizvi Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, MNA	09:45 - 10:45 am	
	Q&A/ Comments:	10:45 - 11:45 am	
	Comments by Session Chair	11:45 - 11:55 am	
	Lunch Break	11:55 - 01:30 pm	
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Session No 6: Parliament and Foreign Policy			
Session Chair: Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi MNA; Former Federal Minister			
	Review and analysis of Foreign Policy by the parliaments of US, UK, and India	01:30 - 01:50 pm	Prof. Dr. Tahir Amin Visiting Prof. LUMS
	Review and Analysis of Pakistan's Foreign Policy by the parliament	01:50 - 02:10 pm	Mian Abdul Waheed Former Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee of National Assembly
	Principle Determinants of Pakistan's foreign policy with Special reference to the role of Parliament	02:10 - 02:30 pm	Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali Former Foreign Minister
	Q&A/Comments	02:30 - 03:30 pm	
	Comments by Session Chair:	03:30 - 03:40 pm	
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Session No. 7			
	Economic Diplomacy and the Role of Foreign Office	03:40 - 04:10 pm	Dr. Asad M. Khan Director General Economic Coordination Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	Session Chair: Mr. Sartaj Aziz Former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs & Finance		

PROGRAMME

	Title	Time	Speaker
Wednesday April 14, 2004	Q&A/ Comments	04:10 - 04:50 pm	
	Comments by Session Chair	04:50 - 05:00 pm	
	Trekking and Tea at Golf Course	05:00 - 07:00 pm	
	Dinner & Entertainment	09:00 - 10:30 pm	
Thursday April 15, 2004	Session No. 8 Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Appraisal		
	Session Moderator Mr. Abdul Sattar Former Foreign Minister		
	Panel Discussion	10:00 - 11:00 am	Panelists: H. E Mr. Shivshankar Menon Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan H. E Mr. Mark Lyall Grant British High Commissioner to Pakistan Mr. Larry Robinson Political Counselor, US Embassy
	Q&A/ Comments	11:00 - 12:00 pm	
	Synthesis of the Session By Senator S. M. Zafar	12:00 - 12:10 pm	
	Comments by Session Moderator	12:10 - 12:20 pm	
	Concluding Remarks	12:20 - 12:30 pm	
	Lunch & End of Short Course	12:30 - 01:30 pm	

APPENDIX B
List of Participants

List of Participants

1	Aasiya Azeem, MNA	PML(Q)
2	Farhana Khalid Banoori, MNA	MMAP
3	Farid Ahmad Piracha, MNA	MMAP
4	Fauzia Wabab, MNA	PPPP
5	Ishaq Khan Khakwani, MNA	PML(Q)
6	Maimoona Hashmi, MNA	PML(N)
7	Makhdoom Ahmad Alam Anwar, MNA	PML(Q)
8	Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi, MNA	PPPP
9	Makhdoom Khusro Bakhtyar, MNA	PML(Q)
10	Mian Shamim Haider, MNA	PML(Q)
11	Naseer Mohammad Khan, Nazim Charsadda	
12	Omar Ayub Khan, MNA	PML(Q)
13	Qamar Zaman Kaira, MNA	PPPP
14	S. M. Zafar, Senator	PML(Q)
15	Sahibzada Mian Jalil Ahmed Sharaquri, MNA	PML(N)
16	Samia Raheel Qazi, MNA	MMAP
17	Sherry Rehman, MNA	PPPP
18	Syed Haider Abbas Rizvi, MNA	MQM
19	Syed Naveed Qamar, MNA	PPPP
20	Syed Nayyer Hussain Baukhari, MNA	PPPP

APPENDIX C
Presentation by
Mr. Ahmed Bilal Mehboob
Executive Director, PILDAT

Short Course on
**The Foreign Policy Process in
 Pakistan**

Welcome Remarks & Introduction

Short Course on Foreign Policy

Welcome!

- ◆ Very warm Welcome to Session Chairs, all Participants, Speakers & Guests
- ◆ Please Check out Contents of the Dossier
- ◆ 2 Briefing Papers and 3 Case Studies, including papers/presentations of Speakers
- ◆ Please fill Feedback Form at the end

Short Course on Foreign Policy

The Programme Overview

- ◆ This is not a seminar or a *Jalsa*; An organised & serious effort to learn
- ◆ Spanned over three-days, 7 Sessions of the Course cover:
 - Foreign Policy Issues
 - Overview of Pakistan's Foreign Policy: 1947 – 2004
 - Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan
 - Security considerations influencing Foreign Policy of Pakistan
 - Role of Parliament in Shaping & Reviewing Foreign Policy

Short Course on Foreign Policy

... The Programme Overview

- Case Studies on Gulf Crisis-1990; Recognition of Taliban and Lahore, Agra and Islamabad Summits
- Economic Diplomacy
- Appraisal of Pakistan's Foreign Policy towards US, UK and India

Short Course on Foreign Policy

Objectives

- ◆ Enhance awareness of Parliamentarians and politicians on the Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan
- ◆ Prepare parliamentarians and politicians to play an effective role in shaping, influencing and Reviewing Foreign Policy
- ◆ Strengthen the role of Foreign Affairs Committees

Short Course on Foreign Policy

Why we hold Workshops for Legislators?

- ◆ To empower legislators (Knowledge is power)
- ◆ To see Assembly Members participating in policy-making (Supremacy of Legislature)
- ◆ To see Democracy and Democratic Institutions strengthened in Pakistan

PILDAT
Pakistan Institute of
Legislative Development
And Transparency

Short Course on Foreign Policy

Who Funds PILDAT?

- ◆ Seed money by Overseas Pakistanis
- ◆ Pilot project funded by UNDP
- ◆ Seek and accept support from all sources without any covert or overt strings (Pure PILDAT Agenda)
- ◆ So far events are supported by UNDP, FNS, FES, DFID, The World Bank, IRI etc.
- ◆ Now many PILDAT events supported by USAID as a part of the PLSC

PILDAT
Pakistan Institute of
Legislative Development
And Transparency

Short Course on Foreign Policy

What is PILDAT?

- ◆ Independent, Non-profit, Research & Study institute
- ◆ Indigenous entity well-versed in local conditions
- ◆ Strictly Non-partisan: Values trust of all parties
- ◆ Dedicated to Parliamentary Strengthening
- ◆ Mission: Strengthening Democracy & Democratic Institutions for a better Pakistan
- ◆ PILDAT has also joined PLSC recently for SNPLC

PILDAT
Pakistan Institute of
Legislative Development
And Transparency

Short Course on Foreign Policy

What is PLSC?

- ◆ Consists of 2 International & 5 Pakistani Org.
- ◆ International Org: WV & IFES
- ◆ Pakistani Org:
- ◆ PILDAT: Legislative Training
- ◆ The Researchers: Heads CSAG & Sindh Chapter
- ◆ CCHD: Heads Punjab Chapter
- ◆ IRDO: Heads Balochistan Chapter
- ◆ AWARD: Heads NWFP Chapter

PILDAT
Pakistan Institute of
Legislative Development
And Transparency

Short Course on Foreign Policy

What is SNPLG Project?

- ◆ Strengthening National & Prov Legislative Gov
- ◆ Started 29th Sep 03, Duration: 3 Yrs
- ◆ Components:
- Legislative Training
- Civil Society Action
- Legislative Transparency
- Research & Media
- ◆ Supported by USAID

PILDAT
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Legislative Development
And Transparency

Short Course on Foreign Policy

Some Recent Activities of PILDAT

- ◆ Briefing Session on Water Issues
- ◆ Briefing Sessions on WTO, PRSP & SAFTA
- ◆ Workshop on Budget Process
- ◆ State of Democracy Report
- ◆ Workshops for MPAs: 3 tiers of Govt.
- ◆ Dialogue: First Year of increased women representation in legislatures

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Short Course on Foreign Policy

Near-future Activities

- ◆ Briefing on Poverty Reduction
- ◆ Briefing on Leadership Skills
- ◆ Workshop on effective committee system
- ◆ Orientation Workshops
- ◆ Budget Process Workshops
- ◆ Parliamentary Internship Programme
- ◆ Parliamentary Study Tours

APPENDIX D
Paper by
Senator Lt. Gen. (Retd.)
Javed Ashraf Qazi
Former DG ISI

How Security Considerations Influence the Formulation of Foreign Policy: The role of security agencies and how this practice compares with other countries' practices

by
Senator Lt. Gen. (R) Javed Ashraf Qazi

Introduction:

1. Nation states live and prosper within secure borders in accordance with their chosen ideologies/systems. The national security rests on a triad of defence, economy and internal security. The Government has to formulate a number of policies to achieve national security. These policies are:
 - a. **Foreign Policy:**
To win allies and friends. To support other Govt. policies and ensure their success to enhance national security.
 - b. **Economic Policy:**
To provide sound base for development and defence.
 - c. **Defence Policy:**
To ensure security of the state and ensure suitable environments for implementation of other policies.
 - d. **Psychosocial Policy:**
To ensure internal harmony and development.
 - e. **Information /Media Policy:**
To win mind and ensure successful projection of own policies.

Formulation of Foreign Policy:

2. Ministry of foreign affairs is primarily responsible for formulation of foreign policy options based on various factors and in accordance with changing environments/requirements. The cabinet approves a policy and the Ministry of foreign affairs then oversees its implementation.

A major impact into the formulation is provided by intelligence agencies primarily by ISI through various channels.

- a. Briefing to the cabinet.
- b. Regular reports to foreign office and interaction between various echelons of ISI and MOF both at home and abroad.
- c. Input at JSHQ, Defence Council and Defence Committee of the Cabinet.

Types of Information provided/inputs by intelligence into Foreign Policy

3. The intelligence is provided about all countries of interest whether friendly or hostile. Since there is no permanence

in relation between states, the only factor, which must dominate all considerations, is National Interest. Friends or Allies of today can be enemies of tomorrow and vice versa, therefore intelligence agencies have to acquire intelligence about all neighbors, allies and other countries of interest. It relates to a total picture along with current developments and future trends. Some aspects covered by intelligence are:

- a. Political system, personalities and historical perspective.
- b. Economic strength and future prospects.
- c. Defence policy, strength, weapon acquisition, and future plans.
- d. Relations with other states particularly with Pakistan and policies effecting our interests.
- e. Other aspects, which may help in formulation of own foreign policy. It includes actions, which may affect own internal situations.

4. Security Consideration Affecting Foreign Policy

- a. In an era of globalization and common market economies, the national security concerns transcend the geographical boundaries of a nation. The ensuing threats are not confined to military manifestation alone but present itself in a variety of nonmilitary fashions. The developed world's urge for greater improvement in social indices and quality of life has lead to intensive competition for shrinking resources. The resultant conflict of interests is therefore, likely to revolve around the energy resource centers. Various power centers around the globe, therefore, articulate their policies and forge regional global alliances to harvest optimum advantage amidst competing forces.
- b. In the post World War II environment, Europe became the center of gravity of politico-economic development in the world, which resulted in US-Soviet rivalry. The end of cold war brought in an illustrative change in the world order that remained in a flux owing to crystallization of US strategy, aimed at world domination as the single most powerful nation in the world. With the passage of time, the European polity and economy stabilized, resulting in emergence of stable and de-facto united Europe, which increasingly started challenging the US politico-economic policy precepts. Politico economic stabilization of Europe and emergence of Asia as the next politico-economic center of gravity however, resulted in US shift from being Euro-centric to Asia-centric. Long term US politico-economic concerns in Asia range from control over the world oil sources in the Middle East and Central Asia and their supply routes for sustenance of its economy to containment of the threat emerging from china and possibly resurgent Islam. With occupation of Iraq, presence in Afghanistan and other key places in Asia, the United States of America has become a de-facto regional power which enables her to attain full spectrum domination of the region.
- c. 9/11 terrorists' attacks have added new dimensions to the global threat paradigm. International community lined-up behind the US, with a resolve to route out terrorism, which is likely to haunt the global peace and stability in more diversified manners. While, the regional players will continue to support the US led campaign against terrorism, on the geo-political and geo-economic framework, they find themselves at cross-purpose with the US led nexus. The ensuing clash of interest therefore, is also likely to lead to a power struggle in this region to garner influence and for greater share in the resources.
- d. In this reinvigorated "Great Game", Pakistan has attained a new found relevance for the US and West. The

Western propensity for enhanced cooperation with India, due to the advantages of larger Indian market and US designs to project India as a countervailing factor against rising Chinese power is likely to adversely affect the conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan. This is a source of serious concern for us as Pakistan's threat paradigm essentially remains India-Centric in character. While capitalizing on the West's leanings, India also continues to benefit from its traditional defence collaboration with Russia. It is also taking advantage of the anti-Muslim Israeli sentiments, to improve its military skills by collaborating in training and acquisition of hi-tech equipment.

- e. Pakistan has enjoyed strong friendly relations with China. Pursuing her economic goals, China is looking for stable regional geo-political environment, and has therefore, removed a number of irritants with the regional countries, including India. Improvement of Sino-Indian relations notwithstanding, it assures Pakistan of its continued traditional friendship and cooperation.
- f. The geo-strategic location of Pakistan places it at the economic crossroads of Central Asia. The key factor in accruing the advantages presented by Central Asian economic opportunities lies in stable Afghanistan. This is where the Iranian politico-economic interests are at cross-purpose with Pakistan. Iran is also sensitive to the presence of Pakistani supported US led coalition in Afghanistan and feel that after Iraq they may be the next target of the US campaign. Taking advantage of such regional sensitivities, the Indians are exploiting the situation through emerging Russo-Iran-Northern Alliance-Indian nexus. Although, no direct threat is envisaged from the western border in short term, Indian meddling in Afghanistan, their presence in the Central Asian States, along with improved relations with Iran, may be viewed as endeavors aimed at de-factor encirclement of Pakistan
- g. In the prevailing global milieu of increasing inter-dependence and awareness of social ethos, the use of force for conflict resolution will often invoke International recrimination. Economic, diplomatic and political coercion will instead form part of the security calculus and are likely to be used more aggressively to achieve the stipulated objectives, short of war.

5. Factors Affecting Security Considerations And Foreign Policy In This Era

The emerging US dictated world order and its objectives

- a. Dilution of European politico-economic power base through a divided Europe.
- b. Physical domination of Asia in critical areas of politico-economic importance, and proxy support to neutralize emerging powers in other areas of significance.
- c. Garner and sustain the support of key coalition partners in various parts of the globe, in order to project its combined power in support of its interests through unilateralist pre-emption, while denying other these measures without US acquiescence.
- d. Through selective enforcement of international conventions and regimes on security and economic issues, dominate/manipulate UN to promote US interests.
- e. Link provision of economic, technological and military assistance to their acclaimed values of human rights, environment, religious tolerance, nuclear proliferation and defence expenditure etc.

- f. Integrate the world's geo-economic sustenance to the American economy,
- g. Link provision of economic, technological and military assistance to their acclaimed values of human rights, environment, religious tolerance, nuclear proliferation and defence expenditure etc.
- h. Integrate the world's geo-economic sustenance to the American economy, whereby any negative/positive growth impact of the US economy directly or indirectly effects the economic growth elsewhere in the world.

6. Preference To Geo-economics

Economy remains the major determinant of viability and power potential of a nation. Geo-economics is therefore, attaining dominance over geo-political alliances. In an era of globally competing economies and increased inter-dependence, it is becoming overly difficult to immune a country's economy from the global economic influences. Developing economies will therefore, continue to face the economic coercion of donors.

7. Media's Impact

The information flow has brought about mass awareness. At the global level, through astute disinformation and well-orchestrated themes, media is extensively used for propaganda and socio psychic exploitation, to mould the opinion of target audience. Countries with greater media resources have a definite edge in voicing their theme songs.

8. Non-State Power Centres

Emergence and empowerment of trans-national forces like collective economic systems, multinational firms, international financial institutions and pressure group like amnesty International; Green Peace etc are making ingress into the sovereignty of smaller nations, increasingly their domestic policies, much to their dismay. Consequently, ideological forces like religion and race are gaining momentum, with the potential to fuel hostilities.

9. Redundancy of the UNO

The UNO increasingly manipulated by the major powers to promote their own interests through selective enforcement of international conventions and regimes. Its influence as a neutral mechanism to enforce measures for greater peace and stability, based on consensus of the world community, is therefore diminishing. Dual standards and biased approach of this premium world body is a cause of grave concern for countries falling out of step with the dictates of major world powers.

10. International Aversion to Geographic Changes

Nations across the globe, due to intermingled interests, remain averse to conflict and escalation that has the potential to upset the status quo and jeopardizes collective interests. Therefore, there is increasing emphasis on resolution of the conflicts through peaceful means, rather than military confrontation. The smaller nations will therefore, witness growing resistance to the acquisition of technologies, which can disturb the balance of power in a region.

11. Changing Patterns of conflict

The conflict pattern is shifting from inter-state to intra-state, often with the tacit support of regional and extra regional players. Force is projected through internal de-stabilization, proxy wars and state sponsored terrorism. The post 9/11 scenario has tended to provide a kind of false legitimacy to various countries to use force within the ambience of war against terrorism, either unilaterally or in coalition with other countries. Such a specter is likely to give rise to asymmetrical inter and intra-state conflicts.

12. Negative Perceptions about Islam

The West is becoming increasingly apprehensive with regard to the global rise of Islamic values. Terrorism emanating from Islamic extremism is being perceived as a major threat and destabilising phenomenon. Overawed by the terrorists' attack of 9/11, the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 has overlooked the distinction between the legitimate armed struggle against foreign occupation and armed insurrection against writ of the legitimate governments. Such leanings are likely to further aggravate the prevailing sense of deprivation and suppression and foster greater resistance.

13. Role and function of Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan

ISI is mainly tune to the collection strategic intelligence, which in simple terms is the knowledge pertaining to enemy's capabilities, vulnerabilities, probable courses of action, plans and other related aspects that may affect Pakistan's national interests directly or indirectly. The Services intelligence directorates being part of the respective services HQs, mainly concentrate on the collection and analysis of tactical intelligence, which has a variety of applications during peace and war. In addition, they also have a counter-intelligence role to deny enemy access to sensitive installations and lines of communication. The Intelligence Bureau on the other hand mainly concentrates on the internal dynamics of Pakistan.

14. Military Intelligence (MI)

- a. The Military Intelligence Dte is dedicated to the collection, analysis and dissemination of tactical intelligence about enemy designs. The primary role of the MI is to keep the General Staff updated about enemy arms build up, movement of troops especially of strike formations, enemy operational plans, frequency and direction of surveillance activity. A close monitoring of all indicators of war including formation level exercises, testing of equipment and new inductions in the enemy war inventory also fall within the realm of MI coverage.
- b. MI also has an important counter-intelligence role for the protection of information, men and material. MI detachments at important stations sensitize the national assets against enemy penetration, subversion or sabotage.

15. Naval Intelligence (NI)

- a. The Naval Intelligence Dte is responsible for keeping the Naval Staff informed about enemy naval buildup, direction, operational plans, new acquisitions, tactical exercises and overall trend of enemy preparations for a War. Tactical or operational intelligence provided by NI on the one hand neutralizes enemy designs in the sea around Pakistan, and on the other directly supports our own current or planned operations.

- b. NI provides credible information and helps in protecting our Naval assets, harbors and installations, besides keeping our sea-lanes safe for maritime activity both during peace and war. At the same time, NI should be able to collect Acoustic Data used for interdicting enemy merchant shipping during war.

16. Air Intelligence

- a. The primary role of Air Intelligence Dte is to keep Air Staff updated on latest enemy dispositions, upkeep of enemy Orbit, Weapons and Equipment manuals and provision of target imageries or sketches to the users. To obviate any surprise attack, movements of enemy's combat aircraft and related weapons need to be accounted for at all times. This also includes continuous update of all weapons and aircraft including new inductions, movement of enemy assets and a close analysis of operational exercises conducted by the enemy.
- b. A scrutiny of the previous Gulf War and the recent conflicts in modern warfare. Our enemy has acquired an almost 1=4 superiority in terms of fighter aircraft, military cargo aircraft and helicopters. This superiority has got to be met through better intelligence effort and optimum and efficient utilization of available resources.

17. Intelligence Bureau (IB)

- a. The intelligence Bureau mainly concentrates on the internal dynamics of Pakistan. Besides monitoring the emerging political scenario, it also keeps a constant watch on the law and order situations, fissiparous tendencies, and ethnic and sectarian trends.
- b. In addition, IB also has an important counter-intelligence role, besides special operations against drug trafficking, smuggling of goods and human smuggling. For its counter-intelligence role, IB has a vast network within the country and at selective stations abroad to monitor and check enemy designs to gain access to vital installation, subversion, and sabotage to create an atmosphere of despair and despondency.

18. Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)

- a. Since its inception in 1948 as a modest organization, ISI has grown in size and stature to emerge as the premier intelligence organization of the country committed to implementing the nation security policy of Pakistan. The main task of ISI has been, firstly in the collection of strategic intelligence and secondly to deny access to enemy agents to our areas of vital national importance. During Mr. Bhutto's time, the Charter of ISI was revised to include Internal Security as well but it is ISI's secondary function since the main responsibility for it rests on IB.
- b. These are some of the basic tasks, which are performed by Intelligence agencies in all countries, big or small, according to their threat perception and the realization of their national strategic objectives. In this subtle game of nations, motives seldom discriminate between friends and foes. In the real world of intelligence, the ends dictate the means to achieve it. There are no holds barred when you are dealing with your real or potential enemies who may hurt your national interests or your very existence as a state.
- c. Apart from acquiring military and politico-diplomatic intelligence, major secret services also try for technological, industrial and economic Secrets. In some cases, missions are also undertaken of sabotage,

subversion and political assassination. Some of the leading Intelligence agencies with huge financial and material resources at their disposal have also raised their integral Special Forces and teams of irregular combatants.

- d. ISI has neither the resources nor the mandate to embark on such large-scale exploits. It has never raised a force, regular or irregular not even in Afghanistan, where ISI had its largest and longest commitment during the Jihad. Nor has it undertaken any assassination missions. But wherever national interests so dictated, it committed the best human and material resources at its command to achieve the targets laid down by the government through means other than those mentioned earlier.

Charter of ISI

19. Within the ambit of the existing constraints, the charter of Dte Gen ISI includes:
 - a. Procurement and coordination of external strategic intelligence.
 - b. Advice to the Federal Government on matters of national security, and counter-intelligence relating to the armed forces.
 - c. Some aspects of internal security
20. Depending upon the geo-strategic and security environment, the emphasis on specific elements of the charter may vary. A manifestation of this is our current focus on international and domestic counter-terrorism. Similarly, our commitment in Afghanistan, which was very heavy during Jihad against the Soviet Union, was scaled down considerably after Soviets were pushed out.
21. It may be of interest to you that nearly 70% of intelligence gathering (universally) is from open sources i.e. media, diplomatic interaction, etc. This should also tell you why some countries maintain big establishments in target countries. The analysis and information Management Wings handle this bulk of information. The challenge here is the enormity of material and its effective collation, analysis and timely dissemination. The remaining 30% of the information has to be acquired through covert operations. This is done through the Operation Wing by means of HUMINT. An increasingly potent source of acquisition is what we call the technical means managed by the Technical Wing. This pertains to satellites, drones, radars, listening devices and other gadgets.

Role of Intelligence in National Policy Formulation in Pakistan

22. Intelligence inputs provide a vital basis for policy decisions particularly on national security and foreign policy. National security is fundamental to all facets of state policy and strategy. Defence policy, foreign, economic and internal security policies have to be based on accurate and timely intelligence. As the prime intelligence agency, the ISI has to furnish this support at the appropriate forums. This, I may add, is a continuous and regular activity of forwarding reports, assessments and estimates to all concerned.
23. Like the intelligence Service of any country, ISI also has a role to play in the formulation of state policy in its own specific sphere of activity. However, we also need to understand that like intelligence services worldwide, ISI's role extends beyond participation in policy formulation and it also had to undertake implementation of the approved policy and strategy in some crucial fields.

24. As I mentioned earlier, an important aspect of the ISI's role is its responsibility as National Intelligence Service, both with external and domestic security mandates, and as a Defence Intelligence Agency. This is the modern trend in the restructuring of all major Intelligence Services post-9/11. This gives the ISI the benefit of a very wholesome perspective of our national scenario extending from the external environment, to the military situation and the domestic national scene including situation in the provinces and major cities of the country. Understandably, we then have the advantage of addressing issues holistically, which I feel is a significant input in the formulation of any policy. This also underlines the importance of close interaction between the ISI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries & departments of the government.
25. An equally critical role of the ISI is its participation in the implementation of the policy. In the world of real politics, all state policies have two facets: the overt and the covert, the declared and undeclared. This is universal and not peculiar to Pakistan alone. Intelligence Services undertake covert operations in support of the overall policy and, let me add that these activities are never a policy in itself. Those amongst us, who are not privy to the overall policy parameters, sometimes misunderstand the situation and form their own peculiar ideas about functions of Intelligence Agencies.
26. Threats to the internal security of Pakistan are as ominous as the external threats. I have no doubt that our adversaries will spare no efforts to destabilize us internally through subversion and sabotage. We have already been divided once through a foreign supported insurgency. 'Never Again' that should be our slogan as far as the internal security is concerned. I feel that the government has rightly assigned this aspect the highest priority it deserves. ISI's Internal Wing along with IB plays an important role in support of government's domestic policies, which, let me say, is its most difficult assignment, given our environment of acute ethnic, religious and political polarization and misunderstanding of ISI's many faceted functions.
27. As you are well aware, Pakistan has played a frontline role in the war against terrorism. The burden of this had to be borne by the ISI at one of the most complex and difficult periods in our history. There was the conflict in Afghanistan, the recent Indian build-up on our Eastern Borders and the transition from military government to a democratic order. However, we have been able to hold our nerves and faced the challenge squarely. Our restructuring efforts and development of a national counter-terrorism network proved timely and have enabled ISI to maintain its reputation as an effective Intelligence Service.
28. The rapidly changing international scenario in the aftermath of 9/11, and a volatile regional situation, has had its compounding impact on Pakistan's security perception also. It squarely called for creating a credible security parameter around Pakistan's as also to protect our permanent interests abroad. It was with this end in view that ISI restructured its organization in accordance with contemporary concepts and also proposed the formation of Higher Intelligence Organization (HIO), which has been approved by the government. Previously, DG ISI was the main coordinator of all Intelligence, but now HIO has a two-tier set-up consisting of the Joint Intelligence Board (JIB) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) to coordinate and best utilize all the Intelligence made available.
29. The JIB is headed by the President, and includes the Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, Interior and Foreign Affairs, Chairman JCSC, Services Chiefs and the DG ISI.

JIC acts as the Secretariat of JIB and is chaired by DG ISI. Its membership includes Secretaries Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Defence, Finance, DG TB, and DGs of MI/NI/ AT.

Overview of other Intelligence Agencies

30. Research & Analysis Wing (RAW)

- a. India's main intelligence agency RAW is the by-product of the 1962 Sino-Indian border clashes when the Intelligence Bureau reportedly failed to assess the Chinese arms buildup. After a careful study, the External Wing of the Intelligence Bureau was detached and baptized as RAW in 1963 with the primary aim of intelligence gathering and subversion in neighboring countries of South Asia including China. Since then, RAW has come a long way from a modest force consisting of around 250 personnel to start with, to some 10,000 trained manpower today.
- b. India has always considered South Asia as its own backyard and RAW is one of the main Indian instruments to put this concept into action. Over the years, RAW has emerged as an important instrument of India's national power and has assumed a significant position in formulating the country's domestic and foreign policy. Today, RAW's tentacles have spread from Maldives to Afghanistan, Central Asia, Middle East, Europe, USA, Canada and Australia. RAW enjoys active collaboration with the leading intelligence agencies of the world including CIA, M16, Mossad and FIS (Russia). In relation to Mossad, RAW's collaboration has gone much beyond the exchange of information. Latest reports indicated the presence of Mossad operatives in Indian-occupied-Kashmir (bK) for establishing a border-sealing infrastructure in addition to providing training and hi-tech equipment to RAW personnel.
- c. In the context of South Asia, RAW employs the usual techniques of disinformation, espionage, subversion and sabotage for creating an atmosphere of insecurity, and then projecting India as the sole protector of smaller nations in the region. Besides Sikkim and Bhutan, which are Indian protectorates anyway, RAW has acquired a deeper ingress in important tiers of the establishment in Nepal.
- d. Indian abetment of Tamil uprising in Sri Lanka is no longer a secret. RAW played an active role in funding, organizing and harboring the uprising, which finally culminated into the assassination of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. In another episode, RAW successfully organized an uprising in Maldives and then went ahead in quick time to quell it.
- e. RAW saw its hour of glory in the then East Pakistan in 1971, when it successfully subverted a localized unrest into an armed uprising spearheaded by Mukti Bahini. Indian armed intervention finally led to the severance of Pakistan's eastern Wing.
- f. RAW has been effectively countered by ISI since the last 10 years. It has come under fire for failure to contain ISI and for failed operations within Pakistan despite huge funds placed at its disposal.
- g. Seeing the success of ISI, the Indian authorities have now detached military intelligence from the purview of RAW to create a Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) under a serving Lt Gen. The new DIA will maintain its own data bank, collate and evaluate military intelligence received from the three services, and provide the interface between military intelligence directorates, RAW, IB and National Security Council Secretariat. It will also extend integrated intelligence support for joint operations by the Armed Forces.

31. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

- a. The American CIA is by far the most powerful and resourceful intelligence agency with base stations and

presence in almost all parts of the world. In its over 50 years of existence, CIA has played a variety of roles in pursuit of US domestic and global aims, which could be the envy of any intelligence agency. In fact, no segment of the cold war apparatus developed after 1947 has been more controversial and politicized than the CIA.

- b. CIA was created in September 1947 under the National Security Act passed by the Congress. It is the pivot of the US intelligence community with its Director as the anchorman. The link between various agencies is maintained through inter-agency groups for efficient management and operational control. There are 15 permanent inter-agency committees and a variety of ad-hoc groups each dealing with a specific problem separately.
- c. Like any other intelligence agency, CIA's main function is to collect intelligence from abroad. It also cooperates with FBI in domestic intelligence effort. CIA is divided into five distinct parts i.e. a Director and four functional Directorates, the largest of which is the Directorate of Operation commonly known in the agency as 'clandestine service'. It is the largest Directorate having an estimated strength of over 6,000 officers and men. Nearly 45% of this manpower is employed overseas usually under diplomatic cover for intelligence collection, espionage, counter-espionage, and covert operations including interference in the internal dynamics of the country as the US policy at that particular point in time may demand.
- d. CIA has its own R&D network designed to develop computer surveillance, high-tech electronic intelligence gathering and photographic reconnaissance facility. In addition, CIA is known to be operating its own satellites for obtaining credible imageries of the target areas. Incidentally, the technological gap between CIA and the rest of intelligence agencies is rapidly widening.
- e. In 1974, CIA was authorized covert actions by the congress and the CIA was provided huge funds running into billions of dollars to expand its network and commit its resources and expertise in attempting to install pro-US regimes in Italy, Korea, Iran, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Panama and Columbia. CIA is one of the few agencies, which have raised and trained their own combatants and irregulars for operations inside the target countries. Such combatants were launched into Afghanistan to soften up the area and win over local warlords before the final assault on was repeated in Iraq also where the allied troops did not face any worthwhile resistance.

32. Mossad

- a. Mossad is the external intelligence network of Israel, which operates directly under the Prime Minister. Its opinion especially those relating to Israeli Security, is given due consideration by the political leadership. Over the years, this organization has acquired notoriety for its thoroughness and ruthlessness in planning and executing its operations mainly against the Palestinians. Since most of the Mossad operations are covered in a thick blanket of cloak and dagger, not much is known about its organization, functions and modus operandi, which is apparently subject to frequent changes according to the demands of the situation.
- b. According to available indications, Mossad is pursuing a three-dimensional approach in ensuring the security of Israel and Jewish interests abroad. This approach broadly includes the following:
 - 1. Keep an eye on the activities of PLO, Hamas and Palestinian extremists and neutralize their plans and activities as far as possible. This is also extended to the coverage of neighboring Arab States

both friendly and unfriendly.

2. Maintain regular contacts with Jewish organizations and Jewish population in all countries, but mainly in USA.
 3. Maintain a watch on anti-Zionist states and organizations and neutralize their activities as far as possible.
- c. Based on the above approach, the main responsibilities of Mossad include the following:
1. Gathering external intelligence.
 2. Providing information on all projects, which require decisions concerning Israeli security.
 3. Recruitment of agents.
 4. Counteracting Palestinian suicide operations.
 5. Fomenting racial and ethnic conflicts as in Lebanon.
 6. Portraying a negative image of Palestinian people and Arab countries especially in Europe and USA.
- d. Mossad has very large financial resources, although the exact quantum of its budget allocation has never been made public. Apart from the normal allocation by the government, Mossad also derives funds from other sources including the profits earned by commercial organizations owned by Mossad and used as cover, commissions on arms transactions, and annual financial assistance provided by CIA.

APPENDIX E
Paper by
Mr. Khursheed Mahmud Kasuri
Foreign Minister of Pakistan

Major Foreign Policy Issues facing the Country

by
Mr. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri
Foreign Minister of Pakistan

- Pakistan's foreign policy is guided by its history, geographical location and ethos of its people. It reflects our national aspirations and is responsive to regional and international imperatives. Maintaining a bipartisan approach in its foreign policy has been an important objective of the government. Given the persistent challenges, we have been proactive in our foreign policy. While there are elements of continuity in the foreign policy, as they should be, there is also a change of emphasis and nuance.
- Pakistan is firmly committed to the promotion of peace and security at the regional and global levels. In keeping with its international obligations and in conformity with the United Nations Charter, Pakistan has consistently worked for the development of inter-state relations on the basis of sovereign equality, mutual respect, non-interference and peaceful settlement of disputes. It remains Pakistan's resolve to promote and enhance bilateral relations and mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields with all the countries of the world. Pakistan firmly believes in an international order that is based on justice, mutual trust and confidence.
- Pakistan and the US had been close allies during the Cold War period. However, as the decade of 1990's began, as significant reordering of policies and priorities by the US came into evidence. These changes brought in new challenges for Pakistan's foreign policy. South Asia was consigned to peripheral status by the US once the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. Within the region itself, US-India relationship improved apparently. After Indian Explosions on May 11 and 13, 1989, Pakistan was obliged to conduct tests to restore strategic balance in the region. As a result, Pakistan was subjected to discriminatory US sanctions.
- It was against this backdrop that the events of 9/11 unfolded having far-reaching ramifications for Pakistan on a global and regional level. These events placed Pakistan in the eye of the storm. Once again, core imperatives of our foreign policy—security, Islamic identity and economic viability were in grave danger of being compromised.

Coalition against Terrorism

- The transforming events of 9/11 and the global anti-terrorism campaign have had a deep and profound impact of Pakistan's foreign policy priorities. Like all defining moments, the situations in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, while posing enormous challenges, also offered Pakistan with an opportunity to reorient its foreign policy priorities in the light of the changed situation in order to promote its vital interest. As President Musharraf told the nation, our decision to join the international coalition against terrorism was to ensure, a) security of the country against terrorism; b) continuity of economic revival; c) safety of our strategic assets; and d) focus on peaceful political solution of the Kashmir dispute.
- Pakistan's support has enabled the global coalition to make important gains in the anti-terrorism campaign and brought Pakistan great appreciation and important stature as a key member of the international community.

- The decision has not only dramatically improved relations with the US and the West but also with Russia, Iran and the Central Asian states. China is also very appreciative of our stand against terrorism. There is wide appreciation of the fact that the reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy in the aftermath of 9/11 was not an easy option, given its serious implications for Pakistan's internal stability and external security. The immediate economic benefit came in the shape of crucial debt relief enabling the country to avert a looming risk of default on its foreign debt service obligations.
- The recent operations in South Waziristan Agency are part of Pakistan's effort to root out terrorism in all its manifestations from its territory. The Government's commitment to the Pakistani society and the International community to fight terrorism makes it incumbent on us to take on this menace frontally. These operations are a part of our resolve to flush out foreign terrorists from our country.
- While, Pakistan's commitment to combating terrorism remains firm, we believe that use of force alone would not suffice, if the objective were to eliminate and not merely to suppress terrorism. The menace of terrorism can be dealt with effectively only through a comprehensive approach. In our view the essential ingredients of comprehensive approach should include (a) a consensus on defining terrorism, and (b) a focus on the root causes of terrorism.
- There is a need to ensure that the fight against terrorism does not turn into clash between the West and the world of Islam. This would have serious risks for world peace and stability. Similarly, the regrettable practices of racial profiling, targeting of the citizens of particular countries or peoples belonging to a particular religion and regions would severely jeopardize the campaign against terrorism.
- Of equal importance is the need to ensure that the fight against terrorism does not turn into a clash between the West and the World of Islam. This would have serious risks for world peace and stability. Similarly, the regrettable practices of belonging to a particular religion and regions would severely jeopardize the campaign against terrorism.
- Of equal importance is the need to curb the tendency on the part of some countries to use the international sentiment against terrorism for advancing their own narrow agenda. This would deprive the international campaign against terrorism of its moral legitimacy. Pakistan rejects the canard of the so-called "Islamic terrorism". Terrorism has no religion.
- Some vested interests are trying to project the fight against terrorism as a clash between civilizations and value systems, more specifically between Islam and the West. This fallacy is dangerous and must be firmly rejected. Deeply concerned over this insidious trend, President Pervez Musharraf presented his concept of "Enlightened Moderation" at the OIC summit held in Malaysia. This concept has two facets: one, the Islamic World must adopt a process of internal reform and renewal by promoting moderation and human resource development and socio-economic development.

The Nuclear Issue

- The objective of our nuclear programme is to deter aggression, so that we can safeguard our national security and protect our sovereignty. We shall maintain the competitive edge of our nuclear programme through our national means. There is no question about it. We shall enhance our capability both qualitatively and quantitatively. The President of Pakistan on several occasions has reiterated our resolve not to roll back our nuclear programme. In fact we would try to improve our programme in all its

dimensions. This is the determination and the will of the people of Pakistan. We can sustain our nuclear programme through indigenous means and resources.

- While we would like to enhance our nuclear capability and continue to do so, we also want a strategic restraint regime and conventional balance between Pakistan and India. We do not want an open-ended arms race between two countries. Pakistan is a nuclear weapons state and this reality has been weapon state. We have a National Command Authority (NCA) headed by the President of Pakistan with Prime Minister as its Vice Chairman. This system was established in 1999 and operational zed in 2000. As such, there's no question of pilferage or leakage from our soil. We now have a very effective command and control system.

Pakistan-India Relation

- Suspicion and mistrust have characterized Pak-India relationship since 1947. The outcome of this Indian factor has also created an imbalance geographically, militarily, economically and politically.
- No nation can realize its full potential without conditions of regional peace. Unfortunately, Pakistan since its creation has been deprived of this blessing. Regional conflicts sharpened by cold war dynamics had created a situation of serious insecurity. We were obliged to develop a credible military deterrence to ensure our security. We want peaceful relations with all regional states particularly India. This quest is actuated by an enlightened sense of national interest.
- The long-standing Kashmir issue represents a challenge to the international community both in its political and human rights dimensions. The Kashmiris are struggling for their right of self-determination recognized and promised to them in a series of Security Council resolutions. Terrorism did not create the tragedy of Kashmir. On the contrary the long delay in the resolution of the dispute has led to desperation and militancy. We seek the resolution of all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir through a peaceful process of dialogue and constructive engagement.
- There is a realization in India and Pakistan that War is not an option any you have to look at ways and means to work for peaceful settlement of disputes between the two countries. Secondly, Human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir have to come to an end. We are looking for solutions, which can ensure peace and stability in the region, justice for the people of Kashmir, and a secure future for the people of South Asia. The current India-Pakistan peace initiative enjoys the backing and support of the international community including USA, EU and China and Japan. There is a new momentum which is the outcome of the statesmanship shown by President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. This is a very salutary environment to kick-start the dialogue.
- Both India and Pakistan have agreed to commence the composite dialogue process, which collapsed at Agra. Now we are meeting, after two and a half years, as a result of the decision taken by President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee on the sidelines of the 12th SAARC Summit in Islamabad. The two sides are committee to addressing all issues between India and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir to the satisfaction of the parties concerned.

The Muslim World

- Pakistan's position in the Islamic world is a matter of satisfaction and pride. The special relations with the

countries of the Middle East region have a historical, cultural, religious, economic and strategic basis. These are nurtured by mutual trust and confidence that have stood the test of time.

- It is quite evident that world order and global peace cannot be restored without addressing the conflicts which beset the Islamic world today. Failure in resolving these disputes will have serious ramifications for international peace and stability.
- Pakistan rejects the cycle of violence in the Middle East, which has a negative impact on the ongoing Middle East peace process and the Quartet's efforts to give sovereignty and statehood to Palestine. We strongly support the Palestinian peoples' struggle for attaining statehood and political independence. Concerted efforts by the international community should be initiated to stem escalation of violence as it is breeding extremism. Pakistan supports the two state formula.
- Iraq remains an open wound on the body politic of the Muslim world. International approach must be guided by the objective of restoring Iraq's sovereignty and political independence; ensuring its unity and territorial integrity; upholding the right of the Iraqi people to determine their own future and giving a central role to the U.N.
- Afghanistan is already moving gradually but inexorably towards a new disposition. An enabling environment would require rapid reconstruction of its physical and social infrastructure. Instability in Afghanistan has a direct bearing on Pakistan. A peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan is vital to our national security, economic and political interest. Therefore, we fully support the Bonn process and efforts of President Karzai for peace and harmony in Afghanistan. The international community must help Afghanistan generously in the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction. On our part we have pledged US\$100 million for this process. A stable Afghanistan is certain to have a positive impact on the politico-economic landscape of Central Asia as well as that of South and Southwest Asia. Politically, it will end the threat of religious extremism to this region. In the economic field, construction of road networks and implementation of the energy pipeline will bring development and prosperity.

Pakistan-US-relations

- Pakistan and US relations have seen many ups and downs. Pakistan had been subjected to US sanctions on account of our nuclear programme, which was inextricably linked to threat to our security in the region. The closer relations between the two countries during the 1980s saw a decline following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and its punitive sanctions against Pakistan complicated the situation in the region, especially it pushed Afghanistan into total collapse and civil war which allowed it to become a base for terrorism. Pakistan itself became a victim of terrorism.
- 9/11 galvanized the world to fight against terrorism. Pakistan is part of the international coalition against terrorism. This has once again brought Pakistan and United States closer in a cooperative bilateral relationship. This time, however, both governments have worked to give bilateral relations a new dimension and endurance. There is recognition that deterioration in their bilateral relations damaged interests of both sides.
- Our role in stemming the tide of terrorism has been acknowledged not only at the level of the US President, Congressmen & Senators but also worldwide. Our relations characterize cooperation in political, economic and defence field. We are working mutually on a long term & sustainable relationship.

While looking beyond the fight against terror, we are aiming to gain access to the US markets and investment flow to Pakistan. There have been many high level visits from both sides. The US Secretary of state Colin Powell visited Pakistan recently in March 2004. US decision to designate Pakistan as a Major non-NATO ally will have long term positive bearing on our relationship with the US. This cooperation, however, will not be directed against third party.

The Evolving Challenges

- The current international configuration has immensely altered the traditional diplomatic functions and practices. The dispersal of authority away from states, the predominance of economics over politics, and the growing role of NGOs, social movements, and other transnational collectivities highlight the need for national governments to alter their modes of interaction with each other and with relevant actors in the multi-centric world.
- A host of new issues including globalization, human rights, democracy, terrorism and the environment have made their way to the centre stage of international attention. Economic diplomacy is assuming greater importance in planning and execution of foreign policy. International relations are being reconfigured to underline the primacy of these issues and new international norms are being rapidly evolved in these and other areas.
- In view of the persistent challenges, the contours of our foreign policy are being constantly re-examined, refined and redefined, as necessary.

Economy

- Among the most significant paradigm shifts that herald the external environment of the twenty-first century is the increasing preponderance of economics instead of politics in international relations which is indeed a reflection of a similar development in interstate affairs. The term political economy now applies both to the internal and external dimensions of politics and economics.
- The emerging new international economic environment influenced in several different ways by the process of globalization has placed new responsibilities on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Cognizant of these external changes we have continued to pursue the country's economic agenda with commitment and vigour. The objective has been to impart an aggressive thrust to the Ministry's endeavors and that of Pakistan's Missions in promoting exports, foreign investment inflows and industrialization.
- Our missions abroad have been maintaining a proactive approach on the commercial front and reached out to potential importers and investors. They are concentrating their endeavors to the (a) promotion of Pakistan's economic and commercial interests, (b) provision of quality assistance to Pakistani businessmen visiting abroad and (c) assistance in trade enquiries by establishing direct contacts with the Chambers of Commerce and Industries at home and abroad.
- Our Missions also help explore new economic opportunities for enhancement and diversification of our exports such as in non-traditional items in order to expand our export base. In addition they help organize trade fairs and single country exhibitions for enhancement of trade with countries of their accreditation.
- After a period of slow growth for several years, mainly due to a prolonged drought and unfavorable external conditions, all vital indicators of the economy are now showing clear signs of a turn around.

Growth rate of GDP is estimated at 6%. Inflation is under control and interest rates are falling. Pak rupee is stable and current account is in surplus. There is a phenomenal increase in foreign remittances and foreign currency reserves, which have crossed dollars 12 billion. The debt burden has eased considerably as a result of the relief that Pakistan has received. Our international partners agree that Pakistan has achieved macroeconomic stability and is well on the way to take-off stage and the climate for investment is conducive in Pakistan.

- Nevertheless, we do not underestimate the challenge of achieving sustainable growth, and the continuing shortage of resources for the vital social sectors. In this endeavor, Pakistan requires the continuing support and cooperation of its international partners.
- The best assurance for the consolidation of global peace lies in the economic development and prosperity of all regions and all peoples. Economic progress in one region supports and complements prosperity in an era of greater prosperity and peace. In this connection the agreement on SAFTA augurs well for the economic well-being of South Asia.

APPENDIX F
Paper by
Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani
Additional Secretary, Foreign Policy Planning

Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan

by

Mr. Shaheen A. Gillani

Additional Secretary, Foreign Policy Planning

I. General

(a) *Universal principles that underpin the making of a Foreign Policy in any country-including Pakistan:*

- A country's foreign policy mirrors its national agenda, priorities, social attitudes and political structure;
- Foreign Policy does not deal as much with the goals as it does with the possible paths (options);
- Foreign Policy is a cumulative process; and
- The task of formulating the foreign policy, particularly of comparatively less powerful states, is more beset with constraints than blessed with sovereign freedom.

(b) *The Core Determinants that define the parameters of Foreign Policy:*

- Geography;
- Security;
- History; and
- Ideology

(c) *Role of the various government sector institutions:*

- Foreign Office;
- Parliament and its Committees;
- Cabinet and Ministries;
- Military Establishments;
- Information; and
- Government Think Tanks.

(d) *Role of Institutions outside the ambit of Government:*

- Political Parties and Pressure Groups;
- Media and Civil Society; and
- Public Opinion and Think Tanks.

II. Emerging Challenges confronting the Formulation of a Foreign Policy

- Momentous transformation of the global political landscape in the post-cold war era;
- The international system of states is now in a flux;
- Borders between domestic and foreign policy issues are becoming increasingly hazy;

- Besides bringing about a Paradigm shift in the international order, the events of 9/11 carry serious implications for the Islamic World;
- Muslim countries can no longer formulate policies without taking this new dimension into consideration;
- Economic diplomacy is assuming greater importance in planning and execution of foreign policy;
- A host of new issues including globalization, human rights, democracy, terrorism and the environment have made their way to the centre stage of international attention; and
- New international norms are being rapidly evolved in these and other areas

III. Formulation of Foreign Policy in Pakistan

(a) *Overview*

- Security has been at the heart of Pakistan's policy since independence;
- In managing relations with India, it subsumes our quest for a just solution of the Kashmir issue as well as our nuclear capability;
- Two other key foreign policy objectives continue to be socio-economic development and our Islamic identity; and
- In response to the rapidly changing international scenario, the contours of Pakistan's foreign policy are also being constantly re-examined, refined and redefined, as necessary.

(b) *Role of various state and non-state actors in the making and implementing of our foreign policy:*

- Enhanced role of the Military Establishment; and
- Diminution in the role of Parliament/civil society, etc.

APPENDIX G
Paper by
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Former Finance and Foreign Minsiter

How Foreign Policy should be made in Pakistan

by
Mr. Sartaj Aziz
Former Foreign Minister

The formulation and implementation of a successful foreign policy in any country depends on three major factors:

- A clear long term vision of the country's role in world affairs and a broad national consensus on the main elements of such a vision.
- An effective institutional framework to coordinate the three main dimensions of foreign policy namely national security, defence policy and economic objectives and to determine the relative priority of each at a given point of time.
- An efficient and professionally managed foreign office which can present well considered options, whenever required, and can implement policies effectively, once these have been formulated by the Government.

Unfortunately, in Pakistan's case none of these pre-requisites have been fully met throughout the past five decades.

Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah did offer the vision of "friendship with all and an independent foreign policy", but the circumstances in which Pakistan came into existence did not allow the realization of this vision. The mistrust and bitterness created by large scale communal rioting, followed by mass migration and the 1947-48 war in Kashmir laid the basis of continuing hostility between India and Pakistan. At the same time, India having failed to maintain the geographical unity of the sub-continent, wanted to assert the political unity of the three fourth of the territories that came under its control, by calling it India thereby inheriting not only the cultural and historical legacies of undivided India, but also the international personality and all the foreign assets of British India. Pakistan was left to build the main infrastructure of its foreign policy from scratch. As tensions with India over Kashmir continued and Pakistan with its much smaller economy began to look for ways to defend its security, it readily accepted the option to join the alliances and defence pacts which USA was building in the 1950s, to counter the Russian influence in the Region. While in the process Pakistan acquired modern weapons but lost the opportunity to evolve an independent foreign policy and gradually slid into the position of a satellite of another nation. This fault line in Pakistan's foreign policy has never been fully repaired.

The second pre-requisite, namely the evolution of an effective national security system, in which the consistency of the country's defence, security and economic policies could be ensured, also became a victim of the recurrent failure of the political process. As a result, Pakistan has remained under direct or indirect military rule for more than half of its independence existence. In such a situation, security and foreign policy was handled exclusively by the military institutions without any major inputs from the civilian leadership or expertise in the Foreign Ministry. Even in periods of civilian rule, (as the 1972-77 and 1988-99) the political leadership that took over the government from time to time had only limited space for making any major changes in the main parameters of foreign policy laid down during the prolonged periods of military rule. This inevitably led to excessive reliance on the military dimension of national security i.e. the importance of safeguarding national security through stronger defence capacity and a gradual relegation of the broader political and diplomatic dimensions of national security. This strategy helped Pakistan to acquire more sophisticated weapons and to maintain a 1:3 strategic balance with India

in terms of defence expenditures but only for a few years. In 1974, India carried out a nuclear test and forced Pakistan to engage in a nuclear arms race with India. This was necessary but in pursuing the nuclear option, Pakistan had to forego access to conventional weapons after the imposition of sanctions by USA in October 1990. This created a very paradoxical situation and narrowed the foreign policy options which Pakistan could pursue in the future.

- a) The first option was to reduce tensions with India and therefore the growing burden of defence expenditure, which became even heavier after the imposition of sanctions in 1990.
- b) The second option was to maintain the strategic balance with India, by increasing our defence budget and also increase pressures on the Kashmir issue, and the resultant tensions with India.

Pakistan chose the second option in the wake of the victory which the mujahideen had achieved over Russia in Afghanistan. If Islamic freedom fighters had defeated a super power why could they not do the same in Kashmir when the situation is in any case ripe for a major 'Intefada' inside occupied Kashmir? It will, the argument went, also force India to deploy at least one third of its army in Kashmir, thereby creating a more evenly balanced situation along the international border between India and Pakistan.

It is difficult to say whether this strategy which Pakistan followed from 1990 onwards in its relations with India was the result of several incremental steps and decisions or was based on a well considered and comprehensive framework. But in retrospect it is clear that the strategy imposed enormous economic and political cost on the country without solving the Kashmir problem in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri people. If we had a coherent national security system to examine all options and their short and longer term implications, the options chosen may have been different and probably better.

The third dimension of a successful foreign policy i.e. a competent and professionally managed foreign office, with its network of embassies and consulates, has been partly undermined by the absence of a well coordinated national security system and partly by a steady decline in the country's image. As already mentioned, there has been a growing gap between the foreign policy perspectives and security assessments of the military establishment and the elected or unelected political leadership of the country and as a result no clear political consensus on the objectives of national security. The Foreign office was caught in the middle of this confusion, oscillating from one perspective to another between so called 'hawks' and 'doves', depending on who was ruling the country at a given point of time. Secondly diplomacy draws strength from the internal unity or disunity of a country and its overall image in the world, which in turn depends on its economic strength and cultural and social ethos. If a country's polity is divided on the basic thrust of its foreign policy and its image is not very positive, the task of the diplomats in the foreign office becomes much more complicated. The Foreign office has no doubt thrown up some outstanding diplomats who have earned a good name for Pakistan, but opportunities for high profile performance in the international arena have been shrinking, with a negative effect on the morale of the Foreign Service, as a whole.

A new watershed in foreign policy

The current phase of Pakistan's history represents a new watershed in the country's foreign policy. The events of September 11, 2001, jolted the main foundations on which Pakistan's foreign policy was built for over two decades namely unflinching support for the Taliban and their predecessors in Afghanistan, active assistance for Jihadi organisations fighting for the liberation for Kashmir from Indian rule and the development of nuclear weapons as a deterrent to India's superior conventional weapons. Under strong international pressure, Pakistan has already revised the first two policies and is also on the defensive on the third plank, following embarrassing reports of nuclear proliferation by our scientists to countries like Libya, Iran and North Korea, Pakistan has also become an

active member of the international campaign against terrorism to gain sympathy and support of USA and other western powers.

In the face of the grim options which Pakistan faced after September 11, these policy changes were probably unavoidable, but these changes and the resultant policy options for the future are reactive in nature and not a part of deliberate pro-active policy framework for the medium term. Even more serious, these policy changes do not enjoy the support of some of the main political parties and also of a large segment of the country's population, mainly because after September 11, Washington's influence on Pakistan's foreign policy has increased.

The flaws and fault-lines that afflict the foreign policy processes in Pakistan, which I briefly outlined at the outset, are of a fundamental nature and cannot be removed in the short run. Yet given the importance of these policies for our survival as a sovereign nation, we, as a nation, have to evolve a more coherent medium term framework for attaining our vital national security objectives. Let me outline some essential requirements:

The first important requirement in the formulation of a coherent foreign policy framework, is to narrow the wide gap in thinking, that continues to exist between the military establishment and the elected civilian set up on different aspects of national security. At present, according to many independent observers, there is a state within a state, which regards itself as the ultimate custodian of national interest and does not accept any deviation from the established parameters. The importance of bringing these varying perceptions together will become obvious if we recall that one of the main causes of political instability and frequent dissolution of the National Assembly (in 1988, 1990 and 1999 for example) was this gap in perceptions on major security issues. In the face of such wide divergences in perceptions, it should not be difficult to understand the agonizing dilemmas that the foreign office professionals face in offering advice on important issues and the gradual deterioration in the quality and clarity of such advice.

The second important pre-requisite will be the evolution of an effective national security system that will not only provide a forum for narrowing the gap between the military and civilian establishments but also create a much wider mechanism of analysis and consultation on policy options and their short and medium term implications. This in turn will require a strong Secretariat of the NSC, continuing support from various think tanks and advisory committees and better coordination among various intelligence agencies.

Ever since President Ziaul Haq created, as a part of his constitutional amendments of March 1985, a National Security Council, to give the armed forces a constitutional role in supervising the political process, this institution has become controversial. The 1985 Council was abolished by the Eighth Amendment within 7 months. Similarly the Council created by President Farooq Ahmad Leghari in January 1997, died without a single meeting. Even the new National Security Council, whose bill was introduced in the National Assembly on 2 April, is similar to that created by President Ziaul Haq in 1985. As is clear from its composition (the absence of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Defence and Interior) the main purpose of the new council is to monitor the political process in the name of strengthening democracy, but the oppositions in Parliament believe this council will weaken the democratic process. Because of this controversy we may once again lose the opportunity to create an effective forum for evolving a consensus on national security issues.

Thirdly, the Parliament and its Committees can play a major role in facilitating a wider process of consultation and on major foreign policy issues. After 1985, special joint sessions of Parliament were held every year to discuss the foreign policy of the country. In addition the Foreign Affairs Committees of both houses met frequently to discuss various issues. Sometimes these Committees prepared special reports on different aspects of foreign policy, after prolonged deliberation in which they invited not only

the Foreign Minister and the Foreign Secretary but many eminent outside experts. (One example is the July 1955 Report of the Senate's Standing Committee). The present Parliament has not even constituted its Committees in the past 18 months, nor held any comprehensive debates on foreign policy. Potentially the Parliament can become a major forum for political debate and decision making in the area of foreign policy. In the process it will not only narrow the gap between the military and the civilian establishments but also in reconciling differences among different political parties and viewpoints, and thus move forward a national consensus on major foreign policy issues.

Finally, one of the most important pre-requisite for the success of foreign policy will be to end the unending polarization in our society i.e. religions, ethnic, provincial and political polarization. The damage that such polarization can cause to our vital national interest can be much more lethal through subversion or aggression from outside.

I hope the participants of this workshop will be able to form their own opinion whether these and many other requirements for a successful foreign policy will be met in the coming months and years.

APPENDIX H
Paper by
Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir
Former Vice President IPRI

How Security consideration Influence Foreign Policy in Pakistan Role of Security Agencies

by
Brig. (Retd.) Shaukat Qadir
Former Vice President IPRI

Let me begin by suggesting that the subject we are interested in studying today is the role of *intelligence* agencies rather than security agencies. Security agencies are those that enjoy legal jurisdiction domestically e.g. the FBI in the US is a security agency with domestic jurisdiction. It also has intelligence functions, but only domestically. Consequently, it has little influence over foreign policy formulation; whereas the CIA, which is an intelligence agency, has considerable influence on foreign policy. In Pakistan, the ISI and the IB are intelligence agencies; the police, para-military forces, and the army when called out in aid of civil power are security agencies. The FIA was created in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's period to fill the gap of domestic intelligence, but the intelligence agencies that influence foreign policy are those that have an external role.

Firstly, let me clarify here that in all countries of the world intelligence agencies have a role to play in foreign policy formulation; not only in terms of input, but sometimes even dictate foreign policy in certain domains. Two domains which are usually exclusively those of intelligence agencies and in which they influence foreign policy are those relating to international terrorism and international drug smuggling. In the US, for instance, in issues relating to these two matters, the state department may have to modify policies without knowing why. Similarly in Israel, where drug trade is not a serious matter yet, in the domain of "terrorism" or Palestinian freedom fighters, the Mossad enjoys exclusive jurisdiction and may dictate foreign policy without explaining why.

Apart from exclusive domains the intelligence agencies have another universally constant role: input; to comprehend this it is important to understand how intelligence agencies work. The intelligence business has four steps to it; collect, collate, analyse, and interpret or predict. Let us look at each by turn. Collection is the basic function; all intelligence agencies collect information of all kinds, sometimes useful, sometimes not; they collect information on any act that appears suspicious or any act by a person who is held in suspicion. Collation is perhaps the most difficult link in the entire process; it implies establishing connections between sometimes totally unconnected pieces of information so that they can then be analysed and then be interpreted to predict an event or interpreted to respond to. I will attempt to illustrate this through two examples.

Example one: An overseas ISI operative reports that X, a known member of the defunct Jaish-e-Muhammed has bought a large quantity of Semtec (a very high explosive) in Kazakhstan and has crossed over to Afghanistan. This will come to the desk of someone in the "External Wing" of the ISI. He will promptly convey this information to his counterpart in the "Internal Wing" and, of course to his superiors in his own wing. The internal wing will immediately alert their operatives to monitor X' movements on the Afghan border. Meantime, Y, a person suspected of having links to an extremist religious Sunni party has been seen aimlessly roaming in Raja Bazaar Rawalpindi and has twice circled the Imam bar Gah in the city. If ISI operatives spot X crossing the Afghan border, they could have him arrested by security agencies or, in search of bigger fish, not arrest him. In the latter event, if someone collated these two unrelated pieces of information, it could be analysed to conclude that the Semtec was intended for use in Pakistan and perhaps a possible target might be the Imam bar Gah in Rawalpindi city. They could then proceed to take precautionary security measures and to proceed to try and identify the ring leaders to arrest them.

Example two: We are all aware that India is active in the Central Asian countries. Someone in the Analysis Wing of

the ISI would sit down to analyse the possibilities and would perhaps consider three possibilities a) it might be an attempt to re-link itself with Russia, b) it could be an attempt to hem in China in the future, or c) it wants access to the energy resources of Central Asia without having to depend upon, or permit benefit to accrue to, Pakistan. Consequently it is trying to ensure continued instability in Afghanistan so that there is no alternative but to take the lengthier route to the seas via Iran. In the event of the first two possibilities, Pakistan may not be seriously concerned; however, in the event of the third possibility, the External Wing of the ISI would be tasked to seek evidence confirming this possibility. If confirmed, it would have serious implications for the foreign policy of Pakistan, which may be modified to deal with this eventuality.

The ISI was created in 1948 as an intelligence agency intended to provide information of relevance to defence matters to all three services; to this end it was placed under the defence ministry. In Ayub's time it was tasked to gather information domestically on political figures of significance, but no major domestic role was assigned to it. Surprisingly, it was in Zulfikar ali Bhutto's tenure that it was formally expanded to include the "Internal Wing". I say surprisingly, because Bhutto created the FIA intended to fill the vacuum of domestic intelligence and in his tenure there appeared to be a deliberate effort to eradicate the military's influence in politics. However, it was in Zia's tenure that the ISI began to acquire the standing that it still enjoys when Zia employed it extensively in the domestic arena to create his "democratic political setup". The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan following the Iranian revolution brought the CIA in, and the natural ally of the CIA was the ISI. We have much to thank them for domestically; including the religious militancy and bigotry, the drug and Kalashnikov cultures and much more, but since this paper is concerned with only foreign policy, I will confine myself to that issue.

In the words of a senior diplomat, "between 1979 and 1984 the foreign office was slowly shifted to the ISI HQ and we were left twiddling our thumbs or acting as spokesmen of their policies, words of caution were to no avail". The Afghan policy took primacy, it had brought back the US (our relations with the US had reached an all time low when the US embassy was burned in August 1979), it was bringing in much needed military assistance including the F-16s, it was bringing funding from the entire Muslim world, and the US led west were prepared to ignore our nuclear programme. Consequently, all other issues and policies were relegated to suit the Afghan policy. Since the Afghan policy lay with the ISI, all other policies were also influenced by it.

The Soviet withdrawal was timed to coincide with the beginning of the Kashmiri freedom movement and, quite naturally, the ISI merely had to shift its vision from the one front to the other, not that they were no longer active in Afghanistan; that was to continue till the defeat of the Taliban by the US, however, religious militancy shifted from one front to the other and the ISI continued to enjoy its supremacy. After the Musharaf coup (or counter coup, as the military prefers to call it), the ISI reached its zenith under Lt Gen Mahmood. He considered himself the person responsible for bringing about the coup and therefore, specially privileged, which he was. After his ouster, Lt Gen Ehsan, a far more amicable and far less aggressive person has taken over, the ISI has been purged of elements unacceptable to the current political milieu, Ehsan is less visible, but its influence continues relatively unabated. It is unlikely that its influence will diminish in the foreseeable future.

Before I conclude, I wish to add that I could not agree more with Mr Sardar Asif Ahmed Ali, when he said that we should not have converted the Kashmiri freedom struggle into a Jihad; personally I believe that was the greatest damage that we did to their cause and they say so. I also fully concur with those who made the point that, while our Afghan and Kashmir policies merit review, we seem to be doing so under external pressure. As a matter of fact, I don't believe there was any "Kashmir" or "Afghan" policies; policies have and, a purpose, to achieve, a time span in which to achieve them and then the methodology is fleshed out. Neither our Afghan policy, nor our Kashmir policy had an end or purpose in sight, they were open ended; an end in itself. Nor in fact, do we have a policy today.

In conclusion, let me offer you a possible foreign policy statement for Pakistan today: “While recognizing the dynamics of a unipolar world and the compulsions of following a policy of appeasement (even servility!) towards the US in the interim; Pakistan will seek to reestablish its sovereignty over the next ten years by creating a nexus between Iran, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan utilizing the energy resources of Central Asia to gain economic independence”. It has an aim, a purpose, a time span, it is achievable, it can make us what we wish to be; a sovereign state independent of external issue, the methodology of this would complete the policy. Mind you, the methodology is a flexible outline, since it needs to adjust to changing times. I only wish this, or something akin to this was our foreign policy; how different would be our dynamics today?

APPENDIX I
Paper by
Mr. Najmuddin A. Saikh
Former Foreign Secretary

How Security Considerations Influence the Formulation of Foreign Policy

by
Mr. Najmuddin A. Shaikh
Former Foreign Secretary

I would like to start by felicitating PILDAT on the organizing of this Short Course on the “*Process of Foreign Policy Formulation in Pakistan.*” for our legislators. In every democracy, it is the task of the people's representatives not only through the government they set up but through discussions in parliament to determine the broad parameters of a country's foreign policy. They need to be well informed.

It is a sad fact that in the relatively short periods for which democracy has prevailed in our country our legislators have paid little attention to this area even while recognizing its importance. For some of them it is a subject of such enormous complexity and delicacy that it is best left to the experts. More cynically others have chosen to ignore it because there is no real constituent pressure to take an interest in this area nor does specialization in this field create the sort of influence that the legislator can use to advance his political ambitions or to solve the day-to-day problems of his constituents.

The fact however is that in any democracy Parliament has a crucial role to play in foreign policy formulation and implementation. They not only adopt legislation needed domestically to give effect to foreign policy decisions but also in many countries to ratify any agreements that the government in power reaches with other countries or groups of countries or international organisations.

Currently in Pakistan the power to ratify agreements lies with the Cabinet and not directly with the Parliament but there should be no mistake that in such ratification the Cabinet is, at least theoretically reflecting the will of the parliament and that when these agreements are of consequence such ratification would normally be preceded by a discussion in parliament or at the very least in the Foreign Affairs committee of both the National Assembly and the Senate. As our democracy matures we may well come to the stage where all international agreements will be the subject of discussion and scrutiny not only by the Cabinet but by Parliament and the Parliament's consent will be needed to ratify such agreements.

The Parliament also controls the purse strings. It is for the Parliament to determine what funds are made available for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the other agencies that play a part in advising the government on foreign policy issues. In so doing it can determine the role the Ministry and the other agencies can play in helping the government to formulate foreign policy and thereafter, what resources the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as the principal instrument of the government for implementation, will have to put these policies into effect.

Just as in the formulation of domestic policy decision makers and strategists have to take account of the views of various constituencies and various sometimes conflicting interests so too in foreign policy one has to take account not only of one's own national interests but those of the country towards which a particular initiative or foreign policy objective is directed.

In domestic politics a successful politician is one who knows either directly or through his aides, not only his own strengths and weaknesses but also those of his coalition partners and his adversaries. He knows to a nicety which goals he will need to modify to achieve consensus. And in today's world, he knows how to present a case at the bar of domestic public opinion so that his assessment rather than that of his opponents is accepted. Pragmatism may, on occasion, dictate alliances with parties with manifestoes that are incompatible with his own vision of the

direction in which the country should be advancing. Pragmatism may also dictate that he uses whatever unofficial intelligence means are available to him to determine the weaknesses and strengths of his negotiating partners.

Similarly, in foreign policy, the successful politician will seek to acquire a sense of the perceived and real strengths and weaknesses of foreign countries, of the domestic compulsions of the leaders of these countries and, where necessary, an estimate of the ideological or other considerations that guide decision making in those countries. Where multilateral negotiations are involved he will also learn how best his country's case can be projected at the bar of international public opinion. Here too driven by the necessity of protecting his country's national interests he may make alliances that are contrary to the ideology of the country or the basic philosophy that he espouses domestically. Again like in domestic politics he will use not only the overt means of gathering information but also the covert means that his official intelligence agencies can provide him.

In large measure the determinant of foreign policy is domestic policy. Foreign policy is the handmaiden of domestic policy. If in domestic policy there is a certain ideological thrust and there is a determination that our relations with other countries will be pursued bearing this ideology in mind despite the costs that it may entail then foreign policy, will veer towards establishing close relations with the countries that share this ideology. The task is then of formulating a foreign policy that allows an advance towards this goal without putting at risk other relationships that are of greater importance in political and economic terms.

If domestic policy recognises that the resources the country can generate internally are not sufficient to fulfill the economic development requirements of the country and that it needs greater access to foreign markets, large amounts of foreign assistance and foreign investment etc. foreign policy must then be formulated with these objectives in mind. Clearly in advancing these objectives there will be domestic policy trade-offs in terms of the reciprocal opening of our own domestic market to foreign exporters, granting of concessions to foreign investors, accepting economic conditionalities for foreign assistance etc. but concessions may also have to be made in foreign policy terms.

There is however one overriding foreign policy goal that cannot be subservient to domestic policy and that is, in fact, the one area in which domestic policy must bend to the requirements of foreign policy. This goal is the protection of the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the country. The extent to which this goal becomes the determinant of foreign policy will vary from country to country. In our own case this has been paramount from the start because of the circumstances in which Pakistan came into being.

But if one were to move away from the Pakistan example and to look at the situation in a theoretical framework how would one determine the formulation of foreign policy in the context of an external threat to national security. Firstly the country's leaders have to use all the means at their disposal to determine what real or potential external threats to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country exist. Second they have to determine whether these threats are such as can be met by the nation's own capabilities or by capabilities that it can afford to acquire. Third they have to determine whether these threats can be mitigated by diplomatic efforts directed at the source of the threat or by diplomatic efforts to build alliances with other nations that share the same threat perception or for other reasons can help offset these threats. Fourth they have to determine the maximum and the minimum concessions that the country would be prepared to make that the sovereign authority believes it can offer to blunt the source of the threat or to build alliances or to acquire the where withal to mitigate or offset the threat.

Further the foreign policy that is devised vis-à-vis the source of the threat must be such as would follow from a deep and thorough study of (a) the potential enemy country's strengths and weaknesses (b) the inimical elements in that country, the rationale, if any for their adversarial posture, the degree of influence they enjoy in decision making, and the steps that can be taken to mitigate the hostility (c) the friendly elements in that country, the

reasons they have for seeking friendship, the degree of influence they enjoy in decision making and what steps can be taken to increase this influence. A second element would be the identification and the highlighting of interests that are served by friendly rather than hostile relations and finding ways of making these common interests known to the masses in both countries with a view to building public opinion in favour of friendship rather than hostility.

In seeking support from other countries the foreign policy devised would be one that takes account of the prospective ally's own needs and its political system. It would be sensitive to the needs of the groups or individuals who would need to be influenced. It would seek to establish as far as possible the geo-political compulsions, which would make such support helpful if not essential for the prospective ally. It would stress the affinities between the peoples of the two countries and the advantages that an alliance would bring in terms of promoting trade and economic relations on favourable terms etc. Finally it would include what could be offered as a quid pro quo for such support.

The foregoing list of determinants, by no means comprehensive, would show that information in a number of areas would have to be gathered and this task would of necessity require primarily the employment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies it maintains in foreign countries but a number of other agencies including the defence and economic ministries and above all the intelligence agencies would also need to contribute.

For example, determining the magnitude of the threat will require not only information on the publicly known facts about the size of the potential enemy's armed forces and about the quality of its weaponry but also less well publicized or even secret information about the leadership qualities of the military commanders, about the relations these commanders have with the political leadership, about their ability to deploy rapidly, about their indigenous capability to manufacture military hardware and a whole host of other such information. Such information, obtained through overt or covert sources would then need to be assessed primarily by military experts before it becomes an input in the policy making process.

Similarly identifying inimical and friendly elements in the potential enemy country and the degree of influence they enjoy would primarily be the function of the ministry of foreign affairs and the envoys it deploys but these efforts could be usefully supplemented by information obtained covertly by intelligence agencies using tools that are not available to the personnel of the Foreign Office.

In other words intelligence agencies and other organs of the government have an important role to play in gathering the information needed, particularly in the context of external security, for the formulation of a coherent foreign policy. The government would be failing in its duty if it relied solely on the ministry of foreign affairs for this purpose even while recognising that the primary responsibility for advising the government on foreign policy must rest with this ministry.

Theoretically it is the ministry of foreign affairs that will be the recipient of foreign policy related information from the intelligence and other agencies of the government and will incorporate it, after analysis, in its recommendations to the government on how Pakistan's security and other interests could best be safeguarded. In practice however the situation has been to say the least very different.

Pakistan has found itself, forced by the perceived threat to its security to devote a larger part of its limited resources to defense and as a necessary corollary to give the military a greater role in the political life of the fledgling democracy.

This has also meant however that the military and the intelligence agencies have had a much greater role to play in determining the policies to be adopted and equally importantly the measures to be taken on the ground through

overt and covert operations to tackle these security threats or to pursue Pakistan's perceived national interests. It has also meant that both the intelligence agencies belonging to the armed forces and those theoretically under civilian authority view their function as going beyond the collection of information.

There is a general impression, and one cannot regard it as inaccurate, that on vital foreign policy issues the government's policy formulations are based on the conceptual frameworks and the information and analysis provided by the intelligence agencies and it is these agencies that are given primary responsibility for their implementation. There is also the general impression that these conceptual frameworks lay an inordinately heavy emphasis on the military facets of security and downplay the other facets that contribute, as much if not more, to genuine national security.

Of course it is not in Pakistan alone that intelligence agencies play a role in policy formulation that goes beyond the provision of raw information obtained overtly or covertly. In the United States where much emphasis has been laid on the fact that in making his policies the President relies most heavily on his principal foreign policy adviser, and that is the Secretary of State, there have been periods when the director of the CIA, has been the dominant voice in policy making. During the period of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the CIA, by and large, dictated American policies in Afghanistan. It had a larger presence in Afghanistan and perhaps in Pakistan than the State Department and many of the most delicate negotiations with Pakistan were conducted through the heads of the intelligence agencies of the two countries.

There is no doubt that all over the world on questions of security the intelligence agencies tend to go beyond the narrow mandate of providing raw information or neutral analysis for their political masters without making policy recommendations. This is as it should be. Intelligence gathering, 90% of which lies in the public realm, has to be done, if it is to be done effectively, by educated and trained personnel and it is almost inevitable that such persons will draw conclusions from such information and wish to share such conclusions along with the information. The question is whether such conclusions or recommendations should by themselves become the basis of policy.

Most intelligence agencies have both an information gathering and analysis capability and an operational capability. Good intelligence agencies try and ensure that the two functions are insulated one from the other. But this is clearly difficult if not impossible to achieve. There is then a strong temptation to tailor the analysis of the information gathered to the needs of the operational branch.

Secondly while intelligence agencies can develop tremendous capacities for information gathering there are inevitably lacunae and, equally importantly, there are large bodies of information the analysis of which needs capabilities and experience that rest elsewhere in the government structure.

Thirdly, foreign policy is not a one-way street. The viability or otherwise of policy options may depend on the reactions and needs of other countries. Gauging these accurately needs contact with decision makers in these countries and that is the task of the ambassadors and embassies.

It would therefore be right and proper that the role of the intelligence agencies should be limited to providing as fully as possible the information that they are able to gather, along, if necessary, with their own analysis of what this information could mean to the one body that is institutionally responsible for assisting the leadership in formulating foreign policy and that body of course is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This ministry's recommendations, once accepted by the government, should, in a democracy, be subject to deliberation and debate either in open session or, if the subject is sensitive, in camera by the relevant committees of Parliament and become the basis of policy only after they have been approved.

APPENDIX J
Paper by
Mian Abdul Waheed
Former Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee
of the National Assembly

**Review and Analysis of Pakistan's Foreign Policy by the Parliament:
Principals, Methodology, Tools And Infrastructure with Special Reference to the Foreign Affairs
Committees of the Senate and the National Assembly**

by
Mian Abdul Waheed
Former Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee
Of the National Assembly

The principals of Pakistan's Foreign Policy have been Security and Economic Progress of Pakistan. Additionally, two factors i.e Solidarity with the Islamic World and Decolonization occupied important place in Pakistan foreign relations.

The tools available to the National Assembly are the Parliamentary Committee of the Ruling Party, the main opposition party and other small parties. Important issue, relating to various aspects of foreign and internal policies are discussed in the Parliamentary Party meetings where guidelines are determined Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, comprises members of the National Assembly belonging to the Ruling Party. The only exception was the election of Madam Benazir Bhutto, as Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs during Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif's first government.

The vitality and the vigone with which the committee on Foreign Affairs can plays its role depends largely on the support received from the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the House. Rules of procedure and conduct of Business by the National Assembly were reframed in early 1990,s under the guidance of the then Speaker of National Assembly Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan. The construction of Parliamentary lodges was undertaken by him Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan also tried to get offices for members of the National Assembly constructed, but the National Assembly was dissolved before this project could be undertaken. No attention ever has been paid to creation of offices for the members of the National Assembly. It is dismaying to say that the people representatives who occupy the highest position in Pakistan have not been provided with the where-with-all of carrying out their obligation. This could be attributed to indifference on the part of the governing political leadership as well as mute resistance by the bureaucracy. In my three terms as a member I tried repeatedly to get this infrastructure created but failed. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Mrs. Benazir Bhutto, Mr. Gohar Ayub Khan and Mr. Yusuf Raza Gillani did encourage the Parliamentarians to go abroad and project Pakistan's view in important foreign policy and international issues. However, the scope of such visits, due to various reasons including the resource constraint was limited. The standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and the National Assembly were hamstrung during the National Assembly which lasted from 1997 to Oct. 1999 as the then Speaker was opposed to Committees Sessions being held in places other than Islamabad. Not a single visit by members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to any country was allowed.

It a matter of great disappointment that in contrast to most other countries, the National Assembly in Pakistan has hardly had any or in fact no role, to play in review, analysis or formulation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy. Debates on foreign policy issues are rare and when held the period of debate is invariably limited to a few days. Whenever an important issue assumes critical proportions, on insistence by the National Assembly, short lived debates, with a view to allowing members to vent their criticism are held. Winding up of such debates has never been satisfactory since issues are papered over.

National Assembly's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, if you look at its mandate is a powerful committee with the authority to review almost everything. Parliamentary Committee of the Ruling and other parties are equally important forums for review and analysis of Pakistan's foreign policy. Our performance, I must confess has been disappointingly inadequate.

I was elected to the National Assembly in 1990, 1993 and 1997 i.e thrice consecutively. I have been watching the performance of the present National Assembly ever since its inception, which unfortunately has done little to show that it has made improvement over the past.

I become a member of the National Assembly, which stayed in power from 1990-1993. Regrettably the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs was elected in early 1993 i.e almost after 2-1/2 years of election of the National Assembly. Mrs. Benazir Bhutto was elected its chairperson. Election of the Chairman was the only session ever held by the committee.

Iraq's occupation of Kuwait was the main issue discussed by the Assembly. The mood of the National Assembly clearly indicated that the religious parties which supported Saddam Hussain left a deep imprint on the minds of the majority of the Parliamentarians. No one dared oppose Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. I was the first member to rise and reject Kuwait's occupation by Iraq. My thesis was to oppose the philosophy that big fish eats the small fish as enunciated in the Indian foreign policy philosophy. I was impelled by the fear that this example could be used by India to indulge in aggression against Pakistan. Our support to Iraq over its conquest of a small neighbor could be used by India to carry out aggression against Pakistan; we would then have little or no logic to plead our case before the International Community.

In the National Assembly which lasted from 1993-1996 the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs was headed by Maulana Fazl-ur-Rehman of which I was a member. The Committee was quite active during this period. An important event was committee's visit to China where useful discussions took place. While reiterating China's deep and lasting friendship with Pakistan the Chinese leaders made it clear that:

- I. Conflicts had to be substituted by conflict resolution and that they had entered an era where they wanted peaceful relations with India. They also advised Pakistan to improve its relations with India.
- II. The future of interstate relations depended on the strength of economic ties between nations. In pursuit of this policy the Chinese had undertaken a policy of enhancing economic relations with India.
- III. The Chinese were prepared to help Pakistan in promotion of economic relations and agreed to recommend to the Chinese Corporations give priority to purchases from and sales to Pakistan, but the Pakistan side, they added, had to compete with others in price and quality.

I was elected as Chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly that lasted from 1997 to October 1999. A number of meetings were held. All members of the National Assembly who wished to participate in the discussions, apart from the regular members of the Committee, were invited to participate. Important intellectuals and Experts on Foreign Policy were asked to deliver lectures on important issues including the core issue of Kashmir, Kargil, Nuclear explosion by India and Pakistan, relations with India, great powers, neighboring countries, Central Africa and the Islamic World. European Union and economic issues including problems faced by overseas Pakistanis were also discussed.

It is regrettable that the views of the Committee, which were duly conveyed to the concerned authorities, were hardly ever taken into consideration. Our views on Afghanistan differed from the policy of the government. Whereas we advocated a policy of liaison with all the contending groups in Afghanistan, we were told that the Taliban were close to victory in Afghanistan. As the event unfolded subsequently, it becomes clear that the Pro-Taliban policy was incorrect. I must admit that though it was the duty of the Speaker to ensure that the committee worked effectively, the speaker at that time hardly ever allowed the committee to play its role.

Exchange of visits by the Foreign Affairs Committees of various countries is a normal phenomenon. Though the committees from several countries visited Pakistan, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of our National Assembly was never allowed to reciprocate. All the visits that took place by some of our members to explain Pakistan's position on the burning issues such as Kashmir, Pakistan's Security, Kargil and Nuclear explosions by India and Pakistan during 1997-1999 were authorized by the then Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. The Speaker, whose primary duty was to make Parliament effective and play its appointed role failed to live up to his duties.

During Benazir Bhutto's second government there was apprehension that the Pakistan People Party Government might sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (C.T.B.T). As member of the opposition we explored whether the Parliament could block ratification of C.T.B.T, in case the Benazir Government signed it. To our dismay we discovered that the National Assembly had no role to play in ratification of Treaties. There is no such role even today. In case the National Assembly was empowered to do so, the government, besides ensuring that the will of the people prevailed, could avoid external pressure by taking shelter behind the fact that ratification of Treaties rested with the National Assembly.

Some of the factors which hinder contribution by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs in reviewing and analyzing on Pakistan's foreign policies are:

- I. Committees are formed only when the National Assembly has lived through half of its life.
- II. National Assembly has never been allowed to complete its full tenure.
- III. There is no permanent office or secretariat. Thus there is no infrastructure.
- IV. A lot of time is wasted in finding office and staff for the Committee Chairman.
- V. It is dismaying that the members of National Assembly are not provided with offices to work. They spend most of the time in roaming around and in Cafeteria.

Facts mentioned by me earlier make it a very sad story that. In a parliamentary system of government, the elected representatives are not provided with the means and the resources or given the opportunity to review and analyze Pakistan's Foreign policy not to speak of its formulation

APPENDIX K
Paper by
Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali
Former Foreign Minister

**Principle Determinants of Pakistan's Foreign Policy with
Special Reference to the Role of Parliament:
Principals, methodology, tools and infrastructure available with
Parliament and Standing Committees on Foreign Affairs**

by
Sardar Aseff Ahmed Ali
Former Foreign Minister

Introduction:

Pakistan's Foreign Policy since its inception has been determined largely by three factors

1. The threat perception from India as a hostile State
2. The unresolved Kashmir dispute
3. The need for rapid economic progress

Pakistan was therefore obliged to seek strategic alliances in pursuing the above goals of security, Kashmir dispute resolution, and economic Progress.

Since India was historically hostile and was in alliance with USSR even though it professed non-alignment, Pakistan was obliged to seek strategic alliances with the West. As a consequence of these imperatives, Pakistan joined the anti-communist alliance of SEATO and CENTO. These alliances brought Pakistan formally into the camp of so-called free world against communism.

Out of these alliances Pakistan benefited substantially in strengthening its military capabilities and made rapid economic progress. Although this policy gave a measure of security to Pakistan, it did little to resolve the Kashmir dispute beyond verbal support. However, one of the conditions of military assistance from USA was non-use of weapons for any other purpose except for fighting communism.

In the 1960s the late President Ayub Khan became one of the strongest US allies. The entire western anti-communist camp considered Pakistan as a strategic ally. But it is to be noted here that the West had not abandoned India even though India was receiving massive Soviet military and economic assistance. The western tilt was towards Pakistan but at no point was it anti-Indian.

In 1965, a major turning point was reached because of two Indo-Pak Conflicts.

In the Ran of Kutch, a border dispute led to major battles in which Pakistan Armed Forces tested their mettle successfully against India. President Ayub Khan made a serious error in over-assessing Pakistan Armed Forces' offensive capabilities as well as the strength of Western support to him. In September 1965, he went to war against India across the Cease Fire Line in Kashmir.

The assumptions behind these attacks were that:

1. India would not cross the International border
2. The western alliance of Pakistan would replenish Pakistan's military hardware during the war.
3. The state of training combat readiness, and hardware was superior to India.

4. The Kashmiri people would rise against the Indian military occupation of Jammu & Kashmir.

Based on these faulty assumptions, his planners hoped President Ayub Khan would be able to militarily force the solution of Kashmir dispute.

Every one of the assumptions proved to be wrong. In 1965, the war was disastrous and at best stalemate. But the greater damage to Pakistan was the loss of credibility in the West as a strategic partner. It was realized in the West that President Ayub Khan was pursuing his own national agenda rather than an anti-communist Western ideological war. Mercifully Pakistan did not lose much in terms of territory or hardware, and Pakistan's closest allies Iran, China and Saudi Arabia stood by it. Even the somewhat hostile Afghanistan regime maintained friendly neutrality. Support came from unexpected quarters like from Indonesia's Sukarno.

Eventually Pakistan was forced to sign the humiliating Tashkent Declaration. Post Tashkent, Pakistan's foreign policy was in doldrums. It had lost confidence of the West. It failed to achieve military objectives in 1965 war. Ayub Khan, who was the blue-eyed boy of the West, was sent into rapid decline, which eventually saw his ouster.

However, domestic turbulence overtook him. Power was taken over by Gen. Yahyah Khan. Gen. Yahya Khan attempted to rebuild bridges with the US. The secret visit of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to China in a small measure restored Western confidence in him but certainly not enough to reacquire the special relationship. The crisis in East Pakistan and its mishandling of civil unrest by the Generals escalated tensions with India which finally exploded into the second major war in the Subcontinent. India, ever the predator neighbor, saw an opportunity to strike a deadly blow. Such was the human rights record of the army action in East Pakistan that the world was shocked by its ferocity and cruelty. Therefore, when the Indian Army marched into Dhaka and affected the surrender of 90,000 Pakistani personnel, the world applauded this Indian conquest. What is mystifying is that Gen. Yahya Khan mainly hoped for the US and Chinese intervention to support Pakistan, which never came. Even stranger is the fact that Gen. Yahya Khan opened the Western front when Pakistan was not under attack in the West.

The Western front failed to release pressure in the East. Eventually the Generals, now humiliated, transferred power to Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto whose PPP had emerged as a majority in the Western provinces. Mr. Bhutto rebuilt some of the broken bridges in the West and normalized relations with the Soviet Union by withdrawing Pakistan from SEATO and CENTO.

The Arab Israel war in 1973 presented a rare opportunity to Pakistan for playing a pivotal role in the Middle East as well as the Islamic world. The Islamic summit in Lahore was a landmark event that projected Pakistan as one of the key actors in the Muslim world. Mr. Bhutto used the opportunity to recognize the secession of Bangladesh and rebuilt relationships with the West, Russia, China, Iran and the Arab Middle East. The Arab oil embargo resulting from 1973 Arab-Israel war sent oil prices sky high and oil-rich Middle East states were flooded by petro-dollars.

The Islamic Summit in Lahore gave Mr. Bhutto an opportunity to build strategic relations with the oil-rich Middle East. Millions of Pakistani workers, businessmen and professionals were absorbed in Arab oil producing countries. The loss of Western aid had been largely compensated by remittances of overseas Pakistanis and direct economic assistance to Pakistan from the oil-rich Arab World.

Mr. Bhutto also signed with India the Simla Accord which brought back 90,000 POWs from India as well as withdrawal of Indian armed forces from the territories occupied in the 1971 war. In Kashmir, the Ceasefire Line was converted into LOC (Line of Control). The Simla Accord recognized the need to resolve the Kashmir dispute peacefully through negotiations.

The Simla Accord was one of the outstanding achievements of Pakistan's diplomacy. It was during Mr. Bhutto's government that Pakistan's Nuclear Programme was initiated and the construction of the Kahota uranium enrichment plant was started.

1977 once again saw internal turbulence in Pakistan. Once again a military dictator Gen. Zia ul Haq took over power. Two major events in the region affected Pakistan's foreign policy.

1. The Islamic revolution in Iran
2. Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan

The late Gen. Zia ul Haq was lacking in moral and political legitimacy. So in both events an opportunity for self-aggrandizement presented itself. In Islam he saw an opportunity and rapidly converted all state institutions into the so-called Islamic mode and took advantage of the rise to pro-Islamic sentiments among the people of Pakistan.

In the meantime, Ronald Regan won the US presidential elections on the platform of demolishing the evil communist empire. This was to be the final push in the Cold War against the Soviet Union. America also sought to avenge its humiliating defeat in the Vietnam War. In Afghanistan there was an opportunity to defeat the Soviet occupation forces but the US had no access to Afghanistan because Iran had turned radically anti-West and anti-US. Pakistan was the only access and a staging area to mount a covert offensive against Soviet occupation forces in Afghanistan.

Gen. Zia ul Haq was quick to see this strategic opportunity. Pakistan hosted 3.2 million Afghan refugees as a result of the war against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Out of this anti-Soviet alliance, Pakistan received about 4 billion dollars of US assistance mostly of military hardware. The war of liberation in Afghanistan was fought from the soil of Pakistan in the name of Islam and Jihad.

Fighters were imported to fight in Afghanistan from all over the Muslim world. By 1987-88 the Soviet Union Armed Forces in Afghanistan had suffered heavy losses and a million Afghans lost their lives. The Evil Empire had exhausted itself through too many foreign policy adventures. It sued for peace in 1988. The Geneva Accords were signed to facilitate the peaceful withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. They left behind a destroyed country and arms dumps believed to be worth over 20 billion dollars. They also left behind President Najeebullah's Afghan Armed Forces and security apparatus. However, Najeebullah's key ally, the pro-Soviet Gen. Rasheed Dostum of the North-West Provinces finally abandoned him and formed an alliance with the Panjsheri leader of the North East, Ahmed Shah Masood. The two marched upon Kabul and took over the city. Islamabad finally woke up to this major development and with assistance of Saudi Arabia brought about an agreement between the resistance parties and groups. As a result, first Mujadaddi and then Rabbani were made Presidents.

Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan became deeper and deeper but unfortunately policy managers in Pakistan relied more on military solutions rather than political solutions. They failed to recognize that in the post Najeebullah period, there was political crisis in Afghanistan, not a military one.

Consequently, there was blunder after blunder and Pakistan was sucked into a zero-sum game in Afghanistan. The second aspect of this failure in Afghanistan was the thinking in Rawalpindi's military circles that Afghanistan had been used to lend strategic depth to Pakistan.

In this modern age of technology, this was a concept based on false assumptions and Bonapartist ambitions. It was bereft of any realism. The other setback to Pakistan's policy was the withdrawal of the US and its allies from

any involvement in Afghanistan. They simply walked away in 1988. Therefore, Pakistan was left to bear almost the entire burden of 3.2 million refugees. Along with this major setback in 1990, sanctions were imposed on Pakistan by the Bush administration for covertly pursuing the nuclear program. Pakistan experienced great economic hardship and isolation. In the meantime, Pakistan had helped the uprising in Indian occupied Kashmir. Its relations with India started to become tense on several fronts. Pakistan's profile suffered many setbacks. The militants who had come to fight in Afghanistan Jihad remained in North West Pakistan. There was an uprising in North East Jammu & Kashmir. Internationally, Pakistan suffered from military and economic sanctions. Internally, Pakistan saw great internal instability. In foreign policy, a few developments did take place in the first Benazir Government. Important nuclear treaties were signed with India, whereas the Government of Mr. Nawaz Sharif pushed Afghanistan into further civil war.

In the second Benazir Government, the rise of Taliban in Afghanistan and eventually their take over of Kabul and three quarters of Afghanistan were major developments. This period also saw Pakistan's quest for deepened relations with Central Asia. The more insecure Pakistan felt in terms of its security, the more it spent on nuclear capability. It is by now an open secret that as a cost of Afghanistan war against Soviet Union, the Ronald Regan administration looked towards Pakistan's nuclear ambitions. In the early and mid-90's India tested its first short-range missile. There was panic in Pakistan's defence circles. As result South Asia was plunged into a missile race.

The politics of oil and gas pipelines in Central Asia again brought Pakistan on the US screen. The Benazir Government was quick to seize the opportunity and signed MOUs with Turkmenistan and Afghanistan for delivery of gas in Pakistan and South Asia from Daulatabad gas-field in Turkmenistan. But the civil war in Afghanistan followed by the Taliban take-over were the biggest impediments in developing this energy lifeline. The medieval policy of the Taliban Government based on primitive tribal interpretation of Islam made the regime fairly loathsome to the world.

The US administration withdrew its support to the Unicoll-Delta alliance to build this pipeline. In the government of Benazir, Pakistan became the biggest contributor to UN peacekeeping forces in the world. Pakistan also played a key role in bringing peace and settlement to the war-torn "Bosnia Herzegovina". Pakistan also played a key role in the U.N. mediation to end the civil war in Tajikistan. It was after the Benazir Government that Osama Bin Ladan moved from Sudan to Afghanistan. It appears that he rapidly took over the key decision-making processes of the Taliban Government. It is alleged that Al-Qaeda made stunning terrorist attacks on US military and civil targets under Osama Bin Ladan's directions. His ability to destabilize Pakistan and penetration in Pakistan was thought to be considerable.

The second Government of Nawaz Sharif saw significant Foreign Policy developments. India tested its nuclear weapons in 1999. Pakistan historically following reactive policies, replied in kind and tested several sophisticated devices. South Asia had turned nuclear which caused great alarm all over the world. But following closely on the heels of nuclear explosions, both Nawaz Sharif and Vajpayee felt the need to reduce tensions. Therefore Mr. Vajpayee visited Lahore and signed the Lahore Declaration, which was a balanced statement and in harmony with the Simla Accord. But while the ink on the Lahore Declaration was still wet, the world heard of a serious conflict in Kargil. It appears that irregular elements and the Northern Light Infantry crossed the LOC around Kargil sector and threatened the road to Ladakh and Leh. This was a brilliant tactical victory and if it was taken to a military conclusion, it would have resulted in severing the entire Ladakh region from military and food supplies. The world, as expected, was highly shocked because both countries were nuclear and missile-armed. But Pakistan's Generals had once again miscalculated on the strategic aspects of Kargil. The world did not intervene and did not force India into a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute, as our military planners had expected.

Pakistan was seen to be a traditional aggressor. A great deal of pressure was brought upon Pakistan, both on ground and diplomatically. Eventually Pakistan was forced to withdraw. Therefore, a partial tactical victory had turned into a major strategic setback. The Indian argument against Pakistan being an irresponsible state was bought by the world, as Indian diplomats in world capitals projected the image of Pakistan as being irresponsible and expansionist. Furthermore, while Nawaz Sharif was involved in negotiations with Vajpayee, the Armed Forces were busy in grabbing Indian Territory. This was the punch-line of Indian diplomats. Kargil resulted in great bitterness between Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff. The tug of war between the two resulted in a take-over once again by the military Chief of Staff.

Although he had no legitimacy, he sought to arrive on the international stage by easing tensions with India. This resulted in the failed Agra Summit. As the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan provided International support to Gen. Zia ul Haq, Musharraf too sought such support.

The events of 9/11 changed the world. But it also changed the fortunes of Gen. Parvez Musharraf. G. W. Bush had decided to combat terrorism all over the world. His first target was Al-Qaeda and Osama Bin Ladan and their host government in Afghanistan. The US required Pakistan's airspace and several bases and facilities in Pakistan to launch its attacks on the Taliban Government. This was a godsend for Musharraf who conceded to these concessions readily. Then Pakistan became a key ally of the US war on terrorism. Hundreds of Al-Qaeda fighters have been arrested by the Pakistani government and handed over to the US. The FBI has been authorized to operate inside Pakistan, hence undermining Pakistan's sovereignty. The tribal belt in the North West has been a host to foreign Islamic militancy since the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

In this grey zone of Pakistan, remnants of the Taliban and Al-Qaida are still alleged to be present. They enjoy deep relationships with semi-autonomous tribes. The US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan are engaged in combating a new resistance against the Karzai Government. This twilight zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan is thought to be harboring Islamist fighters. The Pakistan army has now launched a major operation to capture Al-Qaeda operatives and its leaders.

The other significant event during Musharraf's regime was the Islamabad Declaration which was signed by Musharraf and Vajpayee. This declaration is a balanced one and has the spirit of Simla Accord and the Lahore Declaration. It has considerably reduced tensions in South Asia since 2001 when a major terrorist event occurred in New Delhi. Over a million soldiers faced each other for 9 months. Musharraf faced world pressure to stop all cross border movement on the LOC. In the Islamabad Declaration Pakistan committed not to allow any part of Pakistan territory to be used for terrorism against India. Now Indians are satisfied on this score and tension has eased between India and Pakistan. Both agreed to talk on all bilateral issues including Jammu & Kashmir. Many CBMs have been put into place but time will tell whether Pakistan and India can solve the Jammu & Kashmir dispute. There is an air of optimism among the people of India and Pakistan for peace.

APPENDIX L
Presentation by
Dr. Asad M. Khan
DG Economic Coordination
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

**PILDAT Short Course
The Foreign Policy Process in Pakistan
12-15 April 2004**

Economic Diplomacy and the Role of the Foreign Office

Presentation by **Dr. Asad M. Khan,**
Director (Economic Coordination),
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad
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Presentation Format

- Part-I deals with the description of what we are; what we do; what is economic diplomacy and the existing distribution of work in the Government to protect and promote Pakistan's economic interests abroad
- Part-II describes the new challenges and opportunities
- Part-III identifies the measures that we propose to take to effectively face the new global dispensation

**Part-I
What is the Foreign Office**

- A National Security Institution
- First line of defence
- Pakistan's window to the outside world

What we do

- Formulation of advice to the Government on Foreign Policy issues and strategy. Operationally implementing and promoting our national interests abroad
- Countering hostile activities through external linkages and through helping enhance our power potential, has been our main operational objective
- safeguarding and promoting Pakistan's political, economic and trade interests
- projecting and preserving our image as a progressive, moderate, democratic responsible Nation
- protecting and serving our compatriots abroad

What is Economic Diplomacy

- Diplomacy in general terms is the art of conducting international relations.
- A dynamic and vibrant economy is a critical and important determinant of national security. Hence a major occupation and priority of the Foreign Office
- A functional definition of economic diplomacy in our context would therefore imply the following:
 - securing enhanced and predictable access for our products to other export markets
 - Securing greater Foreign Direct Investment inflows
 - reducing foreign debt and securing enhanced development assistance on concessional terms
 - Generating employment opportunities abroad for our skilled and unskilled labour force

Existing Distribution of Work in the Government to Protect and Promote Pakistan's Economic Interests Abroad

The Key Players are:

- Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Revenue Division
- Ministry of Commerce
- Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis
- Investment Division
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Revenue Division

- Advice on economic and financial policies; promotion of economic research
- Negotiations and coordination for external economic assistance and economic cooperation with other countries
- Securing technical assistance for Pakistan from foreign Governments/organizations and dealing with matters relating to Pakistan's technical assistance to foreign countries
- External debt management, review and appraisal of international and regional economic trends and their impact on the national economy and matters relating to transfer of technology
- Negotiating Avoidance of Double Taxation Agreements with other countries

Ministry of Commerce

- Negotiating treaties, agreements, protocols and conventions with other countries and international agencies bearing on trade and commerce
- Promotion of foreign trade including trade offices abroad, trade delegations to and from abroad, overseas trade exhibitions and conferences and committees connected with foreign trade
- Standards of quality of goods to be imported and exported
- Transit trade and border trade
- Export promotion
- Selecting and posting Commercial officers in Pakistan Missions abroad
- Anti-dumping duties, countervailing and safeguard laws.

Ministry of Labour, Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis

- Dealings and agreements with international organizations in the fields of labour and social security
- Keeping a watch on labour legislation from international angle
- Foreign employment and emigration
- Research into problems of overseas Pakistanis; promotion and coordination of measures best suited to resolving them and motivating Pakistani citizens abroad to strengthen their links with the mother country
- Welfare of Seamen and Pakistan employees, emigrants abroad and their dependents in Pakistan
- Selection and Posting of Community Welfare Attaches in Pakistan Missions abroad

Investment Division

- Investment promotion policy
- Promotion of investment in industry, including foreign investment, investment by Pakistanis living abroad and international investment problems

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

- The Foreign Office shall be consulted on all matters which affect the foreign policy of Pakistan, or the conduct of its foreign relations. This obviously includes Pakistan's external economic relations
- Overall responsibility for relations and dealings with other countries
- Matters (other than those handled by other Divisions) relating to international organizations and bodies and their decisions; and agreements and treaties with other countries
- Diplomatic, consular, trade and other representation abroad
- Visits of the Heads of States and foreign dignitaries to Pakistan and the Head of the Government of Pakistan to foreign countries
- Matters relating to foreign representatives in Pakistan
- Repatriation of Pakistan nationals from abroad

Part-II New Challenges and Opportunities

- Post Cold War unipolarity and shift from geo-politics to geo-economics
- Globalization driven trade liberalization
- Good governance and poverty reduction focused international development assistance
- Establishment of WTO and integrated treatment of trade, development and other related issues including finance, technology, investment and sustainable development
- Market access linkage to non-trade concerns such as good governance, child labour, environment and social issues, drug control and safety and security measures.
- Regionalism v. multilateralism
- Post 9/11 events have brought the focus back to the political dimension and on issues such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, furthering democracy and civil rights

World Trade Organization

- Supra-ministerial, multi-disciplinary, integrated undertaking
- Deals with trade in goods, services and intellectual property
- Seeking enlargement into areas such as investment, competition issues, trade facilitation, government procurement and environment
- The enlarged WTO coverage calls for greater and closer institutional coordination in the government
- A coherent, well coordinated negotiating strategy required to effectively articulate and realize Pakistan's trade and economic objectives

Regionalism v. Multilateralism

- Neither theory nor evidence provides a robust guide to the choice between regionalism and multilateralism.
- Economic Complementarities and Comparative Advantage
- Small states stand to gain
- Doha Declaration a departure
- Ascendant Regionalism

Pakistan's Regional Pursuits

- AGREEMENT ON SOUTH ASIAN FREE TRADE AREA (SAFTA)
- ECO TRADE AGREEMENT (ECOTA)
- TRADE PREFERENTIAL SYSTEM UNDER OIC (TPS-OIC)
- D-8 PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT BEING NEGOTIATED
- SEEKING ACCESSION TO ASIA PACIFIC TRADE AGREEMENT (APTA)
- VARIOUS BILATERAL FREE/PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS FINALISED OR BEING NEGOTIATED
- OBJECTIVE IS TO ENHANCE THE WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE BY ENSURING THAT COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE WORKS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE THROUGH REDUCTION IN CONSUMER PRICES AND WITH ONLY LIMITED TRADE DIVERSION

Part-III

Allocation of Personnel in Missions Abroad

- Pakistan has 103 Representative Missions Abroad with the majority being two men missions
- Out of a total cadre strength of 406 officers, 254 Foreign Service career professionals are deployed in these Missions
- Ministry of Commerce has representation in approximately 33 missions out of which 4 are headed by Commerce
- Labour and Manpower has representatives in 10 missions, where as MINFAL and Finance has one representative each.

Our Strengths and the Road Ahead

- We are the overseas field office for the Government and the private sector and an important player in overseas implementation and execution of national economic agenda
- A dedicated cadre of 406 professionals with a life time commitment to work on foreign policy issues
- There is a need to develop close partnership between the Foreign Office, the sectoral ministries and the private sector to optimally utilize our limited resources.

The Road Ahead

- The Foreign Ministry's role in economic diplomacy is vital and indispensable for several reasons and should cover all areas of Pakistan's external economic relations because:
- It is the only institution with a comprehensive overview of the strategic and current directions in Pakistan's external relations.
- Economic relations are closely linked to political relations and often predicated on such relations
- Best placed to utilize the cross-leverage of political and economic relations, maximizing benefits to the country in both areas.

The Road Ahead

- In contrast to the sectoral view of each of the functional Ministries, the Foreign Ministry has a broad overview and is better placed to prioritize between different and, at times, competing economic and/or political objectives.
- Possesses an existing institutional structure, especially through Pakistan's Missions abroad, to pursue and promote the country's economic and commercial objectives
- The personnel of the Foreign Service are trained and oriented to analyze complex situations in foreign countries. If the capacity of the Ministry in the economic field is adequately enhanced, the Foreign Service professionals, as proved in the past, can deliver the best possible outcomes in negotiations both in the bilateral and multilateral contexts.

The Road Ahead

- If need be, necessary changes should be made in the rules of business to reflect and take into account the new needs and demands on the government in general and Foreign Ministry in particular
- There is a need to intensify and institutionalize inter-ministerial coordination
- The establishment of the Task Force on Trade Diplomacy with representation from Commerce and Foreign Office is a welcome development.
- Similarly, the creation of WTO Council also provides the necessary framework for inter-ministerial Coordination on WTO issues.
- Efforts already underway to restructure and strengthen the Economic Cooperation Division of the Foreign Ministry



5-A, Zafar Ali Road, Gulberg V, Lahore-54000, Pakistan.
Tel: (+92-42) 111 123 345 Fax: (+92-42) 575 1551
E-mail: info@pildat.org URL: www.pildat.org