Q3: The formation of new provinces is a recurring discourse in Pakistan. Critically evaluate the hurdles and give recommendations. (NOA-Mock exam'25)

1) INTRODUCTION:

The demand for new provinces is recurring and politically salient debate in Pakistan. Proposals - ranging from South Punjab (Siraiki) and Bhawalpur to Hazara - claim to address issues of political marginalization, inequitable resources allocation and administrative inefficiency. This answer critically examines the structural, political, legal and socio-economic hurdles that obstruct provincial reorganization and then offers practical implementable recommendations. The analysis uses recent developments (South Punjab/Hazara bills, legislative activity) to illustrate persistent constraints and policy options.

2) CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HURDLES (PROCEDURAL COMPLEXITY):-

Creating a new province requires a constitutional ammendment under part XI of the 1973 Constitution. A bill must pass both Houses of Parliment by a two-third majority and then be transmitted to all provincial assemblies for approval (Article 239 procedure). This multi-stage, high-threshold process deliberately protects fedral stability but raises a major hurdle: achieving consistent two-third support across political actors is extremely difficult given Pakistan's fragmented party politics and provincial interests. The legal threshold therefore converts what maybe valid regional demand into a near impossible legislative task without wide national consensus.

3) **POLITICAL HURDLES (PARTY POLITICS, ELECTORAL INCENTIVES):** Political parties walk a tight-rope between courting regional voters and preserving national alliances. Mainstream parties (PML-N, PPP, PTI) often adopt opportunistic or inconsistent positions: supporting provincial bifurcation rhetorically but resisting concreate constitutional change when it threatens political balance or patronage networks. Party competition in Punjab makes any alteration of seats and electoral maps politically explosive. Senate and committee debates on South Punjab show how parliamentary procedures stall progress - committees often defer or fragment bills rather then push decisive votes. Recent senate panel activity on South Punjab demonstrates this paralysis.

4) **ETHNIC IDENTITY AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES (SOCIAL COHESION RISKS):** Proposals for provincehood are frequently couched in identity claims (language, ethnicity, historical states). While identity based reorganization can empower marginalized groups (eg Siraiki speakers, Hazarewa) it also risks triggering inter group boundary disputes. Overlapping claims (eg which districts belong to a new Saraiki province, whether DI Khan / Tank join South Punjab) creates local conflict. Identity framing also invites zero-sum politics: elites in origin provinces fear loss of resources, political clout and symbolic status (Lahore's dominance in Punjab) which increases resistance. Academic studies show that the Saraiki movement, for eg. has strong identity element but lacks unified political strategy, which complicates negotiations.

5) **ECONOMIC AND FISCAL HURDLES (RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION):** Province creation implies reallocation of financial transfers, assets, liabilities and

natural resources. Central and provincial budgets must be reengineered - dividing physical infrastructure, federal revenue shares, provincial debt responsibilities and development allocations. Provinces with larger fiscal deficits or weaker revenue bases would require long transitions funding, wealthier provinces fear loosing revenue or having to shoulder legacy liabilities. Recent climate shocks and flood relief demands (eg severe 2025 floods in Punjab) make fiscal distribution even more contentious, since provincial governments are under pressure to meet immediate humanitarian and reconstruction needs. These fiscal sensitivities make parties cautious about endorsing new administrative units.

6) **ADMINISTRATIVE AND GOVERNANCE HURDLES (CAPACITY AND INSTITUTIONS):** New provinces require building institutions - secretariat, civil service cadres, law enforcement reorganization, judicial administration and local government frameworks. Weak institutional capacity in many districts raises legitimate concerns about whether a newly formed province can deliver services better than the status quo. Creating a province without parallel investment in administrative capacity risk merely producing undergoverned unit. Past attempts have repeatedly underplayed the human-resource and institutional cost of provincial bifurcation. Practical questions such as staff transfer protocols, pension liabilities, reallocation of public sector employees - remain unresolved in bill drafts.

7) **SECURITY AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS (STABILITY RISKS):** Border or peripheral provinces with weaker state presence (eg parts of South Punjab, adjoining KP districts) have distinct security profiles - organized crimes, militant presence, cross border flows - that complicate security reorganization. Security actors (civil-military apparatus) evaluate the risk of administrative fragmentation reducing control over sensitive areas. Moreover, the central leadership fears that new fault lines could be exploited by non-state actors or external powers seeking to influence regional politics. Thus security calculus is recurring through often unspoken hurdle.

8) SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN DIMENSIONS (REFUGEE, DISASTERS, DEVELOPMENT GAPS)

Recurring natural disasters and the refugee problems highlight the need for resilient administrative units. Yet the argument that smaller provinces will improve disaster management or refugee response is contested: better performance depends more on governance capacity and funding than on mere redrawing of boundries. For instance, Punjab's enormous flood burdens in 2025 accentuated development gaps but also showed that immediate relief depends on coordination across levels of government not just provincial borders. This nuance is often missing in public debates, making the reform appear symbolic rather than solution-oriented.

9) CASE STUDIES: SOUTH PUNJAB (SARAIKI AND HAZARA) — LESSONS FROM PRACTICE:

SOUTH PUNJAB / SARAIKI DEMAND: Long-standing movement with strong regional identity claims and repeated political promises (some secretariats established; parliamentary bills tabled). Parliamentary committees have debated multiple versions but decisive constitutional ammendment remains elusive; geography and differing party maps (PTI, PPP, PML-N) complicate boundaries and political buy-in. Recent legislative activity shows continued interest but no finality.

HAZARA MOVEMENT: Hazara demands have been revived periodically; bills have been presented in recent sessions calling for Hazara province. The Hazara example highlights strong local mobilization but the same constitutional and political barrier remains.

These cases demonstrate that local mobilization alone cannot overcome procedural and political blockades; durable solutions require cross-provincial and national consensus.

10) RECOMMENDATIONS — PRACTICAL, PHASED AND POLITICALLY REALISTIC:

1) PROCEDURAL AND POLITICAL PATHWAY

a) National Commission For Provincial Reorganization (NCPR): Establish an impartial, time-bound commission (parliamentary + experts + provincial reps + judiciary liaisons) to map objective criteria (population, administrative viability, revenue potential, resource base, public consultation outcomes). A commission report should provide detailed maps, and transition plans to depolitisize initial stages.

b) Phased, Conditional Approach: Allow "intermediate" administrative measures (regional secretariats, devolved development authorities, enhanced district autonomy) as confidence builders before full provincehood. These measures should have sunset clauses and performance metrics.

2) LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS:

a) Model Constitutional Ammendment Framework: Prepare a standarized ammendment template (approved by parlimentary legal committees) delineating seat allocations, fiscal formulas and asset liabilities division to reduce adhoc bargaining during floor votes. This template should require pre-endorsement by Finance Commission clarifying resource flows.

b) Binding Referenda At District Level: Where possible, compliment assembly approvals with binding local referenda in affected districts to legitimize boundary choices and reduce identity disputes.

3) FISCAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRANSITION:

a) Transition Financing Facility: Create a fedral transition fund (multiyear, with IMF/World Bank/Islamic Bank facilitation if needed) to underwrite startup cost - secretariat buildings, staffing, IT systems, pensions - conditional on performance benchmarks.

b) Civil Service Rotation and Localization Plan: Design a transparent protocol for reallocating civil servants, preserving service continuity and pension rights; include targeted local recruitment drives to built capacity.

4) SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE:

a) Integrated Security And Development Package: Synchronize administrative reorganization with security planning - joint civil-military working groups to ensure law and order continuity and prevent vaccums that could be exploited by spoilers.

b) Subnational Justice And Police Reforms:
Invest in subnational judiciary and police capacity (training, deployment; community policing) in proposed province areas before authority is transferred.

5) POLITICAL CONSENSUS AND INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE:
a) Cross Party Compact: Negotiate a cross party, time-bound roadmap— with commitments from major parties —to prevent reneging; Parliament should adopt the NPRC recommendations with a super majority where feasible.

b) Public Communication And Conflict Mitigation:
Launch an inclusive public information campaign explaining cost/ benefits, dispute-resolution hotlines for boundary issues, and protection mechanism for minorities to reduce fear and misinformation.

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11) IMPLEMENTATION ROADMAP (SIX STAGES- REALISTIC TIMELINE):

1) Setup NCPr (0-6months) —commission charter, secretariat
2) Diagnostic Phase (6-12 mnths) - maps, fiscal studies, public consultations
3) Interim measures (12-24 months)— Regional secretariat, development authorities.
4) Legislative drafting and referenda (24-36 months)— constitutional ammendments, district referenda.
5) Transition financing and capacity building (36-48months) recruit, train, build institutions.
6) Province Inauguration and consolidation (48-60months)— handover and review.

CONCLUSION: CRITICAL APPRAISAL & FINAL PRESCRIPTION:

The repeated discourse on new provinces reflect genuine grievances over representation, development and identity. Yet the solution is not merely a cartographic exercise: constitutional complexity, party politics, fiscal realities, administrative capacity and security considerations make provinces creation a high-stake reform. To convert recurring rhetoric into constructive reorganization, Pakistan needs a depolitisized, technocratic and phased approach: an impartial commission, conditional interim measures, clear fiscal transition financing, and political compacts that ensure continuity. If implemented meticulously, provincial reorganization can become a tool for improved governance and equity; if rushed or politicized, it risks fragmentation and governance failure.

Q: There is dangerous revival of militancy in KP and Baluchistan. Critically evaluate the reasons and give recommendations.

Dangerous Revival Of Militancy In KP & Baloochistan - Reasons and Recommendation

1. **Introduction:-** Pakistan is witnessing a dangerous resurgence of militancy, particularly in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. This revival has serious implications for security, economic stability & regional geopolitics. The reactivation of groups such as The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP) and Baloch Separatist outfit shows a shifting security landscape after the US exit from Afghanistan. This analysis critically evaluates the reason behind this resurgence and proposes realistic and actionable recommendations to counter the threat.

2. **Background context explained with diagram:**

2021 ⇒ US Withdrawl ⇒ Taliban takeover in Afghanistan

2022-2025 ⇒ Pakistan sees a 65-70% rise in militant attacks

KP ⇒ Increase in TTP activity, targeted killing and ambushes

Baluchistan ⇒ CPEC-linked attacks, BLA resurgence, Gwader and Turbat asymmetric.

3. REVIVAL OF MILITANCY IN KP & BALOCHISTAN

Militant groups have reorganized, expanded safe havens and improved operational capacity. They exploit weak border management, political instability, socioeconomic grievances, and external financial / ideological support.

The security vaccum in Afghanistan has provided strategic space for recruitment, regrouping and cross border attack.

4. REASONS FOR REVIVAL OF MILITANCY:

4.1) AFGHAN SAFE HAVENS FOR TTP:

1) TTP leadership and fighters operate from Afghan soil after regrouping post 2021.
2) Kabul's inability or unwillingness to curb TTP allows cross border attacks.
3) Lack of actionable intelligence cooperation worsens the problem.

4.2) US WITHDRAWL AND REGIONAL SECURITY VACCUM:

1) Abrupt power transition empowered non-state actors.
2) Unregulated weapons, fighters and financial channels reemerged.
3) KP became the first shock absorber due to its porous border.

4.3) WEAK COUNTER TERRORISM COORDINATION INSIDE PAKISTAN:

1) NACTA, police, CTD, and intelligence agencies lack seamless coordination.

2) Delays in implementing the National Action Plan (NAP) weaken the response.
3) Merger (FATA, KP) administrative vaccum also exploited by militants.

4.4) RISING IS-KP ACTIVITY:
1) IS-KP recruits urban youth in KP and Baluchistan
2) It's anti-Taliban and anti-state ideology creates parallel threats.
3) Sophisticated social media propaganda increases recruitment.

4.5) ETHNO POLITICAL GRIEVANCES IN BALUCHISTAN:
1) Local resentment over resource exploitation and political exclusion.
2) Militants use nationalist narratives to justify violence.
3) Areas like Turbat, Kech, Panjgur face persistent attacks.

4.6) TARGETING OF CPEC AND CHINESE INTERESTS:
1) Foreign investment in Baluchistan is seen as a threat by separatists.
2) BLA and affiliated groups attack Chinese workers to gain global attention.

4.7) PAKISTAN - AFGHANISTAN BORDER CHALLENGES:
1) 2600 km long, difficult terrain enables infilteration.
2) Border fencing disputes cause friction.
3) Smuggling networks often overlaps with militant logistics.

4.8) ECONOMIC CRISIS AND UNEMPLOYMENT:
1) Rising inflation and lack of job opportunities fuel recruitment in both provinces.
2) Militant groups offer economic incentives, especially to youth.

4.9) DIGITAL RADICALIZATION:
1) Extremist groups use encrypted apps and social media for indoctrination.
2) Lack of cyber counter terrorism capacity increases vulnerability.

4.10) EXTERNAL INTERFERENCE (INDIA & REGIONAL ACTOR
1) Pakistan accuses external actors of supporting Baloch insurgents.
2) Regional rivals exploit instability for geopolitical leverage.



5. RECOMMENDATIONS / WAY FORWARD:

5.1) RESET PAKISTAN - AFGHANISTAN SECURITY DIALOGUE
1) Establish joint border security commission.
2) Enforce intelligence exchange on TTP, IS KP and smuggling networks.

5.2) REFORM KP POLICING AND CTD CAPACITY:
1) Increase manpower, technology and funding.
2) Modernize surveillance and forensics.

5.3) FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL ACTION PLAN
1) Regulate madrassas, curb extremist financing, and control hate speech.
2) Revive NACTA as the main coordinating body.

5.4) SOCIO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BALUCHISTAN:
1) Prioritize education, health, water and local job schemes
2) Ensure provincial ownership of resources.

5.5) COMMUNITY BASED INTELLIGENCE NETWORKS:
1) Engage local jirgas, tribal elders and religious leaders
2) Incentivize reporting of suspicious activity.

5.6) COUNTER DIGITAL RADICALIZATION:
1) Create cyber units to monitor and dismantle extremist propaganda.
2) Launch deradicalization campaigns for youth.

5.7) PROTECT CPEC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENTS:
1) Establish Special Security Divisions (SSD)

in high risk zones.
2) Improve coordination between military and provincial authorities.

5.8) ADDRESS GRIEVANCES THROUGH POLITICAL DIALOGUE:
1) Engage Baluch Nationalist Groups willing to reconcile.
2) Provide amnesty and reintegration pathways for youth.

5.9) STRENGTHEN BORDER MANAGEMENT:
1) Complete fencing.
2) Increase biometric system at crossings.
3) Regulate illegal trade networks.

5.10) IMPROVE COUNTER TERRORISM LEGISLATION:
1) Update anti terror laws, regulate digital financing
2) Fast track prosecution of terrorism cases.

6. FUTURE OUTLOOK:

If Pakistan stabilizes its borders, closes the ~~economic~~ intelligence gaps and resolves socio economic grievances, the militant revival can be reversed. A proactive - not reactive - strategy is crucial.

7. CONCLUSION:

The revival of the militancy in KP and Baluchistan is driven by overlapping geopolitical, economic and administrative factors. Safe havens in Afghanistan, weak internal coordination, economic hardships and unresolved political grievances all feed into threat. However, with a combination of security reforms, socio economic uplift, regional diplomacy, and counter-radicalization policies, Pakistan can effectively mitigate the resurgence. Sustainable peace requires simultaneous investment in governance, development and strategic coordination with Afghanistan.

Q5: Trump once again pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement. Critically evaluate the future efforts against climate change in the absence of the world leader.

1. INTRODUCTION: GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE IN LEADERSHIP VACCUM: The withdrawl of the United States - the World's second-largest emitter and historically the largest cumulative polluter - from the Paris Climate Agreement for the second time marks a seismic shift in the global climate governance. This moves comes at a time when the global temperature have already crossed 1.3°C above pre-industrial levels, and the world is edging dangerously close to breaching the 1.5°C threshold set by IPCC. The absence of the U.S., a key financer, technological hub, and diplomatic leader, poses serious challenges to future global mitigation and adaptation efforts. This answer critically evaluates how climate initiatives will evolve without the US, what gaps will emerge, and how the world can still sustain momentum towards climate stability.

FUTURE EFFORTS AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF US WITHDRAWL

2. WEAKENING OF GLOBAL CLIMATE LEADERSHIP: The US has historically led climate diplomacy - particularly through COP negotiations, climate financing, and bilateral environmental initiatives. It's absence creates a power vaccum that no single country can immediately fill. While the EU and China may attempt to lead, diverging strategic interests may hinder coherent global direction. As leadership fragments, consensus building at COP conferences becomes slower and more contentious.

3. DECLINE IN GLOBAL CLIMATE FINANCING CAPACITY: The US previously committed $3 billion to the Green Climate Fund, of which only 1/3RD was delivered. With its renewed withdrawl, a significant gap reemerges in financing adaptation for developing nations. Future projects in the Global South - including coastal protection, climate smart agriculture, and renewable energy transition - may face delays due to funding shortages.

4. REDUCING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENT IN GREEN INNOVATION:

The US hosts some of the World's largest clean tech firms, including TESLA, GE, and Silicon Valley's renewable technology startups. Its exit slows the transfer of cutting edge green technologies - particularly in solar efficiency, battery storage and carbon capture. Countries depending on American climate R&D may struggle to keep pace with carbon decarbonization targets.

5. FRAGMENTATION OF GLOBAL CLIMATE DIPLOMACY

Historically, US diplomacy pushed ambitious global targets, especially during Obama's tenure. Without its political weight, future climate negotiations risks fragmentation. Regional blocs, EU, China, ASEAN, African Union - may develop seperate policies, undermining unified framework of the Paris Agreement. This could lead to inconsistent emission reduction pathways among major powers.

6. SLOWING OF RENEWABLE ENERGY TRANSITION IN DEVELOPING STATES:

Many developing nations rely on climate financing, technology-sharing, and diplomatic pressure to transition from fossil fuels to renewables. Without US, the transition in in countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kenya, and Indonesia may slow down. These states may shift back towards cheaper fossil fuels-based development due to limited alternatives and financial constraints.

7. WEAKENING OF GLOBAL EMISSION REDUCTION TARGET:

The Paris Agreement is built on Nationally determined contributions (NDCs). The US withdrawl weakens global ambition because its commitment accounted for nearly 15% of global warming projections exceed 2.3 - 2.7 °C (IPCC 2024). This undermines collective mitigation pathways.

8. INCREASED INFLUENCE OF FOSSIL FUEL LOBBIES:

In the absence of US federal commitment, petroleum corporations, coal companies and natural gas lobbies gain stronger influence. This creates international ripple effects. Countries with agressive fossil lobbies - such as Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the UAE - may push weaker global standards. Consequently, Climate negotiations may witness stronger resistance to phasing out hydrocarbons.

IMPACT OF US WITHDRAWL ON FUTURE CLIMATE EFFORTS:



9. RISE OF REGIONAL CLIMATE COALITIONS (EU-CHINA-INDIA AXIS)

Europe and China may fill part of the leadership vaccum by forming regional coalitions. Example include the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and China's massive renewable energy expansion. However, these initiatives may lack the inclusive legitimacy that US provided, especially for African and South Asian states. Regional coalitions may promote climate actions but without universal outreach.

10. FUTURE ADAPTATION CHALLENGES IN CLIMATE VULNERABLE REGIONS:

South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa and Island nations may face increased/heightened climate vulnerabilities without adequate financial and technological assistance. Higher risk of floods, prolonged droughts and heatwaves will require advanced adaptation mechanisms. Without the US, these states may struggle to built resilient agricultural systems, early warning systems, or climate proof infrastructure.

11. CRITICAL EVALUATION: IS GLOBAL CLIMATE ACTION STILL POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE US?

A purely pessimistic outlook is inaccurate. Despite US withdrawl, several forces continue to drive climate action:

1) EU remains commited to ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)
2) China leads the World in renewable energy installat
3) India continues massive solar expansion (International Solar Alliance)
4) Non-state actors with the US (states, cities, corporations) remain aligned with Paris targets.

However a complete replacement of the US leadership is unlikely. Fragmentation, financing gaps, and weaker enforcement mechanism remain long term obstacle.

12. RECOMMENDATIONS:

12.1) STRENGTHENING EU CHINA JOINT LEADERSHIP MECHANISM: To compensate for the US vaccum, EU and China must establish a coordinated climate leadership platforms focused on NDC enhancement, green technology transfers, and multilateral diplomacy. A shared roadmap can unify global objectives.

12.2) ENHANCING CLIMATE FINANCING THROUGH ALTERNATIVE FUNDS: The Green Climate Fund must be supplemented with new financing mechanisms from EU, Japan, South Korea and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Innovative mechanism, such as Carbon pricing, green bonds and climate insurance pools are crucial.

12.3) EXPANDING THE ROLE OF NON-STATE CLIMATE ACTORS: Universities, multinational corporations and US states - such as California and New York - should continue aligning with Paris goals through networks like "We Are Still In" coalition. Their contribution can partially offset fedral absence.

12.4) STRENGTHENING ADAPTATION INFRASTRUCTURE IN CLIMATE VULNERABLE STATES: Investments are needed in:

1) Climate Smart Agriculture
2) Early warning systems
3) Resilient infrastructure
4) Water management system

Regional Organizations like SAARC, African Union and ASEAN must be strengthened to deliver adaptation solutions.

12.5) ACCELERATING TRANSITION TO RENEWABLE ENERGY: Countries should diversify energy portfolios through solar, wind, hydel and green hydrogen. Chinese, European Union and India can lead technology sharing to ensure developing countries have access to affordable renewable systems.

12.6) INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE: The Paris Climate Agreement requires stronger monitoring, verification and accountability systems. Future COP meetings must establish clearer penalties for non-compliance to prevent major power withdraws from derailing global progress.

CONCLUSION: The withdrawl of the US once again from Paris Climate Agreement significantly complicates future global efforts against climate change. Leadership vaccums, financing gaps, weaker technological transitions, and fragmented diplomacy presents formidable obstacles. However, through strengthened regional cooperation, diversified financing, empowered non-state actors, and more sensitive climate governance by the EU, China and India the World can still maintain forward momentum. A future proof climate agenda requires collective political will, innovative adaptation strategies, and a shared global commitment to safeguarding the planet - even in absence of world's former Climate Leader.