

Precis

Human beings are born into a world that presents itself as a continuous surface of facts, obligations, and events, and yet the most pressing questions that accompany our lives are not the ones about what happens next but about what it all means. Philosophy, in its austere and persistent way, invites us to recognize that the surface of life — the schedules, inheritances, social roles, and accidental occurrences — conceals deeper strata of contingency and necessity. We live as if our choices unfold in a clear moral and temporal order, as if causes could be neatly traced and consequences neatly assigned; but when we inspect the matrix of motives, circumstances, and consequences more closely, we find a thousand resistant seams. The trouble is not merely that the world misleads us: it is that our very manner of understanding — our grammar of agency, duty, and value — is itself historically and culturally entangled. To write a moral history of a single human life is to find, repeatedly, that the grammar of blame and the grammar of praise do not map onto the reality of human becoming. Consider the concept of freedom. On one hand, freedom is preached as the capacity to will without obstacle, to choose in a manner unshadowed by constraint. On the other hand, the empirical fact of our finitude — our dependence on early education, disposition, social institutions, and bodily needs — seems to narrow freedom's scope to a bracketed theatre of permitted moves. When philosophers argue for or against free will, they are not only disputing an abstract metaphysical claim; they are contesting how responsibility will be distributed in the living world. If freedom is a pure metaphysical attribute, its loss would appear catastrophic and nihilistic; if it is a socially constructed capacity, then liberty becomes a project of reform rather than a metaphysical boon. The deep tension arises because both readings capture something true: human will is shaped by forces beyond immediate awareness, and yet within that shaping there exists a dynamic space where reflection, remorse, and revision can occur. The stubborn moral intuition that we can be held responsible — that apology, restitution, and praise have ethical gravity — resists reduction to mere mechanical cause. Time adds another wrinkle. We habitually divide existence into past, present, and future, but this division is not merely chronological; it is existential. The past is not only a catalogue of antecedent events but the sediment of identity: memories, formative injustices, and early affections that quietly condition present responses. The future, conversely, is not only a sequence of potential happenings but the locus of hope, dread, and projects that give current labor its meaning. To live well, then, requires an art of orienting oneself between memory and anticipation. Memory without critical distance ossifies into resentment; anticipation without moral imagination becomes mere egoistic computation. The ethical life demands that we cultivate attentiveness to what we have been, without being imprisoned by it; and a capacity to project ourselves forward, without misrecognizing every possible future as a promise we are owed. Closely related to freedom and time is the problem of meaning. Many of the great philosophical traditions converge on this observation: meaning is not a commodity to be found like a lost coin, but a relation established between a life and a world. A life becomes meaningful when it is tethered to ends that survive the whim of momentary appetite and when actions produce coherence rather than fragmentation. Yet the temptation to seek meaning in grand narratives — ancestral glory, ideological certitude, or the fetish of productivity — is always present. These narratives promise an antidote to contingency but often demand the suppression of doubt. A philosophical temperament, by contrast, retains doubt as a corrective: not a permanent defeat but a disciplined reserve that prevents overreach. Meaning, thus, is an achievement of sustained fidelity

— to persons, to principles, to crafts — that resists the seduction of immediate consolation. Ethics, then, cannot be merely rules appended to action like labels on packages. Moral sensitivity requires an educated imagination. To judge rightly, one must be able to enter, imaginatively and critically, into the positions of others, to understand the particularities of context, and then to render a verdict that balances competing claims. This responsibility is not merely cognitive; it is formative. When we exercise discernment — refusing easy absolutes, recognizing the plurality of legitimate goods — we shape our moral sensibilities for future encounters. Such formation is a slow, sometimes painful process. It involves erring and repairing, facing the discomfort of recognition, and letting new norms carry weight in the heart. The moral life thus resembles the craft of a potter: repeated, painstaking adjustments eventually yield a vessel fit for holding what matters. Justice, as a philosophical category, complicates the picture further because it calls us to consider not only individual virtue but the structure of institutions. We are morally accountable within networks of power, and fairness is not merely a private disposition but a public arrangement. Systems that allocate goods, opportunities, and recognition determine in large part whose voices are heard and whose sufferings are acknowledged. A just society recognizes that personal merit cannot be disentangled from social conditioning; it therefore aims to correct for injustices that arise through mechanisms beyond personal control. Yet there is an unavoidable tension between corrective justice and the liberty of individuals whose choices were freely made. Resolving that tension demands prudence: policies must redress structural imbalances without effacing the moral agency that gives human life its dignity. Identity, too, resists simple reduction. Were we to ask whether there is an immutable core to the self — an inner nucleus that persists through change — we would find persuasive arguments both for continuity and for flux. The self is partly a narrative project: we weave memories, projects, and commitments into an ongoing story that grants coherence. But this narrative is not fabricated from scratch; it is dialogical, emerging in conversation with others, with institutions, and with inherited languages of value. Thus identity is both authored and received. The recognition — or lack of recognition — from others profoundly shapes who we think we are. Philosophers from varied traditions have emphasized the moral significance of recognition: to be misrecognized is to suffer a kind of wrong that corrodes dignity; to be recognized affirms our moral standing in web of relations. Finally, let us consider awe and humility as philosophical attitudes that anchor an examined life. Awe is not merely astonishment at grandeur; it is a recalibration of self-regard in the presence of realities that exceed immediate comprehension. Humility is not slavish self-abnegation but an acknowledgment of limits — epistemic, moral, and temporal. Together they form a corrective to hubris, a reminder that human understanding is provisional and that moral insight often requires patience. Yet humility must avoid degenerating into passivity. The recognition of limits should be the soil from which responsible action grows: an agent acts precisely because the world matters, not because it is fully mastered. If philosophy has any practical bearing, it is here: to provide a disciplined space in which these tendencies — self-exaltation, despair, cynicism, sentimentality — can be examined, corrected, and integrated. The philosophical life asks us to confront discomforting truths about contingency and to respond with a steadier courage: to accept that our freedoms are partial, our histories formative, our institutions flawed, and our knowledge fallible; yet to refuse resignation by affirming that meaning is not impossible, that justice can be approximated, and that human lives can be shaped by deliberation and care. The highest human task, perhaps, is to translate these abstract recognitions into everyday practices: to build

institutions that encourage moral growth, to cultivate relationships that withstand disappointment, and to conduct ourselves in ways that, in the aggregate, nudge the common life toward greater justice and intelligibility. In this pursuit, the profundity of philosophy shows itself not as a refuge from action but as a guide to more thoughtful, and therefore more humane, living.

Words = 1318

{ Precis and Composition }

Question #1

Indent the paragraph. Precis Writing

Title Philosophy: A Guide To
Human Nature

Human beings are surrounded by facts without knowing their meanings. Philosophy tries to explain the meaning of these facts. It tells us that our choices do not have a single consequence. There are many consequences of a single choice. Our nature is entangled in culture and history. We often consider freedom as the capacity to do anything. However, philosophy considers it as the division of responsibilities. It is restricted by education and social institutions. We have divided our life into past, present, and future. The past is the sum of our memories. The future is our anticipation and hope that

"Not only, but also" structure needs parallel phrases

drives our present. A balanced structure between past and present is the prerequisite of good life. We often seek meaning of our life in ancestral glory but meaning refers to our relation between life and the world. It requires aversion from temporary appetites and ~~regu~~ coherence. It can only be possible by suppression of doubt. Similarly, ethics and morality require educated imagination. Before judging someone, we should critically imagine ourselves in their place. However, it can be difficult and painful to achieve. It is because our concept of justice not only considers an individual but also ~~surround~~ considers the institutions which surrounds us. A good society, ~~recognize~~ its societal conditions and corrects the injustice that arises due to it. We often consider our memories to be our identity. However, our identity is formed from institutions and inherited values. Our identity also depends on our recognition. Wrong recognition can harm our dignity while right recognition can improve our moral standing. In the same manner, our life is adjustment in the face of reality that exceeds our understanding and humility is

Subject verb disagreement found. Punctuation needs improvement.

the acknowledgement of our limitations. When combined together, they remind us of our limitations. Recognition of these limits ^{helps} help us to grow. The practical application of philosophy is to provide a deeper understanding of these realities. It asks uncomfortable questions about life and provide us answers. It tells us that our freedom is not absolute. Our histories are ever changing. Our institutions are flawed. Our knowledge is meager. In order to shape our lives, our institutions should encourage growth. Our relations should be strong enough to understand difficult times. We should put in collective effort in moving towards greater justice. In order to achieve all this philosophy acts as a guide for human beings.

Idea is ok.

Comprehension

Human beings live under the habitual illusion that life is essentially a sequence of discrete events — births, accomplishments, losses — each of which can be catalogued, judged, and set beside the others like specimens on a shelf. Yet this inventory model of existence elides the deeper fact that a life is not merely an aggregate of happenings but a continuous interpretative performance: the self is perpetually at work, narrating, selecting, and editing its own experience so that disparate moments cohere into something intelligible. This narrativity is not a mere literary flourish; it is the condition under which we attribute moral praise or blame, assign responsibility, and forge plans. To ask, then, what makes a life meaningful is to inquire not only about external achievements but about the internal grammar whereby events are woven into a single thread.

Philosophers have long insisted that the vocabulary we use to narrate our lives — the metaphors of duty, freedom, fate, and project — profoundly shapes our moral landscape. Consider, for instance, the difference between two metaphors for agency: the clock and the compass. The clock suggests predictability, measured intervals, and causally determined sequences; the compass suggests direction, practical deliberation, and an orientation toward ends. If we think of our actions as clockwork, we incline to deterministic interpretations: causes beget effects and responsibility is a matter of tracing antecedents. If we think of ourselves as compass-bearers, we foreground purposive choice and imaginative projection. Both metaphors capture partial truths; the human predicament lies in holding them together without collapsing one into the other. We are at once product and author of our lives, and any adequate moral theory must account for this duality.

Closely allied to agency is the vexed notion of constraint. Constraint comes in many guises: material scarcity, inherited narratives of worth and shame, linguistic limitations, and the sheer biological finitude of bodies. A person born into scarcity cannot be judged by the same standards as one born into affluence; yet to emphasize constraints exclusively risks excusing moral failure and surrendering the possibility of moral growth. The philosophical task is therefore to delineate a middle path that recognizes the conditioning power of circumstance while preserving the normative force of aspiration. This path requires a calibrated conception of

collide. Resolving
the capacity to
possibilities
design is,
striving
ide
f

responsibility — one that is context-sensitive, that distinguishes between lamentable incapacity and culpable indifference, and that refuses both moral absolutism and facile relativism.

Temporal experience complicates agency and constraint. Time, as lived, is not a neutral container but an active participant in the formation of meaning. The past imprints itself via habit and memory; the future exerts a gravitational pull through hope and anxiety. Yet neither past nor future exists independently of present interpretation. Memory is revisionary: with each act of recollection we select, emphasize, and sometimes silence aspects of what occurred. Anticipation, likewise, is not a transparent window onto future facts but a projection shaped by desire and fear. Thus ethical orientation requires an artistry of temporal attention: to remember critically without becoming captive to resentment, and to imagine the future without supplanting present obligations with fantasies of what might be achieved. Moral maturity consists in the ability to steward one's temporal perspectives so that they inform rather than domineer present conduct.

Meaning, in turn, is something of a social achievement. Although individuals labor to render their lives cohesive, meaning is typically recognized and sustained within a network of relations. Parents, teachers, friends, and institutions provide the interpretative resources — stories, rituals, vocabularies — through which life gains significance. Recognition is, therefore, more than psychological consolation; it is an ethical good. To be misrecognized (to have one's motives distorted or one's identity devalued) is to suffer an injury that interferes with the formation of a coherent self. Societies that neglect the practices of recognition foster alienation, for citizens are left without reliable interlocutors in the project of self-construction. Corrective justice, then, must attend not merely to the redistribution of material goods but to the restoration of conditions under which meaningful recognition can occur.

Aesthetic and contemplative practices play a subtle but indispensable role in cultivating these conditions. The capacity to attend — to notice, to linger, and to register subtle gradations in experience — is parochial to the arts but universal in ethical life. Attention refines desire; it allows us to discern which ends are truly ours and which are borrowed from passing fashions. Contemplative disciplines also teach a kind of humility: they reveal the provisionality of our judgments and the depth of our ignorance. Humility, properly understood, is not self-abasement but a corrective that frees us from the tyranny of immediate assertion and opens us to listening. When humility is paired with sustained attention, it yields judgment that is patient, compassionate, and realistic.

Justice must be understood within this complex fabric of narrative, recognition, and attention. The moral intuitions that animate demands for justice — fairness, equal opportunity, respect for dignity — presuppose a shared moral grammar. But different social groups inhabit divergent grammars, and conflicts often arise when competing histories and evaluative vocabularies

collide. Resolving such conflicts requires not only principled reasoning but imaginative empathy: the capacity to take in another's story, to see how particular injustices have shaped their possibilities, and to design institutions that repair harms without negating agency. Institutional design is thus an ethical art that must balance remedial measures with incentives for personal striving.

Identity formation, finally, demonstrates the porous boundary between personal and communal goods. Identity is neither wholly autonomously produced nor wholly externally imposed; it emerges in the reciprocal interplay of self-fashioning and social reception. The narratives we construct about ourselves find their voice in public language and are sustained by social rituals. When these rituals are inclusive and flexible, they enable plural identities and creative self-expression. When they ossify into rigid hierarchies, they function as mechanisms of exclusion. A polity that aspires to moral legitimacy must therefore cultivate public practices that endorse both the dignity of singular persons and the integrity of shared life.

The philosophical life, then, is not an aloof retreat into abstraction but a disciplined engagement with the practical conditions of living. It asks for clarity in thought, generosity in recognition, courage in action, and modesty in judgment. Its normative aim is not the imposition of one true grammar of life upon all, but the cultivation of competencies — narrative coherence, temporal stewardship, attention, and institutional imagination — that make flourishing possible. In an age of complex interdependence and persistent inequality, these competencies are not luxuries; they are necessities for sustaining common life. Philosophy's highest claim is a pragmatic one: that reflective practices can improve the texture of ordinary living by shaping how we perceive, remember, decide, and repair. To live philosophically is to take seriously the human capacity for self-interpretation and to put that capacity at the service of others as well as oneself.

Questions

1. Explain, with reference to the text, the author's use of the metaphors of "the clock" and "the compass." What tension do these metaphors help to illuminate in moral theory?
2. The passage claims that "memory is revisionary." Discuss the implications of this claim for moral responsibility and for the relationship between past and present. Support your answer with two textual examples or arguments drawn from the passage.
3. Critically evaluate the author's view that "meaning is... a social achievement." What strengths and potential weaknesses can you identify in this claim? Suggest one counterargument and respond to it briefly.
4. The author distinguishes between "constraint" and "aspiration." How does this distinction complicate the notion of moral responsibility?
5. Discuss the role of time in shaping moral maturity according to the passage. How does the author propose we balance past, present, and future in ethical decision-making?

Comprehension

You are allowed to submit only one question in one pdf. The remaining questions may be submitted in separate pdfs.

Answer # 1

The author used the metaphor of the clock and the compass. The clock suggests prediction and sequence. The compass suggests direction and orientation. If we

Consider ourselves as clock we are inclined towards cause and effect relation. If we consider ourselves as compass beavers we foreground purposive choice and imaginative projection. Both metaphors capture partial truth. We should take them side by side without mixing them together.



{ Answer #2 }

In the passage the author claims that memory is revisionary. The past imprints itself via habit and memory. The relation between past and future is that they both cannot exist without of present interpretation. For example, we often select, emphasize and silence aspects of what occurred. In the same way our anticipation is faced by fear and desire.



{ Answer #3 }

According to the author "meaning is a social achievement. It is because meaning is recognized and

Sustained within a network of relations, it is an ethical good which helps in recognition through meaning, our life gains significance. However, misrecognition can cause harm for one self. Societies which do not practice recognition foster alienation. For this purpose corrective justice is important. It restores the conditions under which meaningful recognition can occur.



{Answer #4}

The author distinguishes between constraints and aspirations by elaborating that constraints comes in many forms such as lack of material, language difficulty etc. On the other hand, aspirations are the normative force. Emphasizing constraints risks excusing moral failure and surrendering moral growth. The solution is to find a middle path that recognizes the power of circumstances while preserving the normative force of aspiration.



{Answer #5}

According to the author, time plays an important role in shaping moral maturity. Time is not a neutral container but an active participant in the formation of meaning. The past imprints itself via habit and memory. The future exerts a force through hope and anxiety. We can balance past, present, and future in ethical decision-making by remembering without becoming a captive of hate and imagining the future without fantasies of what might be achieved.



Punctuation

Man is forever caught between necessity and freedom he knows that he must eat and sleep yet he insists that he chooses his own path he is bound by the language of his ancestors yet he imagines that his voice is entirely his own in this paradox he lives neither wholly determined nor wholly free some thinkers argue that freedom is nothing but an illusion a story we tell ourselves so that the weight of existence may be more easily carried others maintain that freedom is the very essence of our dignity and that without it the human being collapses into a mere object among objects which of these claims is truer is not an easy matter to decide for even when we claim to act freely we act under influences that we scarcely recognize tradition expectation desire fear all shape our choices in ways we do not always admit and yet the undeniable fact remains we do blame we do praise we do forgive if freedom were entirely false these practices would be senseless and if necessity were absolute they would be cruel the puzzle therefore is not whether freedom exists but how it coexists with necessity and what this coexistence means for justice responsibility and meaning

{ Punctuation }

Man is forever caught between necessity and freedom. He knows that he must eat and sleep, yet he insists that he chooses his own path. He is bound by the language of his ancestors, yet he imagines that his voice is entirely his own. In this paradox he lives, neither wholly determined nor wholly free. Some thinkers argue that freedom is nothing but an illusion, a story we tell ourselves so that the weight of existence may be more easily carried. Others maintain

that freedom is the very essence of our dignity and that without it the human being collapses into a mere object among objects. Which of these claims is true is not an easy matter to decide, for even when we claim to act freely, we act under influences we scarcely recognize. Tradition, expectation, desire, fear all shape our choices in ways we do not always admit and yet, the undeniable fact remains. We do blame, we do praise, we do forgive. If freedom were entirely false these practices would be senseless and if necessity were absolute, they would be cruel. The puzzle therefore is not whether freedom exists, but how it coexists with necessity, and what this coexistence means for justice, responsibility, and meaning.

Sentence correction

1. The committee, who were expected to announce its decision yesterday, have delayed because the chairman along with his advisors are still disagreeing on the terms, and this uncertainty, it make the investors nervous.
2. A person should avoid making promises that he or they cannot keep, since such actions diminishes trust, creates confusion, and has often been resulted in permanent estrangements.
3. The students which was supposed to present the report on climate change, were absent, and the audience, expecting a thorough analysis, left disappointed because the substitute speaker neither explained the data properly nor he offered meaningful conclusions.
4. The book, together with several articles that discusses the same theme, have been misplaced by the librarian, and no one, not even the assistant, appear to know where it is stored.
5. The proposal was rejected not only because it lacked clarity but also it failed to provide evidences, contained inconsistencies, and the recommendations were sounding impractical in the given circumstances.
6. The manager reminded the employees that punctuality, discipline, and being responsible are expected qualities, and that anyone who violate these principles will be facing strict action.

7. The politician, whose speeches inspires crowds but whose policies has been questioned, claim that his vision and his strategies is what the nation need at this moment.
8. The researchers concluded that the new medicine, which were tested on patients suffering from rare disorders, appear promising, but the results is still too preliminary for drawing reliable conclusions.
9. The village which lying near the river and who often suffers from floods have requested assistance from the government, but the authorities says that no funds has been allocated for such emergencies.
10. The essay was criticized because it contained long sentences full of ambiguities, it ignored the counterarguments entirely, and failing to follow the basic principles of coherence which makes the writing ineffective and confusing for the readers.

{Sentence Correction}

(1)

The committee, which was expected to announce its decision yesterday have delayed because, the chairman

along with his advisor is still
disagreeing on terms, and this
uncertainty makes the investors
nervous.

(2)

A person should avoid making
promises that he or she cannot
keep, since such actions diminishes
trust, creates confusion and has
often resulted in permanent
estrangements

(3)

The students who were supposed
to present the report on
climate change were absent
and the audience expecting a
thorough analysis, left disappointed
because the substitute speaker
neither explained the data properly
nor he offered meaningful conclusions.

(4)

The book along with several articles
that discuss the same theme, have
been misplaced by the librarian, and
no one, not even the assistant, appears

to know where it is stored.

(5)

The proposal was rejected not only because it lacked clarity but it also failed to provide evidences, contained inconsistencies, and the recommendations were sounding impractical in the given circumstances.

(6)

The manager reminded the employees that punctuality, discipline, and acting responsibly are expected qualities, and that anyone who violates these principles will be facing strict action.

(7)

The politician who speeches inspired crowds, but whose policies have been questioned, claims that his vision and strategy is what the nation needs at this moment.

(8)

The researcher concluded that the new medicine, which was tested on patients suffering from rare disorder, appears promising, but the results were still too preliminary for drawing reliable conclusions.

(9)

The village lying near the river often suffering from floods have requested assistance from the government but the authorities claim that no funds have been allocated for such emergencies.

(10)

The essay was criticized because it contained long sentences full of ambiguities. It ignored the counter arguments entirely and failed to follow the basic principles of coherence which makes the writing ineffective and confusing for the readers.

{ Translation }

Human is always lost between two opposite paths during his dedication to find his reality. One on one side he understands the evidence of freedom according to his wishes, such that he is the creator of his destiny, while on the other side he feels that his every action is dominated by a force which is outside his grip. Wisdom teaches him that the universe is based on recipi and principles of need, but his heart insists that a man's reality is his identity. In this confusion neither freedom is complete, nor force. The reality is that a man's life is such a writing in which some lines have already been written and some are being written by his own choice. The question is not whether he is free or not, rather the question is that within his limited circle how can he give birth to responsibilities and meaning. Maybe human greatness is that even after knowing his weakness, he still makes an effort to spend his life with a definite purpose.

Fill in the Blanks (Prepositions)

1. The philosopher insisted that truth is not exhausted ___ empirical facts but extends ___ the realm of meanings that lie hidden ___ appearances.
2. Human beings often oscillate ___ despair and hope, forgetting that meaning emerges not ___ isolation but ___ dialogue with others.
3. Freedom, though celebrated ___ many thinkers, is always entangled ___ necessity and shaped ___ circumstances that precede our choices.
4. Justice cannot be reduced ___ punishment alone; it must be oriented ___ fairness and grounded ___ recognition of human dignity.

5. The poet described time as a river flowing endlessly ___ the past ___ the future, carrying memories ___ its current.
6. The disciple sat silently ___ the presence of his master, listening ___ every word, but never losing himself ___ blind obedience.
7. Identity is constructed ___ narratives, sustained ___ recognition, and threatened when others deny us the right ___ self-expression.
8. Humility does not mean surrendering ___ weakness; rather it consists ___ acknowledging limits and opening oneself ___ new understanding.
9. The community remained divided ___ loyalty to tradition and aspiration ___ reform, unable to reconcile one ___ the other.
10. Philosophy calls us not to escape ___ the world but to live responsibly ___ it, accountable ___ both reason and conscience.

{Prepositions}

(1)

In, to, beneath

(2)

In, In, In

(3)

By, In, By

(4)

To, In, In

(5)

In, And, Within

(6)

In, To, In

(7)

By, By, of

(8)

To , of , To

(9)

In , In , From

(10)

From , In , To