

# Post 9/11 PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY FOR USA.

## OUTLINE

### 1) Historical Background of war on Terror

- Bush Doctrine — "Preemptive Warfare"
- US invoked Article 51 of UN charter, saying that their actions would be against a non-state actor not a state.
- US justified its response under "Roman law" i.e. "Just War Tradition"
- Resolution 1368 by UN Security Council to support US right to defend it-self.

### 2) Pakistan's compulsive Foreign Policy choice Post 9/11.

- Pakistan joined war on Terror not voluntarily but rather a compulsive foreign policy choice.
- US secretary of state and deputy secretary asserted — "You are either with us or against us."

### 3) National Interest Calculus for Pakistan 9/11 Policy.

#### ① Strategic Calculus.

- Access to western advanced technology
- Non-NATO ally. in 2004.
- Frontline State in war on Terror.

#### ② Economic Calculus.

- Gained financial aid, and bail out packages



- Debt & devaluation, FDI etc.
- ③ Political Calculus
  - Counter balance India's narrative post-attacks
  - Gained international legitimacy.

#### 4) Policy Evaluation.

##### 5) Critical Analysis

Not a policy planning failure but had certain execution limitations.

- Media and diplomatic channels failed to promote their narrative at international fronts
- Military was fighting on multiple fronts etc.

no need for detailed outline for 20 marks answer



# POST 9/11 PAKISTAN FOREIGN POLICY FOR USA

## HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON WAR ON TERROR.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks reshaped global politics, leading to the US-led war on Terror in 2001.

~~Pakistan~~ After 9/11 attacks in 2001, the Bush Doctrine emerged as a major shift in US foreign policy, particularly in relation to national security and the use of military force. In this regard the idea of "Preemptive Warfare" is important.

The United States has a right to use military force against emerging threats before they fully materialize. The threat involves weapons of mass destruction/terrorism. US invoked Article 51 of UN Charter that preserves the inherent right of a state to self-defense, if an armed attack occurs against it.

Until the UN Security Council takes measures to maintain peace and security. Now question arises whether self-defense under Article 51 is applicable or not.

US presented <sup>following</sup> three arguments to justify its action <sup>war on terror</sup> in this regard. Firstly, Al-Qaeda is a non-state actor that had carried out an attack of such scale and coordination that it



was equivalent to a state-level armed attack. ~~Article 51~~ <sup>provision</sup> is applied on state to state actions, not giving provisions regarding non-state actors. US further justified its response under the Roman Law i.e. "Just War Tradition" that Threat is so imminent which leaves us with no time for further deliberations. Hence, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1368 and supported the US right to defend itself.

## PAKISTAN'S COMPULSIVE FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE

### Post-9/11

After 9/11, US launched Operation Enduring Freedom to dismantle Al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan. Pakistan's decision to join war on Terror was not a voluntary choice, but rather a compulsive foreign policy choice shaped by strategic realities, US pressure and domestic vulnerabilities. The US Secretary of State "Colin Powell" and Deputy Secretary "Richard Armitage" told then President Pervez Musharraf: "You are either with us 'or' against us."

Key US demands were; closing borders with Afghanistan, cutting off logistical support to the Taliban, granting airspace and intelligence



keep the description of single arguments brief and attempt by giving subheadings.

cooperation, allowing military bases and operational support etc. The former foreign secretary of the state Abdul Satta in his book "Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2019" stated that

"the question while the formulation of the policy was not whether the country could take advantage of its strategic location for economic or political benefits from the United States; the decisive factor was the predictable cost of non-cooperation."

In short, Pakistan joining of US war on Terror was its compulsive choice rather than free will.

## NATIONAL INTEREST CALCULUS FOR PAKISTAN 9/11

Pakistan's foreign policy decision were shaped by "National Interest Calculus" having three key dimensions: strategic, economic and political.

Dimensions	National Interest Goals
① Strategic	Access to advanced weapons, serve western ties, balance India, reaffirm global relevance.
② Economic	US aid, debt <sup>debt</sup> relief, IMF support, FDI, preferential trade access.
③ Political.	Counter India, gain legitimacy for Mushraf regime, avoid unilateral US intervention.



## (1) Strategic Calculus.

By joining war on Terror, Pakistan aim to gain access to Western advanced technology (it was restricted in 1990s through Pressler Amendment), Pakistan became major non-NATO ally in 2001 and was privileged to access to arms deals, training and joint exercises. Pakistan became the frontline state in the War on Terror because of its strategic importance. This partnership served as a balance factor against India's growing defense ties with Israel and US, particularly in advanced weapon system.

## (2) Economic Calculus.

Pakistan gained financial aid and bail out packages, debt rescheduling and deferment, foreign direct investment etc. this helped it to stabilize its fragile economy. The former foreign secretary of state, Abdul Sattar in his book "Pakistan Foreign Policy 1947-2019" describes.

"From 2001 to 2007, the US transferred total financial aid amounted to \$7.1 Billion, including \$2.3 B in military assistance, development assistance, earthquake relief, \$1.6 B in debt, budgetary support, and \$4.8 B in reimbursement of expenditures on logistic support to US forces in Afghanistan."



### (3) Political Calculus

Pakistan got an edge in International diplomacy to counter balance India's narrative post-attack on Indian parliament (2001) and later events like Mumbai attacks (2008). Musharraf's regime gained International legitimacy. Pakistan expected to lead to a broader strategic partnership with west beyond just counter-terrorism. As ~~in fact~~ in 2005 US-Pakistan strategic Partnership flourished, although Pakistan paid a heavy price for joining war on Terror, the mantra "TO DO MORE" of US was meant to negate the sacrifices laid by Pakistan and demanding more lives.

## POLICY EVALUATION.

Aspect	Positive outcome	Negative outcome
① Strategic	Gained MNNA status, secured co-spons, re-affirmed global relevance.	Strategic ambiguity, loss of regional credibility
② Economic	Received billions in aid and debt relief	Economy remained aid reliant, no structural reform
③ Political/Diplomatic	Gained short-term global legitimacy.	Failed to shift narrative, viewed as double-dealing.
④ Domestic security	Initial gains against terrorists	Long-term internal instability and insurgency.



On strategic calculus, Pakistan was successful to gain Major non-NATO Ally status, secured advanced weaponry and reaffirmed its global relevance. On the other hand, Pakistan faced Strategic ambiguity and suffered in the long run due to loss of regional credibility. One of the Pakistan's strategic aim was to counter India's threat by building alliance with US but in 2005 when Indo-US Strategic Partnership proved it a wrong move. On economic calculus, Pakistan gained millions in aid and debt relief, but the economic cost paid by Pakistan was much more than the aid. Economy is still reliant on IMF aid, because no structural reforms taken well on time. On diplomatic or political calculus, Pakistan was accused of "double dealing" though gained short-term global legitimacy. Even today Pakistan is confronting internal instability and insurgency.

## CRITICAL ANALYSIS

If we critically analysis, the foreign policy of Pakistan post-9/11, we conclude that it was the best available option in those time. Though it was a compulsive choice in order to avoid the loss rather than gaining benefits/fruits. we cannot label



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it a policy planning failure but there were certain execution limitations and all the stakeholders were equally responsible for not fully materializing its expected gains. Pakistan military was engaged in multiple fronts such as anti-terror operations in western border, high tension with India at eastern borders. Moreover, it was also facing domestic threats like urban terrorism, sectarian violence etc. Pakistan was accused of playing double-dealing because Pakistan's state media lacked professionalism and international reach to <sup>portray</sup> ~~shape~~ Pakistan as an honest US ally. ~~To~~ In order to avoid similar pitfalls in future crisis, Pakistan needs to integrate civil-military decision-making, and build pro-active narrative control in international media. Rather than focusing on short term tactical gains, we must pay attention towards long-term strategic benefits.

structure needs improvement. use more subheadings and shorter paras.

also, improve the references and the paper presentation part.