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Migration Culture

A Comparative Perspective

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Foreword by Ramunė Čiarnienė

The topic of this monograph prepared by an international group of researchers is up-to-date as well as contributing with the theoretical and empirical research findings to the studies in the field of Migration culture.

This monograph aimes to delve deeper into the migration culture phenomenon patterns in a selected group of European Union (EU) countries: Lithuania, Portugal and Spain. Five objectives have been set to achieve the goal. The reviewed monograph consists of three parts and fourteen chapters.

The first part introduces a theoretical background into migration culture formation and consists of four chapters. Chapter 2 presents previous studies and definitions of migration culture and concludes with definition and features of migration culture. Chapter 3 reveals the push migration factors, representing the economic and non-economic situation of the country of origin as one of the main features. Chapter 4 focuses on values as a major component of a society's culture. Chapter 5 presents a conceptual model for research of migration culture. Chapter 6 presents patterns of migration in the European Union and focuses on the statistical overview of demographical changes, migration situation and migration push factors in the European Union between the older and newer member states.

The second part focuses on Lithuanian migration patterns. Chapters 7–12 present Lithuania's history of migration during historical periods as the catalysts to migration waves, and empirical study of migration culture in Lithuania. The third part introduces examples of migration culture linked to older European Union countries Portugal and Spain.

Every chapter starts with an abstract, reference list is provided at the end of the chapter. Future research directions are provided in Conclusion chapter.

The graphic presentation of the monograph is sufficiently clear and reasonable. The figures and tables used reflect main theoretical insights and empirical research results.

The monograph analyzes and logically summarizes sufficient amount of scientific literature sources, presenting the theoretical insights and empirical research research results of both Lithuanian and foreign scientists. The list of references and literature citations are appropriate.

It can be stated that the objectives set in this monograph have been achieved. From both a scientific and a practical point of view, this collective monograph is significant, and can be seen as an additional contribution to science and a tool for the practical application of knowledge, identifying and analysing construct of migration culture.

January 2021

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Foreword by Laura Salciuviene

The UK left the European Union a year ago. Based on the bbc.co.uk report,[1] the international migration statistics at the Office for National Statistics data suggest that over 130,000 EU people have left the UK. However, many thousands of EU citizens have decided to stay in the UK and have applied for a settlement status. A large proportion of those EU citizens are Lithuanians, Portuguese and Spanish. These on-going migration-related developments raise interesting questions as to why some people leave the UK, while others decide to stay. By offering a conceptual model and empirically testing it in selected EU countries, this monograph offers some important answers to the question on migration culture. Thus, it is a timely publication that contributes to the academic literature on migration culture.

The monograph starts with an introduction to the publication and briefly presents the structure of the monograph. The publication comprises two parts and seven chapters. Every chapter starts with an abstract summarising the content of each chapter and giving "a flavour" for each chapter. The first part provides a "theoretical background into immigration culture formation", where the authors introduce factors driving people to move countries and even continents. Further, the authors present specific "push factors" that play crucial role in migration culture. Likewise, the authors review the literature on values and introduce a conceptual model comprising push factors, values and emigration. This conceptual model adds to important scientific conversations in the field of migration culture. In the empirical study, the authors use several hundred respondents to provide answers to their research questions. The authors present the data collected from an impressive number of respondents in a compelling and informative way. The empirical study uses a complex questionnaire integrating push factors of migration, cultural values and respondents' propensity to emigrate. It is fascinating to see that this work builds on previously published and unpublished works by Mockaitis, Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė. Co-authors conducted the enormously large study involving thousands of respondents to whom the questionnaire containing ninety-two items as well as demographics was administered in an online environment.

[1] Migration figures: Highest number of EU nationals leaving UK in a decade—BBC News.

Understanding of the effects of both push factors and values on respondents' propensity to emigrate requires a lot of explanation from co-authors. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge competences of co-authors in both design and management of an empirical study. Moreover, the findings have been reasonably explained by co-authors, especially the findings on cultural values. Thus, I would like to conclude, it is a timely publication that contributes to the academic literature on Migration culture studies.

February 2021

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Chapter 1
Introduction

Mobility and work abroad have become the central motifs of modern culture (Nowicka, 2007) and the migrant lifestyle has become an influential aspect of career development and success (Rodda, 2015). Over 258 million people in the world live in a country in which they were not born (United Nations, 2018). With 3.5% of the world population, and a number of people that has tripled in the last forty years, almost all regions of the world are concerned.

Some nations' populations, however, are distinctly more mobile than others. Over time migration becomes a common pattern of behaviour, whereby many people in society become captivated by the same intent (White, 2016). These societies could be characterized as possessing cultures of migration or migration cultures.

The term migration can be described (Andresen et al., 2014, p. 2296): "as physical movement from one geographic point to another geographic point (Agozino, 2000), crossing national borders (Boyle et al., 1998)" and culture can be defined as a set of learned and shared values that influence our way of life, our perceptions, beliefs and attitudes, and distinguishes one human group from another (Mockaitis, 2002) and involves collective programming of the mind in three types of values: universal, collective and individual (Hofstede, 1984).

Scholars, such as Timmerman (2014), have studied the process of how a migration-impacted region becomes a *culture of migration.* However, there is no one single opinion among scholars as to what features render a society as a migration culture. A majority of authors (Connell, 2008; Galam, 2015; Heering et al., 2004; Massey et al., 1998; Van Mol et al., 2018) highlight large numbers of outwards-migration for a long time, sometimes continuing for several generations (Liang & Song, 2018) as migration history; others (Asis, 2006 in Galam, 2015; Sirkeci et al., 2012) pay attention to the economic, social and political situation as push-pull factors in sending and receiving countries; and some (Elrick, 2008; Wilson, 2010) note changing beliefs, behaviour and values.

Although the concept of migration culture has recently received attention in wider literature, a more comprehensive conceptualization is as yet lacking. Many studies highlight different aspects or focus on a single characteristic of migration culture.

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There is also a dearth of studies that focus on reasons for, or causes of, migration culture rather than its symptoms; for example, the role of individual or societal-level values in explaining people's willingness or acceptance of migration is addressed only episodically. As such, the concept of migration culture is rather used to describe visible manifestations within societies of migration behaviours than as shaped or driven by invisible or deeper aspects of societal cultures. Whether there are certain characteristics of culture that more or less predispose societies to migrate, such as a set of values that could be described as "migration values", is an aspect of the emergent literature that warrants investigation. Our idea to explore a set of dimensions of migration culture with particular focus on values has support from previous episodical studies conducted by De Jong et al. (1996), where they have identified four migration-related value-expectancy dimensions, and Lönnqvist et al. (2013), who reported about changes of personal values before and after migration of Ingrian–Finnish migrants.

In this work, we examine the concept of migration culture through a more wide-angled lens. We identify several societies that might be labelled as migrant cultures, through an investigation into broader characteristics that demonstrate trends in migrating behaviours over time—that is, observable characteristics. Yet, we also aim to uncover the reasons for these observed tendencies by delving beneath the surface to answer several key questions: What are the key dimensions of migration cultures? What are the characteristics that distinguish societies as migration cultures? Why do people migrate? How does this willingness to migrate become ingrained within a society over generations? How does migration become interwoven within the fabric of a society, societal and individual values?

The aim of this monograph is to delve deeper into the migration culture phenomenon by answering these central questions.

We decided to focus on the case of the European Union, which consists of countries having different history, migration patterns and cultures. The importance could be highlighted as "migration has been, is and will continue to be an important factor in EU population change" (Geddes et al., 2020, p. 6). Moreover, statistics indicate 17 million EU citizens live and work abroad in an EU country other than the one in which they were born (The European Council, 2020).

Usually, speaking about the case of the EU, a concept of mobility is used when we speak about free movement by EU citizens and a term of migration is used when we speak about non-EU citizens "third country nationals" (Geddes et al., 2020). However, a concept of migration culture is directly connected with a particular country or region, and in exploring the case of the European Union, we will use a term of migration analysing separate countries and migration culture there, and will define a migrant as "any person who changes his or her country of usual residence" (United Nations, 1998, p. 17).

We do so through an investigation into empirical evidence that reveals patterns in a selected group of European Union (EU) countries: Lithuania, Portugal and Spain. Our specific objectives are as follows:

1. To define the concept of migration culture and delineate its main features;
2. To develop a conceptual model for exploring migration culture;

3. To analyse migration flows as well as economic push factors on emigration in the EU seeking to reveal three different countries for further analysis;
4. To explore the migration culture of Lithuania via:
    a. A discussion of the history of migration in Lithuania;
    b. An analysis of push migration factors present in Lithuania;
    c. An analysis of value differences between those who prefer to migrate as opposed to those who reject migration in Lithuania;
5. To compare the cases of Portugal and Spain in the context of migration culture.

This monograph consists of three main parts and sixteen chapters in order to present the explored phenomenon of migration culture in greater detail. The first part introduces a theoretical background into migration culture formation and consists of five chapters. Chapter 2 presents previous studies and definitions of migration culture and concludes with our definition and features of migration culture according to which a structure and analysis is built on. According to the main features of migration culture, Chap. 3 reveals the push migration factors, representing the economic and non-economic situation of the country of origin as one of the main features, expressing migration culture. Chapter 4 focuses on other features of migration culture, which generally could be named as values, which are a major component of a society's culture. Chapter 5 presents a conceptual model for the research of migration culture. We end Part I with Chap. 6, presenting patterns of migration in the European Union and focus on the statistical overview of demographical changes, migration situation and migration push factors in the European Union between the older and newer member states.

The second and third parts focus on patterns of migration in selected European Union countries identifying European migration cultures. As a result, based on the features of migration culture revealed in Part I, migration flows and economic indicators were selected for further development. Two older EU countries (Portugal and Spain) with changing migration patterns in the last few decades and one newer country suffering from high emigration rates (Lithuania) were taken for deeper analysis.

The second part is dedicated for Lithuanian case called *Unsettled? Lithuanian Migration Patterns*. Chapter 7 *Lithuania: A small nation, deep-rooted in migration* introduces the general situation of Lithuania and presents a case study of migration culture. Migration culture is analysed according to migration history, migration waves, migration push factors and value differences among different groups of Lithuanians with different experience of mobility and willingness to migrate, which are presented in further chapters. Chapter 8 presents a Lithuanian history of migration starting from the medieval ages, and the four main migration periods starting from the eighteenth century. Chapter 9 focuses on the last migration period and four migration waves exposed that started from 1990. Chapter 10 analyses the culturally encoded motives that lie behind the obvious reasons for emigration and the national identity studies in Lithuania, and relates certain historical periods as the catalysts to migration waves. Chapter 11 presents an empirical study of migration culture in

Lithuania. It focuses on the comparative analysis of six groups of respondents taking into account the values and push migration factors, as described in relation to migration culture, namely immobile locals: (1) without willingness to migrate, (2) willing to migrate; emigrants, (3) intending to return, (4) without intention to return and returnees: (5) without intention to re-emigrate and (6) with intention to migrate. We end Part II with Chap. 12 *A kaleidoscope of societal values in Lithuania: Migration perspectives*, where societal values are analysed via a synthesis of large-scale cross-national studies on values that have included Lithuania.

The third part presents other examples of migration culture explored in this monograph, which are taken from older EU countries. Chapter 13 shortly introduces Portugal and Spain as countries taken for this analysis. Chapter 14 presents a pattern of migration in Portugal, changing from emigration to immigration and links of net migration and economic indicators in Portugal. Features of the recent emigration wave are presented in relation to a previous emigration period. Chapter 15 focuses on a case of Spain. Different from the explored cases of Lithuania and Portugal, we could note that the majority of emigrants from Spain during the last emigration period were not Spaniards but foreigners, who immigrated to Spain earlier. Finally, we conclude with Chap. 16, by summarizing the insights into migration culture presented in this monograph.

The monograph was prepared by a group of researchers, where everyone contributed by writing the relevant chapters. The team consists of six researchers:

- **Vilmantė Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė** is a Professor of Human Resource Management in the School of Economics and Business, a member of the Digitalization Research Group and a leader of the International Migration Research cluster at Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania. She is also a member of the International Economics and Knowledge Research Group at the University of Granada in Spain. She is the author and co-author of more than 150 scientific publications and textbooks and has delivered 12 keynote presentations about migration and expatriation at different conferences. Vilmantė Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė wrote the Introduction and Conclusion, along with Chaps. 6, 7, 8, 9, 13 and 14. She also contributed to Chap. 11. Her research profile link: https://en.ktu.edu/scientist/vilmante-kumpikaite-valiuniene/6a6e3ec7373f2a5d2fdb3e4e5b80debd/.
- **Vilmantė Liubinienė** is a Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities and a member of the Digital Culture Communication and Media Research Group, at Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania. Vilmantė Liubinienė contributed to Chaps. 4 and 16, and wrote Chap. 10. Her research profile link: https://en.ktu.edu/scientist/vilmante-liubiniene/8698ff92115213ab187d31d4ee5da8ea.
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Chaps. 2, 3, and 5, and contributed to Chap. 11. Her research profile link: https://en.ktu.edu/scientist/ineta-zickute/7176e1f950de6aa93e9d9d7cd5156c95/.

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- **Antonio Mihi-Ramirez** is a Professor of International and Spanish economics in the Faculty of Economics and Business, at Granada University. He is the head of the research group SEJ-609 of Granada University "Analysis of migration, International Economics and Knowledge" (AMIKO). In addition, he is a member of the International Migration Research cluster at Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania. In addition, he is the author and co-author of more than 100 scientific publications and textbooks on the topic of international migration flows (from an economic perspective) and knowledge management. Antonio Mihi Ramirez wrote Chap. 15. More information about the author: www.ugr.es/local/amihi.

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Part I
Theoretical Background on Migration Culture Formation

Chapter 2
Migration Culture: The Drivers Behind the Movement of People

The migration culture concept is not a new phenomenon, yet scholarly dialogue about this aspect of migration has emerged only fairly recently. Therefore, studies reviewed on the culture of migration are divided into two groups as (1) the first insights of migration culture at the end of the twentieth century and (2) studies of the twenty-first century presenting a deeper analysis of migration culture, and are presented in this chapter in more detail.

The End of the Twentieth Century: The First Insights of Migration Culture

Perhaps Richardson (1983) was the pioneer who used the term "migration culture". In the case of St. Kitts-Nevis, he describes migration culture as "locally adaptive traits pertaining to the particular island society in question [where] migration is economically and socially fundamental to insular ways of life" (in Mills, 1988, p. 59). Further for understanding how migration culture was created, Mills (1988) analysed St. Kitts-Nevis country's internal processes. This St. Kitts-Nevis case is an interesting example that laid some of the key foundations in the conceptualization of migration culture.

However, we could highlight previous studies, which explored some features in relation to the migration culture. For example, early research in the 1970s had already begun identifying a culture of migration, applying such terminology as "culture of dependency" in analysing Mexican migration to the USA (Wiest, 1973), "migrant syndrome" (Reichert, 1981), "community tradition of migration" (Mines, 1981), "social process of international migration" (Massey et al., 1987) and in referring to migrant communities as "transnationalization of social space" (Goldring, 1992, Rouse, 1992, etc.), "northernization" (Alarcon, 1992) and "transnational localities" (Smith, 1998, 1999) (in Kandel & Massey, 2002, p. 982). Massey et al. (1998)

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explained migration culture as "a key link in the broader social process known as the 'cumulative causation' of migration" (in Kandel & Massey, 2002, p. 982).

More recent references to the emigrant context include "a livelihood option for all classes of people … embedded in the social fabric of the islands" (Potter et al., 2004, p. 59—in Connell, 2014, p. 78), which is described as "a 'visa mentality,' an 'obsessive desire' to migrate (Sunshine, 1985) and a 'migration ideology' in small islands like Nevis (Byron, 1999)" (in Connell, 2014, p. 78). In the case of the Philippines, Asis (1995) defines migration as "routine and taken-for-granted" (in Galam, 2015).

Mills (1988) studied emigration in the Caribbean country of St. Kitts-Nevis from which there was an exodus of people. The high rate of emigration is not uncommon to St. Kitts-Nevis. The country encounters a high rate of emigration; for example, the emigration rate was 42% higher than the population growth rate in period 1960–1970. St. Kitts-Nevis is a very small country. In comparison with the larger countries, emigration loss in St. Kitts-Nevis is felt in a greater social and psychological impact.

Mills (1988, p. 44) collected data on such aspects of migration as: (1) perception of socio-economic conditions of the islands, (2) employment, (3) mobility of household members, (4) characteristics of migrants and (5) income of the household. The main reason that caused Kittitians-Nevisians to migrate was identified as the lack of opportunities (62%), whereof 46% had limited job opportunities. The second dominant condition was the higher prices in relation to wages (31%). The view that emigration mainly occurs due to unemployment is not supported because the data showed that more than half (59%) of all migrants from St. Kitts-Nevis are fully or partly employed at the time of their emigration. Of the country's households, some (44%) are characterized by at least one family member overseas. The average migrant members and return migrants per migrant household equal respectively 2.6 and 1.1. The returned migrants are considered as those who after returning stayed for at least three months. Because most of them do leave again, Mills (1988, p. 47) describes them as "accustomed to living abroad". Emigrants are young with an average age of 24.6 years. The main information about migration is collected from the family.

Appealing to the case of islands, Mills (1988) defines migration culture as "a way of life that was born in immigrant slavery and indenture, and which after emancipation until today is acknowledged as a successful - and for many, the only - strategy for defeating the social and economic pressures of underprivileged status" (Mills, 1988, p. 59). Continuation of the migration is seen as a tradition and important social element in the native society including even those who are wealthy and educated (Mills, 1988).

Explaining the development of the culture of migration, Mills (1988) reviews the four phases of migration of post-Emancipation period which were divided by Marshall (1982), i.e. (1) inter-territorial (1835–1885), characterized by deteriorating economic conditions and stultifying socio-cultural environment; (2) inter-Caribbean (1885–1920), characterized by the worsening economic situation in St. Kitts-Nevis and the Caribbean; (3) crisis (1920–1940); and (4) movement to the metropoles (from 1940) (for more information about the period, see Mills, 1988).

Thus, Mills (1988) generalizes that *culture of emigration* (or *a tradition of emigration*) is created by the historical process with the important impact of socio-cultural, psychological and economic factors. In understanding current and more recent migration processes, it is necessary to understand the historical process of the country and to not restrict the motives to economic factors but pay more attention to non-economic factors as well.

The Twenty-First Century: Demanding a Deeper Understanding of Migration Culture

Kandel and Massey (2002, p. 981) state that in native communities with such a high rate of outward migration, "international migration becomes so deeply rooted that the prospect of transnational movement becomes normative", and youth aspire to a future of living and working abroad. Particularly for young men, migration becomes a rite of passage. Staying at home is deemed as laziness, unenterprising and unattractive to potential mates. In Mexican communities, for example, the migration culture is characterized "by long-standing and high rates of international migration" (Kandel & Massey, 2002, p. 981). Kandel and Massey (2002, p. 981) state that "[i]nternational migration is cultural in the sense that the aspiration to migrate is transmitted across generations and between people through social networks". In their theory of the culture of migration in the Mexican context, they explain that migration-related values become embedded in the culture, disseminated in communities and passed down by generations. Eventually, these values are translated into attitudes and behaviours that influence and perpetuate outward migration to the USA.

Kandel and Massey (2002) explain that a young person's aspiration to live or work in the USA is shaped by several factors, not least of which is the degree of family involvement in international migration decision, as well as the prevalence of migratory behaviour in the community. These aspirations are also shaped by various personal, family and community factors related to migration, such as an individual's past migration experience, demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, the number of nonworking dependents in the household, where one lives, whether or not local work is available and desirable, and one's mother's level of education.

The aspiration to work abroad, in the USA, "is significantly and positively related to the degree of family involvement in international migration" (Kandel & Massey, 2002, p. 992). Through the involvement in international migration, generation after generation pass pro-migration values onto children (Kandel & Massey, 2002).

Meanwhile, the aspiration to live in the USA is unrelated to the prevalence of migration but, even with a weak relationship, the aspiration to work is positively related to the degree of migratory prevalence in the community (Kandel & Massey, 2002).

Research results show that controls such as gender and migratory experience have an impact as well. There are "differences in the transmission of values by gender:

males are consistently more likely than females to want to work (as opposed to live) in the USA, and female aspirations appear to be more sensitive to the degree of family involvement in US migration that those of males" (Kandel & Massey, 2002, p. 990). Concerning migratory experience, "[u]nlike the aspiration to work, moreover, the desire to live in the U.S. is strongly connected to a respondent's own migratory experience: those who themselves have been north of the border are far more likely to express a desire to live there than those who have never migrated" (Kandel & Massey, 2002, p. 994).

Mexican culture of migration has deep historical roots (Wilson, 2010). The aspects of its migration culture include material (economic) base, social relations, rituals and ideologies. Wilson (2010, p. 399) highlights the aspects which work as an aid for migrants, lightening migration and adaptation in the destination country, i.e. "[t]he culture of Mexican migration is seen to rest on attitudes and norms sanctioning the maintenance of reciprocity networks, the establishment of compadrazgo [ritual kinship] relationships, and the furtherance of religious practices".

Wilson (2010, p. 400) distinguishes Cornelius's (1990) definition of the culture of outmigration from Mexican rural communities for its scope of aspects, i.e. "a set of interrelated perceptions, attitudinal orientations, socialization processes and social structures, including transnational social networks, growing out of the international migratory experience, which constantly encourage, validate and facilitate participation in this movement".

Besides, Wilson (2010) developed a definition of the Mexican culture of migration, i.e. the culture of Mexican migration "includes beliefs, norms, attitudes, rituals and values (often contested along gender and generational lines) that develop to rationalize and ratify social and economic structures, and relationships and are in turn ratified by social and economic phenomena" (Wilson, 2010, p. 415). Wilson (2010, p. 415) emphasizes that culture of migration "is not static, but dynamic, changing in response to both internal developments and external forces".

Hedberg and Kepsu (2003) characterize the Finland-Swedish minority's migration to Sweden by a certain culture of migration "linked to Swedish history and language" (Hedberg & Kepsu, 2003, p. 67). Klövekorn (1960), De Geer (1977) and McRae (1999) describe the Swedish speaking minority in Finland as having a strong tradition of international migration (in Hedberg & Kepsu, 2003, p. 71). Sweden is described as a destination country of "nest-leaving", i.e. as a part of the individual life course (Warnes, 1992—in Hedberg & Kepsu, 2003). Hedberg and Kepsu (2003, p. 82) use the term "career-oriented culture of migration".

Hedberg and Kepsu (2003) state that there is a need for new perspectives in migration research, enabling it to complement the dominating neoclassical economic framework. In analysing migration processes, it is necessary to pay more attention to the cultural aspects. The decision to migrate can be expressed by individual and collective values. Also, individual characteristics (e.g. ethnicity, age) have an impact on the selectivity of migrants (Boyle et al., 1998 and Fielding, 1992—in Hedberg & Kepsu, 2003, p. 68).

Heering et al. (2004) analyse the role of family networks and migration culture in the continuation of Moroccan emigration by a gender perspective using social

capital theory and the theory of cumulative causation. Heering et al. (2004, p. 325) state that "[a] kind of culture of migration develops as a result of the expansion of networks", allowing to access better social and economic resources abroad. As Massey et al. (1998) point out, after some time "values associated with migration become part of the community's values" (in Heering et al., 2004, p. 325). Migration behaviour being "integrated into the structure of values and expectations of families and communities" turns youngsters without consideration to choose the option of international migration as part of the normal behaviour, i.e. be the winner. Within migration culture, "migration is considered to be the only way to improve one's standard of living, that is, those who stay are losers, those who leave are winners" (Heering et al., 2004, p. 335).

Heering et al. (2004) investigated the effects of the existence of a migration culture (based on the theory of cumulative causation) and family networks (based on social capital theory) on emigration intentions. In the case of men, it was confirmed that the existence of a migration culture has a positive effect on migration intentions. Also, it was confirmed that the existence of a migration culture has a stronger effect on migration intentions than family networks abroad. The argument of Faist (1997) is provided, who states that "family networks have no effect on the size of the flows, and that migration culture is the main push factor" (in Heering et al., 2004, p. 334). For women, the results are reversed, i.e. just family networks have a positive effect on migration intentions, whereas migration culture does not affect the intention to emigrate. Unsurprisingly, there are gender differences which can be explained by the different roles played by men and women in Morocco.

By researching the concept of a culture of migration, Heering et al. (2004) defined the migration history of a region as a proxy for migration culture. The variable of migration culture has two values, i.e. (1) "a value 1 for non-migrants living in the provinces with an established migration history" and (2) "a value 0 for non-migrants living in the provinces with only recent migration experience" (Heering et al., 2004, p. 329). However, such conceptualization using the theory of cumulative causation into a variable of migration culture does not allow a full understanding of the concept. As Heering et al. (2004, p. 336) argue, "the challenge for future research is to define and measure migration culture more precisely". Such characteristics as multiple social and cultural ties and bi-national settings need to be considered.

Ali (2007, p. 39) proposes that conceptualization of the culture of migration consists of "those ideas, practices and cultural artefacts that reinforce the celebration of migration and migrants", i.e. beliefs, desire, symbols, myths, education, celebrations of migration in various media and material goods. Also, the culture of migration is highlighted as "a learned social behaviour; people learn to migrate, and they learn to desire to migrate" (Ali, 2007, p. 39). Also, Ali (2007, p. 43) uses a term "a subculture of non-migration", i.e. describing those who choose not to migrate. Ali (2007) maintains the view that the culture of migration is "a complement to examining economic factors and network ties to migrate" (Ali, 2007, p. 38) and "while the culture of migration may have its roots in migrant networks, its effects spread out to those without such social networks" (Ali, 2007, p. 40). The role of remittances in the

enhancement of the culture of migration is highlighted as well (Ali, 2007; Connell, 2014).

Horváth (2008) links a *culture of migration* with the migration history of communities of origin. The culture of migration is described "as a taken-for-granted dimension of the new social organisation of labour" (Horváth, 2008, p. 783). Horváth (2008) lists three meanings of the term of a culture of migration as (1) a cultural fact in the communities of origin, encompassing major changes to the value systems of the sending societies as well, (2) a system of norms and ideologies and (3) symbolic functions.

(1) Massey et al. (1994) point out that changes to the value system occur due to the "emergence of new artifacts, habits, perspectives, ideas and values that become a part of the sending society's culture" (in Horváth, 2008, p. 773)—for example, changes in the economic mentalities of return migrants who have experience of individualism, as well as the influence on youth to choose more individualized life strategies (Horváth, 2008). " '[T]hird culture' may be created by fusing the imported and local cultures" (Massey et al., 1994 in Elrick, 2008, p. 1504). (2) The cases of norms changes are provided by Pieke et al. (2004) who concluded that migration becomes the most preferred and desired strategy, ignoring opportunities in origin country (e.g. traditional economic activities as farming) (in Horváth, 2008). (3) A classical rite of passage, i.e. the transition to adulthood, can be an example of a symbolic function.

Elrick (2008) analyses Polish migration to the West using Horváth's (2006, 2008) extended conceptualization of culture of migration, i.e. three types of the culture of migration. Elrick (2008) emphasizes that (1) a form of the third culture is emerging due to transfer of values, (2) an impact on social stratification in the communities can emerge and (3) traditional values are loosening. In comparison with the two regions of Poland with a different history of migration, in a community with international migration experience, and where migration is deeply rooted as behaviour, people are more open to new migration destinations. This is explained by the existence of migration culture and desirability of migration decisions. Thus, people are more open to the changes in norms regarding such aspects as a destination, migration purposes and duration (Elrick, 2008). The concept culture of migration, as defined by disaggregation in the above-described categories, is applied by other researchers (e.g. Galam, 2015).

Thus, Horváth (2008, p. 773) provides a broad-spectrum definition, referring to a culture of migration as "'changes of values and cultural perceptions' determined by previous migratory experiences within a given community that has a considerable migration history".

Similarly, as Horváth (2008) described the migration history of communities of origin as one of the causes of the persistence of migration, Connell (2008) describes a culture of migration as being pervasive and based on historical precedents, i.e. "decisions to migrate were made as part of everyday experiences and generally accepted as appropriate and legitimate means to economic and social well-being" (Cohen, 2004, p. 5, in Connell, 2008, p. 1031), and migration is seen as an integral part of people's lives. Similarly, as Kandel and Massey (2002) noted, migration is seen as

normative behaviour when especially youth are expected to live and work abroad at a particular time in their lives (in Connell, 2008). In the case of the Polynesian island of Niue, Connell (2008, pp. 1031–1032) emphasizes that even people are expecting to emigrate overseas at some point in their lives, but they "expect never to 'abandon' the island. None relinquish land rights in Niue".

In 2014, Connell published a paper in which he analysed the cultures of skilled health workers (SHWs) migration. Connell (2014) states that the socio-economic culture of migration was enhanced by such characteristics as familiarity with potential destinations, language competence, technical ability, family ties in destinations, economic downturn, changes in values, educational opportunities and the end of post-independence bureaucratic employment. Connell (2014) uses the term "the medical culture of migration", occurring with the orientation "to superior technology and advanced skills, with the aspirations of many of those who wish to become SHWs being linked to perceptions that superior medical practices exist overseas, and that to become an effective SHW access to and familiarity with such practices is necessary" (Connell, 2014, p. 73).

Ronquillo et al. (2011) described the culture of migration as "the fervent promotion of labor export spanning all levels of society [with] campaigns aimed at increasing the allure and prestige of migration" as part of a "culturally ingrained desire to emigrate" that resulted in women choosing to become nurses because that enabled emigration" (in Connell, 2014, p. 78). Connell (2014, p. 79) emphasizes that in comparison with other occupations, the decision to become a SHW means "opened up possibilities of migration".

Sirkeci et al. (2012, p. 33) present a case of Turkey which is described as not just a sending country but also a receiving country due to the following reasons: "[t]he formal end of military control, political reforms, increasing social freedoms, rapid urbanisation, and economic development". Thus, Turkish culture of migration encompasses aspects of immigration to Turkey, i.e. returnees. Sirkeci et al. (2012) criticize the division of migration decision by dichotomous categories, i.e. mover and non-mover measured at specific times. Instead, the migration process should be defined as a fluid process "along a continuum that ranges from immobility to mobility" (Sirkeci et al., 2012, p. 34). Cohen and Sirkeci (2011) define the culture of migration as a framework where "/…/the fluid and dynamic nature of migration links movers and non-movers over space and time and in cultural social and economic ways that develop in relation to an individual's abilities; the strengths and weaknesses of their sending community; and the economic and political realities of sending and receiving countries that include social expectations, opportunities, conflicts, security, and insecurity" (in Sirkeci et al., 2012, p. 34).

Turkish culture of migration is characterized by national and transnational conflicts, regional differences in socio-economic development levels in Turkey and "the dual effect of ethnic conflict and socio-economic deprivation" (Sirkeci et al., 2012, p. 34).

In the case of the poorest, it is emphasized that a culture of migration can develop when people have networks (social capital) and knowledge (human capital), and the environment is conducive (Massey et al., 1993; Cohen & Sirkeci, 2011—in Sirkeci

et al., 2012). Otherwise, migration intentions among the poorest and the wealthiest are expected to be low (Sirkeci et al., 2012).

Besides, in the case of Turkish mobility, Sirkeci and Cohen (2016) use the culture of migration perspective with reference to the conflict. Sirkeci and Cohen (2016) identify that the culture of migration is shaped by the conflict model of human mobility, i.e. conflict is considered as a key driver for human mobility.

Timmerman et al. (2014) describe a migration-impacted region by a *culture of migration*. Living in a culture of migration enables people having migration-related perceptions to collect information and exchange ideas for further subsequent aspirations for migration decision. Thus, the existence of the culture of migration does not necessarily mean the decision to emigrate.

Van Mol et al. (2018) have identified that a culture of migration can occur due to large numbers of emigration having an impact on the changes of the values and cultural perceptions in a local community. Thus, migration is visible as a normal decision.

Similarly, as in the case with Turkey analysed by Timmerman et al. (2014), the case study of Ukrainian migration towards the European Union by Van Mol et al. (2018) states that negative migration feedback of close relatives abroad has a higher effect for decreasing migration aspirations in regions characterized by a culture of migration. Van Mol et al. (2018, p. 9) describe the family feedback mechanism as a "turning point".

Galam (2015) examines a culture of migration among Ilocanos in the Philippines. Galam (2015, p. 138) characterizes the concept of a culture of migration with the meaning "a predisposition to migrate". The aspects which influenced the development of a culture of migration are the socio-economic possibilities, historical and cultural specificity, and state policies (Galam, 2015). Other researchers mention such aspects as historical, political, social and economic factors at various national, regional and global, the Philippine state's institutionalization of migration and reliance on remittances (Asis, 2006, Sills and Chowthi, 2008—in Galam, 2015, p. 140).

Van Hear et al. (2018) identify the culture of migration as mediating drive, related to migrant networks. Cohen and Jónsson (2011) describe that the culture of migration "can emerge among people and communities who become habituated to mobility" (in Van Hear et al., 2018, p. 932). Van Hear et al. (2018, p. 932) emphasize that mediating drivers, "/…/through enabling and constraining movement (both in aspiration and actuality), /…/can play a decisive role in determining migration's volumes, forms and directions".

International migration in communities which are characterized by the culture of migration is "prevalent, foreign remittances are part of economic resources that support households and in some cases stimulate entrepreneurship" (Liang & Song, 2018, p. 167). Liang and Song (2018, p. 167) describe the culture of migration as "a responsible transmission of international migration across generations". Besides, Liang and Song (2018) extend the concept of the culture of migration, proposing the concept of the culture of remittances. Liang and Song (2018) explore the flow of remittances in the province of Fujian in China. "The culture of remittances refers

to norms and expectations of remittances in a migrant-sending community" (Liang & Song, 2018, p. 164), i.e. "[t]he culture of remittances aims to capture the norms in the village regarding the decision to send remittances and how remittances are

Table 2.1 Definitions and features of the migration culture

Author(-s)	Identification of culture of migration
Richardson (1983, pp. 23–24) in Mills (1988, p. 59)	*In the context of St. Kitts-Nevis:* "locally adaptive traits pertaining to the particular island society in question [where] migration is economically and socially fundamental to insular ways of life"
Mills (1988, p. 59)	*In the context of St. Kitts-Nevis:* "a way of life that was born in immigrant slavery and indenture, and which after Emancipation until today is acknowledged as a successful - and for many, the only - strategy for defeating the social and economic pressures of underprivileged status"
Massey et al. (1998) in Kandel and Massey (2002, p. 982)	"a key link in the broader social process known as the "cumulative causation" of migration"
Kandel and Massey (2002, p. 981)	*In the context of Mexican communities:* "long-standing and high rates of international migration"
Fielding (1992) and Boyle et al. (1998) in Hedberg and Kepsu (2003, p. 68)	"The difference in migration behaviour between groups is a sign of distinctive cultures of migration. The decision to migrate, as a part of an individual's biography, is formed by individual and collective values and practices, making migration a cultural event and a part of the identity"
Hedberg and Kepsu (2003, p. 67)	*In the context of the migration of the Swedish speaking minority in Finland, the Finland Swedes,* to Sweden: "'culture of migration' linked to Swedish history and language"
Heering et al. (2004, p. 336)	Migration culture is characterized by the existence of the migration history of a region
Ali (2007, p. 39)	The culture of migration "is those ideas, practices and cultural artefacts that reinforce the celebration of migration and migrants. This includes beliefs, desire, symbols, myths, education, celebrations of migration in various media, and material goods".
Horváth (2008, pp. 773, 783)	"'changes of values and cultural perceptions' determined by previous migratory experiences within a given community that has a considerable migration history" (Horváth, 2008, p. 773) The culture of migration is described "as a taken-for-granted dimension of the new social organisation of labour" (Horváth, 2008, p. 783)

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Author(-s)	Identification of culture of migration
Cohen (2004) in Connell (2008)	The existence of the culture of migration is described as "where migration was pervasive and based on historical precedents, where decisions to migrate were made as part of everyday experiences and generally accepted as appropriate and legitimate means to economic and social well-being" (Cohen, 2004, in Connell, 2008) and "where migration was neither rupture nor discontinuity in personal and household experiences, but an integral part" of countries life (Connell, 2008)
Connell (2014, p. 74)	"Cultures and economies of migration are shaped by the stories, advice, experiences, support and incomes of those who have previously migrated. Migration is neither rupture nor discontinuity in personal and household experiences, but a natural, integral, pervasive and inescapable part of everyday life, in more diversified and extended household and national concepts of livelihood and development"
Elrick (2008, p. 1514)	*In the context of villages in Poland:* "cultures of migration emerge in the form of changing values, behaviour and ideas among the villagers. The formation of cultures of migration is /…/an ongoing process, a constant renegotiation of values and practices of the community at various levels, related to economic and socio-cultural contexts"
Wilson (2010, p. 415)	*In the context of Mexico:* The culture of Mexican migration "includes beliefs, norms, attitudes, rituals and values (often contested along gender and generational lines) that develop to rationalize and ratify social and economic structures, and relationships and are in turn ratified by social and economic phenomena"
Cohen and Sirkeci (2011) in Sirkeci et al. (2012, p. 34)	The culture of migration is defined as a framework where "/…/the fluid and dynamic nature of migration links movers and non-movers over space and time and in cultural social and economic ways that develop in relation to an individual's abilities; the strengths and weaknesses of their sending community; and the economic and political realities of sending and receiving countries that include social expectations, opportunities, conflicts, security, and insecurity"

(continued)

Table 2.1 (continued)

Author(-s)	Identification of culture of migration
Sirkeci et al. (2012, p. 34)	Turkish culture of migration is characterized by national and transnational conflicts, regional differences in socio-economic development levels in Turkey and "the dual effect of ethnic conflict and socio-economic deprivation"
Timmerman et al. (2014, p. 496)	"living in a migration-impacted region or not"
Galam (2015, p. 156)	*In the context of Ilocos town in Philippines:* "Filipino culture of migration as it has developed at least in one town in the Ilocos provinces has to be understood not only in light of the long history of Ilocano migration to Hawaii (and the USA) but also in the affordances and possibilities settlement migration there provides", i.e. the socio-economic possibilities
Asis (2006) in Galam (2015, p. 140)	*In the context of Filipino culture of migration:* "/…/traces its emergence to the confluence of historical, political, social, and economic factors at various scales—national, regional and global. /…/the development of a Philippine culture of migration has been greatly facilitated by the Philippine state's institutionalization of migration"
Sills and Chowthi (2008) in Galam (2015, p. 140)	*In the context of the Philippines culture of labour migration:* "/…/attribute the development of "a culture of labor migration in the Philippines" to the country's history of emigration, the state's promotion of overseas labor, and its reliance on remittances to prop up the economy"
Sirkeci and Cohen (2016)	*In the context of Turkish mobility,* the culture of migration is shaped by the conflict model of human mobility, i.e. conflict is considered as a key driver for human mobility
Van Mol et al. (2018)	Culture of migration may be generated by large numbers of emigration
Cohen and Jónsson (2011) in Van Hear et al. (2018, p. 932)	The culture of migration "can emerge among people and communities who become habituated to mobility"
Liang and Song (2018, p. 167)	The culture of migration is described as "a responsible transmission of international migration across generations"



Fig. 2.1 Main factors, describing migration culture

used (for family use or public projects in the village" (Liang & Song, 2018, p. 182). Authors identify three mechanisms, by which the culture of remittances is formed, i.e. (1) consumption pattern in migrant-sending communities, (2) community members' gossip and (3) migration networks.

The identification of the culture of migration is summarized in Table 2.1.

In accordance with reviewed studies, we describe the migration culture in a particular country or region as *"the willingness of people to migrate with a set of corresponding values, which are developed as a result of economic, social, demographic, political and other push factors of that particular country or region. That complex whole triggers people to leave their home country, and could be identified by migration history and high emigration flows"*.

The main factors, describing the migration culture, are presented in Fig. 2.1.

In summary, the main research object of this monograph is that push migration factors representing the economic and non-economic situation of the country of origin as push factors and values are central to understanding cultures of migration. Therefore, push migration factors are presented in Chap. 3 and the values in Chap. 4.

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Chapter 3
How Migrant Cultures Emerge: The Role of Push Factors

Understanding the impact of emigration is a complex issue. There is no single theory of migration; instead, various approaches are used to deal with this topic, including sociology, geography, economics, history, political science, etc. (Bonfanti, 2014). Furthermore, scholars have no doubt that emigration particularly is difficult to measure. Actually, it is the case that people who are leaving a country are usually much harder to count than those who are arriving. We know that numerous studies have been carried out using the push-pull approach, which takes into account the importance of socio-economic factors as determining factors in migration (Jennissen, 2004; Miranda-Martel et al., 2017; Ojeda-Gonzalez et al., 2018; Stiglitz et al., 2009).

Push and pull theory is the most popular theory, explaining human migration processes. In the nineteenth century, Ravenstein (1885, 1889) was the first author who presented studies about the push and pull process in migration. He highlighted that migration is mainly driven by push and pull factors (Wang, 2010). These early studies of Ravenstein (1885, 1889) were the basis for the migration push-pull theory developed by Lee (1966) later. It assumes that "push factors" are factors, which stimulate people to leave their country of origin, and "pull factors" are attractive factors in the host country.

Based on the dual labour market theory proposed by Piore (1971), pull factors at the host countries and primarily in the richest countries are more important than push factors in the country of origin. He claimed that migrants flow from poorer countries into the richer countries as a result of the labour market demand-side which pulls a labour-intensive workforce. However, the relative deprivation theory reveals the importance of push factors and says that relative deprivation develops a social inequality, and that people who live in poverty have greater incentive to migrate than rich people (Stark, 1984). They do this not just to increase household income, but more for an improvement of economic position in the community and feelings of being more honourable. Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that not all labour markets are the same and that the skills, knowledge and mobility of workers vary according to industry, sector of activity and economic situation (Borjas & Cassidy, 2019; Mihi-Ramirez et al., 2020).

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There is a different classification of migration reasons in scientific literature. General factors influencing migration could be described as demographical, cultural, political, legal, economic, social, psychological, safety, geographical and others (Čiarnienė et al., 2009). Piore (1971) provided four main groups of factors, influencing emigration:

1. Factors related to the place of origin as push factors. These factors are related to the socio-economic situation of the country and could be indicated by employment possibilities, standards of living, the criminological and geopolitical situation, leisure, discrimination, etc.
2. Factors related to the place of destination, which could be referred to as pull factors and be a mirror of push factors in the country of origin.
3. Intervention obstacles, such as regulations, or some geographic obstacles that have to be overcome such as a volcano, earthquakes, deserts, the spread of diseases and similar, which are on the increase dramatically nowadays.
4. Personal factors, such as family characteristics, skills, individual sensitivity and access to information regarding countries, knowledge and intelligence.

Push-pull factors have the opposite mirror image in both countries; for example, low wages are a push factor from the country of origin, and higher wages in the receiving country are a pull factor, which in turn stimulates migration. Therefore, this theory is criticized. However, even received much criticism for being too deterministic, old fashioned and not taking empirical laws into account (Samers, 2010), the theory remains the most popular among scholars.

Taking into account definitions and the main criteria of migration culture determination (see Chap. 2), we place attention on countries of origin but not countries of destination and so, the focus is given to the review of the push migration factors.

After a deep analysis of the scientific literature on migration theories, Kumpikaitė and Žičkutė (2012) and Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017) highlighted the list of emigration push factors, which are widely analysed in the scientific literature and are presented along with the analysed authors in this chapter of the book in Table 3.1.

GDP is one of the most popular indicators in migration research (e.g. Etzo, 2011; Jennissen, 2003, 2004; Polgreen & Simpson, 2011; Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2008) used to measure *the level of economic development*. Studies by Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) and Etzo (2011) point out that the relationship between migration decision and GDP per capita is negative, i.e. the lower GDP per capita, the higher the intentions for migration abroad or migration flow. Kainth (2010) explored the positive relationship between migration and poor economic condition of the family, i.e. it forces people to make a migration decision. Mihi-Ramirez et al. (2017) analysed economic indicators, such as long-term unemployment, earnings, income inequality, poverty and economic freedom of countries in the case of poor and rich EU countries, and revealed that emigration rates increased when earnings and economic freedom decreased and long-term unemployment, income inequality and poverty level increased in poor EU countries.

Table 3.1 Push factors

Factors	Authors
Wages and income inequality	Cooray and Schneider (2016), Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008), and Mihi-Ramirez et al. (2017)
Personal life conditions	Bonasia and Napolitano (2012), Cai et al. (2014), Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), Nivalainen (2004), and Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008)
Prices	Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017) and Vernazza (2013)
Wish for changes	Kainth (2010), Hoppe and Fujishiro (2015), and Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017)
Family reasons	Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), and Thet (2014)
Taxes	Gibson and McKenzie (2009), Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), and Mihi-Ramirez and Kumpikaite-Valiuniene (2013)
Political corruption	Cooray and Schneider (2016) and Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017)
Unemployment	Etzo (2011), Kainth (2010), Hadler (2006), Hoppe and Fujishiro (2015), Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), Mayda (2010), Nivalainen (2004), Vernazza (2013), Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008), and Justino (2016)
Too few employment opportunities	
Not enough new workplaces	
Low level of economic development	Etzo (2011), Kainth (2010), Jennissen (2003, 2004), Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), Polgreen and Simpson (2011), and Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008)
Study and education system	Cooray and Schneider (2016), Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), Thet (2014), and Sell and de Jong (1978)
Social conditions	Heitmueller (2002, 2005), Hyll and Schneider (2014), and Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017)
Environmental conditions	Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), Thet (2014), and Xu and Sylwester (2016)
The level of health care	Baláž et al. (2016), Cenci (2015), Gibson and McKenzie (2009), and Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017)
Intolerance of personal attitudes	Kainth (2010), Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), and Stark (1984)
Discrimination	
Not enough cultural centres and museums	Hadler (2006), Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), and Thet (2014)

(continued)

Table 3.1 (continued)

Factors	Authors
Intention to spread own culture and religion	Datta (2004) and Myears (2000)
Pensions	Holzmann (2016) and Jousten and Pestieau (2002)
Negative emotional state	Cai et al. (2014), Ivlevs (2014), Polgreen and Simpson (2011), and Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017)
Pessimism	
Political situation and views	Kainth (2010) and Thet (2014)
Geopolitical situation	

Source developed in accordance with Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017) and Kumpikaitė and Žičkutė (2012)

Results of the study of Kumpikaitė and Žičkutė (2012) in the case of Lithuania support the following findings: that wages, income inequality, unemployment level and its duration and level of the risk of poverty have a direct impact on emigration.

Justino (2016) agreed that the unemployment level was one of the key factors of recent emigration in Portugal. Moreover, Hui (1997) exploring reasons of emigration from Singapore during the 1960s highlighted high unemployment, low wages and political uncertainty in the country during that period.

In another study, Mihi-Ramirez and Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė (2013) list relative high *taxes* as a push factor of migration and this was supported by the research findings of Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), where 21.6% of respondents revealed taxes as the push factor for migration. However, Gibson and McKenzie (2009) identified that tax rates on high incomes do not strongly push top students abroad.

Many authors have considered the effects of *wages, salaries* and *income inequality* on migration (e.g. Cooray & Schneider, 2016; Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2008; etc.). In an analysis of the emigration rates of high, medium and low-skilled migrants, Cooray and Schneider (2016) found a statistically significant negative impact of independent factor such as wages for each different level of skills of the migrants. From the study by Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017) involving 1,586 emigrants from Lithuania, they highlighted that wages (57.9% of all respondents) and income inequality (35.9%) were from the top three most important push factors. Also, in the study of Cooray and Schneider (2016), the model encompasses income inequality measured by the Gini index. The study showed that the Gini index has a negative impact on the emigration rate of high, medium and low-skilled migrants where in particular, medium and low-skilled categories of migrants are statistically significant. The reason for such a connection is corruption. A high level of corruption increases the costs of emigration, leading to difficulties to emigrate for medium and low-skilled individuals from those countries with greater inequality. Zaiceva and Zimmermann

(2008) found that the intention to migrate abroad is decreased when people are satisfied with their salary. Thus, wages and salary remain one of the key factors that have an impact on the decision to migrate.

Issues connected with employment (Unemployment. Too few employment opportunities. Not enough new workplaces). High unemployment pushes people abroad from their region of origin (country) (Etzo, 2011; Mayda, 2010). In another study, Nivalainen (2004) found that in family characteristics, such as unemployment experience, there is a positive impact on migration, but with regional characteristics, such as area unemployment, the impact is negative. In an investigation of unemployment, Vernazza (2013) found that there is a statistically significant positive impact between the unemployment rate, unemployed people and migration propensity. Meanwhile, Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008)'s research shows a statistically significant negative impact between the unemployment rate and the intentions to migrate abroad. Immobility can occur due to too few job offers for the particular skills of individuals, i.e. too many low-skilled and too few high-skilled individuals (Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2008). Moreover, analysing the impact of a country's emigration rate and such macroeconomic determinants as the unemployment rate, it is necessary to understand that the impact can be twofold, i.e. increasing unemployment can increase emigration (positive impact), but it can show negative impact as well, i.e. unemployed people are leaving the country, decreasing the unemployment level and/or leaving more employment opportunities and workplaces for the remaining population.

To better understand the aspects of occupation and migration intention, the study by Hadler (2006) identified that the migration intention is lower for those who are self-employed and higher for unemployed. For those, who are unemployed, the impact to make a migration decision is statistically positive for each of the migration phases analysed by Hoppe and Fujishiro (2015), i.e. by predecisional, preactional and actional phases. Kainth (2010) analysed the impact of the factor group of better *employment opportunities* and demonstrated that a lack of job opportunities pushes people to migrate.

Reviewing *personal life conditions*, family income, expenses for housing maintenance or purchase, etc., provides many indicators (Kumpikaitė & Žičkutė, 2012). Nivalainen (2004) found the positive impact between the variables of migration and family income statistically significant. Meanwhile, Cai et al. (2014) analysed the relationship between the national average of international migration desires in poor and rich countries and household income. The findings showed a positive impact on poor countries and a statistically significant negative impact on rich countries. Considering the housing variable, Nivalainen (2004) identified the statistically significant negative impact between migration and home-ownership. Personal life condition—selected by 37.6%—was a push factor for Lithuanian emigrants (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2017). In addition, Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008) found out that there was a statistically significant negative impact between migration abroad intentions and variable of the home-ownership, expressing attachment to the region. However, Bonasia and Napolitano (2012) analysed unskilled and skilled migration flow and found a statistically significant negative impact with the indicator of the house prices index ratio difference. *Prices* have an important role in the migration decision as

well. The study by Vernazza (2013) examined the positive impact of the price level on migration propensity. These findings were supported by Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017) who found out that price was a push factor for 28.0% of explored respondents.

Considering *social conditions* in the migration decision, Heitmueller (2002, 2005) found that the emigration rate and social protection expenditures ratio are associated negatively. When there are some levels of aversion to relative deprivation, the migration intention increases (Hyll & Schneider, 2014). Social conditions were the reason for emigration for 15.0% of explored Lithuanians (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2017). Moreover, in the scientific literature, some papers identified *religion* as a push-pull migration factor (Datta, 2004; Myers, 2000).

The desire to receive an education can be a factor that has an impact on the migration decision (Thet, 2014). *Study and education system* with such aspects as study and education price, quality, aspiration for education, etc., play an important role in considering migration. Cooray and Schneider (2016) found that the lower the government expenditure on education, the higher the emigration rate. Moreover, dissatisfaction with the education system also increases emigration (Hui, 1997), especially for highly skilled professionals (Delicado, 2019).

Besides other factors, Holzmann (2016) highlight *pensions* and *health care* benefits as push factors for migration. Pension issues are reviewed by Jousten and Pestieau (2002). In the case of the EU, when the retirement pension is low in the home country, people decide to migrate and to earn a bigger pension in another EU country.

Speaking about the *health system*, Gibson and McKenzie (2009) notice that top students are attracted to return to New Zealand due in part because of the quality of the health care system. Thus, the level of health care is an important variable in the migration decision (Baláž et al., 2016; Cenci, 2015; Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2017). In the case of Ireland, a decrease of resources in the health system influenced a deterioration in the workplace quality for doctors and had an impact on their emigration (Burke et al., 2014; Humphries et al., 2019).

Family reasons such as parents and relatives abroad or marriage have an impact on the migration decision. Thet (2014) reported that such factors as relatives and friends in the area often considered before migration are therefore associated with migration. Also, people tend to migrate to get married (Thet, 2014). In the case of Lithuania, family reasons were selected by 24.9% of respondents (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2017).

People's *wish for changes* can be expressed in a variety of life aspects, e.g. wish for changes in social tensions, self-aspirations fulfilment, career aspirations, etc. Kainth (2010) found out that routine in families and a lack of freedom have a positive impact on migration, i.e. people migrate to rid themselves of a family feud, in order to live a more peaceful and satisfying lifestyle. Moreover, Hoppe and Fujishiro (2015) analysed migration decisions in different decision phases and identified that self-efficacy and career aspiration have a positive impact on each of the decision-making phases, i.e. predecisional, preactional and actional phases.

In an analysis of the factor of public services, Thet (2014) investigated that people tended to migrate because of no physical safety in their origin place. The

analysis showed that in *environmental conditions* such a variable as security is an important push migration factor, while such a variable as air pollution, though not a dominant reason for migration, is positively correlated with emigration rates especially for higher educated migrants (Xu & Sylwester, 2016). In the case of Lithuania (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2017), this factor was one of the least important and was noted just by 8.8% of the total group of 1,586 respondents.

Kainth (2010) and Thet (2014) identify the role of *political factors* in the migration decision. Kainth (2010, p. 4) states that "the political background /…/ exercise a significant influence on the migration of the people". In an investigation study of *corruption* and emigration, Cooray and Schneider (2016) found that the emigration rate of high, medium and low-skilled migrants is positively associated with corruption, i.e. when corruption increases, emigration of highly skilled people also increases. However, emigration of medium and low-skilled people increases at initial levels of corruption.

Hadler (2006) investigates a positive association between migration intention and motives of social life. In accordance with Thet (2014), being *dissatisfied with cultural/recreational condition* acts as a push factor. The dearth of local interest in *culture and the arts*, *ethnic discrimination*, regimented lifestyles and insecurity about the country's future were highlighted as one of the most important non-economic push factors for the emigration of Singaporeans in the 1960s (Hui, 1997). Insights from Kainth (2010) also support the idea that people migrate due to *discrimination* on the ground of the caste. Changes in attitudes and values, especially for the young generation, can influence migration decisions (Kainth, 2010). The younger generation can feel *intolerance of personal attitudes* from an older generation or other reasons (political, religion, etc.).

From a Lithuanian emigrants' case study by Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017), respondents' answers revealed *negative emotional state* or *pessimism* in the home country as another push factor. Ivlevs (2014) analysed the impact of life satisfaction with intentions to move abroad and willingness to work abroad and identified the negative impact for the above-described factors for each of decisions, i.e. move and work abroad. Meanwhile, Polgreen and Simpson (2011) found the negative impact between emigration and happiness, whereas Cai et al. (2014) analysed the national average international migration desires in poor and rich countries and found negative impact with subjective well-being, i.e. the higher subjective well-being, the lower the international migration desires. Subjective well-being measures the quality of life in the scale of ladder steps from 0 to 10, where 0 means "the worst possible life for you" and 10—"the best possible life for you". These factors have a link with emotional state of citizens. Moreover, Hui (1997) found out that intense competition, which influences emotions negatively, was one of the main factors of emigration in Singapore.

In addition, some authors (Christenson, 1979; Hunter, 2005; Lonnqvist et al., 2013; Tartakovsky et al., 2017) reveal the importance of values in the migration process. As mentioned in Chap. 2, we see values as one of the key factors to explain the culture of migration, and as such, Chap. 4 will look in more detail at their importance.

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Chapter 4
Characteristics of Migration Cultures: The Importance of Values

Research on Universal Values

A major component of a society's culture consists of its systems of values and beliefs (Cambridge Dictionary, 2020). A set of learned and shared values influences our way of life, beliefs and attitudes, and distinguishes one human group from another (Mockaitis, 2002). Those beliefs and behaviours are passed on from generation to generation (Cross, 2016). Beliefs and values affect every learned behaviour. These systems are a central component of the larger cultural systems in which they exist. Belief systems involve stories or myths, the interpretation of which provides insight into how people should feel, think and behave. The most prominent systems of beliefs tend to be those associated with formal religion; this even plays a role in secular societies as a component of their culture (see, e.g., Inglehart's, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel's, 2010 discussion on this point).

A value system differentiates those feelings, thoughts and behaviours that are considered right from those that are held to be wrong. Value systems can and very often do grow out of belief systems. Scholars such as Rokeach (1973), Williams (1968) and Kluckhohn (1951) consider values to be the criteria people use to select and justify actions and to evaluate people, including the self, and events. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, p. 556) defined values as concepts or beliefs that pertain to desirable end states or behaviours, transcend specific situations, guide selection or evaluation of behaviour and events, and are ordered by relative importance.

According to Knafo et al. (2011), the last several decades have seen a continued interest in the study of values at both the individual and societal levels. Values have been recognized as having a crucial role in understanding cultures in the growing body of cross-cultural research. At the individual level, values express broad, trans-situational motivational goals (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992). They affect the way people perceive and interpret the world, their preferences and actions. At the societal level, values reflect the reactions of groups (e.g. nations, communities, organizations) to existential challenges (Hofstede, 2001; Schwartz, 1999). They, therefore, play a crucial role in the functioning of social institutions.

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Empirically-derived measures of cultural values emerged from the 1960s onwards with works, such as those of Rokeach (1973), Hofstede (1980), the Chinese Culture Connection (1987), Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990), Inglehart (1990, 1995) and more recently the GLOBE (2004) study. Rokeach (1973) is considered the "Father of values research" (Ralston et al., 2011, p. 4). His instrument, the Rokeach Values Survey (RVS), was in fact developed in the USA and relied on respondents from a single country. Hofstede (1980, 1984) pioneered the field of cross-cultural research, with his 40-country study (that was expanded in 1982 to 50 countries and more recently to more than 70) of cultural values, grouped into dimensions, at the societal level. To capture distinct Chinese values based on the Confucian ethos, the 23-country study by the Chinese Culture Connection (1987) developed the Chinese Value Survey (CVS), which was uniquely non-Western in its identified values.

Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990) drew from the Rokeach Values Survey (Rokeach, 1973), which had limited application for cross-cultural research, as it was initially based on research in the USA and the CVS; they developed an instrument that could be applied cross-culturally. Initially, Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) tested the RVS in two countries (Israel and Germany) and compared these to five additional countries (Australia, USA, Hong Kong, Spain and Finland) in 1990. This instrument became known as the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) (Schwartz, 1992, 2006). Application of the SVS in cross-national samples resulted in distinct values dimensions at the individual and societal levels. The theory developed by Schwartz concerns the basic values held by people in all cultures. Schwartz (2012, p. 3) contends "that there is a universal organization of human motivations. Although the nature of values and their structure may be universal, individuals and groups differ substantially in the relative importance they attribute to them. That is, individuals and groups have different value 'priorities' or 'hierarchies'" (Schwartz, 2012, p. 3). At the individual level, Schwartz identified ten motivationally distinct types of values and specifies the dynamic relations among them (Schwartz, 1992). At the societal level, seven values dimensions have been identified (Schwartz, 2006). We discuss both in subsequent sections.

The SVS: Values of Individuals and Societies

Individuals and groups can be distinguished as people assign values in varying degrees of importance. A particular value may be very important to one person but unimportant to another. Similarly, societies may place more emphasis on certain types of values than others. In his values theory, Schwartz (1992) conceptualizes values as possessing six main features that are implicit in the writings of many theorists, as outlined in an overview of the theory of basic values by Schwartz himself (2012, pp. 3–4):

> (1) Values are beliefs linked inextricably to affect. When values are activated, they become infused with feeling. (2) Values refer to desirable goals that motivate action. (3) Values transcend specific actions and situations. (4) Values serve as standards or criteria. They

> guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events. People decide what is good or bad, justified or illegitimate, worth doing or avoiding, based on possible consequences for their cherished values. (5) Values are ordered by importance relative to one another. People's values form an ordered system of priorities that characterize them as individuals. (6) The *relative* importance of multiple values guides action. (Schwartz, 2012, pp. 3–4).

Values influence action when they are placed in context and are important to the actor. Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) measured both the content and structure of values following the strict motivation which distinguishes those values as important to the people of any culture. These values, according to Schwartz (2012, p. 4), are likely to be universal because they are grounded in one or more of three universals of basic human existence or needs that help people to cope. These requirements are the needs of individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction and the survival and welfare needs of groups (Schwartz, 1994). Holding value priorities that are compatible with the way one lives and perceives oneself is likely to enhance self-esteem and to provide a sense of personal coherence and consistency. Consequently, people adjust their value priorities to their life circumstances; they downgrade values made unattainable by their role opportunities and constraints, and upgrade those, which are attainable (Schwartz and Bardi, 1997).

At the individual level, Schwartz identified ten values subdimensions that represent values on a motivational continuum (Schwartz, 1992). The 10 subdimensions are: Self-direction, Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power, Security, Conformity, Tradition, Benevolence and Universalism. Schwartz (1992, 2012, pp. 4–7) defines each of the ten value types in terms of the broad goal it expresses (see Fig. 4.1).

The SVS consists of 57 items drawn from the 36-item RVS and 40-item CVS as well as items developed unique to the SVS. The final SVS questionnaire includes 45 items that are used to measure the 10 value types directly and 12 remaining items to calibrate individual scores. Of these, 45 SVS items were found by Schwartz (1992) to be valid in cross-cultural comparative studies and were comprised of 35 items from the prior studies (RVS and CVS).

Schwartz (1992, 2012) arranges the value types in a circular structure in which traditional values share motivational similarities to conformity values. He argues that values can be arranged in a circumplex model to reflect the relationship of values to one another. For individuals, values represent the motivational goals that serve as guiding principles in their lives (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990). These dimensions can therefore be assessed empirically by analysing the inter-correlations among the values of individuals within a culture (Schwartz & Ros, 1995).

For example, the pursuit of some types of values naturally opposes other types; these values (e.g. Achievement and Benevolence or Power and Universalism) are on opposite sides of the values wheel. Values that are in harmony with the pursuit of other values are adjacent to one another. In this way, the proposed structure conceptually represents a motivational continuum. Schwartz (2012, p. 12) has provided evidence of the cross-cultural validity of his circumplex model of values, pointing to data from hundreds of diverse samples in 82 countries.

Fig. 4.1 10 (+1) individual-level values. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Schwartz

The values subdimensions in Fig. 4.1 have also been categorized into four higher-order dimensions; these higher-order dimensions represent bipolar dimensions of adjacent value types. They are: openness to change versus conservation and self-enhancement versus self-transcendence. Table 4.1 depicts the higher-order dimensions and corresponding value types.

Table 4.1 Higher-order circumplex dimensions

Dimension	Value types
Openness to change	Stimulation, Self-direction
Conservation	Conformity, Tradition, Security
Self-enhancement	Power, Achievement, Hedonism
Self-transcendence	Universalism, Benevolence

Individualism/collectivism is regarded as the main dimension on which it is possible to distinguish values both on a societal level (Hofstede, 1980; Mead, 1967) and on the individual level (Triandis, 1987). Initially, these subdimensions, or value types, were also classified into higher-order dimensions of individualism and collectivism (Schwartz, 1992). According to Schwartz and Bilsky (1987), values may serve the interests of the individual and/or of some collective. Collectivism consists of the value types—Benevolence, Conformity and Tradition, and Individualism—Achievement, Power, Stimulation, Hedonism and Self-direction. Thus, two sets of higher-order values were derived (i.e. to reflect orientations and motivational continua).

A Refinement of the Theory of Values

Despite the overwhelming increase in research based on the Schwartz theory of values (Knafo et al., 2011), nearly two decades later Schwartz et al. (2012) developed a "refined theory of basic individual values". The motive for the refined theory, as explained by the authors (Schwartz et al., 2012, p. 663), was to provide "greater heuristic and explanatory power than the original theory of 10 values (Schwartz, 1992)". The refined theory "more accurately expresses the central assumption of the original theory that research has largely ignored: values form a circular motivational continuum. The theory defines and orders 19 values on the continuum based on their compatible and conflicting motivations, expression of self-protection versus growth, and personal versus social focus (Schwartz et al., 2012, p. 663)". Schwartz et al. (2012) argue that splitting the existing 10 dimensions into further dimensions may allow researchers to focus on specific aspects of a (sub)dimension that would enable more fine-grained analyses.

In the refined version, Schwartz et al. (2012) began with an examination of the original value theory, data from applications of the SVS and PVQ,[1] and identified new, potentially beneficial, conceptual distinctions. Then they assessed the distinctiveness of the values they identified through empirical research in 10 countries. As noted by Schwartz et al. (2012) and Tartakovsky et al. (2017), the refined theory specifies a comprehensive set of 19 motivationally distinct values divided into 12 groups: Self-direction (thought and action), Stimulation, Hedonism, Achievement, Power (dominance and resource), Face, Security (personal and social), Tradition, Conformity (rules and interpersonal), Humility, Benevolence (caring and dependability) and Universalism (nature, concern and tolerance) (Schwartz et al., 2012). Figure 4.2 presents these values and their motivational goals.

[1] The PVQ is the abbreviation for the Portrait Values Questionnaire, a 40-item instrument similar to the SVS that has been applied in studies on populations for which the original SVS was not suitable, such as children and adolescents (Schwartz, 2006). The key difference between the PVQ and the SVS is that the PVQ measures values indirectly, as opposed to direct measurement in the SVS.

Fig. 4.2 19 values defined as motivational goals. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Schwartz et al. (2012)

Several of the dimensions have been divided into separate categories (e.g. Power, Benevolence and Universalism) reflecting a division into narrower values; two new values—Humility and Face—are also included. The circumplex of values is ordered in a similar way to the original theory. The higher-order dimensions (openness to change, self-enhancement, conservation and self-transcendence) remain the same as in the original theory, and the new divided value types are included under their corresponding dimensions. Three values overlap two higher-order value types: Face (conservation and self-enhancement), Hedonism (openness and self-enhancement), and Humility (self-transcendence and conservation) (Schwartz et al., 2012). The dimensions are further categorized into social focus (openness to change and self-enhancement) and personal focus (self-transcendence and conservation). Finally, a distinction is made between anxiety-avoiding and anxiety-free "sectors", certain factors clearly labelled as one or the other, but with others falling in between

(e.g. Humility and Achievement values seem to straddle both, as does the self-enhancement dimension, while the conservation dimension more clearly falls within the anxiety-avoidance sector). The researchers argue that the "blurred" lines between some of these categories enable researchers to combine adjacent values in the circle when empirically assessing their structure, as well as to pick and choose values tailored to a particular study.

The SVS at the Societal Level

The SVS has also been applied in the study of differences at the societal level (e.g. Schwartz, 1994, 2006). In a similar method to the categorization of individual-level values, at the societal level seven dimensions of values were distinguished, representing three higher-order factors, arranged in a similar way to individual-level values. Related values dimensions are presented on a wheel adjacent to one another, with opposing values across the wheel. Yet, unlike the individual-level values that represent motivational goals, at the societal level values dimensions represent shared views among members of a group (society) about desirable goals or priorities in the abstract (Schwartz & Ros, 1995). These dimensions represent the relationship between the individual (affective autonomy and intellectual autonomy) and the group (embeddedness), the role of individuals in the world and their relationship with nature (mastery versus harmony) and the organization and responsibility of individuals within societies (hierarchy versus egalitarianism) (Schwartz, 2006). Schwartz and colleagues have published findings of replication studies using teacher and student samples and comparisons of western countries to the rest of the world (e.g. Schwartz & Ros, 1995) and correlations with the societal-level dimensions and various country-level indicators (e.g. Schwartz, 2006). Table 4.2 provides an overview of the societal-level dimensions and associated values in the SVS.

Further discussion and application of these dimensions at the societal level are presented in Chap. 12 (Title: ***A kaleidoscope of societal values in Lithuania: Migration perspectives***). Cultural value priorities are shared among members of societal groups and demonstrate how societies organize themselves in order to address their fundamental human dilemmas (e.g. as defined by Kluckholn and Strodtbeck [1961] and others). For example, in coping with these basic issues, Schwartz and Ros (1995) purport that societal value priorities influence the allocation of scarce resources such as human capital and land and dictate the ways in which they are or should be employed. They dictate acceptable norms of behaviour in societies and the rules for evaluating behaviour. Members of a culture share many experiences as they are socialized into a shared cultural context, yet at the same time, they have their own value priorities that are based on psychological differences or personality characteristics (Schwartz & Ros, 1995). Thus, the SVS has been applied to measure cultural variation with and across societies. We next turn to the World Values Survey (WVS) of Inglehart and colleagues, another example of the study of values at the societal level that we will return to in our examination of migration and migration cultures.

Table 4.2 Societal-level dimensions in the SVS

Dimension	Values emphasized
Embeddedness	The value placed in a culture on social relationships, solidarity and group goals
Hierarchy	The value placed on status as demonstrated via hierarchy, rules and obligations, unequal distribution of power
Mastery	The value placed on self-assertion, and dominance over the environment
Affective autonomy	The value placed on the individual seeking personal gratification and experiences
Intellectual autonomy	The value placed on independent pursuit of individual ideas and intellectual curiosity
Egalitarianism	The extent to which a culture values all people as equal, concern for the welfare of others
Harmony	The value placed on living in harmony with the world rather than actively trying to change it

Theory of Value Change by Ronald Inglehart

Inglehart (1990, p. 68) bases the theory of intergenerational value change on two key hypotheses. The first is the scarcity hypothesis: "An individual's priorities reflect the socio-economic environment: one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply". The second is the socialization hypothesis: "The relationship between socio-economic environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved because, to a large extent, one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's pre-adult years (Inglehart, 1990, p. 68)". The combination of these two basic hypotheses and the assumption of increasing material prosperity, in Inglehart's view, form the basis of values change. Early socialization or socialization during one's formative years, according to Inglehart (1997, p. 34), is more important for the formation of values than later socialization. This, of course, does not imply that no change occurs during adult years. Nevertheless, human development seems to be far more rapid during the pre-adult years than afterwards, thus, leading to the conclusion that basic personality change declines sharply after adulthood. Fundamental values change in societies takes place gradually; it largely occurs as a younger generation replaces an older one in the adult population of a society. Thus, the cohort or generational effect is associated with the year of birth and concerns all of the events that one generation has experienced and that other generations have not.

Most theories of value change, including Inglehart's (1990) generational replacement thesis, follow an evolutionary logic, even if they are not explicit about this. This is true for three reasons. First, values are assumed to change in adaptation to changing living conditions. In Inglehart's thinking, these are generational adaptations to changing living conditions in people's formative years. Second, adaptation

happens at the micro-level and when many micro-level adaptations move in the same direction, they accumulate to a macro-level trend. Third, these adaptations are not centrally planned or "socially constructed": no central actor controls them. It is the logic of adaptation that leads agents who are capable of choice to adopt similar strategies (Welzel & Inglehart, 2010, p. 46).

The cultural theory implies that cultures change slowly. Furthermore, when basic cultural change does occur, it takes place more rapidly among younger groups, where it does not need to overcome as much resistance as among older groups, resulting in intergenerational differences. An awareness of the fact that deep-rooted values are not easily changed is essential to any realistic and effective programme for social change (Inglehart, 1997, p. 19). Dunlap and York (2008) argue that Inglehart's theory of value change has provided important insights about the reasons for societal change over the past several decades; its popularity is evidenced in that it has become both widely endorsed and often criticized on various grounds.

As a corollary of Inglehart's ideas, other researchers (e.g. De Graaf & Evans, 1996) have argued that values change is a function of non-economic factors, such as education and dramatic events (e.g. war). These scholars have focused on the period effect, which concerns events that affect all generations equally and at the same point in time. De Graaf and Evans (1996) point out that only generation and period effects can explain the relationship between year of birth and postmaterialism. Postmaterialistic values as a dimension include liberal values, values related to the commitment to democratic norms, such as freedom of speech, tolerance, and concern with ideas and individual rights (Duch & Taylor, 1993). Liberal values are positively associated with the level of education and are likely to be transmitted from parents to children (Inglehart, 1997).

Inglehart's work is focused on contrasting a set of values that are said to reflect a materialist orientation with those reflecting what he calls a postmaterialist view. Those who are living in non-industrial or industrializing countries are more likely to have materialist values that prioritize economic and physical security. People in post-industrial nations are more likely to have postmaterialistic values that reflect an increasing emphasis on the needs for belonging, esteem and self-realization. Evidence from the World Values Survey (WVS), headed by Inglehart since 1981 (2000, p. 23), indicates that economic development is linked to predictable changes away from absolute social norms towards increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting and postmodern values. But culture is also historically predetermined. The fact that a society was historically Protestant or Orthodox, Islamic, or Confucian gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist when we seek to control for the effects of economic development. In his analysis of the distinction between materialism and postmaterialism, Inglehart predicts that shift in (certain) societies reflects what people want out of life—the transformation of basic norms governing politics, work, religion, family and sexual behaviour. Thus, the process of economic development leads to two successive trajectories, modernization and postmodernization; postmodernization represents a later stage of development that is linked with very different beliefs from those that characterize modernization (a greater tolerance for ethnic, cultural, and sexual diversity and individual choice

concerning the kind of life one wants to lead Inglehart, 1997, p. 23). These belief systems are not mere consequences of economic or social changes, but they shape and are shaped by socio-economic conditions, in reciprocal fashion (Inglehart, 1997, p. 8).

In postmodern society, the emphasis on economic achievement as the top priority is giving way to an increasing emphasis on the quality of life. Individual choice of lifestyles and individual self-expression is coming into focus. Thus, the shift from materialist values, emphasizing economic and physical security, is occurring towards postmaterialist values, emphasizing individual self-expression and quality of life. Historically, the Roman Catholic Church was the prototype of a hierarchical, centrally controlled institution; Protestant churches were relatively decentralized and more open to local control. The impact of living in a society that was historically shaped by once powerful Catholic or Protestant institutions persists today, shaping everyone—Protestant, Catholic or other—who is socialized into a given nation's culture.

But religion, argues Inglehart (2000, p. 32), is not the only factor shaping cultural zones. A society's culture reflects its entire historical heritage. One of the most important historical events of the twentieth century was the rise and fall of the communist empire that once ruled a third of the world's population. Communism has left a clear imprint on the value systems of those who lived under it. Societies with a common cultural heritage do generally fall into common clusters. But their positions also reflect their level of economic development, their occupational structure, their religion, the experience of communist rule, their colonial heritage and other major historical influences (Inglehart, 2000, p. 35).

The WVS has hundreds of specific values, but, according to Inglehart (2015), many basic values are closely correlated and can be depicted in two main dimensions. The first major dimension is traditional versus secular-rational values. It reflects the contrast between societies where religion is very important and those where it is not. These societies have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences. In nearly all industrial societies, worldviews have shifted from traditional toward more secular-rational values.

The other major dimension is survival versus self-expression values. As long as people feel insecure, safety priorities will dominate in a society. When survival is uncertain, people will do anything to stay alive: fight, kill each other for food and so on. When people take survival for granted, they become much more peaceful. Their priorities change from an overwhelming emphasis on economic and physical security towards an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being, self-expression and quality of life. Self-expression values give high priority to environmental protection; tolerance of foreigners, gays and lesbians; gender equality; and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life (Inglehart, 2015).

Finally, as concluded in recent studies by Inglehart (2015, 2018), the broad cultural shift from survival values to self-expression values moves from giving the top priority to economic and physical safety and conformity to group norms, towards

an increasing emphasis on individual freedom to choose how to live one's life. Self-expression values emphasize gender equality, tolerance of homosexuals, foreigners and other outgroups, freedom of expression and participation in decision-making processes. It relates to a rising sense of subjective well-being and tolerance, trust and political moderation. This produces a culture in which people place relatively high value on individual freedom and self-expression, and have activist political orientations. In such a context, the system of values becomes closely intertwined with individuals' self-expression drives. The younger the individual, the more he/she is open to change.

Moving from Values Theories to Migration Research

An increasing number of studies have begun looking closely at the link between values theories and migration—in particular migration values. Some researchers assert that migrants' values are likely to change after emigrating to a new country (e.g. Rudnev, 2014); others claim that certain factors that are specific to immigration may affect immigrants' value preferences (Lönnqvist et al., 2011, 2013). On the other hand, researchers, such as Tartakovsky et al. (2017), presume that immigrants internalize their value preferences during their socialization in their country of origin and bring them to a new country, where they remain relatively stable. Migrants' values do not change dramatically; they should remain similar to the values typically held by people in their country of origin and distinct from the values of the non-immigrant (or local) population in the host country. Tartakovsky et al. (2017) found that after many years in the new country, the values of immigrants are in fact different from the values of the receiving society (Tartakovsky et al., 2017). Thus, do values change, and how is values change related to the study of migration culture? Do they assist in identifying migration culture? What types of values do migrants possess? The theories and frameworks of Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz et al. (2012) and Inglehart (1990, 1997, 2015, 2018) described in this chapter may provide some insight into these types of issues.

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Chapter 5
Migration Culture: A Conceptual Model

Our conceptual model of migration culture (Fig. 5.1) consists of three main factors: values, push factors and the emigration event. Emigration is affected or influenced by internal and external forces: people's cultural values that shape their perceptions, attitudes and beliefs, as well as by external forces that act to "push" people to leave their home countries. However, the mere fact of emigrating does not render a society as possessing a migration culture. The act of emigrating is not an isolated event, but one that is tied to the beliefs and values of societies that shape and are shaped by conditions in the home country context that act as driving forces behind migratory behaviours and further reinforce beliefs about migration. Our understanding of migration culture thus follows the definition of Horvath, who states that a migration culture evolves into a cultural fact in the communities of origin, encompassing major changes to the value systems of the sending societies (Horváth, 2008, p. 773). Thus, not only do societal and personal values influence decisions to emigrate; they also, over time, influence the cultural fabric of society. Migration is essentially almost interwoven into the value system of the culture. In brief, "values associated with migration become part of the community's values" (Massey et al., 1998, p. 47).

Certain types of values in a society might be associated with the emergence of a migration culture. These values reinforce the idea that migration is a final goal to be attained (Massey et al., 1998). Migration thus becomes a habitual action, or a societal norm as such, that encourages others to maintain a pattern of behaviour, as people become captivated by the same migratory intent (White, 2016). Hedberg and Kepsu (2003) make the point that decisions to migrate are cultural; they form a part of people's identity and are shaped by individual and collective values. That is, personal values act as drivers to attain migration goals, and the collective norms within society that deem migration acceptable act to reinforce those decisions.

But, how do these values form? There must be an impetus to enable not only an emergence of values supporting and reinforcing of migration culture but also the gradual evolution of societal norms encouraging emigration. Are there forces or factors in the home country environment that contribute to a migration

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

Fig. 5.1 Conceptual model of migration culture

mindset? Through the World Values Survey (WVS) data, for example, Inglehart and Baker (2000) demonstrate a shift that occurs in societal values across countries, with rising economic development. Societal values tend to shift from survival to self-expression values and traditional to secular-rational values, with rising levels of per capita GNP. Yet, some societies appear to be "caught" in survival mode, while moving away from traditional values (such as the Baltic ex-Communist countries) or lingering in between dimensions, e.g. between traditional and modern yet on the verge of survival values (such as Portugal and Spain). Could environmental factors and the institutional environment conflict with existing societal or individual aspirational cultural values, in these cases, leading to a desire for change, or, failing that, a desire to seek an environment more congruent with one's values? Inglehart and Baker (2000) argue that a lack of economic progress can lead to regression, rather than an evolutionary progression of societal values. Yet culture change is a slow process, and institutional or contextual change may occur at a more rapid pace (Roland, 2004). Roland (2004) likens institutional change to the result of a clash between "slow" (e.g. culture) and "fast-moving" (e.g. political, economic) institutions to an earthquake caused by slow-moving pressure building up over time and erupting into substantial changes in formal institutions. North (1990) speaks of institutional inertia as a result of slow changes or lags in formal rules, or because of constraints caused by a country's history (or historical path). A country's past can impede its development in the present. Could migration culture reflect a build-up of pressures and a rejection, of sorts, of the home country environment? Could factors in the environment give rise to or contribute to the development of a culture of migration?

The push factors in our model may provide more perspective. As reviewed in Chap. 3, push factors consist of various factors (economic and non-economic) in the home country that affect emigration. We might think of them as factors that influence the need to emigrate, as well as the desire to do so. These factors are part and parcel of the institutional environment in the home country. They can also be external and formal (imposed by or resulting from institutions) as well as internal and more informal (resulting from personal factors but nevertheless inextricably linked to and likely resulting from external factors). Institutional and formal factors are those, such as wages and income inequality (Mihi-Ramirez et. al., 2017), price levels (Vernazza, 2013), a country's level of taxation (Gibson & McKenzie, 2009), the level of unemployment in the country, the inability to find employment or lack of jobs (Justino, 2016), low level of economic development (Etzo, 2011), inadequate

pensions (e.g. Holzmann, 2016), level of corruption (e.g. Cooray & Schneider, 2016), an adverse political climate (e.g. Kainth, 2010), poor quality of the educational system (e.g. Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2017) and lack of or poor-quality health care (e.g. Baláž et al., 2016).

These factors may also directly affect personal push factors, such as one's quality of life (e.g. Bonasia & Napolitano, 2012), experiencing an intolerance of one's personal attitudes or even discrimination (e.g. Stark, 1984), low overall well-being, negative emotions and pessimism (e.g. Ivlevs, 2014), family concerns (e.g. Thet, 2014) or an overall desire for change (e.g. Hoppe & Fujishiro, 2015). Even factors such as a lack of cultural activities (e.g. museums) (e.g. Hadler, 2006) and a desire to practice one's culture and religion (e.g. Datta, 2004) have been identified in the literature. There is no one set of specific factors, but rather, it is a combination of various factors that influence one another and people's desires to change or better their lives by seeking opportunities elsewhere. These factors can in turn affect societal attitudes and values (e.g. refer to the discussion about Lithuania's societal values relative to those of other countries in Chap. 12), as well as personal values. An incongruence with one's values will also lead to a desire to affect change, i.e. through emigration; values might also reflect underlying migration intentions.

Further, we can delve into historical trends in a country to gauge whether certain communities, or societies, have historically experienced migration flows or just within a particular period. Some countries have experienced migration throughout their histories; others experience distinct emigration waves. Patterns in these movements can allude to migration cultures. In addition, scholars (e.g. Cohen & Sirkeci, 2011—in Sirkeci et al., 2012, p. 34) have also contrasted between the behaviours of movers and non-movers (non-migrants), or stayers.

We expand upon extant studies by considering different types of mobility profiles. For example, it is important to consider not only the actual migrants in an analysis of migration culture, but migration intentions as well. A comparison of actual migrants to stayers (non-migrants), as well as permanent returnees to returnees who intend to or do leave again (whom Mills [1988, p. 47] describes as "accustomed to living abroad") or combinations of such profiles, can improve our understanding about the links between the key variables in our model (Heering et. al., 2004). There is, as yet, a lack of understanding of the role of values, in particular the values profiles of various migrant profiles, in the shaping of a migration culture. To illustrate this point, Kandel and Massey (2002, p. 983) state that "[t]he essence of the culture-of-migration argument is that non-migrants observe migrants to whom they are socially connected and seek to emulate their migratory behaviour". But there are numerous categories of non-migrants, i.e. those who do not have intentions to emigrate, as well as non-migrants who are willing to emigrate. Hence, we might expect, for example, that non-migrant locals, who do not have the intention to migrate, should have different values than individuals who have migration experience or intentions. In other words, we may find that different migrant groups will have different values, despite the existence of home country push factors.

In Part II of this monograph, in exploring migration culture, we will focus on several examples from European Union countries. Migration culture is

described through an exploration of the migration history of communities in the different countries of origin, migration flows over time and their economic and non-economic situations, i.e. the push factors impacting emigration. We also empirically assess the values that underlie migration culture through a comparison of the values of different migrant groups as outlined above. This study on Lithuanian migration values is presented in Chap. 11. The cases of Portugal and Spain are presented in Chaps. 14 and 15. In these chapters, we focus on the migration histories, migration flows and push factors. Thus, we examine Fig. 5.1 via an analysis of different countries and factors, with the expectation that the results will augment our understanding of migration culture.

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Chapter 6
Migration in the EU

The EU was founded in 1957 when six countries, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, formed a union. Denmark, Ireland and the UK joined the EU 16 years later in 1973. In 1981, Greece joined, with Portugal and Spain following in 1986, and then Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. The biggest addition of ten new members took place on the 1st of May of 2004. These ten included Cyprus, Czech Republic,[1] Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Three years later, Bulgaria and Romania joined, and in 2013, Croatia became the 28th EU member state. Analysing all countries in more detail, we will divide them into old EU countries (those 15 which joined the EU before 2004) and new EU countries (those 13 which joined in 2004 and after). The UK left the EU in 2020, but for this analysis we will focus on the previous situation of the EU and therefore will not exclude the UK from this work.

All EU countries differ in size of population, migration flows, economic development, values and history. In this chapter, trying to demonstrate migration flows, we also take into account the size of population and fertility rate in different countries as this and migration have a direct impact on population. Moreover, numbers of migrants could not be analysed equally in the small and large states. In addition, in this chapter in relation to migration culture, we look over the economic situation and migration flows in the EU member states, separating the older from the newer in order to highlight different cases for further deeper analysis in this monograph.

Demographic Situation

The 28 EU countries are very different according to their size. A comparison of populations taken in 2019 shows Germany as the biggest country exceeding 83 million, with France and the UK taking second and third place with more than 66

[1] We use Czechia for Czech Republic further in this monograph.

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million each. Meanwhile, populations of Cyprus, Malta and Luxemburg are less than one million. In total, 15 countries have populations of less than 10 million (see Fig. 6.1).

The percentage change of population of all countries in 2000–2018 is demonstrated in Fig. 6.2. Generally, the population of the EU increased by 5.1%. Looking at changes in population growth, it was positive in 19 countries and steadily increased. However, in the last 20 years, population has decreased in nine countries.

Romania's population dropped from more than 22 million to less than 20 million. However, we should take into account that other countries with populations that steadily decreased in the last 20 years have much smaller populations than Romania. For example, Lithuania, which had 3.5 million citizens in 2000, lost more than 700,000 (25.7%) of its citizens and Latvia with a population of 2.4 million in the year 2000 saw this decrease by almost a half a million (24%) in the last 20 years.

According to Fig. 6.2, we could see that Lithuania and Latvia lost the biggest amount of their population. Bulgaria's population decreased by 17%, Romania 15.7%



Fig. 6.1 Population in the EU states in 2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020a)



Fig. 6.2 Change of population in the EU states in per cent during 2000–2018. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020a)

and Croatia 10.3%. We also would like to note, that Estonia, even though its population started to grow in the last few years, still had a loss of almost 6%. In addition, the total change in Greece's population—even with the influx of refugees into the country—is also negative (−0.5%). At the other end of the scale, the population of Luxembourg increased by almost 30%, Ireland by 23% and Malta and Cyprus by more than 21%.

In order to reveal links between demographical changes, we therefore look at fertility rates and migration flow, which are the main indicators influencing demography. Total fertility rate is a main indicator, which influences the size of population. It demonstrates number of children per one female. Historical evidence tells us that it is necessary that the fertility rate should be at least 2.1 children per one female in order to maintain population levels in the country. However, this rate is much lower in the majority of developed countries.

Figure 6.3 demonstrates the fertility rate in all EU countries in 2018. It shows us that in all the EU states the fertility rate is too low for natural population increase, with the EU average at only 1.56 children per one female. The worst situation is in Malta, Spain and Italy, where the fertility rate is lower than 1.3. Cyprus, Greece and Luxembourg have a rate between 1.3 and 1.4, Portugal, Poland, Croatia and Austria exceed 1.4, and Slovakia and Hungary are higher but still remain below the EU average. Other countries are above the EU average with the highest fertility rate

Fig. 6.3 Fertility rate in the EU countries in 2018. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020b)

in France, mostly influenced by the fertility rate of immigrants. However, none of the EU countries reach a rate of 2.1 to maintain population at the current levels.

We could see changes in fertility in ten countries during 1960–2018, where data was available (see Fig. 6.4). Fertility rate decreased twice almost in all countries. However, the biggest change could be indicated in Ireland, where fertility rate dropped by 62%. The smallest change (29%) is seen in Estonia. Meanwhile, we should indicate that fertility rate in Estonia in 1960 was the lowest among all presented countries. At this time, it was just 1.98 children per 1000 females and did not reach necessary 2.1. Czechia and Hungary also failed to reach the necessary 2.1 number at this time.



Fig. 6.4 Fertility rates and percentage change in 1960 and 2018. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020b)

By summarizing, we could indicate that not one of the EU countries in 2018 has a fertility rate of 2.1 or higher and so will inevitably face significant ageing problems and a natural decrease of their populations. Therefore, immigration is another option to fight ageing and to increase the growth of population.

Migration Flows in the EU Countries

In analysing migration flows, we look at net migration[2] in the last decade comparing newer and older EU states. We start from the newer EU countries and divide them into separate groups. Malta is the only one new member with a positive net migration throughout this decade, and therefore, we excluded it from this analysis.

Figure 6.5 demonstrates net migration in the new EU states with changing net migration patterns. Cyprus could be highlighted as a country with the most notable changes in migration flows. Net migration in Cyprus was much higher than in other countries during 2008–2011. According to the European Commission (2019), net migration in Cyprus has been positive from 1983 to 2011. However, a very rapid slump could be highlighted in 2013 and 2014, with net migration positive again from 2016. Estonia had the second highest net migration among all countries starting from 2015. It changed its pattern from an emigration to an immigration country. During the same period, we could note, migration was positive during almost all the explored period in Slovenia, Czechia and Hungary. Net migration was fluctuating around zero in Slovakia and Poland.

Four countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania) from the 13 new EU states had negative migration during all the explored period (see Fig. 6.6). We could note that in the case of Lithuania, immigration exceeded emigration just in 2019. Moreover, we included into this figure Croatia, who had a fixed negative net migration starting from 2010. Seeing that emigration exceeded immigration in these presented countries during the explored period, these countries could be indicated as having signs of a migration culture.

In presenting the older EU countries, we could highlight that nine of these had positive net migration during 2008–2019 (see Fig. 6.7). The highest immigration was counted in Luxembourg. Sweden received the highest net migration rate in 2016 and it is connected with the refugee crises. However, this is out of our scope and we do not analyse the impact of the refugee crises in this monograph.

The other six older EU countries had either positive or negative net migration in the last decade (see Fig. 6.8). For example, we know Germany as a country of immigrants, which is one of the most attractive destination countries for recent migrants. However, it was faced with emigration problems in 2008. France changed its patterns from positive to negative net migration starting from 2015. Negative net migration remained for several years in Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Therefore, it could be noted as one of the features presenting migration culture.

Generally, countries with higher income levels tend to offer better conditions for the prosperity of immigrants (Bonfanti, 2014). This is also in line with the concept of profit maximization developed by Wallace et al. (1997). The specific location of certain consumer products used to be in places linked to better lifestyles. These "location-specific consumption packages" (Wallace et al., 1997, p. 39) depend on the level of household income and government policies and actions. Therefore, trying to

[2]Net migration is a difference between immigrants and emigrants.



Fig. 6.5 Newer EU countries with changing net migration patterns per 1000 citizens in 2008–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020c)

look at the relation of migration flows and the above-mentioned features, we look at socio-economic factors in the EU.

Fig. 6.6 Newer EU countries with negative net migration per 1000 citizens in 2008–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020c)

Economic Patterns in Relation to Migration Flows in the EU States

The economic situation in the country, and push factors connected with it, has an influence on migration flows and the formation of migration culture.[3] As it was already noted in Chap. 3, Mihi-Ramírez et al. (2017) using a study of EU members, highlighted economic factors which influence migration flows. The authors highlighted that unemployment, income inequality and poverty have a direct positive impact on the increase of emigration flows. And earnings and economic freedom decrease the flow of emigration from countries. Following data from Eurostat (2020d,e, f, g, h, i), we review economic indicators for the EU28,[4] highlighted by Mihi-Ramírez

[3] About migration culture and factors describing it theoretically are more presented in Chap. 2.

[4] As the United Kingdom was a part of the EU during analyzed period, it was not excluded from the study.



Fig. 6.7 Older EU countries with positive net migration per 1000 citizens in 2008–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020c)

et al. (2017) and Žičkutė and Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė (2015) and focus on a period from 2004 and after, when the biggest number of new members with very different economic development joined the EU.

Firstly, we present long-term unemployment from 2000 (see Table 6.1). Long-term unemployment measures the share of the economically active population aged 15–74 who have been unemployed for 12 months or more.



Fig. 6.8 Older EU countries with changing net migration patterns per 1000 citizens in 2008–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020c)

Before joining the EU, Poland and Slovakia had the highest long-term unemployment level, which exceeded 10%. Looking at 2005, one year after EU membership, we could see the average long-term unemployment level calculated for the EU27 was 4.5%. The highest unemployment remained in Slovakia (11.7%) and Poland (10.3%). In other countries, this level did not exceed ten per cent. The lowest

Table 6.1 Long-term unemployment in the EU countries

	EU member from	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
EU27		n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	**4.5**	**4.1**	**3.3**	**2.8**	**3.1**	**4**	**4.3**	**4.9**	**5.5**	**5.5**	**5**	**4.4**	**3.8**	**3.2**	**2.8**
Austria	1995	n.d.	n.d.	1.1	1.1	1.5	1.4	1.5	1.3	1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.7	1.9	1.8	1.4	1.1
Belgium	1957	3.8	3.2	3.7	3.7	4.1	4.4	4.2	3.8	3.3	3.5	4.0	3.5	3.4	3.9	4.3	4.4	4.0	3.5	2.9	2.3
Bulgaria	2007	9.6	12.6	12.0	9.0	7.2	6.0	5.0	4.1	2.9	3.0	4.7	6.3	6.8	7.4	6.9	5.6	4.5	3.4	3.0	2.4
Cyprus	2004	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	1.3	0.9	0.7	0.5	0.6	1.3	1.6	3.6	6.1	7.7	6.8	5.8	4.5	2.7	2.1
Croatia	2019	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	7.4	6.7	6.0	5.3	5.1	6.6	8.4	10.2	11	10.1	10.2	6.6	4.6	3.4	2.4
Czechia	2004	4.2	4.2	3.7	3.8	4.2	4.2	3.9	2.8	2.2	2.0	3.0	2.7	3.0	3.0	2.7	2.4	1.7	1.0	0.7	0.6
Denmark	1973	1.0	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.1	0.8	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.4	1.8	2.1	1.8	1.7	1.6	1.2	1.2	1.0	0.8
Estonia	2004	6.7	6.4	6.1	4.8	5.2	4.4	2.9	2.3	1.7	3.7	7.6	7.1	5.5	3.8	3.3	2.4	2.1	1.9	1.3	0.9
Finland	1995	2.7	2.5	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.5	1.2	1.4	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.3	2.3	2.1	1.6	1.2
France	1957	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	3.2	3.4	3.4	3.6	3.1	2.9	3.3	3.9	3.9	4.2	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.6	4.2	3.8	3.4
Germany	1957	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	5.9	5.7	4.9	3.9	3.5	3.3	2.8	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.0	1.7	1.6	1.4	1.2
Greece	1981	6.2	5.5	5.3	5.4	5.6	5.2	4.9	4.2	3.7	3.9	5.7	8.8	14.5	18.5	19.5	18.2	17.0	15.6	13.6	12.2
Hungary	2004	3.1	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.7	3.2	3.4	3.5	3.6	4.2	5.5	5.2	5.0	4.9	3.7	3.1	2.4	1.7	1.4	1.1
Ireland	1973	1.5	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.7	3.5	6.9	8.8	9.2	8.0	6.6	5.3	4.2	3.0	2.1	1.6
Italy	1957	6.5	5.9	5.3	5.0	3.8	3.7	3.3	2.9	3	3.4	4.0	4.3	5.6	6.9	7.7	6.9	6.7	6.5	6.2	5.6
Latvia	2004	n.d.	n.d.	5.7	5.0	5.0	4.5	2.4	1.6	1.9	4.5	8.8	8.8	7.8	5.7	4.6	4.5	4.0	3.3	3.1	2.4
Lithuania	2004	n.d.	n.d.	7.4	6.0	5.6	4.4	2.6	1.4	1.3	3.3	7.4	8.0	6.6	5.1	4.8	3.9	3.0	2.7	2.0	1.9
Luxembourg	1957	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.4	1.2	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.9	2.2	2.1	1.4	1.3
Malta	2004	n.d.	n.d.	3.0	3.1	3.4	3.4	2.7	2.7	2.6	2.9	4.1	3.9	3.8	3.5	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.0	1.8	1.1

(continued)

Table 6.1 (continued)

	EU member from	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Netherlands	1957	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	1.0	1.5	2.3	2.1	1.5	1.2	1.1	1.3	1.6	1.9	2.5	2.9	3.0	2.5	1.9	1.4	1.0
Poland	2004	7.4	9.2	10.9	11.0	10.3	10.3	7.8	4.9	2.4	2.5	3.0	3.6	4.1	4.4	3.8	3.0	2.2	1.5	1.0	0.7
Portugal	1986	1.7	1.5	1.7	2.2	3.0	3.7	3.9	3.8	3.6	4.2	5.7	6.2	7.7	9.3	8.4	7.2	6.2	4.5	3.1	2.8
Romania	2007	3.8	3.4	4.6	4.3	4.8	4.0	4.1	3.2	2.4	2.2	2.4	2.9	3.0	3.2	2.8	3.0	3.0	2.0	1.8	1.7
Slovakia	2004	10.1	11.3	12.2	11.4	11.8	11.7	10.2	8.3	6.6	6.5	9.2	9.2	9.4	10.0	9.3	7.6	5.8	5.1	4.0	3.4
Slovenia	2004	4.1	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.1	2.9	2.2	1.9	1.8	3.2	3.6	4.3	5.2	5.3	4.7	4.3	3.1	2.2	1.9
Spain	1986	5.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	3.5	2.2	1.8	1.7	2	4.3	7.3	8.9	11.0	13.0	12.9	11.4	9.5	7.7	6.4	5.3
Sweden	1995	n.d.	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.3	n.d.	n.d.	0.8	0.8	1.1	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.3	1.2	1.1	0.9
UK	1973	1.5	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.9	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.2	1.6	1.3	1.1	1.1	0.9

Source Eurostat (2020d)

long-term unemployment was in the UK (1%), Denmark (1.1%) and Luxembourg (1.2%).

The "golden age" came to the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) in 2006–2008, when the unemployment level decreased. This is very notable in Latvia and Lithuania where the unemployment level dropped to less than two per cent. However, the situation changed the following year when the consequences of economic crises arrived. At the same time, the situation changed differently in Poland and Slovakia, where the unemployment level was the highest until 2008. It decreased in Poland and was three per cent in 2010 and 2015. The situation improved in Slovakia too, where the unemployment level did not exceed ten per cent.

If we look at the older EU members, we could see that the unemployment level increased the most in Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain, where it started to increase from 2009 until 2014/2015, at which point it then started steadily to decrease to where it is today. Another interesting case we can see in Greece, where long unemployment level rocketed from 3.7% in 2008 reaching its peak of 19.5% in 2014. However, Greece's unemployment stayed the highest and still exceeded 12% in 2019, and stayed the highest among all the EU member states in 2019. However, if we look at other countries, we could see that situation is much better everywhere, with unemployment levels lower than five per cent—apart from Italy (5.6%) and Spain (5.3%). We could indicate the lowest long-term unemployment in 2019 was in Czechia (0.6%), Poland (0.7%) and Denmark (0.8%).

Secondly, we look at earnings, presented as minimum wages and purchasing power parities (PPPs), which show price-level indices and real expenditures calculated according to EU28 and PPPs of EU28 = 100, in the EU states.

Wages constitute the direct contribution of workers to an economy (Borjas & Cassidy, 2019). If wages abroad are higher than in the country of origin, then that country is attractive to immigrants (Keep.eu, 2013). According to the literature on migration, wages are usually higher for locals since they also hold more skilled jobs (Keep.eu, 2013). Minimum wages are presented in Fig. 6.9. The biggest difference (almost 10 times) between the highest and the lowest minimum wage may be identified between Bulgaria and Luxembourg. Lithuania stayed third from bottom for a long time with its low minimum wage. However, with its increase in 2020, it overtook Hungary, Estonia and Slovakia. In addition, comparing 2016 and 2020, a very big increase could be revealed not just in Lithuania but also in Romania, Poland and Slovakia.

However, the minimum wage does not demonstrate the real situation in the country. Therefore, we look at purchasing power parities (PPPs) for earnings to compare countries (see Table 6.2). Comparative price levels are the ratio between PPPs and the market exchange rate for each country. Analysing PPPs, when EU27 = 100%, we could notice that in all the EU countries that joined in 2004 and later, PPPs are lower than the EU27 average during all our explored period (see Table 6.2). We could indicate that the situation fluctuated in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czechia, Croatia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. PPPs almost steadily increased in Estonia, Latvia and Malta in spite of the crises period in 2009–2010. Looking at the older EU members, we could note countries such as Greece, Portugal

Fig. 6.9 Minimum wages in the EU countries. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020e)

Table 6.2 PPPs in the EU countries 2008–2019

Country	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Denmark	138.5	140.4	140.1	141.6	142.6	142.3	143.8	142.8	146.2	143.3	141.6	141.3
Ireland	129.6	125.9	120.2	121.1	121.8	124.1	128.0	128.4	129.4	131.2	132.7	133.7
Luxembourg	115.8	119.7	121.7	122.3	123.0	123.9	125.9	125.5	127.9	129.0	129.5	131.1
Finland	119.9	121.8	121.8	122.9	125.0	126.2	126.6	125.8	126.1	126.2	126.0	126.7
U.K.	115.9	108.7	112.9	113.1	122.5	119.9	128.2	142.6	127.8	119.9	120.1	121.2
Sweden	112.2	105.8	119.4	126.2	129.9	134.4	129.7	127.8	130.7	128.9	123.6	120.6
Netherlands	104.9	108.0	109.7	110.9	111.4	112.1	114.1	114.2	115.9	115.0	115.5	116.5
Belgium	110.8	111.7	111.3	111.2	111.5	111.9	111.3	111.2	113.4	114.3	114.8	114.7
France	111.8	112.4	111.7	111.4	111.9	110.6	111.2	112.0	112.5	113.2	113.6	114.1
Austria	105.4	106.8	106.6	107.4	108.0	108.6	109.4	109.3	110.5	111.8	112.0	113.0
Germany	105.9	107.0	106.1	104.8	104.9	106.2	106.0	107.0	107.1	106.5	106.8	106.8
Italy	102.4	103.4	101.9	103.4	104.6	105.3	106.8	106.5	104.4	103.8	103.5	102.7
EU27	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Spain	97.0	99.1	99.7	99.9	99.2	97.4	96.3	94.9	95.4	95.0	95.7	96.6
Cyprus	90.8	93.0	95.0	96.3	96.9	96.1	94.8	92.2	89.6	90.3	89.9	90.1
Slovenia	83.0	87.7	86.9	86.0	85.5	85.5	86.2	86.0	86.9	86.5	87.2	88.1
Portugal	86.4	87.3	87.1	87.6	87.0	85.4	86.3	86.5	87.4	89.2	89.1	87.9
Malta	79.3	80.7	79.5	80.6	81.4	83.8	84.0	83.9	84.6	84.9	85.2	87.3
Greece	92.8	95.3	97.6	97.6	96.2	92.5	88.8	88.2	87.7	87.7	86.5	86.6
Estonia	75.6	74.1	73.0	74.2	75.5	76.8	77.5	77.5	78.8	81.1	83.0	85.1
Slovakia	70.9	73.5	70.7	71.3	71.9	70.6	70.5	70.7	78.0	78.9	79.7	81.1

(continued)

Table 6.2 (continued)

Country	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Latvia	77.5	75.2	69.9	72.6	73.8	72.6	73.7	73.2	74.5	75.3	76.5	78.6
Czechia	74.1	69.8	73.0	74.9	73.5	70.2	65.4	66.8	68.3	70.6	73.4	74.6
Croatia	75.0	74.9	74.8	72.8	71.0	70.0	68.5	67.8	68.6	69.5	70.2	71.2
Lithuania	65.9	66.2	64.3	65.3	65.5	64.8	64.7	64.1	65.1	66.4	68.0	69.5
Hungary	70.2	63.6	64.6	63.1	62.6	61.1	60.3	61.4	62.4	65.0	64.5	65.3
Poland	69.0	57.9	60.7	58.8	57.5	57.3	58.1	57.6	55.9	58.8	59.6	60.0
Romania	60.6	54.9	54.7	55.0	53.0	54.8	55.0	55.1	53.8	53.9	54.1	54.9
Bulgaria	51.4	53.8	53.0	52.0	51.8	50.9	49.4	49.7	49.7	51.3	52.0	52.8

Source Eurostat (2000f)

and Spain which according to their PPPs are lower than the EU27 average during all the analysed period. Denmark is a country with the highest PPPs, exceeding 140 followed by Ireland, Luxembourg and Finland with PPPs of more than 120.

Indicators, connected with poverty and inequality among people, are also important push factors. Figure 6.10 demonstrates information about income inequality in the EU members. Income inequality was measured by the Gini coefficient of equivalized disposable income which could vary from 0 to 100. A higher percentage indicates higher inequality among citizens in that country. A Gini index value above 50 is considered as high, between 30 and 50 is considered medium and less than 30 as low income inequality in a country.

The lowest inequality among the EU countries is in Slovakia, Slovenia and Czechia where the Gini index was lower than 25 during almost all the explored years (Eurostat,



Fig. 6.10 Gini index in the EU members in 2008–2018. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020g)



Fig. 6.11 Relative median at-risk-of-poverty gap in per cent in 2005–2018. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020h)

2020g). Still, low income inequality is seen in Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Hungary, the Netherlands, Denmark, Malta, France and partly in Ireland. Poland's income inequality became lower than the EU average starting from 2014, and its Gini index over the last three years has been less than 30. We could indicate that the highest monetary inequality exists in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania. Portugal, Spain, Greece, the UK, Italy and Estonia are also in the group where the Gini coefficient is higher than the EU average. We would like to note that the Gini coefficient increased in Luxembourg and Germany over the last few years, and they are no longer among countries of medium inequality.

Poverty rate is shown in Fig. 6.11. We took this indicator from Eurostat (2020h), where it is calculated as the distance between the median equivalized total net income of persons below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold and the at-risk-of-poverty threshold

itself, expressed as a percentage of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. This threshold is set at 60% of the national median equivalized disposable income of all people in a country and not for the EU as a whole.

The highest poverty is seen in Romania where more than 35% of citizens lived in need in 2015. We could indicate that poverty is higher in the newer EU countries, such as Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, and older states such as Spain, Greece, Italy and Portugal in comparison with the EU average and what could have an impact on the willingness of citizens to emigrate. The best situation could be noted in Finland, the Czech Republic, Malta, Ireland, Netherlands, Cyprus and Belgium, where less than 20% of the population lived in poverty during almost all the analysed period.

Following the idea of Mihi-Ramírez et al. (2017), we compare GDP in PPS. The volume index of GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) is expressed in relation to the EU average set to equal 100. If the index of a country is higher than 100, this country's level of GDP per head is higher than the EU average and vice versa. Basic figures are expressed in PPS, i.e. a common currency that eliminates the differences in price levels between countries allowing meaningful volume comparisons of GDP between countries.

GDP in PPS of 2019 is presented in Fig. 6.12. Looking at PPS, we could write that distribution among countries is remarkably high. Luxembourg's indexes are double in this and other analysed factors. Ireland exceeds the average twice. Other older EU countries beside Portugal, Spain and Greece are higher than average. GDP in PPS is the lowest in Bulgaria and reaches just a half of the EU average. The index of Latvia, Romania, Greece and Croatia has 65–69% of the EU28. Poland and Hungary reach 73%, Slovakia 74% and Portugal 79%. Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus vary from 82 to 89%. Spain, Czechia, Italy and Malta are just a bit below the EU28 average.

Following previous analyses, we could indicate one more time that this indicator is worse in the newer EU countries than the older ones. However, the index is improving in the majority of newer countries, with the exception of Cyprus, whose PPS until 2011 was higher than the EU average after which it fell down. In the majority of cases, old EU members are above the EU28 average (see indication in green colour). However, GDP was lower in Greece and Portugal during all this explored period. We could note that the situation changed in Italy starting from 2014, where the index fell below the EU28 average. The situation was even worse in Spain where PPS increased lower the EU28 average in 2010.

Summarizing this chapter, we could highlight relations between economic indicators and net migration flows. We could see noticeably clear differences comparing net migration flows in older and new EU countries. Positive net migration is dominating in older countries and negative in newer countries. However, not all countries migrate the same—even if the economic situation is not so good in the country. Based on analysed statistical data of migration and socio-economic indicators, we could reveal that Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria and Romania represent the new EU countries having patterns of migration culture. Looking at older EU states, such countries as Greece, Spain and Portugal could be highlighted.



Fig. 6.12 GDP in PPS in 2019, when EU 28 = 101. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020i)

From this list, we take three countries for our further analysis. Firstly, we analyse a case of Lithuania as an example of a small new EU country expressing migration culture. Afterwards, we present cases of Spain and Portugal, which are older EU countries and have had a history of migration for several centuries. Moreover, these countries are faced with some economic challenges and had negative net migration in the last decade. Spain and Portugal are interesting cases to study and to see changes in emigration flows. After being immigrant-receiving countries, they both became sending countries: Spain between 2012 and 2015; and Portugal between 2011 and 2016.

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Part II
Unsettled? Lithuanian Migration Patterns

Chapter 7
Lithuania: A Small Nation, Deep-Rooted in Migration

Lithuania today is a small country in the Baltic region of northern-eastern Europe with an area of 65,300 square kilometres bordered by Poland, Belorussia, Latvia and Russia (Kaliningrad district). Its population is almost 2.8 million and 84.2% of them are Lithuanians (European Commission, 2021). The dominating religion is Roman Catholicism (77.2%) (Bater, 2020). Lithuania regained its independence from the U.S.S.R. in 1990 and became a democratic republic. It did not face any revolution or war after World War II. Moreover, Lithuania is a safe geographical area and it does not face earthquakes, tornadoes, volcanoes or other natural disasters. Lithuania is surrounded by green nature full of forests and lakes,[1] with moderate levels of air pollution (IQAir, 2019). Its crime index was 33.88 and its safety index in 2020 was 66.12 (Numbeo, 2020), placing Lithuania in a position of 40 out of 133 countries. Therefore, it can be confidently stated that Lithuania is a calm and safe country, and yet it has had high emigration rates for the last 30 years.

Looking at statistical figures for migration and the economic factors presented in Chap. 6, we could prove that Lithuania, compared to its closest neighbours and other EU countries, has a high rate of emigration. It is due to several key factors, not least of which has been the deteriorating economic situation over the last few decades since independence, as well as political changes.

Commonly, in migrant-sending communities, migration might become seen as normative behaviour, especially for young people, which is what happened in Lithuania. It corresponds with Liang and Song's (2018, p. 164) statement that "young people are expected to migrate as a rite of passage". Such flows of migration from one generation to another can be sustained due to the migration culture (Kandel & Massey, 2002, Wilson, 2010—cited in Liang & Song, 2018, p. 164; Sirkeci & Cohen, 2016). When Lithuania gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1990, emigration started and continued for 30 years, with several generations moving

[1] More information about Lithuania is available in https://www.britannica.com/place/Lithuania/Settlement-patterns.

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abroad during this period. Only in 2019 did net migration become positive for the first time during this period of Lithuanian independence (see Fig. 7.1).

Moreover, Lithuania also has a migration history spanning centuries. Thus, we might think of emigration from Lithuania as more than just a recent phenomenon and even describe Lithuania as an "emigration country". In addition, Lithuania is among the smallest countries in the EU, with a population of less than 3 million (see Fig. 7.1). As Mills (1988) notes, in smaller population countries, the social and psychological impact from emigration is more pronounced. Therefore, taking these issues into our scope, we suggest that Lithuania is a good example to explore migration culture in more detail.

The characteristics of migration culture are highlighted in the theoretical analysis presented in Chap. 2. This includes the history of migration, migration flows, economic and the non-economic situation in the country, all as push factors and values. These are analysed further in Chaps. 8–12 in order to describe the migration culture of Lithuania.



Fig. 7.1 Population in thousand and net migration of EU countries 2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020a, 2020b)

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Chapter 8
Lithuania Is Historically a Migration Culture

Although Lithuania is a small country today, it has a rich history and international heritage. Its name was written for the first time in the Annals of Quedlinburg in 1009. It is an interesting fact that Lithuania was the last country in Europe to adopt Christianity. This happened in the fourteenth century when the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was the largest country in Europe and included the current territories of Belarus and parts of Ukraine during that period. A country in so large a territory with many different nationalities already provided an influence on travel and migration inside it.

Historically, Lithuanians are one of the most migrating nations. By the end of the nineteenth century, it had had one of the largest numbers of emigrants in Eastern Europe. A total of four emigration periods during the history of Lithuania could be revealed. Therefore, we should note that Lithuanians have migrated not just in the last 30 years. The main historical facts of Lithuania in relation to migration are presented in Table 8.1.

First Emigration from Lithuania (Pre-migration Period)

Lithuania was already known as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania from the early thirteenth century, where people lived. The thirteenth to fourteenth centuries can be considered as a pre-migration time when members of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania army spread from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Subsequently, many compatriots emigrated for various wars, upheavals, religious or political reasons (Dransekaitė, 2019). So, the movements of people of different nations and religions became a natural process in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.

The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland became one country in 1569. It was called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and existed until 1795. During these 200 years, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was ruled not just by locals but also by foreign sovereigns. The most famous of them were

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Table 8.1 Historical framework of migration in Lithuania

Historical event/ period of Lithuania	Year	Reasons for migration	Destination of migrants	Period of migration
Mentioned for the first time	1009			
Grand Duchy of Lithuania	Thirteenth–sixteenth century	Wars, religious and political	Slavic regions from the Baltic to the Black Sea	Pre-migration period
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth	1569–1795	Wars, religious and political	Poland, France, Italy	
The Russian Empire's control	1795–1918	Political, Economical	England, USA, South Africa	1st period
Establishment and existence of the Republic of Lithuania	1918–1940	Economical	Canada, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay	2nd period
The Soviet occupation	1940–1945	War, Political	Western Europe, Australia, USA	3rd period
	1945–1990	Employment	Other Republics of the U.S.S.R (Kazakhstan, Russia)	Restrictions on movement
Re-establishment of the Independence of Lithuania	1990	Economical, family, others	The USA, Germany	4th period
Joining the European Union	2004		UK, USA, Ireland, Spain	
Joining the Schengen zone	2008		UK, Ireland, Norway	
Joining the Eurozone	2015		UK, Germany, Norway	

Henric Valua from France; August-Bona Sforza from Italy (mother of the grand duke Zygmunt II); and Friedrich August II from Germany (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2016). Features of migration could be indicated during this period too, as people moved to different countries because of different wars, political issues and the mix of different nations in this Commonwealth.

The First Migration Period

The Russian Empire took control of Lithuania starting from 1795 after the collapse of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This control continued until 1918 when the act of an independent State of Lithuania governed by democratic principles was signed, with Vilnius as its capital.

Emigration from Lithuania, referred to as the first wave, started at the end of the nineteenth century and continued up to World War I (Kuzmickaitė, 2003). This period of migration relates to economic and political reasons, with most of these migrants being unqualified. For example, 53% of Lithuanians who immigrated to the USA in 1899–1914 could not read (XXI amžius, 2001). Quite often those people could not even afford to buy a ticket for travel and therefore employers from abroad that needed the labour force paid for it.

However, not all people were low qualified and moved for economic reasons. Peasants moved because of the economic situation, young men avoiding service in Russian army, some other people because of restrictions Lithuanian language and other national discrimination. Remembering the tragedy of the Titanic passenger liner in 1912, we would like to remember three Lithuanians who faced tragedy on this ship, and all died when the ship sank. However, their stories and reasons for travelling to the USA were different. The most famous of these three passengers was Juozas Montvila, a 27-year-old priest and one of three priests who died on board the Titanic during this catastrophe. Due to his Christian activities against Tsarist Russia rulers, Montvila was harassed by the authorities and constrained from being a priest. It was suggested that he escape from Lithuania to New York (where his brother lived) until the situation in Lithuania calmed down. The second Lithuanian who died on board the Titanic had previously emigrated to Liverpool to avoid serving in the Russian army. Later he was employed as a crew member on this famous ship. The third person lost that night was a 22-year-old Jewish locksmith from a big family in Lithuania. He left for economic reasons and was planning to open a lock factory in the USA, and to later invite the whole family over to join him.

During this first migration period of Lithuania history, Lithuanians mostly moved for work to the USA and European countries, with Lithuanian Jews preferring the USA and South Africa. The majority of emigrants had plans to return before leaving, however, only around 20% of these migrants returned to Lithuania (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2016).

The Second Migration Period

The second emigration phase is related to economic issues the most. As was mentioned before, Lithuania gained its independence from the Russian Empire in 1918 and the Republic of Lithuania was established. However, it was a new state, and the economy of the country was underdeveloped and therefore people started to

emigrate, trying to survive, and looking for a better life abroad. It is estimated that more than 100,000 citizens left Lithuania from 1918 to 1940 (Dapkutė, 2012).

Lithuanians still preferred to travel to the USA. However, in 1921, the USA changed its immigration policy and introduced quotas, which effectively halted immigration from Lithuania. Therefore, people needed to look for other destination countries. In such circumstances, Canada and South American countries became new home countries for emigrants from Lithuanian. We could highlight that even two-thirds of migrants went to South America in the period 1920–1940. Although this happened 100 years ago, Lithuanian communities are still in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay today.

The Third Migration Period

The third migration period was different. Lithuania had only existed as the Republic of Lithuania for 22 years when it was occupied by the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1940. This Soviet occupation and annexation of Lithuania instigated the largest tragedy of the Lithuanian nation in its entire history. The destruction of Lithuania's political-social and economic structure, cultural values, and the implementation of the communist worldview and ideology in society were implemented (Genocide & Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, 2020). Stalin—the U.S.S.R leader—wanted to prove his power in this occupied area and to decrease Lithuanian strength and sense of nationalism. In the four days between June 14th and June 18th, 1941, and just before the U.S.S.R joined World War II, around 40,000 educated citizens were exiled to Soviet labour camps in Siberia.

During World War II, Lithuania came under German control between 1941 and 1944, and this brief period it was finally incorporated into the U.S.S.R in 1944 as one of its constituent republics and stayed as a member for 50 years until it declared its independence from the U.S.S.R in 1990.

The years from 1944 to 1990 can be divided into four historic sub-periods: the first period (1944–1953) covers the years of late "Stalinism"; the second period (1953–1964) coincides with Khrushchev's "thaw"; the third period (1964–1984) was one of "stagnation" under Brezhnev; and the fourth period (1985–1990) was marked by perestroika under Gorbachev[1] (Žilinskienė and Ilic, 2020: 3).

The period from 1944 to 1953 until Stalin's death could be described as one of terror, Russification, the influx of Russian-speaking colonists to Lithuania, and the cleansing of national civil servants. During this period, repressions against Lithuanian citizens started again, including the implementation of economic coercion, which included obligatory donations of food products by farmers forced labour and the

[1]Perestroika, (Russian: "restructuring") programme instituted in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s to restructure Soviet economic and political policy (https://www.britannica.com/topic/perestroika-Soviet-government-policy).

mandatory purchase of government bonds (Genocide & Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania, 2020).

Mass emigration that took part during this period was driven by political reasons connected with war, occupation and fear of safety. People fled from Lithuania in a natural, unplanned, disorganized way (Dranseikaitė, 2019). Usually, these people were not called emigrants but asylum seekers or refugees. Most of them were highly educated and held high positions in Lithuania and included politicians, artists, and scientists. They spread among refugee camps in Europe and when they refused to return to their occupied homeland, they stayed in Europe, or moved to North and South America and Australia. In such a way, over 60,000 became forced political emigrants (Dapkutė, 2012). After 1944, most of the intellectuals left Lithuania or were sent to Siberia. Between 1944 and 1953, nearly 120,000 people (five per cent of the population) were deported and thousands more became political prisoners (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2016). To conclude, we could emphasize that it was one of the most painful moments in all Lithuanian history.

Soviet Occupation

During Soviet occupation, migration to the West was prohibited. As Dapkutė (2012) noted, the Iron Curtain was probably the most successful barrier to emigration for Lithuanians. Russification stopped after Stalin died, although implementation of Communist ideology continued throughout the occupation, along with the integration of Lithuania's economy into that of the U.S.S.R (though later Lithuania gained more rights to manage its own economy).

McLaughlin and Juceviciene (1997) stressed that Lithuanians lived under a "double-life" syndrome, where people had one private family life, and another in the public sphere. Even, the official negative attitude of the U.S.S.R towards the West and emigration was persuaded from an early age, but parents and grandparents used to tell stories about freedom and the West, and presented the West and the Western lifestyle as a tempting fantasy (Dapkutė, 2012). Moreover, almost every family had relatives who had left Lithuania as political emigrants and remained living abroad. Several generations of Lithuanians struggled to keep their national identity in the face of many threats and restrictions, but the possibility to migrate was one way for them to keep their national identity (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2017). People had visions of the forbidden West offering them a better life, and people were looking for different possibilities to migrate such as tourism, marriage to a foreigner or a job abroad. However, only an exceedingly small percentage of citizens one way or another, legally or illegally left the country to the West.

Mobility was only allowed within the 15 U.S.S.R republics and this immigration from other Soviet Republics was clearly visible during Soviet occupation in Lithuania, especially in the late 1980s. In spite of this, Lithuania survived all of its occupation with a very homogeneous population. Lithuanians moved mostly

to Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, especially for construction work on newly established cities.

The Fourth Migration Period

Dreaming about the best of what the West had to offer, led to a large wave of emigration from Lithuania as soon as the thaw began, but also starting already before independence during 1988–1990 (Dapkutė, 2012). After 50 years of occupation, Lithuania's independence was finally restored on March 11th, 1990 and in 2020 Lithuania celebrated the 30th anniversary of this event. With independence in 1990, borders opened, and the mobility of people increased, and negative net migration remained throughout the period of 1990–2018. This period could be called the fourth migration period in Lithuanian history and could be divided into four waves, described in more detail in Chap. 9.

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Chapter 9
A Re-emergence of Lithuanian Migration Culture: Four Recent Emigration Waves in Lithuanian Society

As mentioned in Chap. 8, Lithuania became an independent country in 1990 and since then international migration from the country began. Starting from 1995 Lithuania gained one of the leading positions for emigration among all European countries and this leading position remains so today (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2017) (see Fig. 9.1).

"Good life does not come easily in Lithuania" (Bolzanė, 2012), "Lithuania: The Emigration Nation" (Jankaityte, 2016) or "Are Lithuanians a nation of emigrants?" (Dranseikaitė, 2019) are headlines we have seen in the newspapers, and they demonstrate that Lithuania has a title of a migration nation. What is the reason for that?

Officially, almost 150,000 citizens have emigrated over the past ten years and about 700,000 people left Lithuania from 1990 to 2018. Besides that, Rakauskienė and Ranceva (2013) note that only 55% of emigrants declared their migration after 1990, and this was only during the first decade which means that the real figures should be almost double. Such a huge migration rate meant that every sixth citizen emigrated from Lithuania, making it truly a nation of emigrants.

Based on changes in emigration rates (Statistics Lithuania, 2020) the period of 30 years, starting from 1990 could be divided into four waves (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė, 2019a, 2019b) (see Fig. 9.2). These four waves of the emigration waves could be related to some events which happened in Lithuania and which influenced the growth of emigration:

1. Post-independence decade (1990–2003);
2. Accession to the EU and the economic prosperity period (May 2004–2008);
3. Economic crisis and accession to the Schengen zone (2009–2014);
4. Joining the Eurozone and the Brexit referendum affect (2015–present date).

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

Fig. 9.1 Net migration ratio (persons per 1,000 citizens) in the present EU countries in 1990, 2000, 2010 and 2017. More is written in Chapter 6. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020a)



Fig. 9.2 International emigration ratios in Lithuania 1990–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Statistics Lithuania (2020)

Post-Independence Decade (1990–2003)—The First Emigration Wave

Just after the release from the Soviet Union and the consequent collapse of it—initiated by Lithuania—the possibility of free movement in post-Soviet republics appeared. This influenced the migration of some nations first. The Jewish community was number one, with Jews leaving Lithuania for Israel. Moreover, officers of the Soviet army and their family members repatriated Russia and other Soviet republics. Political and economic changes, as well as the lifestyle and values of Lithuanians, influenced a rapid increase in emigration following Independence (Kuzmickaitė, 2003) and Lithuanians started to migrate in 1992 and 1993.

We should note that in a planned economy during the Soviet occupation, there was full employment in Lithuania as in all other Soviet republics. Therefore, official unemployment was impossible and its rate was zero per cent. However, after the collapse of the planned economy, people were faced with labour market challengers connected with moving into a free economy. Many enterprises were closed, and the unemployment rate started growing (Stankunas et al., 2006). It rose to 14% in 1994 and 17.1% in 1995[1] (Sipavičienė & Stankūnienė, 2013). Moreover, changes happened not just in the economy but in all other spheres such as political, education, health, and security.

The period of transition changed the situation for the worse and provided uncertainty to many people (Hesli & Miller, 1993). Citizens started feeling a growing

[1] Official calculation of this indicator started just in 1994.

inequality, which corresponds with the studies of Pridemore et al. (2007) and Cao and Zhao (2010), who revealed that during times of rapid social change, the inequality among citizens started to increase. Therefore, people were pushed to move. When citizens are influenced by political, economic, social and cultural transformations they start migrating, taking it as a surviving strategy (Kaminski, 2014). In addition, Lithuanian citizens were travelling abroad, buying goods and returning to resell them in Lithuania. This kind of mobility was a part of a business strategy.

Because of the momentous disruptions during the Soviet era, changes in values, norms and lifestyles proceeded, which influenced the emergence of new mobility factors and pathways (Žilinskienė and Ilic, 2020). Moreover, as Funk and Mueller (1993) note, differences in philosophical, cultural, as well as political and economic contexts could be revealed in Lithuania in comparison with Western countries.

Speaking about this first emigration wave, the USA was the most attractive destination country for migrants. It remained a Western dream country as it was before World War II. Germany and the UK were other attractive countries too, with all three related because of language issues and economic development. During the Soviet regime, Lithuanians used to study Russian as the first and English or German as the second foreign language. Therefore, it was easier to go there because of the possibility to communicate easier. Spain, due to its climate, provided the possibility to work with fruits and vegetables on its farms and became the fourth most attractive country for emigrants during this first emigration wave.

It should be mentioned that the biggest number of emigrants to these countries was illegal and that illegal emigration dominated from 1990 to 2003. Some people made their emigration escaping during tourist trips; others were looking for possibilities to get married to a foreigner. Students often would not return to Lithuania once they had finished their "Work and Travel USA" programme. Moreover, monitoring was not conducted very clearly meaning that statistics were difficult to get, making it hard to calculate the total number of emigrants according to their destination countries.

Accession to the EU and the Economic Prosperity Period (May 2004–2008)—The Second Emigration Wave

The second big wave of emigration started when Lithuania joined the European Union in May 2004. The majority of old EU member states still had closed labour markets for the new members, although there was an easier possibility to get jobs and to enter the EU countries legally, which all meant the increased mobility of Lithuanian citizens. Around 16,000 people emigrated from Lithuania annually from 2004 to 2009. The economic situation was not good in Lithuania in 2004, high unemployment level and depression continued (Stankunas et al., 2006). However, Lithuania reached its "golden" period between 2006 and 2007, with decreased unemployment at 4.25% in 2007(see Fig. 9.3), lower than the EU average of 6.8% At that time Lithuania started facing a lack of specialists, with a high demand in the construction sector where

Fig. 9.3 Unemployment levels in Lithuania. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Statista (2020)

many specialist builders had already emigrated. However, in 2008, emigration was just 25,750 citizens, the lowest number from the start of the EU membership (see Fig. 9.2).

The UK (see Fig. 9.4) became number one for Lithuanian emigrants because of legality, open employment market, distance and expenses during this emigration wave. On the other hand, the USA lost its popularity a bit and fell into second position. Ireland was third, with Germany fourth and Spain fifth. Mostly, it could be noted that destination countries were selected by migrants because of their economic situation and previous historical flows of migration.



Fig. 9.4 Emigration from Lithuania by its destination countries. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Statistics Lithuania (2020)

Speaking about the qualifications of emigrants, we want to mention that both qualified and unqualified employees left during this period. In addition, criminals also left Lithuania during this second migration wave, leading to a decrease in the level of crime in Lithuania. The "surviving" strategy (Kaminsky, 2014) changed to strategies of "ensuring the livelihood of retirement", "better education" and "career".

The year 2005 was a peak in emigration for the second wave of emigration. 57,885 citizens left the country that year. However, emigration started to decrease in 2006, when welfare benefits and support increased in Lithuania. This situation continued for three years until 2009 when the economic crises reached Lithuania and the third emigration wave started.

Economic Crisis and Accession to the Schengen Zone (2009–2014)—The Third Emigration Wave

The economic crises influenced the imbalance in wages and made an impact on the increase in emigration in Lithuania again. The unemployment level jumped up in 2009, reaching a peak of 18% in 2010, and therefore emigration again became a possibility of surviving. Lithuania's wages were one of the lowest among the EU countries during all its independence.[2] Moreover, analysing purchasing power parities,[3] showing purchasing power, Lithuania was always below the EU28 average. PPPs fell, reaching just 64.3 during the economic crises in 2010 (see Fig. 9.5).

In addition, Lithuania joined the Schengen zone in 2008, which legally opened borders to many European countries. These two factors were the main reasons for the beginning of the third emigration wave (see Fig. 9.2). The rates of declared emigration increased during this period too. The peak of emigration was fixed in 2010, with 83,000 leaving the country in this year. However, this number is calculated based on a new law for all permanent residents of the country, requiring them to pay for compulsory health insurance. Therefore, many people who did not register for their departure earlier did this in 2010. Moreover, regression analysis of 2001–2012 period conducted by Kumpikaitė and Žičkutė (2013) revealed that the unemployment rate, Gini coefficient and Tax Freedom Day were the main emigration reasons in Lithuania.

Looking at the destination countries (see Fig. 9.4); the UK kept its leading position with rocket growth during the third emigration period. Between 2004 and 2008, almost 14,000 citizens left Lithuania to go there, twice as many as the second and third destinations together (Ireland and Norway—a "new" destination country. Germany fell into fourth place, with the USA remaining in fifth and Spain falling to sixth. Emigration rates started to decrease in 2012. According to Pridemore et al. (2007) emigration should decrease after the adoption of new economic systems and the

[2]More information is presented in Chapter 6.

[3]Purchasing power parities (PPPs) show price level indices and real expenditures calculated according to EU28 and PPPs of EU28 = 100.



Fig. 9.5 PPPs in Lithuania 2008–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020b)

return of social equilibrium. Looking at statistical data for 2012–2014, it seemed that Lithuania had finally reached this point.

Joining the Eurozone and the Brexit Referendum Impact (2015–Present Date)—The Fourth Emigration Wave

However, the situation changed in 2015 (see Fig. 9.2), with 44,533 citizens leaving Lithuania; almost 10,000 more than in 2014 (36,621 citizens in 2014). In addition, the emigration flow increased and reached 50,333 citizens in 2016. There are two reasons that explain this situation: Firstly, Lithuania joined the Eurozone on January the 1st of 2015 and as a consequence, the prices of goods and services increased a lot. Purchasing power parities decreased and was 64.1% of the EU28 average in 2015. However, wages almost did not change and the minimum wage in Lithuania remained one of the lowest in the EU with almost 30% of citizens in the regions earning such an amount.[4] Therefore, emigration as "surviving strategy" remained

[4]See more in Chapter 6.



Fig. 9.6 Minimum wage in Lithuania during 1999–2020. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Trading Economics (2020)

actual in Lithuania still and the 4th emigration wave started. This corresponds with circular cumulative causation theory, when home and host countries contribute to the dynamics of migration (De Haas, 2010.). The unemployment level decreased and was 9.1% in 2015. However, looking at 2020, we see a huge increase in the minimum wage in Lithuania (see Fig. 9.6), but here it should be noted that the taxation system changed in 2019, meaning that this new figure of 607 Euro is approximately equal to 450 Euro according to the earlier tax system.

Secondly, a referendum about Britain leaving the EU (Brexit) was held in the UK in 2016 when flows from Lithuania there increased again (see Fig. 9.7). Therefore, people took emigration to the UK as the last change to move there. Moreover, due to uncertainty, many emigrants from the UK moved their family members over from Lithuania to join them in the UK. Finally, it appears that all those who wished to leave, had already done so during 2015–2017 and due to Brexit's unclear future, the UK started to lose its attractiveness (Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė, 2019b). The other most attractive countries stayed the same: Norway, Germany, Ireland, the USA and Spain (see Fig. 9.4).



Fig. 9.7 Emigration from Lithuania to the UK in 2014–2018. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Migration in numbers (2019)

Summarizing we could say that based on features described by scholars analysing migration culture, such as migration history, high rates of emigration, Lithuania has features of migration culture.

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Chapter 10
Lithuanian Values and National Identity: A Catalyst for Migration

During the period of national rebirth in Lithuania (1987–1990), the Lithuanian national identity was seen as an indispensable agent of the mobilization of the people in their fight for freedom. Nationalism and patriotism seemed to be intertwined. Peaceful opposition, referred to as the "Singing revolution", finally brought to its goal—the restoration of freedom and re-establishment of the state of Lithuania on 11 March 1990.

Keeping and fostering the Lithuanian language as well as the national identity was a main goal for the nation to survive during the fifty years of Soviet rule. It was not an easy task, as during Soviet times there was no integrity in the factors forming the value system of a person. Official communist ideology tried to change the outlooks towards religion, family, school, property, moral and spiritual values. Mass repression was aimed at destroying or isolating intelligent and educated people, those who were thinking differently. Contradictions between the value priorities expressed in private and in public became evident. Christian morality in many cases was challenged by the prevailing code of the builders of communism. Consequently, society became secularized and seeking material goals. One part of the population, mostly the young, accepted and took on the values of the period in order to adjust. The other part did not change their outlook but were not able to openly declare their position in public. All these factors taken together triggered the third period of migration as described in Table 8.1. Historical framework of migration to Lithuania (see Chap. 8).

There was no possibility and no sense to discuss national identity in public during the Soviet period. According to the ideology of that time, Soviet identity had to be formed. Nevertheless, though the public expression of national identity during the period was suppressed, it did not disappear. Violence caused resistance and in private gatherings, national traditions and feelings started to be revived. The Roman Catholic Church tried to encourage the preserving of religious devotion and national patriotism as well. All these factors taken together helped to preserve national identity. Fostering the traditions and national identity resulted in the fact that Lithuania has remained a highly homogeneous country for the last century (see Table 10.1), comprised of mostly (86%) ethnic Lithuanians; 77.23% of the population was also Roman

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Table 10.1 Population by ethnicity in Lithuania in per cent

Nationalities	1923	1959	1989	2001	2015	2019
Lithuanian	84.2	79.3	79.6	83.5	86.7	86.4
Pole	3.3	8.5	7.0	6.7	5.6	5.7
Russian	2.5	8.5	9.4	6.3	4.8	4.5
Belarussian	0.2	1.1	1.7	1.2	1.3	1.5
Ukrainian	0.0	0.7	1.2	0.7	0.7	1.0
Latvian	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
German	1.4	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Jew	7.6	0.9	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1
Tatar	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Romany	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

Source Statistics Lithuania (2016)

Catholic. Other religious groups, such as Russian Orthodox (4.11%), Old Believers (0.77%), Evangelical Lutherans (0.60%), Evangelical Reformed Believers (0.22%), Balts' Belief (0.17%), Jehovah's Witnesses (0.10%), Sunni Muslims (0.09%) and Pentecostalists (0.06%) were comparatively low in numbers in Lithuania (Statistics Lithuania, 2016).

The discussion of the Lithuanian national identity and the system of universal values remains very significant in seeking to understand contemporary migration culture, the factors that trigger emigration waves and, on the other hand, bring about decisions to return to the home country after decades spent in emigration. Thus, the analysis of cultural factors, triggering migration and the changes occurring over time, particularly, in the system of universal values, as the basic element of culture, are relevant for research and are essential to study if we are to understand the characteristic features of migration culture in Lithuania and to suggest the recommendations that might be helpful for stopping the brain drain.

Cultural changes and the transformation of the value system come up as the result of developments occurring in politics and social life, advancements and innovations in the economy, technology and many other spheres of society. But culture, in turn, forms an environment in which these socio-economic and political developments become possible. Thus, mutual relationships are set up between these phenomena.

Transformation of values is an incredibly significant indicator of cultural change considering the local, global and technological influences. In order to analyse the value change over time, the relationship of individualism versus collectivism, materialism and post-materialism as well as cross-generational change must be considered. Cross-generational or the analysis of value systems by age are important to consider, as the formation of the universal value system is most profound and intensive at a young age and it also reflects the cultural and the societal norms of the time when the person was most intensively socialized. As society changes, values undergo change as well.

Table 10.2 Ranking of values in different age in groups in Lithuania

No	Value type		18–25	26–35	36–50	51 +
1	Individualist	*Security*	1	1	1	1
2		*Self-Direction*	2	2	2	3
3		*Achievement*	4	7	7	7
4		*Stimulation*	7	6	8	8
5		*Hedonism*	9	9	11	11
6	Collectivist	*Benevolence*	3	3	3	4
7		*Universalism*	5	5	4	2
8		*Conformity*	8	8	6	5
9		*Power*	10	10	9	10
10		*Tradition*	11	11	10	9
11		*Spirituality*	6	4	5	6

*Source*Liubinienė (1998)

In order to accomplish the longitudinal study that would enable us to trace the value developments over time and to research the cultural factors shaping migration culture in Lithuania, one has to understand not only the economic and socio-political drives, but to go deeper and to find the culturally encoded stimuli that lie behind the obvious reasons for emigration. Hence, we come to the cultural values which are crucial for explaining the social and personal patterns of behaviour in certain population groups.

The research on universal values in Lithuania, accomplished more than twenty years ago (Liubinienė, 1998), revealed that after restoration of independence, the collectivist type of values still prevailed in the outlooks of people as the aftermath of a long Soviet totalitarian period. While traditional values were deeply rooted among the elderly, the young seemed to be more open to change and ready to adapt to the new, mainly, individualistic type of values. Age turned out to be the greatest distinctive factor influencing different ratings of values (see Table 10.2). Together with the change of values in the direction of individualism, the change from a conformist type of society towards a more open and democratic society was on the way.

Referring to the study called "National identity of students and academics during the period of democratic reforms in Lithuania" (Liubinienė, 1998), national identity was understood as the constituent part of cultural identity. National identity was perceived as being shaped by national self-consciousness and, vice versa, and national identity was believed to form the content of national self-consciousness. The social environment and the ethnic group in which a person was born and raised had a very great effect on the formation of the system of national identity. During the stage of primary socialization, the family played the greatest role in forming an understanding of national belonging. When the individual matured and identified oneself with a particular nation, he/she had already taken over the system of national values, national symbols, traditions, customs, historical past, outlooks and norms of

that nation. Thus, the national consciousness of the individual had been shaped. Still, the system of national identity is not stable; it is always in the process of constant change, influenced by time, social, political, economic and cultural changes.

A Short Overview of the National Identity Studies in Lithuania

To understand the phenomenon from a historical perspective, the first attempts to study national identity in Lithuania were undertaken only after the establishment of the Independent Republic of Lithuanian in 1918. Up till 1918, there were no historical conditions for that. Among the researchers who started the studies were philosophers A. Maceina, S. Šalkauskis, Vydūnas. Discussions about the psychological type and national character of Lithuanians were also taken up by the general public in the popular journals of the time "Židinys" in 1933–1934 and "Naujoji Romuva" in 1939.

With the establishment of the Republic of Lithuania, scholars, who had acquired appropriate education in the universities of Western Europe or Tsarist Russia, were able to start the research of national psychology and identity. Kaunas, as the temporary capital of Lithuania (1920–1939) became the political, cultural and intellectual centre of the state, which led to the concentration of the majority of Lithuanian intelligentsia and academic society in the city. Such prominent educators, philosophers and psychologists as A. Maceina, S. Šalkauskis, J. Vabalas-Gudaitis and others, being professors at Vytautas Magnus University, made attempts to research national identity and psychology. Bearing in mind that these studies were mainly initiated by philosophers and psychologists, they were more of a descriptive character but nevertheless their input into the field of science was very significant at that time. The factors causing emigration of the second period (1918–1940) were mostly economic. Most of the people who acquired their education abroad were eager to come back and apply their knowledge in their home country.

Judging from a contemporary perspective, the debate over national consciousness and identity at that time in both academia and among the general public was rather superficial, sometimes inspired by sensual patriotism, idealizing the past and the Lithuanian history as such. Most of the works written at that time were of a descriptive character. J. Girnius, writing in emigration, in 1947, observed that, although those first attempts were insightful and valuable, at the same time, "all of these observations have remained mere observations: no one has yet attempted to concentrate on an integral picture" (1991, p. 151). Another problem was the confusion and vagueness of concepts. The so-called national character was a problematic concept regarding its content and raised more questions than answers to the scientific nature of it. This statement is supported by J. Girnius's attempt to define the character of the nation. In 1947 Girnius, writes: "it is our outlook on life, our attitude to man, and his relation to life" (Girnius, 1991, p. 151). Bearing in mind that this type of study was only the

first attempt to investigate "the psychology of the nation", it must be admitted that the terms used at the time were "pre-scientific".

It is to Girnius's merit that for the first time he tries to systematize and distinguish what values are the most important to the Lithuanians. Some observations remain very abstract, (1991, p. 152) whereas other statements have a lasting impact and allow us to compare the Lithuanian values at the time of the first Republic of Lithuania with recent research on the value system. Another noteworthy aspect of Girnius's research is the distinction of some national symbols and the interpretation of their meaning.

Despite the efforts to continue work that begun in emigration, in 1940 research on the subject was broken and for five decades this topic has not been considered.

The aim of both the Soviet and German occupation was to destroy intelligentsia, prohibit the spread of free speech, and bury the idea of national independence. The closure of Vytautas Magnus University, the exile of the professors and the physical extermination of intelligentsia were measures taken to break the resistance and intimidate the people. According to Gaižiūnas (1989, p. 73), both Stalinism and Hitlerism caused terrible deformities in the development of society. During the Stalinism regime, according to Vėbra (1992, p. 55), there was an ongoing negation of such categories as "national spirit", "national ideology", "rebirth" and other. In the Soviet years, this type of research was suppressed for several reasons: first, it was incompatible with the Soviet politics, the task of which was to form one nation, the Soviet people, and any elevation or differentiation of one nation, or another could be accused of as "nationalism". There was a policy of levelling people and forming and nurturing Homo Sovieticus.

And yet, the situation in Lithuania in this respect remained much more favourable than in Latvia or Estonia. The fifty-year period had a tremendous influence on Lithuanian consciousness, and the Lithuanian national identity had changed considerably. People born in the Soviet years had no direct connection with the independent past of the nation, and the education system did not provide any knowledge about the past. The only way to carry on and foster traditions was through the family, or old books, which were also forbidden. In many families, parents avoided talking about the past in order to protect their children from getting into political persecution. However, with time, some cultural activities have taken over the educational role and have greatly contributed to the enlightenment and education of young people in a national and patriotic spirit. Theatre, music, folklore, art, in one form or another, preached the aspirations of the nation's independence and promoted a rebirth movement. The same idea has gained a hidden expression even in sports arenas. Thus, the national basketball team "Žalgiris" and their victories over the Soviet sports club "CSKA" not only aroused sports enthusiasm, but also developed patriotic feelings. The national intelligentsia during the period of national rebirth initiated the national movement "Sąjūdis" and played a major role in strengthening the national identity of Lithuanians.

With the beginning of the second national rebirth in Lithuania in 1988, the questions of national identity and mentality were again seen as very important to study and during the period leading to independence there were a great many publications

in the newspapers and magazines on the topic. A collection of articles like "Tautinis mentalitetas / National Mentality", edited by Grigas (1989), a book "Contemporary Lithuanian National Self-Consciousness" by Kuzmickas and Astra (1996), publications of the Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and Sociology "Permainų metas: tapatumo ieškojimas / The Time of Change: The Search for Identity" edited by Mitrikas (1995), "Paribio Lietuva / Borderland Lithuania" edited by Grigas (1996), and a collection of articles in English, edited by Taljunaitė (1996), "Changes of Identity in Modern Lithuania" appeared.

Many authors at that time saw the renaissance of the nation as an opportunity to restore and consolidate lost values (Jonaitis, 1989, p. 94), agreeing that the promotion of Soviet-era dogmatic materialism and atheism has narrowed the horizons (Kuzmickas, 1989, p. 77). In order to rebuild or develop national self-awareness, the intergenerational transmission of national values and traditions became especially important for young people (Matulionis, 1989, p. 57). Kuzmickas emphasized the role of culture as the most important continuator, presenter and protector of historical existence in the period of rebirth. In the words of the author, the cultural memory of the nation, the social experience, was preserved and transmitted from generation to generation, and the aspirations of freedom, justice, civic responsibility, human dignity were expressed. National self-awareness, unable to be expressed in the form of politics, arose and developed as a cultural self-awareness of the nation (Kuzmickas, 1989, p. 78).

The system of universal values was perceived as an integral part of national consciousness and self-awareness. Values were considered to shape national identity and the changes taking place in the value system allowed us to describe the changes taking place in the complex system of national identity. Kuzmickas and Astra's project "Review of Contemporary Lithuanian National Consciousness" carried out in 1994–1995, included a study of contemporary Lithuanian values.

A study by Liubinienė (1998) based on the research of universal values and national symbols, traditionalism and the changes occurring in the Lithuanian culture, was an attempt to identify changes in the Lithuanian national identity over time. Although this study was limited to a sample of students and academics, some general tendencies could be applicable to the broader population. An analysis of dominating values among elderly respondents, based on the theoretical assumptions of Inglehart (1990, 1997), enabled us to draw conclusions about prevailing values during the period of the first Independent Republic. The social environment which was forming the outlooks of the young people during the times of the first Independent Republic was a harmonious one. Family, school and church in bringing up the person relied on the principles of Christian morality. The Society was rather close, education not easily available to every person. The greatest role in bringing up the person was left to the Church, which favoured devotion and patriotism. Under such conditions, the system of national identity was shaped by unanimous factors. The main principles it relied on were national pride, patriotism, love of God and Motherland, respect for historical past and traditions. All these factors have strengthened the expression of national identity.

The Soviet period, as was mentioned before, had a great impact on the distortion of the understanding of national identity. Still, Lithuanian traditions and national values were successfully embedded in the younger generation who grew up during the Soviet period. With the beginning of Perestroika in the Soviet Union, the political situation in Lithuania became milder and the revival of national consciousness and patriotism became very important factors uniting people for the universal national rebirth movement.

National identity in Lithuania became very strong and noticeable during the period of national rebirth, as the cultural environment of the period was stimulating its formation and manifestation. According to Liubinienė (1998), during the period of national rebirth national identity was strengthened by the following factors:

1. Collective types of values and traditional national symbols fitted very well to express national awareness. All the symbols of the period were of an expressive nature. They were charged emotionally and expressed as common ideas. Extremely popular were folk songs, which became the main symbol of the singing revolution. The symbols of statehood, history, ethnic culture and religion were used to raise patriotism, national consciousness and national awareness.
2. Revival of ethnic culture, customs and traditions, adherence to national traditions, most of which were in one way or the other related to religious holidays, became the way to preserve national culture and national identity.
3. The strong influence of the Roman Catholic Church and a strong feeling of national pride was an equally important factor.

In its turn the strong feeling of national identity united a great part of society in the fight for restoration and consolidation of independence. With the restoration of independence on 11 March 1990, the transitional period to democracy started bringing overwhelming changes in all spheres of life. As a result of these changes, the system of national identity had been changing too. Summing up the results of research, carried out in 1998 by Liubinienė, the main characteristic features of the system of national identity in society at that time were as follows:

1. National identity was influenced by the transformation of the system of values which started following the direction towards individualism. This conditioned the weakening of the feeling of national identity.
2. Culture under the influence of the West became more open, thus, moving away from the influence of traditionalism. Traditions became a part of cultural heritage to which less attention was being paid. The penetration and following of Western lifestyles stimulated the transformation of value priorities. Under the influence of these factors on certain groups of the population, the feelings of patriotism and national awareness became weaker. All this taken together has had a weakening effect on the system of national identity.
3. National identity was different in different groups of populations. Traditional values were most quickly rejected by the young who were more adaptive to the penetration of Postmaterial values. This was especially characteristic of the generation of post-Soviet youth. The older generations did not change their

outlook, or if they did, then the changes were very slow. Thus, among them a strong feeling of national identity has been retained. Considering the results by gender, the stronger feeling of national identity has been maintained by females. By professional affiliation—the people involved in the activities related to humanities had a stronger manifestation of national identity compared to those employed in business or engineering.

The research conducted in previous years (Liubinienė, 1999, 2004) forecasted the tendencies towards the faster development of the civic identity, as the result of the intergenerational change. Civic identity is based on the preference of individualist values rather than collectivists. It was supposed that with the intergenerational change, the preference of individualistic type of values (as Inglehart's theory of value change [] proclaims), might become more and more prominent.

After Lithuania became a member of NATO (2004) and joined the European Union (2004), further studies have revealed that in identity research one may keep to different perspectives.

Based on the more recent studies by Kačergytė and Liubinienė (2015) and Liubinienė (2018), from a global perspective, many contemporary authors concentrate on the description of cultural, religious, ethnic, civic, national, gender identities (Buhr et al. 2014; Watzlawik, 2012), others examine the structure of identity as such and concentrate on the question of how individuals arrive at it (Elwell, 2013; Nelson, 2001; Schechtman, 1996).

Moreover, with the scale of contemporary global migration, more and more often the question of transnational identities come into the focus of research (Skandrani et al., 2011). In such cases, identity development depends on the intercultural influences, as well as different levels of social, political or economic development. In other cultural contexts, gender might matter a lot. That is why some research concentrates solely on the problems of female identity (Skandrani et al., 2011). Nevertheless, we see that in most of the research the national, ethnic/cultural, and religious identities are found to be intertwined (Watzlawik, 2012). In cases of immigrants, national identities based on the countries' boundaries do not seem to matter; more important are, according to Skandrani et al. (2011), regional identities. Cultural and national/regional identities can therefore stand for the same concepts.

The question raised wondering if with the intergenerational change, the preference of individualistic type of values might become more prominent, in its turn, showing the adherence to civic or Western nationalism bound by a commitment to the state, its institutions, and the values ascribed to the government, in Lithuanian context; this question could be answered twofold: The changes in the system of national identity have occurred during the years of independence, and there is a tendency observed for the preference of individualistic types of values.

Economic and physical security leads to pervasive intergenerational cultural changes that reshape the values and worldviews of the people, bringing a shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values—which is a part of an even broader shift, according to recent studies of Inglehart (2018), a shift from Survival values to Self-expression values. This broad cultural shift, as Inglehart claims, moves from giving

top priority to economic and physical safety and conformity to group norms, towards increasing emphasis on individual freedom to choose how to live one's life. Self-expression values emphasize gender equality, tolerance of gays, lesbians, foreigners and other outgroups, freedom of expression and participation in decision-making processes. In such a context, the system of national identity becomes fluid, as it becomes closely intertwined with an individual's self-expression drives. The younger the individual, the more fluid is one's identity. With intergenerational change as well as global migration flows and technological advancement, it may lead to new forms of identification with the country of residence and citizenship.

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Chapter 11
A Study of Migration Culture in Lithuania

Method

Initially, a theoretical analysis of migration culture and a statistical data overview of Lithuanian emigration patterns was completed, including the main economic factors in the frame of the EU. The next steps for an overview of migration culture in the case of Lithuania—such as exploration of emigration economic and non-economic push factors, which corresponds with the economic and social-cultural situation in Lithuania and values of individuals—were taken.

As mentioned in Chap. 5, we refer to different mobility profiles, encompassing both actuality and aspirations, i.e. as immobile locals (people who do not have willingness to migrate) and immobile locals with willingness to migrate, emigrants who show their willingness to return and those who do not want to return and returned migrants (returnees) with the willingness or not to re-emigrate again. Thus, the main questions we seek to answer in this chapter are: How do push factors differ among different groups of respondents? How do values differ among different groups of respondents in relation to migration culture?

We proposed that migration is a goal, which stimulates individuals and groups to move. Bardi et al. (2009) have argued, that values sometimes change, particularly as a consequence of life-changing events. Therefore, we argue that migration is a life-changing event and migration culture could be explored for common themes and the extent of individual variation by analysing individual values. In addition, the priority order of values of immobile locals should differ from the value priorities of emigrants. A study conducted by Lönnqvist et al. (2011) on changes in values of migrants before and after migration corresponds with this idea. Therefore, we argue that immobile locals without the intention to migrate should express different values than emigrants without the willingness to return. Emigrants without the willingness to return should reflect to values expressing migration culture the most. On the other hand, immobile locals without the willingness to emigrate should reflect to non-migrant values, as they do not have migration experience and migration intention.

V. Kumpikaitė -Valiūnienė et al., *Migration Culture*,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73014-7_11

The case of Lithuania enabled us to measure the differences of values in population groups differed by migration intentions and fill up the gap in research.

To collect the data, the survey method was chosen. This method ensures a systematic collection of data, allows us to get data in large populations, run statistical analysis, and identify population-based trends.

Measures

Two surveys were conducted for data gatherings. The first survey was conducted with emigrants from Lithuania and the second one with citizens living in Lithuania. Three main measures were used; in particular, push factors of migration, cultural values and willingness to emigrate:

- Measurement of push factors of migration was based on the answers to the question asking respondents to evaluate the list of factors that provoke the idea or thoughts to emigrate. The list of factors was based on previous research by Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė and Žičkutė (2017). An open answer for any other personal factor was also included in this list. Each factor was either selected (coded as '1') or not (coded as '0').
- The measurement of cultural values was based on the Schwartz theory of universal cultural values. The list of universal values with short explanations from Schwartz and Bilsky (1987) was included in the questionnaire. The older datasets of values were taken for the reason they could be compared with the results of research of universal values in Lithuania conducted by Liubinienė (1998). Respondents were asked to evaluate each value in an 8-points Likert scale, also used by Schwartz and Bilsky (1987): '−1' indicated opposite position to the value, '0' indicated a not important value, and a growing importance was recorded further, up to '7' that reflected to the final supreme important value. Following the Schwartz theory, 56 values were grouped into 11 value groups that were summarized into two groups, i.e. individualism and collectivism. Confirmatory factor analysis confirmed the appropriateness of measurement. Particularly, Cronbach's alpha for 11 values was varying from 0.762 to 0.903 with one lower alpha (0.683) for the scale of Spirituality measurement.
- The willingness to migrate was evaluated using different questions in both surveys. The willingness to return to Lithuania was explored in a survey of emigrants. Willingness to migrate for locals was measured using answers to two questions, such as "Are you planning to depart (emigrate) for settlement or work in other country during the next 10 years" (7 points Likert scale from '1' = "definitely no" to '7' = "definitely yes"), "Have you ever departed for a foreign country? Please indicate the format of your departure" (nominal scale with the list of reasons, such as emigration, business trip, study, etc.). Six respondents' profiles were identified based on both surveys, i.e. immobile locals, not willing to emigrate (coded as '1'), immobile locals, willing to emigrate (coded as '2'), emigrants, willing to

return (coded as '3'), emigrants, not willing to return (coded as '4'), returnees, not willing to emigrate again (coded as '5'), and returnees, willing to emigrate again (coded as '6').

The research model is presented in Fig. 11.1 used for exploration of mentioned factors which provides a deeper description of migration culture in Lithuania.

Data Gathering Procedure and General Information

As was mentioned before, two sample methods were applied for data gathering. The first part of the survey was devoted to Lithuanians residing outside of Lithuania and to Lithuanians, who had already returned to Lithuania and was conducted online due to the low response rate in the case of migrants (Shaffer et al., 2006). The survey was conducted via the Internet, trying to access as many Lithuanians abroad and returnees locally, as possible. The data was collected online in October 2015 and in October–December 2016. Invitation to participate in the survey with a link to the online questionnaire was delivered to Lithuanian emigrants abroad through social media and web pages, and it appeared in Lithuanian emigrants' web-pages in different countries. In Lithuania, invitation to participate in the survey was spread through local websites, and through personal social networks asking that they share this invitation further. In total, 4140 emigrants and returnees took part in this survey.

The second part of the sample data was collected in Lithuania. Lithuanian citizens, i.e. respondents who have expressed the willingness to emigrate and who were not willing to emigrate participated in this survey, keeping groups of equal size and ensuring relevant representation. A self-administrated questionnaire was sent by email for randomly selected respondents from the country representative database of a global research agency and an interviewer-administrated questionnaire was presented via phone or face-to-face, also for randomly selected respondents. In this part of the survey, 1250 respondents participated with 875 completed questionnaires online and 375 completed face-to-face or through phone interviews. Groups of willing and not willing to emigrate respondents were kept of equal size with relevant representation. The agreement to participate and the rate of full completion of the questionnaire was 2.36%. The data was collected from May to July 2018.

The total sample of both studies consisted of 5390 respondents. Demographic information on the sample consisted of gender, age, and education of the respondents. The characteristics of both subsamples are presented in Table 11.1.

Additional demographic data like the average monthly income and occupation was gathered for the sample of 1250 respondents. The majority of monthly incomes fell into two categories, from 250 to 500 Euro (31.1% of 1250) and from 501 to 1000 Euro (32.4%). Main groups of occupation were specialists (like lawyers, teachers, and doctors—22.1%), service employees and sellers (12.6%), clerks (9.4%), retired persons (8.6%) and technicians and junior specialists (8.2%).



Fig. 11.1 Theoretical model for Lithuanian study

Table 11.1 Sample characteristics

Characteristics	Emigrants and returnees	Immobile locals	Total sample
	$N = 4140$	$N = 1250$	$N = 5390$
Gender (females, %)	74.9	59.2	71.3
Age (%)			
Up to 29	40.5	36.0	39.5
30–39	36.6	19.2	32.5
40–49	16.8	16.6	16.7
50–59	5.4	14.1	7.4
60 and more	0.8	14.1	3.9
Education (%)			
Primary	0.5	0.6	0.5
Main	2.6	2.5	2.6
Secondary	15.8	19.6	16.7
Professional	16.9	21.3	62.2
Higher	64.1	56.0	62.2

Descriptive Analysis

The total sample allowed us to identify six different phases of migration. Respondents were split into three phases: immobile locals, emigrants and returnees. Each of these phases had one part of willing to take action, i.e. willing to emigrate, return or re-emigrate, and another part of not willing to take such action. Demographic characteristics according to different groups of respondents and their willingness to migrate are presented in Table 11.2.

Looking at respondents' genders, we could see that females are dominating in all explored groups. They are willing to stay in Lithuania more than men in groups of immobile locals and returnees. However, a larger part of them is willing to return to Lithuania than to stay in a host country. Analysing respondents according to their difference in age, a much larger group of immobile locals willing to emigrate is among respondents of up to 29 years. However, looking at returnees, this age group splits into almost equal groups—one is willing to stay, another is willing to re-emigrate. The biggest group of emigrants with the intention to return could be depicted in an age group of 30–39 years. Finally, speaking about education, the majority of Lithuanians in any of the phases have higher education. Locals are slightly less educated than emigrants and returnees. This could be explained that in the case of locals, we tried to access more diverse and equal groups of respondents in relation to age, gender and education. However, in the case of emigrants, this availability was limited.

Table 11.2 Sample characteristics

Characteristics	Immobile locals willing (%)		Emigrants willing (%)		Returnees willing (%)	
	Not to emigrate	To emigrate	Not to return	To return	Not to re-emigrate	To re-emigrate
Gender (female %)	60.1	58.2	72.6	78.3	76.6	65.9
Age						
Up to 29	21.9	51.3	42.6	37.1	48.9	49.6
30–39	16.7	21.9	33.8	40.5	38.3	29.6
40–49	16.7	16.4	16.6	17.1	10.6	16.3
50–59	19.8	7.9	6.2	4.5	2.1	3.7
60 and more	24.8	2.5	0.8	0.7	0.0	0.7
Education						
Primary	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.5	0.0	0.0
Main	2.3	2.7	2.7	2.7	0.0	3.0
Secondary	19.8	19.4	16.1	15.9	8.5	11.9
Professional	20.4	22.2	16.7	16.3	27.7	25.2
Higher	56.9	55.0	64.0	64.7	63.8	60.0
% of total sample	12.1	11.1	40.6	32.8	0.9	2.5
N	652	598	2189	1769	47	135
N	5390					

Limitations

The research and data have several limitations, which should be considered for interpreting results and using findings. The first limitation is related to sampling and the size of subsamples. The study was completed in two phases, with a gap of two to three years. Also, respondents are not equally distributed among different phases of migration, but two main parts of samples (immobile locals and emigrants) are big enough for appropriate statistical analysis.

The second limitation is the context of one country only. All the results are valid for the Lithuanian context and for Lithuanians. It is a case of one country migration culture in comparison to its non-migration culture. As the survey is based on Schwartz's theory of universal values, it provides insights for future research into migration cultures in other countries as well as ensuring the possibility of comparativeness.

Also, a survey as a method itself allows us to gather opinions instead of real situations or behaviour. A self-reported questionnaire about values may provide more socially acceptable answers. Similarly, respondents might be willing to state their willingness to emigrate but never think about that seriously or really emigrate in the

future. At the same time, push factors might seem to be very relevant at the moment of filling in a questionnaire because of temporary emotions or situational conditions but stop pushing to emigration on the next day.

Finally, the survey has limitations in researching the concepts. It has not included local migration inside of Lithuania or migration between countries outside of Lithuania. The limitation is related to the only one geographic link between two counties, i.e. Lithuania as a home country and any foreign country as a host country. Also, lots of moderating or mediating factors, for example, family role, networking or personality traits might also be linked to the migration culture but have not been investigated in this survey.

Results

Non-Migration Values and Willingness to Emigrate: Case of Immobile Locals

We started analysis of the results with identification of non-migration features of migration culture, which is represented by immobile locals. In particular, those immobile locals, who are not willing to emigrate, should reflect a pure non-migration culture's feature. Features of another part of this group, immobile locals, who are willing to emigrate, should be in transition to migration culture, represented by emigrants. Therefore, in this section, we present profiles of immobile locals and the analysis of non-migration culture.

Results revealed that immobile locals were different not only in willingness to emigrate but also in age ($t = 17.133$, df $= 1189.378$, $p < 0.001$). Immobile locals, who were not willing to emigrate, were significantly older than those who were willing to emigrate. All other demographic characteristics were similar. Gender, education or income, were not significantly different. The average person in both groups was female (60% of not willing to emigrate and 58% of willing to emigrate), with higher education (57 and 55%, respectively) and monthly incomes from 501 to 1000 Euro (33 and 32%, respectively). Regarding monthly incomes, slightly more of respondents not willing to emigrate, earned higher monthly incomes than those who are willing to emigrate. Also, less of them declare no willingness to answer to this question (11 and 14%, respectively). Demographic profiles of immobile locals in both groups regarding willingness to emigrate are presented in Fig. 11.2.

We compared push factors of emigration in the next step. Push factors according to priorities of immobile locals in each group are presented in Fig. 11.3. The same push factors were seen as important for locals who were not willing and those willing to emigrate but differences were found in almost all factors (except geographic location). Those who were willing to emigrate selected push factors significantly more frequently. The top 10 push factors consisted of the same factors for both groups but factors were prioritized slightly differently.



Fig. 11.2 Demographic profiles of immobile locals



Fig. 11.3 Priorities of push factors for immobile locals

Ranking of further push factors was similar in both groups. The only exception was for the answer "none". Locals, who were not willing to emigrate, were selecting this answer statistically more frequent than those, who were willing to emigrate. Analysis of push factors also showed that such push factors like geographic situation or climate conditions, cultural life or the purpose of spreading own convictions (culture, lifestyle, religion, etc.) are at least important for both groups of immobile locals.

Analysis of universal values in the group of immobile locals revealed the features of non-migration culture. Universal values describing pure non-migration culture were evaluated according to their importance to immobile locals, who were not willing to emigrate. The profile of values describing non-migration culture expressed by immobile locals not willing to emigrate is presented in Fig. 11.4.

Fig. 11.4 Values describing non-migration culture

According to the survey results, values representing features of non-migration culture in Lithuania are described by such values as *Stimulation* and *Universalism*, which differs this group of respondents from other groups in relation to willingness to migrate:

- *Stimulation* was scored significantly at the lowest by the immobile locals who were not willing to emigrate, compared with all the other groups. Thus, this value is the least important to this group of respondents among all the groups.
- *Universalism* was another value with significantly different scorings compared with other groups. However, this value was scored even lower by immobile locals who were willing to emigrate, placing a group of non-willing to emigrate immobile locals in between of them and other groups of emigrants and returnees.

In addition to mentioned differences in values, comparison of two groups of immobile locals revealed differences in such value groups like Hedonism, Tradition, Conformity, Security and Spirituality (Fig. 11.5).



Fig. 11.5 Differences between values of immobile locals

- *Hedonism* as a value was less important to those immobile locals, who were not willing to emigrate, than to those who were willing to emigrate ($t = -3.092$, df $= 1247.756$, $p = 0.002$). Both of the values in this value group, i.e. pleasure and enjoying life, were scored lower by the first group of respondents. It provides some assumptions that people with higher intentions to enjoy life are not happy with the situation in Lithuania and, therefore, are thinking that moving abroad would let them fulfil their hedonism wish.
- *Tradition* was scored higher by those immobile locals who were not willing to emigrate, than by those, who were willing to emigrate ($t = 6.736$, df $= 1247.996$, $p < 0.001$). All the values in this value group, i.e. moderate, respect for traditions, humble, accepting my portion, and devout, were significantly more important to the first group. It means that citizens who value all aspects connected with traditions are more connected with their current environment and therefore do not want changes and do not want to emigrate.
- *Conformity* also was found to be a more important value to those immobile locals, who were not willing to emigrate, than to those who were willing to emigrate ($t = 4.132$, df $= 1248$, $p < 0.001$). Such values as self-discipline, politeness and honouring of parents were significantly more important to the first group of respondents. Interestingly, obedience was scored much lower by both groups of immobile locals than other values in this value group. This result was similar only to returnees, who were willing to re-emigrate again. All other migration groups were scoring this value significantly higher than immobile locals. We may just suggest that different situations in emigration require obedience and therefore, emigrants start to value it more. However, such assumptions need more studies to be proved. Other values presented in Conformity, such as honouring parents

expressed higher by immobile locals without willingness to emigrate, show their attachment to their country and exiting values here.

- *Security* was the value with highest scores of importance among all value groups for both groups of immobile locals. However, immobile locals differed from each other according to this value. Security was found to be more important to those immobile locals, who were not willing to emigrate, than to those who were willing to emigrate ($t = 4.399$, df $= 1248$, $p < 0.001$). Security of family and health were the most important values for all immobile locals in this value group, with significant difference between groups of immobile locals with regard to health ($t = 2.444$, df $= 1189.917$, $p = 0.015$). Security of family was similarly important for both groups of immobile locals. All other values in this value group were scored as more important to those immobile locals, who were not willing to emigrate, than to those who were willing to emigrate. Looking at these results we could note that because of their high evaluation of Security, immobile locals without intention to emigrate protect current stable and safe situation, which they have in their home country of Lithuania and therefore, do not want such challenges as emigration, which could decrease their Security.
- *Spirituality* as a value was found to be more important to those immobile locals, who were not willing to emigrate, than to those who were willing to emigrate ($t = 3.322$, df $= 1248$, $p = 0.001$). However, only the difference in one value, i.e. spiritual life, was confirmed ($t = 6.263$, df $= 1248$, $p < 0.001$).

Several differences were found in separate values but not in value groups. Immobile locals, who were not willing to emigrate, reported *higher importance* than immobile locals, who were willing to emigrate, of such values like:

- *authority* ($t = 2.906$, df $= 1248$, $p = 0.004$),
- *preserving public image* ($t = 3.460$, df $= 1248$, $p = 0.001$),
- *influential* ($t = 3.758$, df $= 1248$, $p < 0.001$),
- *creativity* ($t = 2.294$, df $= 1248$, $p = 0.022$),
- *helpful* ($t = 2.483$, df $= 1245.035$, $p = 0.013$),
- *forgiving* ($t = 2.611$, df $= 1248$, $p = 0.009$).

Looking at these results, they correlate with the local environment, where it is easier to maintain authority, public image, and remain influential than being an immigrant in another country. Moreover, we might think that people we know are more helpful and forgiving but such assumptions require deeper research. We want to reveal that immobile locals, who were not willing to emigrate, reported *lower importance* of *wealth* ($t = -3.758$, df $= 1248$, $p < 0.001$) than immobile locals, who were willing to emigrate. This corresponds with results (Bonasia & Napolitano, 2012; Cooray & Schneider, 2016) that people (in Lithuania too [Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2017]) migrate because of economic factors and a better life.

Summarizing the results about the importance of values, *collectivistic* values were scored higher by those immobile locals, who were not willing to emigrate, than by those, who were willing to emigrate ($t = 4.824$, df $= 1247.817$, $p < 0.001$), while no significant difference was found in regard of *individualism*.

Features of non-migration culture in Lithuania are represented by immobile locals, who are willing to emigrate, but still staying local. They can be described by the lowest importance of Universalism and Self-direction (see Fig. 11.6).

Another feature of this group of respondents is higher valued Stimulation, which encourages those people to emigrate than in the case of pure non-migration values expressed by not willing to migrate immobile locals ($t = -3.140$, df $= 1247.492$, $p = 0.002$). However, Stimulation is still less important than to other groups of respondents which explains that it is an important value taking decision to migrate. Despite other mentioned differences in values of not willing to emigrate locals, willing to emigrate locals also have the highest value of enjoying life among all researched groups at significant level. The importance of an exciting life is also significantly the highest in all groups except returnees, who are not willing to re-emigrate. They scored the importance of an exciting life similar to immobile locals, who are willing to emigrate.

Fig. 11.6 Values of immobile locals with willingness to migrate

In general, comparing *immobile locals* with other groups of respondents, they were found to be significantly different (lower scores) in individualism and collectivism from *emigrants* but less different from *returnees.*

Migration Values and Willingness to Return: Case of Emigrants

It is assumed that migration values describing migration cultures are represented by emigrants. The analysis of migration culture expressed by values is presented in this section, providing the profile of two groups of emigrants: firstly, those who do not demonstrate willingness to return and secondly, those who want to return.

Despite the willingness to return to Lithuania, emigrants were similar to all demographic characteristics. Demographic profiles of emigrants in both groups are presented in Fig. 11.7. The average person in both groups was female (73% willing to return and 78% not willing to return) of 25–34 years old (46% in each group), and with higher education (64 and 65%, respectively). However, the question about monthly incomes was not included in the survey of emigrants.

Exploring push factors, results highlighted several push factors were seen similarly by willing and not willing to return emigrants. No significant difference was found in push power of personal life conditions, salary differences and income inequality, prices of products and services, education and science system, unemployment, or spread of own convictions. Also, emigrants were similarly pushed by family reasons, possibilities of employment or the lack of new workplaces.

The list of the 10 most important push factors is also only slightly different (see Fig. 11.8). As an example, family reasons were ranked at 6th place by emigrants, willing to return, while the same factors were ranked at 8th place by those who



Fig. 11.7 Demographic profiles of emigrants



Fig. 11.8 Priorities of push factors for emigrants

were not willing to return. The possibilities of employment were more important to those who were willing to return (rank 9th), than to those who were not willing to return (rank 12th), while the social security system was ranked in opposite way (rank 12th and 9th, respectively). Interestingly, the level of a country's economic development was seen as less important for those who were willing to return (rank 8th in comparison with rank 6th).

In overall, cultural life and spreading own convictions were the least important push factors for emigrants. Still, several differences of push factors for emigrants willing to return and not willing to return were found significant. Emigrants who were not willing to return, reported *higher importance* than emigrants who were willing to return, for all following push factors besides "*other*":

- salary in Lithuania ($t = -2.080$, df $= 3775.890$, $p = 0.038$),
- political corruption ($t = -4.475$, df $= 3631.887$, $p < 0.001$),
- level of country's economic development ($t = -4.424$, df $= 3602.696$, $p < 0.001$),
- tax system ($t = -3.167$, df $= 3655.129$, $p = 0.002$),
- social security system ($t = -4.434$, df $= 3548.143$, $p < 0.001$),
- desire for changes ($t = -2.331$, df $= 3676.021$, $p = 0.02$),
- level of health care ($t = -3.013$, df $= 3457.296$, $p = 0.003$),
- intolerance, discrimination ($t = -4.136$, df $= 3324.009$, $p < 0.001$),
- environment and climate conditions ($t = -6.216$, df $= 3048.446$, $p < 0.001$),
- cultural life ($t = -2.265$, df $= 3290.843$, $p = 0.024$),
- other ($t = 2.912$, df $= 3930.137$, $p = 0.004$).

In addition, we want to note that the list of push factors that was provided to emigrants was slightly different from the one that was given to immobile locals. The primary list was used for this part of the survey. This list was updated due to repetitive factors in the answer "other" in the survey of emigrants. These answers were analysed and classified, supplementing the primary list for the next survey of

immobile locals. Additional notes about the negative way of naming the factors were taken into account, updating the instrument for the next part of the survey. Therefore, this should be considered by comparing immobile locals and emigrants.

Analysis of the universal values of emigrants who were not willing to return, revealed the features of a migration culture (see Fig. 11.9), which can be described with such values as *Achievement, Stimulation, Self-direction, and Tradition*:

- *Achievement, Stimulation and Self-direction* values were found to be more important to emigrants, who were not willing to return, than to any group of immobile locals at a significant level. These results were similar to immobile locals with the intention to migrate.
- *Tradition* was scored in a different way. First, emigrants were scoring this value at a higher level than immobile locals, who were willing to emigrate. Secondly, they valued Tradition at a lower level than immobile locals, who were not willing to emigrate.

Fig. 11.9 Values presenting migration culture



Fig. 11.10 Differences between the values of emigrants

In addition to this, *Universalism, Benevolence, and Conformity* were found to be more important to emigrants, who were not willing to return, than to immobile locals. *Spirituality* was scored by emigrants the same as Tradition, i.e. higher than immobile locals who were willing to emigrate, but lower than immobile locals who were not willing to emigrate.

Further comparison of two groups of emigrants in regard to their willingness to emigrate, revealed differences between individualistic value groups. The importance of all collectivistic values except Tradition was evaluated similarly by emigrants. So, the differences were found in the following value groups (Fig. 11.10).

- *Power* was found to be more important to emigrants, who were not willing to return, than to those, who were willing to return ($t = -2.642$, df $= 3697.951$, $p = 0.008$). The difference was generated with significantly higher scores such as wealth and social recognition. Two other values, like authority and preserving public image, were also scored higher but no significant difference was confirmed. We might think that emigrants who do not want to return, value Power more because they may have achieved a higher status through wealth and Power, and therefore may not want to return and lose that success.
- *Achievement* as a value was also more important to emigrants who were not willing to return, than to those who were willing to return ($t = -3.996$, df $= 3956$, $p < 0.001$). All values from this value group were scored in the same way, with a significant difference. So, ambitious, influential, capable, intelligent and success are more important values to emigrants who were not willing to return, than to those who were willing to return. Again, it shows that emigrants value achievements more and probably find that they can reach this easier by being abroad.

Interestingly, the importance of influence was evaluated significantly lower than other values in this value group in both groups of emigrants.

- *Hedonism* was also found to be more important to emigrants, who were not willing to return, than to those who were willing to return ($t = -4.424$, df $= 3956$, $p < 0.001$). Both values like pleasure and enjoying life were scored significantly higher by the first group of emigrants.
- *Stimulation* was the next value group to be more important to emigrants who were not willing to return, than to those who were willing to return ($t = -3.510$, df $= 3956$, $p < 0.001$). A significant difference was found in regard to an exciting and varied life, while the importance of daring was similar in both groups of emigrants.
- *Self-direction* was also found to be more important to emigrants who were not willing to return, than to those who were willing to return, with slightly less significance level than in comparison with previous value groups ($t = -2.482$, df $= 3956$, $p = 0.013$). Three of six values in a Self-direction group like freedom, choosing their own goals, and self-respect were scored higher by emigrants, who were not willing to return, than by those who were willing to return.
- On the contrary to previous value groups, *Tradition* was found to be less important to emigrants, who were not willing to return, than to those, who were willing to return ($t = 3.057$, df $= 3674.218$, $p = 0.002$). Two values in this group were scored significantly differently by two groups of emigrants. Those who were not willing to return found the respect of traditions and devout as less important values for them than those who were willing to return. This has linkage with a general understanding that traditions are less important for emigrants than immobile locals, however, willing to return emigrants feel connection with home traditions and therefore express their wish to return.

Several differences were found also in separate values but not in value groups. Emigrants, who were not willing to return, reported *higher importance* than emigrants, who were willing to return, of such values as:

- *equality* ($t = -2317$, df $= 3956$, $p = 0.021$),
- *world with beauty* ($t = -2.113$, df $= 3956$, $p = 0.035$),
- *social justice* ($t = -2.250$, df $= 3956$, $p = 0.025$),
- *broad minded* ($t = -3.157$, df $= 3956$, $p = 0.002$),
- *loyal* ($t = -2.346$, df $= 3956$, $p = 0.019$),
- *responsible* ($t = -2.589$, df $= 3956$, $p = 0.034$),
- *mature love* ($t = -2.346$, df $= 3956$, $p = 0.010$),
- *self-discipline* ($t = -2.482$, df $= 3956$, $p = 0.013$),
- *politeness* ($t = -3.457$, df $= 3812.501$, $p = 0.001$),
- *social order* ($t = -2.233$, df $= 3956$, $p = 0.026$),
- *family security* ($t = -1.972$, df $= 3956$, $p = 0.049$),
- *healthy* ($t = -2.268$, df $= 3820.169$, $p = 0.023$).

In addition, emigrants, who were not willing to return, reported *lower importance* of *spiritual life* ($t = -2.472$, df $= 3664.301$, $p = 0.013$) than emigrants, who were

willing to return. Summarizing the differences and similarities of emigrants, they were found to be different in individualism ($t = -4.304$, df $= 3727.386$, $p < 0.001$), while no significant difference was found in the overall evaluation of collectivism.

The values of emigrants with intention to return can be identified by the lowest importance of Power (see Fig. 11.11), except returnees, who are willing to re-emigrate.

Such low importance of Power value group was mainly based on low scores of social power and social recognition. However, the difference in social recognition value was confirmed in comparison with emigrants who were willing to return, and such groups as immobile locals, despite their willingness to emigrate, and returnees who were not willing to re-emigrate. Differences were found in regard to social power in emigrants and immobile locals, but not in comparison with returnees.

In general, the comparison of *emigrants* with other migration groups revealed to be significantly different (higher scores) in individualism and collectivism from *immobile locals* but similar to *returnees.* In particular, a significant difference was

Fig. 11.11 Values of emigrants with a willingness to return

not found between returnees, who were willing to re-emigrate, and both groups of emigrants in cases of individualism and collectivism.

Values and Willingness to Re-emigrate: Case of Returnees

We explored returnees, who differ in regard to their willingness to re-emigrate in the next step. The first group of returnees expressed universal values and no willingness to re-emigrate. The second group of returnees expressed universal values and a willingness to re-emigrate. Profiles of both groups of returnees are presented in this section.

It should be noted that the survey was not primarily planned for research returnees. Therefore, the subsample of returnees is small, in comparison with immobile locals and emigrants. Statistics, used to analyse returnees, were limited due to the subsample size and data specifics. However, data was received for this category also and was used to identify primary profiles of returnees as well as to give insights into future research.

Despite the difference in willingness to re-emigrate, no significant differences were found comparing both groups of returnees according to demographic characteristics (see Fig. 11.12).

The average person in both groups was female (77% of not willing to re-emigrate and 66% of willing to re-emigrate) of 25–34 years old (55% of not willing to re-emigrate and 47% of willing to re-emigrate), with higher education (64 and 60%, respectively). Interestingly, the majority of returnees, who were not willing to re-emigrate, were 25–29 or 30–34 years old, 28% in each age group, while the majority of returnees who were willing to re-emigrate, were 25–29 years old (28%), with the next by size group of 20–24 years old (19%). It might correspond to returning



Fig. 11.12 Demographic profiles of returnees



Fig. 11.13 Priorities of push factors for returnees

families, where children have grown up but are still willing to come back to the host country.

Only three of the top 10 most important push factors were the same and with the same priorities, i.e. salary in Lithuania, prices of products and services, and tax system between two groups of returnees (see Fig. 11.13). Changes in priorities were found in regard to personal life conditions, salary differences and income inequality, desire for changes, political corruption, and possibilities of employment. Some factors were found in the top 10 list by one group only, like family reasons or education and science system in the list of returnees, who were not willing to re-emigrate, or the level of the country's economic development or social security system in the list of those who were willing to re-emigrate.

Most push factors were scored similarly by both groups of returnees. Significant differences were found in some factors:

- *salary in Lithuania* (Mann–Whitney $U = 2328$, $p = 0.001$),
- *salary differences and income inequality* (Mann–Whitney $U = 2634$, $p = 0.044$),
- *intolerance, discrimination* (Mann–Whitney $U = 2749.5$, $p = 0.009$),
- *environment and climate conditions* (Mann–Whitney $U = 2817$, $p = 0.031$),
- *political corruption* (Mann–Whitney $U = 2517$, $p = 0.008$),
- *family reasons* (Mann–Whitney $U = 2691.5$, $p = 0.011$).

Salary in Lithuania, its differences and income inequality, intolerance and discrimination, environmental and climate conditions and political corruption were found to be more important push factors for returnees who were willing to re-emigrate, than to those who were not willing to re-emigrate. On the contrary, family reasons as a push factor were more important to returnees who were not willing to re-emigrate, than to those who were willing to re-emigrate. This indicates that returnees without an intention to re-emigrate would leave just because of family reasons when those

with the intention to re-emigrate are not satisfied, with more different factors pushing them to leave.

According to the survey results, values expressed by returnees who were not willing to re-emigrate were described with the highest importance of all value groups, except Hedonism. Most of the differences in comparison with immobile locals were significant, while differences in comparison with emigrants were not so high, therefore not significant. These differences could be explained in the following way: people who make the decision to migrate have higher expressed values and perhaps because of this they dare to emigrate and immobile locals with lower rated values do not make a decision to leave and go abroad. Although, the pure values of returnees without intention to re-emigrate can be described by the high importance of all values, except Hedonism (see Fig. 11.14).

Comparative analysis of two groups of returnees revealed differences in such value groups as Achievement, Universalism and Benevolence (Fig. 11.15). Differences

Fig. 11.14 Values of not willing to re-emigrate returnees



Fig. 11.15 Differences between the values of returnees

were measured using the Mann–Whitney U test. Returnees with no intention to re-emigrate rated all mentioned groups of values higher than returnees with the intention to re-emigrate:

- *Achievement* was found to be more important to returnees who were not willing to re-emigrate, than to those who were willing to re-emigrate ($U = 2488.5$, $p = 0.028$). However, the result was reached only with the high difference in intelligent value ($U = 2381.5$, $p = 0.008$). No significant difference was found in regard to all the other values in this value group.
- *Universalism* was also scored higher by returnees who were not willing to re-emigrate, than by those who were willing to re-emigrate ($U = 2312$, $p = 0.006$). Half of the values in this value group were found significantly more important, i.e. world at peace, unity with nature, wisdom and protecting the environment.
- *Benevolence* was found to be more important to returnees, who were not willing to re-emigrate than to those who were willing to re-emigrate ($U = 2540$, $p = 0.042$). This difference was also based on a single value, i.e. mature love ($U = 2441$, $p = 0.013$). Returnees, who were not willing to re-emigrate, valued mature love more than those who were willing to re-emigrate.

In addition, some differences were found in separate values but not in value groups. In comparison with returnees who were willing to re-emigrate, those who were not willing to re-emigrate, scored higher values such as:

- *social recognition* ($U = 2451$, $p = 0.019$),
- *freedom* ($U = 2475.5$, $p = 0.011$),
- *creativity* ($U = 2596$, $p = 0.0496$),

- *respect for traditions* ($U = 2370$, $p = 0.009$).

It has already been noted before that more mobile people seem to value Traditions less. Supposedly, returnees who express high values of freedom, social recognition, and creativity cannot fulfil this in a home country and therefore, tend to re-emigrate again.

Summarizing the results in the frame of individualism and collectivism, returnees, who were not willing to re-emigrate, also valued both of them higher than returnees, who were willing to re-emigrate. However, the significant difference was found only in regard of collectivism ($U = 2399.5$, $p = 0.013$).

Values, reported by returnees who were willing to re-emigrate, are unique in Stimulation, in particular, and in value of varied life. A profile of these values is presented in Fig. 11.16.

The difference in Stimulation between two groups of returnees is not significant but difference in varied life is significant in comparison to all other groups, i.e. immobile locals and emigrants. So, values of both groups of returnees were found to be

Fig. 11.16 Values of willing to re-emigrate returnees

very similar. With regard to migration and non-migration cultures, values of returnees were found to be more similar to migration culture than to a non-migration one. It means that migration experience might change values and vice versa, a different set of values could impact a decision to migrate. However, we conclude that more studies in relation to values and migration are necessary to provide a deeper reasonable analysis.

Changes in Universal Values of All Groups of Respondents Exploring Migration Culture

Summarizing the research, a comparative analysis of three main groups of respondents in regard to migration and values was completed. The values of immobile locals representing non-migration culture were described by ranking universal values. Migration culture was described by universal values according to the level of their importance, which was reported by emigrants. Finally, the values of returnees were found to be different from non-migration culture but similar to migration culture, with a certain limitation in regard to sample size of returnees. Therefore, the values of returnees are more similar to the values of emigrants than to locals. All these values are presented in Fig. 11.17.

Comparative analysis showed that all three cultures were different in most of the value groups as follows:



Fig. 11.17 Differences of universal values between immobile locals, emigrants and returnees

- *Achievement, Benevolence* and *Conformity* were found to be the most important for emigrants, less important for returnees, and the least important for immobile locals. The differences were mainly based on differences in such values as *ambitious, capable, true friends, honest, helpful, and honouring parents.*
- *Stimulation, Self-direction* and *Universalism* were found to be the most important for returnees, less important for emigrants, and the least important for immobile locals. We assume that mobility could be revealed as helping to fulfil all these expressed values.

Some value groups were different in importance between immobile locals and emigrants:

- *Hedonism* was found to be more important for immobile locals than for emigrants, supposedly that the first group of respondents enjoy life more and a local environment lets them do it better. This assumption corresponds with the findings that difference in *Hedonism* was mainly based on differences in the value of *enjoying life.*
- *Tradition* and *Security* were found to be more important for emigrants than for immobile locals. The differences were mainly in such values as *moderate, respect for traditions, humble, national security, reciprocation of favours, family security, healthy, and clean.* These results give us insights in relation to emigrant diasporas in different countries, where they try to keep their nationality, language and traditions of the home country. These traditions become for them more important than for locals who constantly live in a home country with these common traditions of their daily life and who therefore do not care and do not value them so strongly.

No differences were found in cases of Power and Spirituality value groups but separate values in these groups were also found:

- *social power* and *social recognition* were more important for immobile locals than for emigrants,
- *wealth* and *preserving public image* were more important for emigrants than for immobile locals.

Immobile locals, emigrants and returnees were all significantly different in Spirituality values like:

- *spiritual life, inner harmony, and meaning in life* were the most important for returnees, less important for emigrants and the least important for immobile locals,
- *detachment* was the most important for immobile locals, much less important for returnees, and the least important for emigrants.

Conclusion

To summarizing, our assumptions about differences of values exploring migration culture were confirmed. We could reveal that the values of emigrants and returnees are expressed higher than the values of immobile locals. In this relation, individualistic and even more collectivistic values were valued more by mobile groups of respondents. The highest differences were revealed between the most opposite groups of respondents: emigrants without intention to return and immobile locals without the intention to emigrate. These values could be described as expressing migration and non-migration cultures. The values of emigrants who are willing to return, might be seen in between values of migration culture expressed by emigrants not willing to return and non-migration culture expressed by immobile locals. The values of emigrants might reflect similar developmental dynamics to the values of returnees.

The values of migrants without a willingness to return, representing migration culture are mostly expressed by Self-direction, Benevolence and Universalism (see Table 11.3) which means that emigrants seek independent thought and action, preserve and enhance the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact, and value understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection of the welfare of all people and nature the most. It corresponds with findings of Lönnqvist et al. (2011) who acknowledges that some values, such as Universalism, could be more readily adopted from a new environment than other values.

On the other hand, non-migration culture expressed by immobile locals without any willingness to migrate could be described by Security, Benevolence and Self-direction values ranked the highest. Supposedly, because safety, harmony and stability of society and relationships and of the self are the most important for them;

Table 11.3 Comparison of means and ranks of values describing pure migration and non-migration cultures

Values	Emigrants without the willingness to return		Immobile locals without willingness to emigrate	
	Mean	Rank	Mean	Rank
Self-direction	5.73	1	5.03	3
Benevolence	5.60	2	5.14	2
Universalism	5.50	3	4.94	4
Security	5.47	4	5.39	1
Stimulation	5.40	5	4.85	5
Conformity	5.06	6	4.66	7
Achievement	5.13	7	4.65	8
Hedonism	4.64	8	4.7	6
Spirituality	4.50	9	4.64	9
Power	4.03	10	4.05	10
Tradition	3.57	11	3.79	11

all stopping them from a mobility decision as this action could harm their present security. We could see that Self-direction is less important for immobile locals than emigrants. Another value, which differs between these two groups, is Hedonism, which shows that pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself is more important for locals. Remembering that evaluations of immobile locals were the lowest from all groups, we want to note that the mean of Hedonism, Power and Tradition was higher for immobile locals than for emigrants. Therefore, we could conclude respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that one's culture or religion dictates are less important for emigrants. It could be because some of them prefer assimilation or marginalization acculturation strategies (Unger et al., 2007), and therefore, they refuse their own culture.

No ranking difference was identified in relation to such values as Power. However, looking at the separate values of this group, we can note that people valuing authority and preserving public image are willing to stay, however those who value wealth prefer to migrate.

This finding could be explained based on social role theory (Eagly & Wood, 2011), where the key aspect of the social reality represented in group stereotypes is the typical roles occupied by members of a group. In addition, a unified theory of implicit attitudes, stereotypes, self-esteem, and self-concept stereotypes (Greenwald et al., 2002) could also be used to explain that it is often harder for a foreigner to gain recognition and reputation abroad. Therefore, people seeking authority and preserving their public image prefer to do so in their home country.

In order to present Lithuanian values in relation to other countries, the next chapter of this monograph focuses on societal values via a synthesis of large-scale cross-national studies on values that have included Lithuania. An image of Lithuania emerges that paints a picture of a migration culture that has formed over decades. Moreover, we should bear in mind that Lithuania, having been an emigration country for almost 30 years, had positive net migration in 2019. It means more immigrants came to Lithuania than emigrated. Therefore, it is important to reveal Lithuanians' values towards immigrants. Moreover, we could note that values could change in the long term when more migrants will come to Lithuania. All these aspects will be presented in Chap. 12.

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Chapter 12
A Kaleidoscope of Societal Values in Lithuania: Migration Perspectives

The study of Lithuanian societal values has gained momentum since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s; however, data for comparative research purposes is still fragmented. In this chapter, we synthesize extant studies of values at the societal level that have included Lithuania, and we present Lithuania's position relative to other countries across the various data sources. A portrait of societal values for Lithuania is portrayed showing its relative position on various values dimensions that could provide guidance in discussing national attitudes to migration and behavioural tendencies. In the context of migration, a natural question emerges about whether there is a relationship between values and attitudes towards migration or migrant behaviours. Where data is available, we provide some evidence of these links and conclude with recent migration studies that have considered the issue of values change over time.

The values emphasized by a society are central to understanding its culture; they lie at the very heart of culture and shape society's beliefs, understanding, practices, norms and institutions (Schwartz, 2006). Mockaitis (2002) defines culture as a set of learned and shared values that influence our way of life, our perceptions, beliefs and attitudes, and distinguishes one human group from another. Individuals are guided by the values structure of their societies; values shape societal institutions, relationships between various groups within society, and guide attitudes and behaviours of individuals (Schiefer, 2013; Schwartz, 2006). Societal values also shape responses to and attitudes about migration and immigrants (Arikan & Bloom, 2012; Schwartz, 2006). Lithuania has experienced rising levels of emigration over the past 30 years, with an almost 26% decrease in its population (European Migration Network, 2016). A deeper look into the societal values that prevail in Lithuania may provide some insights into migration trends in the country.

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Lithuanian Societal Values

In this section, we examine values at the societal level and integrate them into a values map, or wheel of cultural values. Figure 12.1 represents a kaleidoscope view of Lithuanian culture, based on a synthesis of large-scale studies of values to date that have included Lithuania.

There are five such studies to date that have ranked countries based on values or combinations of values at the societal level:

- A study in 50 societies conducted by Ralston et al. (2011) based on the Schwartz Values Study (SVS);
- A study on Lithuanian national cultural values conducted by Mockaitis (2002) that compares Lithuania to 69 other countries in Hofstede's database (Hof);



Fig. 12.1 A cultural values wheel for Lithuania

- The World Values Survey (WVS) by Inglehart et al. (2014) that provides access to a 70-country database;
- The World Happiness Report (WHR) by Helliwell et al. (2018) of 156 countries; and
- The European Social Survey (2016) (ESS), comparing values in 23 European societies.

We have arranged the results into a wheel of values, in which Lithuania's position or rankings on the values derived from the above studies are provided. The rankings do not allow us to discuss values in absolute terms but rather to compare Lithuania's relative position to those of other countries/cultures. The focus is on the dimensions of values in the inner circle (green). The sizes of the slices are approximately proportional to the importance of a dimension in Lithuania; the larger the slice of the circle, the more emphasis is placed on the values comprising that dimension by Lithuanians. The outer layer depicts some typical values that comprise each of the dimensions (in red), with additional supporting evidence about Lithuania's ranking on related single-item values from other studies (white tabs), such as the ESS and WVS. These studies are placed above/near those values dimensions to which they are either empirically or conceptually closest. In depicting the cultural orientations, we have followed the logic of the structure used by Schwartz (2006); the cultural value orientations are displayed based on shared assumptions between them. Adjacent orientations share assumptions and are compatible. Incompatible orientations or those with opposing assumptions lie on opposite sides of the circle.

The arrangement of the values orientations into a wheel also reflects empirical evidence of correlations between the dimensions among the various studies. For example, Schwartz (2006) has found correlations between his autonomy-embeddedness dimension, and the egalitarianism-hierarchy dimension and the survival vs self-expression dimension of the World Values Survey (Inglehart & Baker, 2000), as well as the values-based questions used in the ESS.[1] He also found significant correlations between Hofstede's individualism dimension and his autonomy dimensions (affective and intellectual), negative correlations between Hofstede's power distance and the affective autonomy dimensions, and positive correlations between Hofstede's masculinity and mastery (Schwartz, 1994). In addition, Smith et al. (2002) found significant correlations between many of the dimensions of Hofstede and Schwartz, e.g. individualism and autonomy (positive), power distance and egalitarianism (negative) and harmony (negative). A brief explanation of the orientations/dimensions follows.

Schwartz's (2006) first dimension is labelled autonomy vs embeddedness. This is conceptually similar to individualism vs collectivism, and thus the orientation affective autonomy and individualism are adjacent, while embeddedness is opposite. In *individualistic* cultures, people place emphasis on the self over the group and are encouraged to express their own ideas, speak their mind and rely on oneself. *Affective*

[1]The ESS included a series of questions from the Portrait Value Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2001), consisting of individual-level questions about the importance placed on desirable goals, that, when aggregated to country level, reflect societal-level values.

autonomy encourages individuals' own attempts at pursuing positive affective conditions (Schiefer, 2013), e.g. personal gratification, pleasure, excitement and variety in life. Lithuania is a mildly individualistic society (ranking 28th out of 70 countries) and scores quite low on affective autonomy.[2] Lithuanians value independence and self-reliance to a moderate degree but not personal fulfilment and personal enjoyment. This is also supported by Lithuania's low ranking in the ESS at 19th out of 23 countries on the importance placed on personal enjoyment. In its ranking on affective autonomy, Lithuania is similar to India, Chile, Lebanon and Thailand.

However, Lithuania scores rather high on the opposing orientation—*embeddedness*. Embedded cultures believe that people are interwoven within the wider collective. Embedded cultures emphasize shared goals and shared ways of living (Schiefer, 2013). Relationships are important as a means for attaining these shared goals and maintaining a shared identity. This in turn means that stronger judgements and distinctions are made among groups. Restraining from actions that might disrupt the societal order, stability and security is the norm, as is respect for tradition and the status quo. In the WHR and WVS, Lithuania ranks rather low on the belief that people are able to make their own life choices. People are bound by or embedded within the wider group or society. Lithuania's embeddedness orientation is similar to that of Singapore, Finland, Turkey, Hong Kong and Malaysia. Schwartz (2006) has argued that societies that emphasize this orientation are less open to foreignness. That is, they fear exposure to attitudes, norms, beliefs and behaviours that differ from their own. This includes a lower tolerance of immigrants.

Related to this is the *uncertainty avoidance* dimension of Hofstede (1980a). This dimension depicts "the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations" (Hofstede, 1991, p. 113) and their ways of coping with uncertainty. In societies higher on this dimension, we find lower tolerance of change, more coping mechanisms such as rules, procedures, control and details, higher stress, emotions and anxiety, and a lower acceptance of outsiders. Lithuania ranks medium high on this dimension, similar to Germany, Ecuador, Thailand and Morocco. Easy going or laid back would not be fitting adjectives for describing Lithuanian society.

How concerned are Lithuanians with the welfare of others? The *egalitarianism* value orientation underscores concern for other people's welfare, recognizing them as equals, and an expectation to act for the benefit of others (Schwartz, 2006). Values held by egalitarian cultures are equality, honesty, social justice, being helpful and dependable. Lithuanian's ranking is not high (35th out of 50 countries), on par with countries such as China, India, South Korea, Hong Kong and Vietnam. Supporting evidence from the ESS shows that compared to other European countries, Lithuanians strongly believe that men have more rights to a job than women, and strongly

[2] Schwartz also includes the dimensions Intellectual Autonomy and Hierarchy. These have not been included in this summary, as no reliable data for Lithuania are available. In a replication study by Ralston et al. (2011) in 50 societies, including Lithuania, internal consistency problems were found for these two dimensions.

disbelieve that all people should be treated fairly and that people should care about the wellbeing of others (ranking last out of 23 European countries).

In the WVS, Lithuania scores high on survival values and low on self-expression values. Inglehart and Welzel's (2005) survival vs. self-expression values were conceptually refined by Welzel (2013) to produce the emancipative values index. *Emancipative values* are akin to human empowerment and place priority on gender equality, equal opportunities, freedom of choice, personal autonomy and self-expression, acceptance of homosexuality, abortion and divorce. Lithuania scores rather low on emancipative values (43rd out of 70 countries). According to Welzel (2013), emancipative values strengthen with rising levels of education and resources such as wealth and intellectual skills. Opportunities to connect with others also induce these values. As emancipative values spread through society, people also become less preoccupied with material security and shift their focus to happiness and life satisfaction (Bates, 2014). However, as we move across the wheel to the opposing orientation of mastery, we see that this is not yet the case. Lithuanians are also relatively unhappy, ranking 50th (out of 156 countries) on the WHR and 22nd (out of 23 countries) on the ESS.

In the WVS, Lithuania scores high on secular-rational values and low on traditional values. This dimension was further refined by Welzel (2013) into the secular values index. Lithuania scores intermediate on *secular values* (ranking 22nd out of 71 countries), placing relatively low priority on authority, including religious authority (faith, commitment, religious practice), patrimonial authority (the nation, the state and parents), authoritative institutions, such as the army, police and the justice system, and normative authority (anti-bribery, anti-cheating and anti-evasion norms). In fact, in perceptions of corruption, Lithuania ranks 4th out of 156 countries in the WHR by Helliwell et al. (2018).

In Schwartz's study, the dimension of hierarchy opposes egalitarianism. In the values wheel adjacent to secular values and opposite egalitarianism we find *power distance*. This dimension from Hofstede (1980a, 2001) reflects the extent to which less powerful people within a society accept the fact that power is distributed unequally within the society, institutions and organizations. With an index score of 45 and a ranking of 51 out of 70 countries (Mockaitis, 2002), Lithuania is in the medium range on power distance, as are countries such as Hungary, Jamaica, USA and Estonia. In certain contexts, displays of authority, status, power, prestige and inequality will be acceptable, in others less so, although the values associated with uncertainty avoidance, low egalitarianism and embeddedness may connote that power and inequality are part of the fabric of order in society and people are socialized to accept the rules and obligations embedded within the hierarchical structure. As such, there may be little outward resistance despite a lower internal tolerance or preference for power distance.

On opposing poles in the figure, we see harmony and mastery. Lithuania ranks high on mastery and lower on harmony. Harmony cultures emphasize fitting into the world rather than controlling or changing it (Schwartz, 2006). The lower ranking on *harmony* is associated with a lower importance placed on the environment and environmental protection (India, Portugal, Taiwan and Russia rank similarly). *Mastery*

embodies values such as self-assertion, recognition, success and competence, control over the environment or changing it for the purpose of attaining one's own goals (Schwartz, 2006). Next to mastery in the wheel is the *masculinity* dimension of Hofstede (1980a), which pertains to the "extent to which the dominant values in society are 'masculine'" (Hofstede, 1980b, p. 46); masculine values are those such as assertiveness, the attainment of wealth, money and things, ambition and success. On the opposing pole are feminine values, such as nurturing, cooperation, relationships, friendliness, quality of life and harmony. Lithuania ranks high on masculinity (14th out of 70 countries, like China, Philippines, Colombia and Poland) and high on mastery (ranked 12th out of 50 countries, near Bulgaria, Portugal, Turkey and Russia). ESS results support Lithuania's high ranking on mastery and masculinity; out of 23 European countries Lithuania ranks first in the importance placed on material wealth and fourth in the extent to which success is valued. With respect to caring for the environment and preserving nature (harmony), Lithuania ranks 21st out of the 23 European countries on the ESS.

Attitudes Towards Immigrants and Immigrants' Attitudes

Lithuania has been included in five rounds of the ESS since 2008. Questions in the 7th (2014) and 8th (2016) survey rounds included measures of attitudes towards immigration and immigrants. Relationships between values and attitudes about/towards immigration and immigrants have been tested by many scholars; we provide a few examples using single-country Lithuanian data to illustrate some of the already established universal relationships.

Schwartz (2006) analysed ESS data over several waves in the 1990s and compared attitudes towards immigration to his values dimensions. ESS questions measured attitudes towards immigrants of other ethnicities/race and socio-economic status (immigrants from poorer countries). Significant negative correlations were found between these attitudes and his intellectual autonomy dimension ($r = -0.63$, $p < 0.05$) and egalitarianism ($r = -0.68$, $p < 0.01$). Recall that Lithuania is positioned rather low on egalitarianism, a dimension that encompasses fair and equal treatment of others, openness and tolerance. Lithuanian scores for acceptance of immigrants from other groups were available in the ESS data round 8 (2016) and are depicted in Table 12.1. Lithuanians scored quite high in negative attitudes towards immigrants from other races/ethnic groups (ranking 18th out of 23 countries), from poorer countries outside the EU (ranking 18/23), and towards immigrants from the same race/ethnic group as the majority in the home country (ranking 17/23).

Although this synthesis paints a fairly grim portrait of Lithuanian societal values relative to those of other countries, values are not static. As a kaleidoscope changes patterns when turned, studies have also suggested a link between migration and values change. Although the above results depict values of Lithuanian societal values (i.e. reflecting central tendencies at country level), there is evidence that migrants' attitudes reflecting the cultural values inherent in their home countries change over

Table 12.1 Lithuanian immigration attitudes

Question	Scale	Mean (S.D.)	Rank
Round 8 2016			
Immigrants of the same race or ethnic group as the majority in one's country should be allowed into the country	1 = allow many 4 = allow none	2.30 (0.97)	17/23
Immigrants of a different race or ethnic group to the majority in one's country should be allowed into the country	1 = allow many 4 = allow none	2.71 (0.90)	18/23
Immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe should be allowed into the country	1 = allow many 4 = allow none	2.81 (0.90)	18/23
Immigration as bad or good for the country's economy	0 = bad 10 = good	5.03 (2.29)	12/23
Whether the country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants	0 = undermined 10 = enriched	4.72 (2.34)	15/23
Whether immigrants make the country a worse or better place to live	0 = worse 10 = better	4.67 (2.06)	16/23

time insofar as the influence of values originating from the heritage culture weakens. Migrants, who initially carry the inherent cultural values from their home culture, are also exposed to the values, norms and attitudes of a new host culture. Over time, one would expect that immigrants would be affected by both, depending on the extent of their interaction with or assimilation to the new culture.

In a study incorporating 24 countries in the 2008 round of the ESS, Schiefer (2013) examined whether negative group attitudes (out-group attitudes) were related to Schwartz's cultural dimensions of hierarchy, mastery and embeddedness, hypothesizing that when these dimensions are more pronounced in a society, individuals display more negative attitudes towards others. Immigrants to a country are expected to show weaker negative attitudes. General negative attitudes (enmity) were measured towards homosexuality, gender equality, unemployed people, and people from other age groups. Schiefer found that cultural values significantly affected negative group attitudes. Countries higher on hierarchy, embeddedness and mastery showed more negative attitudes. Moreover, first-generation immigrants were less affected by host country values than second-generation immigrants. Second-generation immigrants quite closely resembled the patterns of non-immigrants in the relationship between values and attitudes. In other words, the host country may have a stronger effect on second-generation immigrants' values than their familial or heritage culture. Lithuanian results in Schiefer's (2013) study showed closer similarities between non-immigrants and first- and second-generation non-EU immigrants, followed by second-generation EU immigrants. Large differences in Lithuania were observed between all of these groups and first-generation EU immigrants. Lithuanian non-immigrants also scored the highest on enmity of all 24 countries in the sample. Recall Lithuania's high rankings on the mastery and embeddedness dimensions.

Pessin and Arpino (2018) incorporated ESS 2006, 2008 and 2010 data in a study of first- and second-generation immigrants, to examine the extent to which cultural values of the home and destination countries influence their gender attitudes. They test the relative strengths of the socialization versus life course approaches in shaping immigrants' attitudes. On the one hand, primary socialization occurs when values are transmitted from parent to child; these values are found to persist throughout adulthood. On the other hand, people are also influenced by their environment or by life events, and thus secondary socialization of values can occur through exposure and experience. Pessin and Arpino (2018) tested whether the gender attitudes of immigrants reflect the attitudes of their culture of early socialization. They found that the dominant values/attitudes of their heritage culture have a greater influence on attitudes of first-generation immigrants and less so on second-generation immigrants' attitudes. Second-generation immigrants are exposed to both familial culture and the host culture and are socialized into both. First-generation immigrants also carry the attitudes of their country of origin, yet these differences in attitudes to their host culture tend to lessen over time. Second-generation immigrants' attitudes more closely resemble those of the host culture. Recall again that Lithuanians rank fairly low on egalitarianism and hold strong views that men have more rights to a job over women (ranking 3rd out of 23 countries). Given the results of Pessin and Arpino (2018), one might expect that such attitudes, if held by Lithuanian emigrants, would, over time, become more favourable, influenced by the dominant gender attitudes of destination countries.

These studies demonstrate that a shift in attitudes and values is likely to occur over immigrant generations. An issue that remains to be examined is whether societal values are linked to migration trends (not just attitudes or beliefs), and whether the large outflux of emigrants from Lithuania in recent decades can be explained by examining national culture. Kumpikaite-Valiuniene (2019) provides many reasons for the large outflux of Lithuanians in several waves since the 1990s, yet these reasons are mainly economic (e.g. low income, high unemployment, external shocks). She also notes that 2018 saw the first decrease in emigration, and also an increase in non-Lithuanian immigrants. Yet the majority of immigrants to Lithuania are still returnees. Paradoxically, Lithuanians do not hold favourable attitudes towards immigrants of any type (including the same ethnic group), thus returnees to Lithuania might encounter animosity. It remains to be seen whether any experienced shifts in the attitudes and values of returnees due to their own sojournment will, over time, contribute to positive societal changes.

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Part III
The Wandering Iberians: Evidence of Migration Cultures

Chapter 13
Iberian Pathways: Portugal and Spain as Migration Culturess

In Chap. 6, an analysis of European Union countries in relation to migration flows and economic factors was conducted. Countries were divided into two groups as older and newer EU countries and based on the highest emigration flows and economic factors two older EU countries, Spain and Portugal, were taken for further analyses exploring migration culture.

Both Portugal and Spain have some similarities in their development and historical migration culture. They both are situated in the Iberian Peninsula, and their dominating religion is Catholicism. We know these countries because of their explorers, such as Vasco da Gama, Gaspar Corte-Real, Pedro Alvaro Escobar and Ferdinand Magellan from Portugal, and Christopher Columbus from Spain during the Age of Discovery (the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries) and their colonization movements. They both have a long migration history and faced several more recent migration periods in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Portugal and Spain became democratic countries in the late 1970s and both finally joined the EU in 1986. The fertility rate is very low in both countries. According to Eurostat (2020a) data in 2018, it was the second worst in Spain (1.26) and the seventh in Portugal (1.42). Purchasing power is lower than the EU average, people living at-risk-of-poverty exceed 25% in both countries, and they have medium Gini index (Eurostat, 2020b, 2020c). In 2019, the human development index was very high—2nd in Spain and 38th in Portugal (Human development report, 2020). However, Spain is the fourth-most populous country in the EU with a population of around 47 million and Portugal's population is just a little higher than 10 million (Eurostat, 2020d).

Analysing migration flows starting from 2008, we could note that net migration in Spain was the second largest after Luxembourg and was 9.5 per 1000 citizens in 2008 (Eurostat, 2020c). However, it was just 0.9 in Portugal in 2008. Net migration started to decrease in both countries from 2009. Negative net migration could be indicated during the period of 2011–2016 in Portugal. The period was shorter in Spain; it started in 2012 and finished in 2015. The net migration rate reached the

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same level of 9.5 in Spain in 2019. However, different features of this last emigration wave in Portugal and Spain are revealed and presented in further chapters.

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Chapter 14
Wavy Migration in Portugal

History of Migration in Portugal

Portugal has a long and very rich history of migration. The Portuguese traditionally emigrated for better life conditions or to escape from colonial wars and authoritarianism (Justino, 2016). Historically, Portugal was changing its status from "sending" to "receiving" and again to "sending" from time to time (Silva & Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė, 2019). The emigration from Portugal started in the fifteenth century when the Portuguese started their exploration and colonization of overseas territories starting with Brazil—a land for better life (Baganha et al., 2004). During that time people from the mainland moved to Madeira and the Azores. Later, these citizens started to migrate to the Portuguese African territories, India and Brazil. From that time Brazil has remained one of the most popular destination countries for the Portuguese. However, Portugal was popular for immigrants too, who preferred it because of its location. Portugal lost its attractiveness for immigration with the demise of its status in the seventeenth century.

Pires et al. (2011) reveal that Portugal became a country of emigration starting from 1850. Brazil even became independent in 1822, and in the second part of the eighteenth century it became the main destination country for Portuguese migrants.

Pereira and Azevedo (2019) highlight four emigration waves from Portugal. The first one continued from 1850 until 1930. From the mid-nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, approximately two million Portuguese left the country with the main destination trajectories being North and South America. Brazil was the most popular destination country due to its colonial history (Rocha et al., 2015). As Lesser (1999) notes, in eighty years (between 1870 and 1950) around 4.5 million immigrants from Portugal entered Brazil (Lesser, 1999). The USA was the second most popular destination country after Brazil. At that time Portugal was considered the country with the twelfth highest number of emigrants.

The second wave (see Fig. 14.1) of Portuguese migration started after the end of World War II around 1950 and continued until the fall of Portugal's dictatorship in 1974. During this wave, Portugal's low qualified labour force migrated to work in the

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

Fig. 14.1 Net migration per 1000 citizens in Portugal 1960–2020. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Macrotrends (2020)

expanding economies of Central and Northern Europe (Malheiros, 2011). European countries such as France and Germany became the main destination countries for Portuguese during this period. This second wave was marked by the emergence of barriers and restrictive emigration policies introduced by the Portuguese authoritarian regime at that time (Pereira & Azevedo, 2019). However, Portuguese emigration slowed down due to an economic crisis in Europe when the major countries closed their doors to foreigners in 1973 (Malheiros, 2011).

The dictatorship ended after the Portuguese Revolution in April 1974 and this influenced the return of many Portuguese exiles. However, this also had an impact on the beginning of the third emigration wave of Portuguese. Portugal joined the European Union in 1986, and the possibility of free movement influenced migration outflows from Portugal. In addition to this, EU membership attracted non-EU citizens to immigrate to Portugal and therefore, migration inflows exceeded emigration. However, as Pereira and Azevedo (2019: 5) note "emigration continued to be a consistent feature of Portuguese society: between the 1980s and the end of the twentieth century, about 20,000 Portuguese migrants left the country each year".

The fourth and current emigration wave started around 2001. It is connected with Portugal's entry into the Eurozone, stagnation of the European economy and increased unemployment. However, this wave could be divided into two phases (decades). The world economic crises also had an impact on the increase in emigration numbers from Portugal. From 2008 to 2016, Portugal experienced a severe economic recession. This crisis had a strong impact on most of the country's institutions and affected all social spheres, including migration flows. Peixoto and Iorio (2011) note that the crisis significantly increased the number of people leaving the country.

However, immigration rates of foreigners remained higher that emigration rates until 2010. As Pereira and Azevedo (2019) reveal, the number of Portuguese emigrants reached the same level as during the previous peak of the second wave in the 1960s: an average of 115,000 Portuguese nationals emigrated each year between 2013 and 2015. In comparison with previous waves, changes of the relationship between a colony and the colonizer could be highlighted as more people started to move to non-Portuguese speaking countries, especially the UK. Other main destination countries included Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and Brazil.

With regard to the educational level of migrants, it is worth mentioning the brain drain, since the international mobility of highly qualified workers has been an essential element for any economy for several decades (Jajri & Ismail, 2014). There are different opinions about skill levels of recent migrants in Portugal. According to OECD data, 11% of the Portuguese that emigrated in 2011 had a university education in comparison with only 6% of emigrants in 2001 who had a qualification from university (Elo & Silva, 2015).

Pires et al. (2015) state that the majority of emigrants now differ to previous waves because most are qualified people. However, Justino (2016) notes that besides the migration of young qualified employees, a big number of migrants are low or middle skilled. We would like to reveal that statistical data (OEm Portuguese Emigration, 2020) supports that argument.

Moreover, a proportion of migrants are Brazilians and Eastern European citizens, who came to Portugal before the crises in the 1990s and who have now started to leave. Justino (2016) revealed differences between migrants from Portugal in the major destination countries of the current migration wave (see Table 14.1). However, we want to note that destination countries differ for migrants born in Portugal. In 2018, almost 25% of migrants born in Portugal migrated to Brazil and Switzerland, and around a further 10% were received in France (Portuguese Emigration Factbook 2019, 2020).

Besides migration history, we will look at the relationship between economic indicators and migration flows. It will allow us to present a migration culture according to the push factors of Portugal in the last decade.

Links of Net Migration and Economic Indicators in Portugal in the Last Decade

The economic situation is an important issue for Portuguese emigration. The majority of emigrants are paid less than 1000 Euro per month in Portugal. After they moved away from Portugal, that value raised to within a range of 1000 to 3000 Euro (Pires et al., 2015). Comparing salaries with the UK, which is most popular destination country for Portuguese migrants, the average monthly salary in the UK was equivalent to 2253 Euro in 2015. In comparison, in 2014 the minimum wage in the UK was

Table 14.1 Profiles of migrants in the main destination countries

Country	Description
Spain	Employees working in construction, service, manufacturing and agriculture. It was the main destination country in 2007. Low skilled Portuguese left Spain to other countries after the 2008 crises. However, it became the second most popular country in 2018
United Kingdom	Employees working in distribution, hotel and restaurants. The top destination in the last decade. It was the most attractive country in 2018. Recent emigrants are mostly low skilled. The Portuguese are the lowest educated in comparison with other national groups in London
Switzerland	Employees working seasonal work and in construction, trade and services. Leading destination from the 2000s. Much of this migration is seasonal and circular, taking deployments in Germany. The Portuguese is the third largest population in Switzerland. It was the third most attractive country for all migrants and the second for Portugal born migrants in 2018
Germany	Most migrants from Portugal are low skilled. However, it is a destination for young scientists and engineers. It was fifth in popularity for all migrants to Germany in 2018
France	A large population of high skilled employees. Half a million migrants from Portugal live in France. Majority from previous waves. The biggest number of remittances received to Portugal is from here. Fourth for migrants in 2018
Brazil	It is an attractive place for companies to move to from Portugal after the economic downturn. Majority of migrants are middle and high skilled and entrepreneurs. The most popular country for Portugal born migrants

Source Justino (2016) and Portuguese Emigration Factbook 2019 (2020)

1301 Euro and in Portugal 566 Euro. It explains why the Portuguese choose to move abroad or not return home after their studies in a foreign country.

Recession during the economic crises continued until 2013. It influenced structural and social problems, which lead to large income inequalities, and long-term unemployment especially among young and highly qualified employees. However, comparatively, those having tertiary education are more employable (OECD, 2019). Increased unemployment was one of the main reasons for emigration. Looking at Fig. 14.2, we see a sharp increase in unemployment, which negatively correlates with emigration flows. It means that when people could not find employment for a long time, they emigrated and therefore, with the long-term unemployment, the number of emigrants increased (net migration decreased). Moreover, we should note that starting from 2011, the highest unemployment was calculated at the age of under 25 and was higher that 30%.



Fig. 14.2 Links of net migration and long-term unemployment in Portugal during 2008–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020a, 2020b)

An opposite situation could be discovered by analysing Purchasing Power Standard[1] (PPS) (see Fig. 14.3). We could observe that emigration increases when purchase power decreases in the country. It means that people struggling to afford basic necessities start leaving the country. Supposedly in this way they try to earn more money and to restore their purchasing power. The purchase power drastically dropped in 2013 and that year net migration was at its lowest. Emigration started decreasing from 2014 with an improvement of purchasing power. However, data demonstrates a decrease of PPS in 2019, which in turn could influence a growth in emigration again (Eurostat, 2020c). Notwithstanding, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 changed regular lives, the economic situation and in turn it distorts and adjusts migration flows.

Finally, looking at net migration and the percent of people living at risk of poverty (see Fig. 14.4) we could see the same shape as in analysing long-term unemployment and PPS. When the risk of poverty increases net migration is decreasing, indicating the growth of emigrants. It means the number of emigrants, in comparison with the immigrants, increases. Therefore, the direct negative link between the risk of poverty and the net migration in Portugal is indicated.

[1]Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) is expressed in relation to the EU average set to equal 100. If the index of a country is higher than 100, this country's level of GDP per head is higher than the EU average and vice versa. Basic figures are expressed in PPS, i.e. a common currency that eliminates the differences in price levels between countries allowing meaningful volume comparisons of GDP between countries.



Fig. 14.3 Links of net migration and PPS in Portugal during 2008–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020a, 2020c)



Fig. 14.4 Links of net migration and risk of poverty in Portugal during 2008–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Eurostat (2020a, 2020d)

The analysis provided shows that migration flows correlate with the economic situation in the country. When the economic situation got worse, emigration started growing. Therefore, it could be indicated that links between the economic situation, such as increased unemployment and level of poverty and decreased PPS, push people to leave their home country. These factors could be related with low qualified emigrants. However, Delicado (2019) analysing skilled migrants in a case of scientists indicated more pull factors, such as the opportunities to learn new things, development of their CV, possibility to join international networks, or to work in a prestigious institution with specific material and human resources; these were especially strong for the younger generation. Surveys about the benefits of European integration revealed a positive attitude towards it among the Portuguese population. In 2007 62%, and in 2010 42%, revealed that "opportunities to find work are better abroad than at home" (European Commission, 2007). This attitude differs according to age and education and these possibilities are more revealed by younger and more educated people.

Non-economic Factors Describing Culture of Migration in Portugal

Speaking about migration culture in Portugal, other features beside the economic situation of the country and positive attitude for working abroad could be also noted. Family and other social ties with Portuguese emigrants abroad reduce a risk of failure and unsuccessful experience, and help in the adjustment of emigrants (Justino, 2016). Moreover, Portuguese diasporas provide social support and networks for newcomers and returnees. This is also an important factor for people taking a decision to migrate. Knowing that social support will be received before and after arriving makes people feel safe and easier in taking a risk with migration. However, it should be noted that skilled migrants from the recent wave do not look for such diaspora support as reported by Pinto and Araújo (2016).

Justino (2016) states that economic decline and emigration have influenced Portuguese identity. People stopped believing that they will be able to reach pre-crises prosperity. PPS fell down by two points comparing 2011 and 2013, and the risk of poverty and unemployment increased. Therefore, society has begun to see this period as a reversal of progress and a return to the mass emigration of the 1960s. Rosales and Machado (2019) explored the Portuguese who immigrated to Brazil. They state that as per the majority of economic migrants of the world, migrants from Portugal could be described as people seeking a better quality of life. In addition, Amit (2007) highlights migrants as people with their true self and true identity, seeking to materialize a new life and to value materialism.

Another study, presented by Cordeiro (2019: 13), shows that "emigrant status does not seem to fit well with the self-identity of Portuguese immigrants". Taking a case explored in the US Cordeiro (2019) notes that one interviewee was proud of

being an immigrant, however, he does not accept being referred to as an emigrant from Portugal. Usually, the USA is seen as the nation of immigrants and Portugal as a nation of emigrants (Martin, 2011). Many migrants from all around the world seek to migrate to the USA as a dream country, where everything is possible and to reach "their own personification of the American dream". Comparing a case in Brazil, it should be noted that Portuguese migrants do not try to assimilate or integrate into Brazil culture or to become Brazilians (Rosales & Machado, 2019). They hold onto their European passports and argue that this gives them an added value in comparison with the Brazilian passport.

However, despite differences of behaviour in the host countries, it is necessary to emphasize that Portuguese have strong Portuguese-American or Portuguese-Brazilian communities, where they value Portugal culture, values and habits, and staying Portuguese while abroad.

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Chapter 15
From Immigration to Emigration in Spain

Migratory flows in Spain are not a new phenomenon, although the effects are different according to the economic cycle. In the case of Spain, migration has played a very important role throughout history, especially in the last century, in the general evolution of the population and in economic, cultural and even political behaviour. Furthermore, there is certainly no doubt that emigration would have a very pernicious effect on the population of developed countries like Spain.

Spain went from a strong economic expansion (in which there was a massive reception of immigrant workers), to a serious recession (especially since 2008). This meant a great decrease in the number of immigrants received and, at the same time, the beginning of a growing emigration from Spain to other countries, something that had not happened with such intensity since the 1980s (Mihi-Ramírez, 2013a). This situation implies high-impact changes; therefore, this chapter aims to place emigration in Spain in context, taking into account the effects of the most relevant push factors from a socio-economic perspective. Accordingly, this chapter analyses relevant socio-economic push factors, which were highlighted in Chap. 3 and used for analysis in the cases of Portugal and Lithuania. However, in this chapter we seek to reveal the differences of Spain in comparison with these two previously analysed cases of Lithuania and Portugal.

Evolution of Migration in Spain

Until 1950 the predominance of Spanish emigration, especially low-skilled workers, was from a few regions towards very specific destinations "forever", especially to America. Afterwards, there was an increase in the regions of origin and destinations, with the main focus on Western Europe.

The slow but progressive economic development that began in the 1960s led to emigration finally ceasing in the late 1970s. Progressively Spain began to receive immigrants, and over time the number of arrivals increased massively. It was also

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during this period that the return of Spanish emigrants to other European countries occurred for the first time, a fact that puts Spain on a par with the patterns of other neighbouring countries. Furthermore, a considerable Spanish emigration returned from the American continent to the main European industrial regions.

In the twenty-first century, emigration in Spain remained residual, and immigration continued on a large scale but with changes in the sending countries following the progressive adhesion of countries to keeping within the European Union. Efforts here focused on the management and integration of these flows and on incorporating Europe's migration policies.

Certain decisive factors in socio-economic development that determine the improvement or deterioration of the quality of life in Spain and, consequently, the capacity for retaining or expelling its population, could be highlighted. This, together with a consideration of the most recent data, would allow us to show in more detail the evolution of Spanish emigration in the twentieth century and into the twenty-first century, which could be summarized in the following four phases (see Fig. 15.1).

Phase 1, until 1950. Throughout the twentieth century, emigration was significantly unequal between the two halves of the century, but also between men and women. In the first quarter of the century, more people emigrated than during the Spanish Civil War (1935–1940). These facts contradict the views on the scale of the Spanish exile as a result of the Spanish Civil War. The great return of women in the first half of the twentieth century is remarkable, apparently due to the large number of women who went abroad as domestic servants and returned to Spain in their old age between 1915 and 1930 (Franch et al., 2013) (see Fig. 15.2).

Among the main causes of mobility during that period were the crisis in certain agricultural productions (especially the case of the grapevine) and the progressive mechanization (although still incipient) of agricultural work, especially the

Fig. 15.1 Evolution of net migration (Immigrants—Emigrants) of Spain, 1900–2020, *five-year periods*. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2020), United Nations (2020) and Franch et al. (2013)



Fig. 15.2 Evolution of net migration of Spain by gender in 1990–2000. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2020)

harvesting of wheat, which was until then one of the main causes of internal displacement (Romero Valiente, 2018).

Phase 2, 1950–2000. The economic situation was rather uneven throughout the second half of the twentieth century. The first years were ominous for the Spanish economy, whose level of development was far from the average European level. However, from 1985, with minor interruptions, Spanish society reached a high level of economic development. The mechanization of agriculture, the fundamental basis of the Spanish economy over the first half of the century, had a considerable impact on the decline in migration activity rates and the growth in unemployment rates. At the same time, there was a lack of adequate social benefits to prevent hunger and withstand the long time spent searching for employment. The large surplus agricultural working population could not be absorbed either by industrial development or by emigration to Europe (Romero Valiente, 2018).

Until World War I, migration was mainly by sea to countries in either the North or South American continents. However, from the second half of the twentieth century onwards, migration to the main European industrial areas developed considerably, in part due to improvements in the transport and communications system, exclusive labour motivations in favour of others (such as the possibility of return), seeking a higher quality of life, or pursuing studies.

Between 1950 and 1970, Spanish emigration abroad was massive and without major gender differences, being especially intense between 1955 and 1965. Spanish society of the 1960s began to undergo an economic development that transformed the rural and agrarian economy into an industrial and urban economy, accompanied by a

high birth rate. We should also mention here the large increase in internal migrations, which formed a great exodus from the country to the big cities. These facts marked the economic and demographic future of the last quarter of the twentieth century. Thus, the higher level of economic development led to the end of emigration from the 1980s and a progressive return of these emigrants from the 1990s.

Along with the huge Spanish emigration to Europe in those years, there was a moderate immigration of foreigners, which began to increase from 1980 onwards and became massive by the end of the century. Hence, Spain, which had been an emigration country until then, became one of the largest receiving countries of foreign populations since the mid-1990s (Franch et al., 2013).

From the 1970s, the lack of attractive dynamic areas for emigration, due to the effects of the 1973 oil crisis in developed countries of Western Europe, is complemented by the reduction of push factors in this period. Additionally, socio-political changes in Spain after the end of the dictatorship meant new possibilities opened up in the traditional sending regions of Spain: a process of decentralization and regional development, rural employment policy and the relief of migratory pressure caused by departures in previous decades. Overall, it significantly reduced emigration.

Phase 3, 2000–2006. This phase continues the period of Spain's integration into the European Union and a cycle (in broad terms) of economic growth (Ferrari, 2020; Franch et al., 2013). There was an important call effect from the Spanish labour market and, consequently, the consolidation of Spain as a receiving country of immigrants and a residual emigration country (González Enríquez & Martínez Romera, 2018; Romero Valiente, 2018). With the restructuring of the Spanish labour market in those years, Spain became much more attractive to foreign and local workers. Also important in this period were the push factors from home countries, within the framework of a (modern) "world system". This triggered a process that made Spain the centre of attraction of a migratory subsystem within the EU with some specificities with respect to other EU countries. This stage has been essential for the constitution of the migratory networks from certain countries to Spain (Garcia-Rodriguez et al., 2015). Figure 15.3 resumes emigration from Spain from 1960 to 2019. When emigration in Spain began again at the start of the twenty-first century, it went from barely 173 emigrants (in 2000), to a gradual increase that intensified notably with the economic crisis, reaching its peak in 2013 with 532,132 emigrants. Current figures remain high with annual figures of around 300,000 emigrants in 2018 (Spanish National Institute of Statistics, 2020).

Phase 4, from 2007. From 2007 began the deterioration of economic conditions and increased emigration (as well as reduced immigration). The great economic recession meant that Spanish emigration once again began to be a reality. It declined long after the 1970s (Izquierdo et al., 2015). Emigration flows kept growing (see Fig. 15.3) and net migration became negative during 2012–2015 (see Chap. 7). In our monograph, we further focus on this recent emigration phase and explain its particularities.

Firstly, in this case one of the great differences with previous times is that a large part of the emigrants are highly qualified workers (Mihi-Ramírez, 2013a). According to these statistics from the European Commission (2020), between 1997 and 2007 the



Fig. 15.3 Number of emigrants from Spain in 1960–2020. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2020)

number of Spaniards who requested recognition of their degrees and qualifications in another European country was 6,583, while between 2008 and 2019 it was 63,598, an increase of +966%. Also, more than 17% of people with a higher education in Spain emigrated to EU between 2008 and 2019.

Figure 15.4 shows the destinations in Europe most requested by Spaniards for the homologation of degrees and qualifications in the entire period analysed of 2008–2019, where the UK, Italy and France are particularly prominent. By occupation, most belong to the health and education sector (European Commission, 2020). This is similar to the case of Portugal. Some authors argue that the emigration of health and education professionals would contribute to the deterioration of the health system and the training of future skilled workers (Bundred & Levitt, 2000).

Secondly, in the fourth emigration wave of Spain, there is one main difference from the analysed cases of Lithuania and Portugal. This new emigration is mainly the result of immigrants (mostly from Latin America and EU countries) returning to their countries of origin (or re-emigrating) as work opportunities diminish (Bermudez & Brey, 2017). In this regard, Fig. 15.5 shows the number of emigrants according to their birthplace and we see that the vast majority of emigrants from Spain were returning to their country of origin. The difference in numbers between Spanish and emigrants from country of origin was almost five times bigger in 2013. We could also note that the number of emigrants moving to a country other than the one they were born in was higher than the emigration of Spanish during 2008–2013. Therefore, we focus more on the particularities of remigration of immigrants.

The top-specific countries of destination of migrants from Spain are shown in Fig. 15.6 (also taking into account the place of birth of the migrants).[1] In these years, the return of emigrants from Romania and Morocco stands out which were, together

[1]The reader can find a more complete and illustrative visualization of the emigration of the Spanish here: Mihi-Ramirez, A. (2020). *International emigration of Spaniards 2008–2018*. http://hdl.handle.net/10481/61084.



Fig. 15.4 Application for recognition of academic degrees and qualifications of Spaniards to other European countries (AT—Austria, BE—Belgium, BG—Bulgaria, CY—Cyprus, CZ—Czechia, DE—Germany, DK—Denmark, EE—Estonia, ES—Spain, FI—Finland, FR—France, GR—Greece, HR—Croatia, HU—Hungary, IE—Ireland, IT—Italy, IS—Iceland, LT—Lithuania, LU—Luxembourg, LV—Latvia, MT—Malta, NL—Netherlands, PL—Poland, PT—Portugal, RO—Romania, SE—Sweden, SI—Slovenia, SK—Slovakia, UK—United Kingdom) in 2008–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with European Commission (2020)

with Ecuador, the main groups of foreigners who settled in Spain. In addition, there is evidence of an increase in the emigration of Spain-born people to the UK and France, as well as migrants who were born in other countries, such as China and Romania. In general, the return of migrants to South America (one of the largest groups of foreigners in Spain) was greater in 2008 than in 2019, except in the case of migrants who were born in Colombia.

Using information from the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2020), we would like to highlight that emigrants born in Spain tend to be between 25 and



Fig. 15.5 Evolution of emigration abroad per year, by country of birth (Place of birth: Spain, the country of origin to which they return, born in other countries [neither Spain nor the country of origin]) in 2008–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2020)

29 years old. And in the case of migrants born in other countries, they are older and concentrated in the 40–44 year age group. Perhaps the older age reflects the number of times that they have emigrated. Overall, the largest age group of emigrants is 25–34 years, regardless of place of birth, and with a slight majority of men. This data may serve to support the few studies conducted on the subject so far (Bermudez & Brey, 2017; Izquierdo et al., 2015).

According to the literature about migration, migratory flows tend to be more concentrated in those regions where economic activity is more intense or there is a larger stock of immigrants, since the previous existence of networks implies more facilities and greater support for new immigrants (Massey, 1988; Nordregio, 2013). In this sense, in Spain the regions with the largest populations, such as Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia and Andalusia, are also those that have experienced the greatest increase in migration flows. Net migration experienced a decline during the recession, which was especially marked in those regions where the impact of the crisis or the foreign population was greater (Spanish National Institute of Statistics, 2020).

Seeing that emigration increased during the economic recession, we therefore analyse its relation to socio-economic factors and will focus on the differences between Spanish and foreign emigrants.



Fig. 15.6 Top host countries of emigrants from Spain by born country in 2008 and 2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2020)

Migration Flows in Relation to Socio-Economic Factors

Migration flows and wages. The migration theory of the dual labour market states that growth requires on the one hand, an increase in technology and highly skilled workers, and on the other hand, it also requires low-skilled labour to do the work that is not wanted and lower wages (Dickens & Lang, 1984; Piore, 1979). So, to increase growth, labour could be replaced by capital, or in labour-intensive sectors, more immigrants could be hired to achieve this growth. Likewise, the theory of the new economy of labour migration (Stark, 1991) indicates that wages determine the attractiveness of industrial sectors for international workers in a host country.

In the case of Spain, wages have kept the same for a long time for Spaniards, but for foreign workers, they have fallen sharply since the beginning of the crisis and have



Fig. 15.7 Average annual wages of Spanish and foreign workers in Spain 2008–2014. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with the Spanish Tax Agency (2020)

not yet recovered; meaning that the wage gap with respect to national workers has widened (see Fig. 15.7). In 2008, the average wage of Spanish workers was 19,999 Euros (and 16,873 Euros in the case of foreigners) and in 2018 (the most recent data is 20,475 Euros (and 12,244 Euros for foreigners) (Spanish Tax Agency, 2020).

This decline in wage income affects the evolution of GDP. From a microeconomic point of view, the reduction of companies' labour costs can favour the hiring of workers and the increase of production. However, from a macroeconomic perspective, for the overall economy a reduction in wages may lead to a reduction in the standard of living, in the purchasing power of workers and in the private consumption of workers (Ferrari, 2020; Maza et al., 2019).

The fall in the wages of immigrants occurs in practically all the regions of Spain. These records confirm some of the aspects mentioned above from the perspective of wages. Thus, emigration in Spain is mostly among foreigners. These foreign workers settled in major regions where wages were higher, such as Catalonia and Madrid. The literature supports that workers are usually concentrated in regions where wages are higher (Maza et al., 2019; Mihi-Ramírez et al., 2017). Later, falling incomes have led to a resurgence of emigration to other countries (especially from these foreigners). Moreover, a drop in wages is more pronounced where economic activities are more intensive in low-skilled labour: Extremadura, Castilla La Mancha, Valencia and Andalusia. In addition, there is a significant gap between the level of wages for Spaniards and foreigners, which may act as a push factor for emigration.

There are also important differences by gender and age, in line with the trends mentioned for the last phase of emigration in Spain. Thus, wage levels are more precarious in the case of young people and women. Nevertheless, this data partially explains the migrations in Spain, which should include other relevant factors in order to have a more comprehensive understanding. In this sense, most of the migration approaches explain migratory flows in terms of the labour market.

Labour market and factors explaining it. The labour market situation is another important determinant identified in the literature on migration (Mihi-Ramírez et al., 2017). Figure 15.8 shows the evolution of unemployment rates in Spain by nation-



Fig. 15.8 Unemployment rate in Spain by nationality and gender in 2006–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Ministry of Labour Migrations & Social Security (2020) and Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2019)

ality and gender, and also by regions. Again, the years in which the great recession hit hardest correspond to an increase in emigration in Spain (Figs. 15.1 and 15.3). The unemployment rate is particularly high for foreign workers. The highest unemployment occurs in 2013, and from that year onwards it begins to fall, although there is less recovery in the case of women's unemployment. In 2019 unemployment has not yet recovered, in fact, there are several Spanish regions where it has increased.

We should remember that emigration was higher for men (see Fig. 15.2). Furthermore, if we look at Fig. 15.9, the male activity rate drops slightly and the female activity rate remains the same. Therefore, the most coherent explanation for the slower recovery in female unemployment from 2013 could be the increased male emigration, which reduces official male unemployment records.



Fig. 15.9 Evolution of the activity rate and emigration by gender in Spain 2008–2019. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2020)

The aforementioned increase in unemployment also has an impact on the country's income via taxes and workers' contributions to the Social Security system (SS). Thus, if we take the example of personal income tax on income declared by foreign workers (who have emigrated in greater percentage), it represented a total gross amount in 2008 of almost 24 billion Euros, a decrease of 9% in 2013, and a recovery to pre-crisis levels by 2018 (Spanish Tax Agency, 2020). Similarly, with regard to income from Social Security taxes, Fig. 15.10 shows how they have fallen since 2008 to an annual minimum of 677,297,482 Euros in 2013, a drop of 7%, though they have since begun to recover (Spanish Tax Agency, 2020). The State's income from these concepts represents a significant amount that varies according to the number of workers.

The analysis of the labour market is completed in Fig. 15.11, which compares several labour market indicators between 2008 and 2018 (Stark, 1991): the activity rate in Spain, the employment rate, the unemployment rate of foreign workers, the percentage of workers with a temporary or part-time contract, the percentage of workers who work in lower-qualified jobs as regards their level of studies, and finally, the percentage of employed persons in lower-qualified jobs.

The perception of better living conditions in Spain has been one of the factors that explains low emigration and also the massive reception of immigrants, especially

Fig. 15.10 Incomes of the Social Security System of Spain by foreign workers. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Ministry of Labour Migrations & Social Security (2020)



Fig. 15.11 The labour market features of Spain in 2008 and 2018. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Labour Force Survey Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2019)

after European integration (Maza et al., 2019; Mihi-Ramírez, 2013b). In view of the current economic situation, it would at least be necessary to maintain the level of income of immigrant households in Spain so that foreign workers can cope with the poor situation in the labour market and decide to stay in Spain. This issue is also relevant for keeping emigration rates low and for the return of emigrants abroad.

The risk of poverty and social exclusion. It is worth asking whether the deterioration of labour conditions and low wages, and the subsequent decline in the purchasing power of workers, have led to changes in their standard of living. Along

with purchasing power, the standard of living can be measured by knowing whether the population has the resources to meet its basic needs.

The living conditions survey carried out by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) examines the Arope indicator, which measures the risk of poverty. According to the INE (2019, 1): "The population at risk of poverty or social exclusion is that which is in one of these situations:

- At risk of poverty (60% median income per consumption unit).
- Severe material deficiency (lacking in at least four items from a list of nine).
- In jobless or low-employment households (households in which their working-age members did less than 20% of their total working potential during the reference year)".

Overall, the risk of poverty among the population of Spain has increased in recent years. Figure 15.12 shows the percentage of persons below the risk of poverty line, which in Spain went from a total of 18.6% in 2008 to 25.6% in 2018. By breaking down this information by nationality, it can be observed that in the case of Spaniards, it has evolved in an analogous manner to the total, increasing from 15.6% in 2008 to 25.6% with the deterioration of the economic situation.

For foreigners from other European Union countries, the risk of poverty is much higher, rising from 41.5% in 2008 to 47.7% in 2018. On the other hand, foreigners from non-EU countries are at the greatest risk of poverty and social exclusion. This increased from 44.3% in 2008 to a peak of 63.9% in 2015, although the most recent data puts it at 56% in 2018. Thus, this group is the most vulnerable to the deterioration of the economic situation in Spain.

Probably, we can find here the explanation to the great increase of the emigration of the resident foreigners in Spain from 2015 (see Fig. 15.3). Here, the lack of expectations together with the better economic situation in other EU countries (which are relatively close and for which there is free mobility provided by the EU Schengen

Fig. 15.12 Risk of poverty and social exclusion in Spain by nationality in 2008–2014. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with INE (2019)

Treaty) has meant that in Spain, the large increase in the number of foreign immigrants that began with the economic crisis continues today in unprecedented numbers.

Financial poverty and social exclusion can also be measured indirectly through the difficulties expressed by individuals in making ends meet and coping with expenses considered as usual. This is a subjective indicator that complements the objective indicators based on the Living Conditions Survey (Spanish National Institute of Statistics, 2019). Figure 15.13 shows the number of households facing major difficulties in meeting regular expenditures. In line with the economic cycle and the



Fig. 15.13 Major difficulties in making ends meet according to nationality (% of population aged 16 and over). *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2019)

indicators analysed above, there are large differences between locals (10%) and foreigners (25%), especially in the case of immigrants from non-EU countries. This situation translates into greater pressure to emigrate for these groups, especially in recent years.

The study of response and resilience to adverse economic situations would complete the analysis of the socio-economic push-pull factors that determine migration. On the basis of the indicators in the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report, we examine the economic risks and vulnerability of households and individuals, as well as their responsiveness and resilience in dealing with adverse economic situations.

We use another subjective indicator, such as the inability to cope with unforeseen economic expenses (see Fig. 15.14). This indicator is collected in the Living Conditions Survey (Spanish National Institute of Statistics, 2019). Again, there are large differences between locals and foreigners, particularly in the case of immigrants from non-EU countries. This is a particularly vulnerable collective facing difficult situations, so they have a low capacity to withstand which may lead to emigration as the only way out.

Summarizing this chapter, we would like to highlight that the perspective of neoclassical macroeconomic theory of migration varies with economic growth (Borjas, 2013). Therefore, we conclude with a review of the main indicator of economic growth, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and migration flows.

Looking at GDP in relation to migration during 1960–2018 (see Fig. 15.15), we could see the influence of economic cycles on migratory flows. In short, emigration in Spain grew until the mid-1980s when greater stability and growth in the economy, as mentioned earlier, came to Spain. From that moment on immigration to Spain began to grow massively especially in the 1990s within the context of European integration, economic liberalization and large foreign investment. In the mid-2000s, emigration started to gradually grow once again, and after the onset of the economic crisis it experienced the strongest growth in the whole period observed, coming after several decades in which its value had remained residual.

According to Bartolini et al. (2017) and Gropas and Triandafyllidou (2015) during the great recession the emigration of the Spanish began later than in all the other southern European countries due to their greater rejection of geographical mobility. The great intensity of changes in migratory flows in recent years also highlights the greater interconnectedness and influence of the economy than in previous periods.

Largely, the decision to emigrate has been motivated by the lack of job expectations in Spain rather than by training and professional improvement strategies (González Enríquez & Martínez Romera, 2015). This situation implies leaving the country in conditions of low skills and vulnerability. In fact, Spanish emigrants once in the destination country have had to face similar situations of unemployment and low income, which together with not very high proficiency in the language of the destination country, leads integration being less successful (Bartolini et al., 2017; Gropas & Triandafyllidou, 2015). This explains why, in view of the first signs of economic recovery, emigration, although still high, has slowed down. In this case, many Spanish emigrants would not go beyond what Dassetto (1990) called the first



Fig. 15.14 Inability to meet unforeseen financial expenses (% of population aged 16 and over). *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2019)

moment or stage of the migratory cycle, based on a determined labour relationship, where settling down and integration are not consolidated.

Similarly, the economic crisis led to a sharp reduction in the number of immigrants (Mihi-Ramirez, 2013b; Spanish National Institute of Statistics, 2020). However, compared to previous movements, this situation has been one of short duration and intensity. The immigration drop was as low as 2.2% and was just limited to the years 2012–2016. Since 2017 Spain has recovered positive migratory balances, in



Fig. 15.15 Number of emigrants, and GDP growth rate in Spain 1960–2018. *Note* Designed by the authors in accordance with Spanish National Institute of Statistics (2020)

a process that is undoubtedly linked to economic recovery, especially job creation (Ojeda-Gonzalez et al., 2018).

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Chapter 16
Conclusion

The mobility of people is known from the beginning of their existence. However, some nations are more mobile than others and this is related to migration culture as we have described in this monograph. The concept of *migration culture* was only first mentioned in the 1990s, however, this phenomenon is analysed episodically. Therefore, our monograph contributes to the exploration of migration culture implementing a broader perspective and includes such features as migration history, migration flows, economic and non-economic push migration factors and values describing people in relation to migration culture. Our findings contribute to the scientific and practical explorations of migration culture.

Scientific Contribution

Firstly, as there is no clear definition of migration culture provided in scientific literature, we formulate a definition of our own stating that migration culture is "*the willingness of people to migrate with a set of corresponding values, which are developed as a result of economic, social, demographic, political and other push factors of that particular country or region. That complex whole triggers people to leave their home country, and could be identified by migration history and high emigration flows*".

Secondly, as was mentioned, it accomplishes a study of migration culture from a broader perspective. The case of Lithuania focuses not on fragmental analysis of separate features but includes a broader spectrum of the features highlighted in the scientific literature. Thirdly, the Lithuanian study demonstrates changes of values connected with mobility and the revealed differences of values could contribute to knowledge in migration literature, value change studies and international management fields. Fourthly, we highlight the importance of economic factors, which have an impact on the increase of emigration flows in the explored countries. Fifthly, comparative analysis of push factors in Lithuania's case revealed differences of

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factors among the analysed groups of respondents, which contributes to a deeper exploration of push–pull theory.

In this monograph, we presented analyses of three countries (Lithuania, Spain and Portugal), representing migration cultures. They were selected based on migration history, emigration flows and their economic situation in the last decade. Push migration factors, representing the economic and non-economic situation of the country of origin and values, are central to understanding cultures of migration that is the main research object of this monograph. Push factors were explored for all countries, though just in the case of Lithuania, a deep analysis of universal values was conducted. Emigration in Spain, Portugal and Lithuania was not a new phenomenon; however, the effects are different according to the economic cycle. In the last decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of this century, Spain and Portugal were countries of reception for immigrants. However, they became countries of emigration again, something that has not occurred since the 1980s but has very pernicious consequences for the future of the countries.

The evolution of push factors in recent years explains the decline in living standards as well as living conditions. Firstly, we would like to highlight that emigration flows increase when economic indicators become worse in all explored countries. In addition, we could note, after the great economic crisis in all cases analysed, emigration flows increased. The precariousness of employment has grown significantly, especially between young people, and this situation, together with the increase in relative poverty, has ultimately resulted in increased emigration in cases studied. However, comparing all three countries we could note the main difference between emigrants in these countries. Most of the Lithuanian emigrants are its citizens. However, a large part of the emigrants from Spain are foreigners who settled in Spain in recent years and are now returning to their home countries or are moving to other foreign countries. In the case of Portugal, locals and foreigners emigrate, but Portuguese are also a bigger part of all emigrants.

Lithuania has had negative net migration since 1990. However, it has captured positive migration starting from 2019. We could forecast that immigration will increase in the long term more. Migration flows will determine the population growth of developed countries like Spain, Portugal and probably Lithuania in the coming years. Considering the deterioration of the global and country economy and its effects on migratory flows, it is a priority to consider this topic because of the large impact on socio-economic development. Such tendencies are seen in Spain and Lithuania. The return of Spanish emigrants to Spain and Lithuanian emigrants to Lithuania is growing. However, the COVID-19 situation could impact economic development and migration flows a lot.

Exploring the case of Lithuania, Lithuanians were mostly pushed to leave the country because of economic factors, such as low salaries, high prices and the burden on them as well as personal living conditions. The importance of these factors increased during every migration wave. Besides that, in the last decades more social factors, such as the possibility of self-development or the wish for changes, have influenced the decision to migrate. Comparing different groups of respondents,

differences were revealed. Immobile locals with the willingness to emigrate indicate the following important factors: (1) salary differences and income inequality, (2) salary in Lithuania, (3) prices of products and services, (4) tax system, (5) the current (predictable) size of pension, (6) corruption, (7) personal life conditions, (8) level of country's economic development, (9) social inequality and (10) possibilities of employment. However, the ranking of push factors by emigrants is a bit different: (1) salary in Lithuania, (2) personal life conditions, (3) prices of products and services, (4) salary differences and income inequality, (5) political corruption, (6) level of country's economic development, (7) tax system, (8) family reasons, (9) social security system and (10) the desire for changes.

We want to note that our rationality to analyse values in relation to migration culture was supported. Generalizing the findings, we might conclude that the values in emigration seem to undergo slight changes. These findings will be in line with the studies accomplished by Rudnev (2014), Lönnqvist et al. (2011, 2013). But, as we see from the discussion of the results, those differences in value preferences are not so great, which supports Tartakovsky et al. (2017) claim that immigrants form their system of universal values during the time spent in the country of origin and bring them to a new country, where they remain relatively stable. Migrants' values do not change dramatically. This also supports the theory and in particular socialization hypothesis developed by Inglehart (1990) which claims that the basic values of a person are formed during one's pre-adult years and reflect the conditions that prevailed at that time. Moreover, the relationship between the socio-economic environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved because, to a large extent, people are not prone to changing their beliefs and attitudes so quickly.

However, exploring the case of Lithuania, we revealed differences in values between different groups of respondents. Some statistical differences were revealed between all six groups of respondents (locals without intention to migrate, locals with intention to migrate, emigrants with intention to return, emigrants without intention to migrate, returnees without intention to leave and returnees with intention to migrate again). The highest differences were revealed between immobile locals without willingness to emigrate and emigrants without willingness to return. Therefore, taking in mind Tartakovsky's et al. (2017) approach that values of migrants remain relatively stable and are not impacted a lot by a host country and its values, we could therefore claim that values describing migration culture point towards a willingness to migrate. Five top values for immobile locals without a willingness to migrate are as following: (1) security, (2) benevolence, (3) self-direction, (4) universalism and (5) stimulation. The corresponding five values for emigrants without willingness to migrate are: (1) self-direction, (2) benevolence, (3) universalism, (4) security and (5) stimulation.

A study conducted by Lönnqvist et al. (2011), exploring Ingrian–Finnish migrants in Finland indicated the increased importance of Universalism and Security values, and the decreased importance in Achievement and Power values. However, we could see our findings are a bit different. We also found that the importance of Universalism increased for emigrants. However, evaluation of Security values decreased,

and Achievement increased in the case of Lithuania. Power stayed at the same place (No. 10) for immobile locals and emigrants.[1]

Moreover, we found out the existence of differences of values between immobile locals with a wish to migrate and without it. Hedonism, Traditions, Conformity, Security, and Spirituality are more important for immobile locals without the willingness to emigrate and just Wealth, a value from Power group, was scored to be higher for immobile locals willing to emigrate. This corresponds with a study of De Jong et al. (1996). They have identified four migration-related value-expectancy dimensions: income, affiliation, stimulation, and comfort. It could be explained by other studies that people migrate because of economic reasons, higher income and seek wealth abroad (Cooray & Schneider, 2016; Kumpikaitė-Valiūnienė & Žičkutė, 2017).

Comparing our data with the findings of De Jong et al. (1996) we have the following results: stimulation is ranked the same by immobile locals and emigrants in the case of Lithuania, the mean value is higher for emigrants, which means a bigger importance of stimulation for them. Affiliation, explored by De Jong et al. (1996), could be related to social recognition according to the Schwartz theory of universal values (Schwartz, 1992). However, in the case of Lithuania, this value was scored more by immobile locals than emigrants. Moreover, emigrants without the willingness to return value this more than migrants with the willingness to return.

Moreover, looking at the universal values of individuals, studies revealed that respondents having migration experience score the values higher than immobile locals.

Practical Implications

This research approach could deliver practical ideas and implications for policymakers and organizations by helping them to understand relationships between push factors, an employee's values and likely willingness to migrate, and losing working age citizens. In addition, the case of Lithuania demonstrated differences of values and push factors between different profiles of respondents. It contributes to knowledge and understanding of the complex phenomenon of traditional norms and persistent migration behaviours (migration culture) and can influence the development of appropriate policies to decrease migration and encourage re-emigration to the home country. Therefore, policymakers should pay attention to values, push factors and motives connected with them when preparing programmes promoting the return of emigrants. Moreover, this proposed research approach could deliver practical concepts and implications for policymakers and organizations by helping them to understand the relationships between migration culture, employees' values and their willingness to migrate.

[1]More information about value differences among different respondents groups in a case of Lithuania is provided in Chap. 11.

Such a set of presented findings open the doors for future studies and the migration culture phenomenon could be analysed more extensively and to a deeper extent in the future.

Future Research Directions

More studies exploring the individual values of immobile locals and others should be made. In particular, we recommend that cultures of migration in cases of different countries should be analysed, as there is a major gap in the existing literature. The phenomenon should be analysed holistically rather than episodically considering one or other aspect. We suggest Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria to be taken for further analysis of case studies in the EU. We propose that similar results could be highlighted exploring push factors, however, more differences could be indicated exploring values. As it is noted in Hedberg and Kepsu (2003, p. 68) the individual decision to migrate is formed by individual and collective values and practices, making migration a cultural event and a part of the identity and moreover, values are related to nationality and culture. Therefore, even our study revealed the importance and differences of values, although we do not know if the same value differences exist in other nations. Therefore, more studies in different contexts are needed in relation to migration culture in order to answer the questions: What values stimulate people to migrate exploring different countries? How do those values differ between nations? Does any value exist separating emigrants and immobile locals without the willingness to migrate, despite their attraction to their nation? What are changes in values of migrants in relation to host country values and time spent in that country? How do those changes depend on nations living in the same host country? etc. International studies of values according to the Schwartz theory, that we have done in this study, could be taken in different countries and compared with the values of emigrants. Moreover, Hofstede's cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 2001) could be implemented to analyse similarities and differences to answer our formulated questions.

Moreover, future research should include statistical data analysis of migration flows in selected historical periods as Kandel and Massey (2002) and Sirkeci and Cohen (2016) have advocated and attend carefully to the social-economic and political situation during that period. Different cases of countries facing serious political changes could be taken to explore migration culture in more detail. Individual value changes during that period could help with explaining the fundamental dimensions of a culture of migration. Moreover, previous migration experience (Timmerman et al., 2014) should be included to support deeper analysis.

Summarizing, we could say that this monograph is one of the first steps of its kind exploring migration culture, so it rose many new questions. Therefore, there is still a lot of work to be done in the future to explore the phenomenon of migration culture.

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