



PAK AFFAIRS

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Pakistan’s civilian government has little control over the country’s powerful army which stands out as a most trusted institution, with more than 80 percent public approval, compared to 36 percent approval for government. Weak institutions that fail to address Pakistan’s challenges have allowed the army to become more assertive, explains Riaz Hassan, research professor and director of the International Centre for Muslim and Non-Muslim Understanding, and he argues that demography has a role: “The most striking aspect of Pakistan’s demography is that it is made up of six ‘nations,’ each divided between two or, in the case of Balochis, three countries,” he writes. “All are predominantly Islamic, but also endowed with their own distinct, historically grounded cultural identities.” Despite governmental failings and difficult civil-military relations in Pakistan, public polling indicates strong support for democracy, at 80 percent, rather than for a military dictatorship. – Yale Global

Pakistan’s Civil-Military Relations

Pakistan’s demographic makeup, with ethnic groups spread across borders, contributes to security and governance challenges.



Riaz Hassan

Sewing a crazy tribal quilt: Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan with fellow Pashtun fighters at an earlier time; Baloch rebels surrender weapons to the Pakistani government.

ADELAIDE: Of Pakistan’s many problems nothing is perhaps as enduring or as debilitating as the conflictual relationship between its civilian leadership and the military. Unlike in most democratic countries, Pakistan’s elected civilian government rarely commands the gun. Scholarly debates and analyses have identified multiple reasons including weak political institutions and parties, incompetent political leadership, the entrenched power of the civil-military bureaucracy, and threats to Pakistan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Other contingent factors arising from the country’s demography and geography contribute to Pakistan’s difficulties, but are rarely given attention for shaping the civil-military relations, governance and security challenges that the Pakistani state has faced from the onset. The imperatives of geography, demography and security play a critical but varying role in shaping relations between civilian and military leaders in other countries as well.

Weak institutions are often attributed to the lack of well-established political parties headed by competent leaders. This, in turn, has failed to develop the basis for a robust and effective political and constitutional system, seriously impeding the government’s ability to respond to a myriad of internal and external challenges it faces related to national cohesion and integration, ethnic tensions, sectarianism, regional inequalities and international relations. In this space the bureaucratic military elite has become steadily more assertive, increasing its power at the expense of the country’s political elite.

The military is Pakistan’s most trusted, disciplined and cohesive Institution. Its composition closely corresponds to Pakistan’s demography. At 57 percent Punjabis make the majority followed by Sindhis, 17 percent; Pashthun, 15 percent; Kashmiris, 9 percent; and Balochis, 3 percent.

Between 1980 and 2000 four democratically elected governments were dismissed by the country’s presidents on charges of corruption, inefficiency and an inability to meet security challenges. This resulted in the



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
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strengthening of the civil-military bureaucracy. Indeed, civilian bureaucrats or military generals have governed Pakistan for almost 45 of its 70 years. These factors have undoubtedly played a role in shaping civil-military relations in Pakistan.

Before the July national elections Pakistani media were replete with stories about the army’s role in the removal of Nawaz Sharif as prime minister and the support of his archrival and now prime minister – Imran Khan, a Pashtun with strong family roots in the Punjab. The army of course vehemently denies these allegations. But perceptions matter.

The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of the States, a treaty signed in 1933, defines a state as possessing a permanent population, a defined territory and a government capable of maintaining effective control over its corresponding territory and conducting international relations with other states.

The most striking aspect of Pakistan’s demography is that it is made up of six “nations,” each divided between two or, in the case of Balochis, three countries. All are predominantly Islamic, but also endowed with their own distinct, historically grounded cultural identities. The geographical contour of Pakistan and its demographic heterogeneity has had profound implications for Pakistani’s territorial integrity, social cohesion, political stability, security and international relations – and the table shows the geographical contour of the state of Pakistan and the ethnic heterogeneity of its population.



(Source: [Pakistan Census data](#) and Wikipedia)

Kashmir has been a source of intermittent military skirmishes and conflicts with India since 1947, and these have been the source of Pakistan’s deteriorating relations with its neighbor. The area remains a major political and security challenge for Pakistan. Baluchistan, Pakistan’s largest province, resource-rich and sparsely populated, straddles Pakistan and Iran. Around 75 percent of the Balochi population resides in Pakistan, while the rest live in Iran and Afghanistan. It too has been a site of decades of ethnic conflict with the Pakistani government over regional inequalities and the exploitation of its mineral and gas resources, which failed to deliver real economic and social benefits to Balochis. The Pakistani army has carried out numerous operations in the province under the rubric of counterterrorism, only serving to heighten ethnic tensions. The province also continues to be a site of incidents carried by Balochi nationalists.

But perhaps the most serious political challenge facing Pakistan concerns the conflict in Afghanistan, which, like the other disputes, also shares a significant demographic dimension. The Pashtun nation consists of approximately 45 million people. Pakistan is home to 31 million Pashtuns, about 70 percent of the population, with Afghanistan home to another 14 million or about 30 percent. The Pashtuns are overwhelmingly a tribal society, their identity grounded in the historical memory of a common lineage,



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Islam and the over-arching universal tribal code of Pashtunwali. These features constitute the social and cultural “glue” of solidarity among the Pashtuns of both countries.

While Pashtunwali rules are not a detailed legal code, they provide an all-encompassing framework for behavior and managing conflicts in Pashtun society. According to the code, when one’s honor is harmed, a person has a duty to respond by seeking revenge greater than the original slight. This dynamic offers deeper insight into the Taliban insurgency. Most Pashtuns are deeply conservative and strongly attached to their tribal values. Moreover, the majority of Taliban fighters are Pashtuns in culture and character, with a deep sense of shared identity. They are outraged by those who usurp their autonomy and denigrate their culture. The core logic of the Taliban insurgency is that they fight for the defense of their country, honor and religion, to avenge the deaths of relatives killed by Western forces and allies alike.

The proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan following occupation in 1979 by Russia and after 2001 by the United States, its allies and the Taliban have made Pakistan an intersection of several global fault-lines. This, too, has had serious consequences for its economy, political stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Under these conditions, and in the face of the external threat of aggression and war, the Pakistani military has been obliged to perform its constitutional duty to ensure national security and unity, and to assist the government in its humanitarian mission. The conditions in Afghanistan, over which Pakistan has no real control, have compounded the problems of chronic political instability and difficult civil-military relations.

In conclusion, weak political institutions and parties and incompetent leadership as well as the country’s geography and demography contribute to governmental failings and complex civil-military relations in Pakistan. This reality is reflected in public opinion polls that show a low level of trust in the government at 36 percent along with parliament, 27 percent; political parties, 30 percent; and politicians, 27 percent. In this context the most trusted institution in the country is Pakistan’s army, which is trusted by 82 percent of the population. But despite the lack of confidence in political intuitions and high trust in the army, most Pakistanis do trust democracy. According to a December 2017 Gallup Poll, 81 percent of Pakistanis prefer democracy, while only 19 percent would rather have a military dictatorship. Recent electoral developments suggest that Pakistan may be heading towards sustainable democracy.

Riaz Hassan is a visiting research professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies National University of Singapore and senior honorary fellow at the Asian Institute, University of Melbourne. He is also director of the International Centre for Muslim and Non-Muslim Understanding at the University of South Australia and emeritus professor of Sociology at Flinders University.

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Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in a Pakistan: Some Lessons from Turkey
Zhao Shurong* and Saif Ur Rahman

School of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, PR China

***Corresponding author:** Zhao Shurong, School of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, PR China Tel:

+862861831756; E-mail: shurz2015@163.com

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Abstract

Pakistan and Turkey enjoy great similarities in many aspects. Yet, the greatest similarity among them is the history of military interventions in domestic politics. The elected governments have been overthrown by the militaries in both the countries, imposing martial laws intermittently. However, since its gaining power in 2002, the government of Justice and Development Party (AKP) has taken series of steps to re-balance Turkish civil-military relations in favour of elected government, which have proved successful in thwarting coup attempts by the country's military.

Pakistan being a parliamentary democracy has no place for its military to indulge in domestic politics. However, Pakistan has remained under direct military rule for half of the country's existence. For the remaining half, a fragile democracy existed with ominous threat of military rule. In this article, an attempt has been made to identify the causes of military's intervention in domestic politics in Pakistan. Some parallels have been drawn to the transforming civil-military relations in Turkey, with a view to draw some pertinent lessons for Pakistan. This article suggests certain first and second-generation measures for democratic government in Pakistan for ensuring civilian supremacy.



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in civil-military relations as enunciated by its constitution.

Keywords: Pakistan army; Military politics; Turkish military; Civilmilitary relations; Military intervention; Pakistani politics; Military and democracy

Introduction

The July 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey was widely discussed in media and political circles alike in Pakistan. On the eve of the visit of Turkish president recep Tayeb Erdogan to Pakistan, the prime minister of Pakistan said during the joint press conference that Turkish people have set a great example by foiling a coup attempt recently [1]. In this article, the dynamics of Pakistan’s military intervention in domestic politics have been discussed while analysing, relevant example from the countries, where the civilian supremacy in civil-military relations were achieved successfully.

Pakistan came into being in a volatile security environment as a seceding partner of British India in August 1947. The complex internal and external threats dictated the country to invest heavily in defence sector. The cold war era further modernized Pakistan Army. The military used its advancement and foreign support to occupy domestic power. After the decades of rule, Pakistan army self-assumed the guardian role and expanded its corporate interests, evolving into a praetorian military. Military directs foreign policy as well as domestic policy and exclusively controls nuclear weapons program of the country. With greater awareness and freedom of media in 21st century, there is an increasing demand from the public to cut down Military’s role to its legitimate position in the constitution.

Literature Review

Volumes of literature exists explaining the reasons of military intervention in domestic politics, however, the special aspect of Pakistani military intervention in politics has not been widely debated in Pakistan, partly because of the reason of military enjoying a status of “sacred cow” at home and any objective criticism directed towards military establishment is regarded synonyms with un-patriotism and may bringing reprisals through formal as well as informal means. Samuel P Hungten proposed the theory of separation for keeping the military under the supremacy of civil control on the pattern of Western democracies. Hungten’s formulations were based on post world war-II civil-military relations of America. Rebecca Schiff has given the theory of concordance for civil-military relation. Military interventions in domestic politics occur only where there is discordance between the three partners. The author further elaborates the three partners of concordance as the military, citizenry and political elite to agree over four indicators such as military recruitment, political decision making and military style [2]. Another view of military’s intervention in state politics is described by Nordlinger with a tripartite classification based on the powers exercised by intervener and the type of goals pursued [3]. The lowest level of interventionists is the “Praetorian Moderates” who act as pressure groups mostly and avoid indulging in direct government. They return power to the civilian rule after “displacement coups”. The second



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category is of “Praetorian Guardians” who share the values of moderates but willing to take over the power usually for two to four years and preserve the system which serves the military interests. The last category is of “Pretorian Rulers” who deeply involve in governance and extent their rule. They embark on an ambitious economic and political agenda and when they handover power, they maintain the status of praetorian moderates, keeping watchful eye on the civilian government. In an another discourse on democratizing civil-military relations in Eastern European countries, Andrew Cottey suggests in his article “second generation problematics” that after the fall of communism, the East European states have formalized first generation reforms, while there is need for a second generation reforms for civilian governance of defence and security sector [4]. The first generation of reforms include the institutional and legal reforms to bring military under the control of civil executives, while the secondgeneration reforms are the practical manifestation by state capacity building. The first-generation reforms de-legitimize the military intervention in politics and state affairs while the second-generation measures ensure its implementation.

Causes of military’s intervention in domestic politics in Pakistan

Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy as per the constitution adopted in 1973, therefore, a structure of civilian oversight of military matters exist. Army is among two other branches of defence forces including navy and air force which falls under the defence ministry where the secretary defence is the senior most bureaucrat to run the affairs of the ministry. The secretary defence is answerable to the defence minister who in turn is responsible to the cabinet and prime minister on the defence matters. But, the situation on ground is quite contrary to the theoretical framework enunciated in the constitution. The military has been making coups up to four times in the past since 1958 and directly ruled the country for almost 35 years out of the country’s seventy years of existence. For remaining half, it has played the role of king maker from behind the scenes. It has nurtured loyal politicians, political parties and crafted electoral manipulations to get its favourable parties to the power [5]. Some of the important reasons of Pakistan turning into a garrison state are elaborated in successive paragraphs.

Pakistan army, as an institution had a leading start at the inception of the country. Pakistan received 33% of military shares and only 17% of monetary reserves as a seceding partner of British India in the postcolonial partition arrangement in 1947 [6]. The initial war with India in 1948, the internal discord with in the provinces and mounting fears that the partitions will be undone by India, compelled the founding fathers of the newly born state to invest heavily into defence at the cost of other institutions. The founding leaders died soon after Pakistan came into existence without formulating a constitution for the new republic and without setting a clear course for the future of the country. Commander in chief of the armed forces exploited the vacuum and encroached into the power corridor by assuming the portfolio of defence minister as early as 1954 and sealing the fate of the country by imposing first Marshal Law in 1958 [7].



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Abetting military rule by world powers especially USA remained another reason of military's involvement in domestic politics. In postworld war II scenario, Pakistan came into forefront of US foreign policy of containing Soviet Union. Dealing with one man in military was an easier task for US than a chaotic parliament and array of political leaders in Pakistan. Thus, the closeness between USA and military rulers in Pakistan from General Ayyub to Pervez Musharraf were corrosive for democratization and civilian supremacy in its civilmilitary relations [8]. The prolonged rule gave military the opportunity to direct Pakistan's foreign policy single-handedly and shape the domestic politics.

The weak, inept and corrupt civilian institutions encouraged military to take all the state matters into its hands. Though, it is argued that, during the repressive military regimes, the civil, political and social institutions of the country were never allowed to be strengthened. Important state institutions like judiciary, legislature and media were coerced to legitimize military rule. Along with state institutions, the citizenry at large also did not resist to the abrogation of constitution by the military. This apparent indifference was due to low literacy rates and lack of awareness among population about the rule of law [2].

To safeguard its corporate interests, it's imperative for the military to dominate other state institutions. During the decades of rule, Pakistan Army has evolved into a praetorian military. It runs almost fifty business conglomerates ranging from the commercial banks to the plants of fertilizers, cement, sugar and many other commercial products [9]. Military is also heavily involved in the real-state business in the country. According to Dr Ayesha Sidiqa, Pakistan's military is the largest land owner within the country. Military controls 12% of the total state land [10]. It has the capacity to convert the state land from official to private use unlike other institutions which also possess state land in Pakistan. The distribution of economic gains generated from military business is skewed towards military hierarchy. The estimated worth of legally acquired assets of a Pakistani Military's general is \$2.59 million to \$6.90 million in a country like Pakistan, where two third of its population lives below poverty line (one dollar a day) and another twenty percent just above it [6].



Re-balancing civil-military relations in Pakistan

In a parliamentary democracy, defined boundaries exist for civil and military institutions, therefore, Pakistan does not require major structural reforms. However, the military tutelage which comes off due to its informal mechanisms of state control need to be revisited and a few second-generation reforms needed to re-balance civil-military relations in Pakistan.

Turkey initiated its statutory reforms in February 2002 as a result of Copenhagen criteria for the accession to European Union membership [11]. These harmonization laws proved to be a stepping stone for rebalancing the civil-military power in favour of elected government in Turkey. During the military rule, National Security Council (MGK) was set up to provide a legalized role for Turkish armed forces in governance of the country. The AKP government amended the role and composition of National Security Council (MGK) with more civil representation and making its recommendations advisory rather than priority [11]. Whereas in





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case of Pakistan, military had long been desirous of its institutional role in country's governance. The Pakistan Muslim League government sacked its army chief in 1998 for the latter's proposal of forming national security council on Turkish lines. However, in 2013, the same government legalized defacto military dominance over national security affairs by reconstituting Defence Committee of Cabinet (DCC) into Cabinet committee of National Security (CCNS) [8]. In DCC, the services chiefs were only invited when needed while in CCNS, they were made a permanent part of the cabinet, putting its democratic credentials in question where uniformed men were made permanent part of cabinet committee. Pakistan's parliament and its standing committee on defence need to play an active role in security policy making and scrutinizing the defence expenditures for effective civilian oversight of military matters.

Another land mark constitutional reform by AKP government in Turkey was its amendment in the contents of article 35 which gave military the authority to intervene in domestic politics whenever it considered the internal security was at risk. The provisions of state security courts were also repealed from the constitution, where civilians were being tried by military. AKP government also passed an amendment to 1982 constitution allowing the military officers to be tried in civil courts for offenses against constitutional order [12]. As a result, over 200 military officers and men including former army commander of land forces were arrested and investigated in 2007 for alleged conspiracy against the elected government. The Erdogan government also responded proactively to the warnings issued by military in 2007 about the suitability of its political candidates, reminding the military that it had no authority to instruct government in its affairs. Whereas, in Pakistan's case, a weak democratic government is in a permanent state of danger from military intervention. A religious cleric Tahir ul Qadri along with the cricketer turned politician Imran Khan staged a long march and sit-ins in 2014 demanding the prime minister to step down. During the protests, a stage came when the military takeover of government seemed imminent. The army chief instructed the government through public statements not to use force when the raged protestors marched on to the parliament and prime minister house [13]. The elected government in Pakistan, unlike Turkey could not have the courage to remind army chief about his constitutional position of being answerable to prime minister. Allegedly, these protests were backed by the premier intelligence agency of the country and some generals in military [14]. The government could not investigate these allegations.

The first ever transition of power between the elected governments in Pakistan's history came after the elections of 2013. The Sharif government after coming into power in 2013, initiated a trial of general retired Pervez Musharraf for his extra constitutional steps of abrogating the constitution; however, the government could not sustain military pressure and allowed him to proceed abroad to obviate the trial [15]. Historically, the generals have never been held accountable in Pakistan. The elected government in Pakistan needs to learn from the Turkish case and hold military generals accountable for breaking their oath and violating the constitution, to dissuade any future military interventions in politics. The Hamood Ur Rahman commission report on 1971 debacle needs to be made public and an inquiry of Kargil



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issue needs to be done which was publicly committed by prime minister Nawaz Sharif before the elections of 2013. The Sharif government gave some unusual concessions for military to encroach into civilian domain of governance under National Action Plan (NAP) for combating terrorism. The military courts were established and apex committees were formed involving corps commanders in provincial law and order issues. The elected government in Pakistan needs to strengthen state institutions rather involving military in the judicial, executive and policing matters.

In Pakistan, when military is not involved in direct rule, it interferes in domestic politics through its informal means more than the formal one. The intelligence agencies, which have acquired huge capabilities, resources and operational independence initially during the cold war era and then during the recent war on terror have often used its apparatus in domestic politics. The former director general ISI (Inter Services Agency) accepted the role of his agency in electoral manipulations by bribing politicians in 1991 elections [5]. ISI operates in the country in a state of legal vacuum [8]. It's a federal agency under Prime minister, without any federal body to monitor, regulate and control the agency. Though it is directed and influenced by army as its director general and most of the officers come from army. However, legally ISI is not under general headquarters either. A parliamentary committee under prime minister should be set up as a legal body on the lines of US congressional committee on intelligence, to monitor, control and regulate the operations of ISI. The induction of civil officers in ISI should be increased giving them opportunities for promotions to senior positions. The outlook of ISI should be made as a civilian agency headed by a retired military officer or a civilian bureaucrat for a more civilian control of defence matters. Reforming of the country's premier intelligence agency and its role in politics was agreed by the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PMLN) and Pakistan People's Party (PPP) during the charter of democracy signed in 2006. An order issued by the previous PPP government placing ISI under interior ministry was retracted overnight without giving any justification [16], which reflects how fiercely military guards itself from the oversight of elected government in Pakistan.

Separation of domestic and external violence making forces is an important norm of democratic civil-military relations. In Pakistan's context, this distinction is blurred with army's monopoly over paramilitary Forces. The paramilitary forces (rangers, frontier corps and frontier constabulary) responsible for border protection and internal security come under the interior ministry and provincial governments in Pakistan. These forces are controlled by officers sent from army giving it an extra layer to indulge in domestic security matters. Federal or provincial governments have customary command over these forces and they are directed, controlled and operated by military command. In some instances, the ranger forces in the province of Sind were accused by the provincial ruling party for exceeding their mandate and making some politically motivated arrests of corruption cases. The corruption was linked with terror financing to bring the political arrests within the mandate of Rangers [17]. It clearly reflects that the military rather than provincial government controls the



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paramilitary forces. The ranker officers of paramilitary forces should also be allowed to rise to senior posts. The officer corps of these paramilitary forces in Pakistan should have a broad representation from police, military and civil services and made truly responsible to provincial government for increasing civilian control of internal security matters. In India, the border security forces have their own cadre of officers and the force is headed by a police officer, whereas, in Pakistan's paramilitary forces the ranker officers are denied promotions after they achieve a certain middle rank [18].

Due to the overbearing military influence, both the elected and military governments have militarized the civilian administration in Pakistan. The civilian professionals are dismayed at the appointment of retired military officers to the senior slots of civilian administration, to which they neither have a qualification nor experience. Appointment of retired Lieutenant General as Chairman WAPDA (Water and Power Department) by Sharif government in Aug 2016 is a testimony of the fact [19]. Moreover, through the military quota in civil administration introduced by General Zia's regime, military maintains tutelary influence over civil administration [8]. With the help of this quota, military officers are inducted to civil posts in public administration, police and foreign service directly as compared to their civil counterparts who go through a rigorous competitive process. These military officers in civil services maintain close contact with their colleagues in military and intelligence agencies, and act as a tool of military influence in civil administration. The induction of military officers to civil departments to be made equally competitive to that of candidates applying from civil for maintaining transparency. Moreover, civil departments should be de-militarized to reduce the imperious military influence over civil institutions.

Turkish president Gul and prime minister Erdogan participated the supreme council (YAK) annual meeting for military promotions in 2010. AKP government successfully influenced military promotions by blocking generals officers' promotion who were under investigation for plotting coup against government [12]. Pakistan's military enjoys complete autonomy over its internal promotions, transfers and appointments except prime minister selects next army chief from the five candidates recommended by chief of army staff. the corps commanders play a key role in influencing the decisions of army chief and military policy formulation. The elevation of law abiding, nonpolitical and professional generals to the post of corps commander is vital for military's commitment to democratic norms and the rule of law. The prime minister or a special committee of cabinet must have a vetting power to block any candidate in the last promotion board to the lieutenant general in the army for a sustainable democracy in Pakistan.

Military in Pakistan gets opportunity to intervene only when the domestic situations deteriorate and the elected governments fail to perform. Good governance is a prerequisite for a sustainable representative government. The elected government in Pakistan needs to prove through their performance that democracy is the better course for the country. The previous government of Pakistan People's Party had a deficient performance on economic front. However, it can be credited for putting Pakistan on the course of parliamentary form of



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democracy again by restoring the constitution to its original form and repealing the amendments carried out during the military rule. The present government has fared well in economic progress. Under Sharif government Pakistan was termed fastest growing Muslim Country and 5th fastest economy in the World for the year 2015 [20]. The bold steps of AKP government in containing military power in Turkish politics was primarily successful because of its massive economic progress. AKP won three consecutive election since 2002, which is indicative of the national confidence on the party leadership. Pakistani elected leaders need to learn lesson from Turkish economic progress that the nation will only stand with democratic forces if the elected leaders can deliver.

Military in Pakistan guards its image jealously and uses all covert and overt measures to propagate its heroic image. Military's building of its image as saviour of the state is crucial for national psyche of hoping military to intervene when the situation deteriorates. Military in Pakistan maintains considerable number of media outlets, radio stations and coopted journalists in the media circles. In 2016, Asma Jahangir, a prominent human right activist and lawyer filed a case in Supreme Court of Pakistan asking the government to disclose the source of income, expenditures, and the regulations under which Inter services Public Relations (ISPR), the military's media wing is functioning [21]. She argued that the ISPR has a huge media cell and it is used to defame individuals. The elected government should not let the public to lose their confidence on democracy and rule of law. AKP in Turkey gained more and more popularity since its elections in 2002. It made a history in Turkish politics by increasing its share in Parliament in every coming election while remaining in power. Large part of this popularity can be attributed to articulated media campaign. As of 2009, AKP funded 19 daily newspapers, 120 magazines, 51 radio stations and 20 television channels [12].

Turkish military had been dominating foreign and domestic policy till the end of 1990s. The militaristic foreign policy of Turkey had developed problems with most of its neighbours. The cyprus issue was considered a "national cause" by military. Under AKP rule, the Turkey's external relations also witnessed a turned around. It pursued a "zero problem policy" with all the neighbours, redefined its position on Cyprus and backed annan plan of reunification of cyprus. Internally also, AKP adopted appeasement policy towards Kurd minority. Due to economy-based foreign policy and regional integration, Turkish trade with neighbours grew six folds during the AKP rule [12]. Pakistan has also been turned into a security state due to its militaristic foreign policy. The domination of foreign policy by military has severed Pakistan's relations with three out of the four immediate neighbours. The suppression of dissent at domestic front has already costed the country heavily. The promotion of militarism has neither won the Indian held Kashmir nor did the policy of "strategic depth" towards Afghanistan brought any positive returns. It is high time for the military in Pakistan to learn from the past experiences and let the art of "diplomacy" be done by the professionals.



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Conclusion

In Pakistan, the path of democracy is perilous one. However, returning the country to democracy after every military coup indicates that the nation's faith in rule of law and representative governments has not diminished yet. The coup makers in Pakistan also displayed their allegiance towards democracy by announcing to bring "real democracy in Pakistan" speaks all about the fertility of this land for the representative form of governance. The military governments have always tried to demonize politicians and political process but they have not been able to evolve into a lifelong dictatorship. Pakistan needs to evolve into a practicing democracy with a civilian supremacy in its civil-military relations.

The military rule itself has only been a temporary relief for Pakistan's problems. Pakistan faced worst crisis in its history including its dismemberment during the military rule. The national fabric was weakened and military policies on external fronts also failed miserably. The military in Pakistan needs to learn from the past and let the elected governments to complete their tenure in office repeatedly without direct or indirect intervention in domestic politics, to evolve stable democratic institutions in the process. The country needs to follow an economic led foreign policy with civilian supremacy in civilmilitary relations for political stability, social harmony and economic prosperity in Pakistan. Though, there are minimal chances of direct military rule in Pakistan, however, Pakistani politics seems to be dominated by military through its informal means for the foreseeable future.

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Colonial politics This part explains the colonial authority structure. It explains how the civil-military bureaucracy and the landed-feudal class formed a praetorian oligarchy/alliance to pursue their politico-economic interests in British India. The chapter also explains the partition of British India in 1947. The partition-oriented structural dynamics are also highlighted in this chapter. Colonial authority structure The authority structure of the British Empire comprised the governor-general, the viceroy and the state bureaucracy. This power system was answerable via the secretary of state to the British parliament in London. The state bureaucracy was an integral part of this authority structure. The state acted as an interventionist force to pursue its capitalist interests. In this respect, it was the bureaucracy which enjoyed an arbitrary position in terms of bureaucratic paternalism. The role of the landed feudal was effectively reduced by the state-led economic mechanism, affected and regulated in turn by the market. The state penetrated and influenced civil society through the bureaucracy (Waseem 1994: 27-28). The forces of colonialism gradually replaced the Moghul state (empire) structure. Bengal and the Punjab succumbed to the British East India Company in the mid-18th and mid-19th centuries respectively. The British developed an operative 'institutional' setup for the administration of the colonial society. The political economy of colonialism made the state act as promoter, guarantor, and protector of British capitalist interests in India. On the other hand, the state functioned as an organisation





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‘relatively autonomous’ of these interests as well as from local politico-economic forces (Waseem 1994: 21-27). PCD Journal Vol. IV No. 1 2012 Waseem, however, has not differentiated between the types of colonial state bureaucracy. His sole emphasis on the civil bureaucracy has not given a complete picture of the colonial authority structure. Tan Tai Yong, has, however, convincingly established the linkage between the landed-feudal class and the British military, forming the praetorian oligarchy in pursuit of politico-economic interests. Yong has emphasised the ‘culture of militarism’ of the pre colonial Punjab. India throughout its history witnessed invasions from its northern parts called the Punjab. In the wake of the Moghul decline, the Punjab was conquered and governed by Maharaja Ranjit Singh. He raised his own army mainly comprising Punjabi Sikhs. The East India Company regime annexed the Punjab in 1849. The next decade saw demilitarisation of the defeated Ranjit’s army. The 1857 mutiny, however, made the British re-evaluate the strategic importance of the Punjab as well as the Punjabis who had earlier supported the ‘military-fiscal state’ of the company’s rule (Yong 2005: 19-51). In the 1880s soon after the Second Afghan War, the colonial masters perceived the so-called ‘great game’ that was the Russian threat. The ‘martial races’ concept was developed by the British authorities to ‘divide and rule’ not only the armed forces but also India. The ‘Punjabicisation’ of the colonial military initiated the recruitment of Punjabi Sikhs, Punjabi Muslims and Pathans of north India — the military districts — into the restructured Bengal Army (Yong 2005: 57-89). In the 1890s the opening of ‘canal colonies’ initiated a process of land allocation by the colonial masters to win the loyalty of the soldiering classes. In 1900 the Land Alienation Act was passed by the state to stop land slipping out of hands of the landed-feudal class. Coincidentally, this landed-feudal class consisted of ex-soldiers, pensioners, and relatives of in-service army personnel. From 1914-1919, the Punjab provided a majority of recruits to safeguard the colonial interests in Asia, Africa, and Europe (Yong 2005: 90-108). The war years brought close collaboration between the civil and military authorities, giving birth to the concept of ‘militarised bureaucracy’. The chaotic economic situation after the war years, along with the political uprisings of, for example, the Khilafat movement, threatened the socio-economic balance in the rural-military districts. As a result, civil-military cooperation in terms of Punjab Soldiers’ Boards was further consolidated (Yong 2005: 141-182). This civil-military integration was a planned mechanism to prevent the recruiting districts being influenced by nationalist politics of the post-war period. In other words, the British authorities were instrumental in the creation of praetorian oligarchy. Thus, during the inter-war period (1919-1939), the Punjab Soldiers Board functioned as an institutional part of the district administration (see Alavi 1988). However, the nationalist movement gained momentum during the inter-war period. The raj was political, too. In revising the 1909 Morley-Mitno reforms, it blessed the Indians with limited representation by introducing Montagu-Chelmsford reforms in 1919. However, in post-reformist India, both the Congress and the League failed to make political in-roads into the praetorian Punjab which provided 60 percent of the Indian army by 1927. Instead, the Punjab-based Unionist Party, an alliance of Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh landed feudal, held on



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to power until the last days of the raj. The Unionist Party clearly represented the praetorian oligarchy, especially in the military districts of northern Punjab (Yong 2005: 241-280). Thus, it is argued that the colonial authority structure comprised both the civil and military bureaucracy, along with the governor general and viceroy. The British recruited Punjabis in large numbers from late 19th century onward to the British Indian Army to secure the imperial boundaries from the Russian threat. The British won the loyalty of the military districts in northern Punjab through a systemic allocation of land. In the inter-war period, the civil-military bureaucracy and landed feudal collaborated with one another politically and economically. Their collaboration gave birth to a praetorian oligarchy in British India. The strategic partition there are numerous theories with respect to the partition of British India. Hamza Alavi (1988, 1990) has advanced the 'salaried theory', arguing that the salaried classes, such as lawyers of United and Central provinces, as well as Bengal and the Punjab, strove constitutionally to safeguard their economic interests. However, Khalid bin Sayeed has emphasised Muslim separatism. His thesis was based on civilisational differences between the Muslims and the non Muslims of India. Sayeed, undoubtedly, represented the two-nation theorists (Sayeed 1967:4). Waseem, on the other hand, has based his findings on multiplicity of variables. Structurally, the Pakistan Movement started in the Muslim-minority provinces. Ideologically, it was the two nation theory that served as an ideology. Organisationally, it was the Muslim League which provided the platform to the Indian Muslims. Personally, it was Jinnah's Weberian charisma that was the driving force. Nonetheless, Waseem, if studied deeply, also belongs to the two-nation strand (Waseem 1994:59-83). Similarly, Jalal (1991:16) also laid emphasis on the personality factor. She, however, differed from others in the sense that Jinnah was not necessarily struggling to win independence. His acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946 marked his political resilience. Jinnah used the demand for Pakistan as a bargaining chip to maximise the Muslims' interests, argued Jalal. The academic value of the above-mentioned theories appreciated, I instead tend to explain the partition phenomenon from the colonial perspective. After all, it was the British, not the Congress or the Muslim League, which partitioned the sub-continent. In this respect, in his recently published work *In the Shadow of the Great Game*, Narendra Singh Sarila has convincingly unfolded the story of India's partition. His thesis was based on declassified archival facts about the way the British made policies to preserve its geostrategic concerns during the Second World War. The Congress, due to its own nationalist politics, resigned from the office in eight out of 11 provinces in 1939 just after the war broke out in Europe. On the other hand, the British wanted to have a strife-free Punjab (where it recruited 50 percent of the British Indian Army). In this respect, the Muslim League and its leadership especially Jinnah was appeased by Lord Linlithgow, who in announcing the British declaration on 8 August 1940, acceded the 'veto' to Jinnah on India's future constitutional developments. Even the Unionist leadership, which was part of the praetorian oligarchy, was urged by Lord Linlithgow to enter into electoral alliance with the League. Jinnah, who thought on communal lines much earlier in 1939, conversed with Lord Linlithgow that the



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“Muslim areas should be separated from ‘Hindu India’ and run by Muslims in collaboration with Great Britain” (Sarila 2005: 34-64). In the wake of poor British performance in the war, the division in the Imperial army, the Congress’s demand for a free-India and the League’s ‘autonomous’ rhetoric, it was Lord Wavell, not Mountbatten, who first blueprinted the future of Pakistan on 6/7 February 1946. Responding to a telegram to the secretary of state for India, Wavell, while forwarding his scheme, gave great importance to the communists’ interventionist designs towards the Middle East (the wells of power), and rest of Asia (Sarila 2005: 194-196). To contain and combat this menace, the support of the Muslims was crucial. In this respect, an independent Pakistan was perceived to serve as a military base in fulfilling the British strategic aims. Hence, British India was partitioned into India and Pakistan. Bengal and the Punjab were also partitioned into East Bengal (in Pakistan) and East Punjab (in India) in August 1947. The princely states, including Kashmir, were denied independence by London. Soon after the transfer of authority to India and Pakistan on August 15, 1947, the two countries started integrating the princely states under the partition formula (Sarila 2005:330-336). Therefore, it is in this context of partition that the issue of Kashmir’s integration and the cross-border migration needs explanation. Moreover, I have termed such developments as ‘partition oriented structural dynamics’ because they were part of the colonial state in terms of territory and population. I would explain later how these ‘structural dynamics’ affected the military and politics in post partition Pakistan. Thus, it has been argued that the British authority structure was PCD Journal Vol. IV No. 1 2012 decisive in terms of policy making and implementation. Moreover, the Punjab proved crucial as a recruiting ground for the Imperial army. The soldiering classes were granted land in order to win their loyalty and depoliticise them. The British strategically partitioned India on communal lines in August 1947. Moreover, the partition left a legacy of ‘structural dynamics’ that have affected the state of Pakistan as we see in the next chapter. Praetorian Pakistan This part argues that Pakistan is a praetorian state which inherited the pre-partition praetorian oligarchy. Also, it explains if the colonial authority structure and the partition oriented structural dynamics affect politics and the military in Pakistan. Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy Territorially, Pakistan inherited North West Frontier Province, West Punjab (onward Punjab), East Bengal, Sind, and a few princely states including Bahawalpur, whose rulers under the partition formula acceded to Pakistan. The British Balochistan, comprising princely states of Kharan, Lasbela, and Kalat, was raided by the Pakistan army in March 1948, annexing it with the latter (Tariq Ali 1983:123; Jalal 1991:93). In addition, the country had to struggle to get its material — i.e. bank balance, and arsenal — and non-material — i.e. military personnel, and bureaucrats — shares (Rizvi 2000: 35-61; Haqqani 2005: 11-12). Besides, Pakistan received in total more than seven million Indian refugees (mohajirs) of which more than five million settled in Punjab alone – two percent of which came from United provinces and mostly settled in urban Sind, i.e. Karachi (Census of Pakistan 1951: 11-25). The Muslim League and its leadership, including Jinnah, were migratory as well. Punjab and Bengal emerged as the two largest provinces in area and population. Scholars and analysts have so far focused on those mohajirs who spoke Urdu and settled in urban Sind



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(Waseem 1994: 102-111). I instead argue that the politics of Punjabi mohajirs in particular and 129 Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State 130 (local) Punjabis in general is crucial to explaining their influence on politics and the military in Pakistan. The colonial authority structure, in terms of civil-military bureaucracy, was structurally transformed into the Pakistani state. As mentioned earlier, up until partition the Punjabis had made up 50 percent of the British Indian Army. Therefore, Punjabis, both local and mohajirs, outnumbered even majority Bengalis in the armed forces of Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan inherited a good share of colonial civil bureaucracy. The local-mohajir Punjabis outgrew all other ethnic groups in the Pakistan's civil services (Waseem 1994:108). Besides, the landed feudal class of Punjab was institutionally well organised to assert itself politically (Alavi 1990). So, this overwhelming position of Punjabis was one of the dynamics of partition which affected the structure of state and military in Pakistan. Thus, it is argued that the over-representation of Punjabis in the civil-military bureaucracy, along with the Punjabi landed feudal class, confirms the structural significance of pre-partition praetorian oligarchy which institutionally remained unaffected by the partition. Pakistan inherited this praetorian oligarchy, it is argued. In addition, I have termed this 'Punjabicisation' as a 'Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy' which exploited the country politically and economically. Overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy The Punjabis outnumbered all other ethnic communities in the civil-military bureaucracy, as explained earlier. The civil-military bureaucracy consolidated its numerical strength in the absence of indigenous leadership and any political organisation. In other words, the migratory political leadership proved ineffective in putting the civil-military bureaucracy under permanent civilian control. In post-partition Pakistan, Jinnah, the governor-general, was all powerful under the amended 1935 India Act (Alavi 1990). However, Jinnah and the Muslim League had little to say in areas now constituting the state of Pakistan. The praetorian oligarchy remained unaffected by the partition process. It provided little space to the ailing Jinnah and disenchanted Liaquat Ali Khan, the country's first prime minister (Alavi 1990). PCD Journal Vol. IV No. 1 2012 Instead, owing to the peculiar nature of the state which inherited an 'overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy' and an ill representative Muslim League, the civil bureaucracy emerged from within the praetorian oligarchy as a powerful political actor due to its expertise in the art of administration. In the name of the governor general, the Punjabi bureaucrats established a hitherto unknown post of 'secretary general' and a 'planning committee' directly responsible to Jinnah who by that time was bed-ridden. Choduary Mohammad Ali, the secretary general and later prime minister of Pakistan, by passed Liaquat Ali Khan and his cabinet in terms of policy making and its implementation (see Alavi 1990). It was this Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy which feared the majority Bengalis who demanded a constitution and general election. To do injustice to the Bengalis, it was Jinnah himself who declared Urdu a national language in East Bengal in March 1948. It was not to suggest that Jinnah represented this oligarchy. It has, however, been argued that the civil bureaucracy was the real power holder and a think-tank responsible for policy input for the administrative state of Pakistan. Thus, the praetorian oligarchy had no objection to Urdu in the name of so-called nation building



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(Rahman 1998: 200-209). On the other hand, the military as part of the praetorian oligarchy did not lag behind in terms of power projection. I have explained it by again looking at partition. As mentioned before, the ‘strategic partition’ was done in order to use Pakistan as a military base. Therefore, the British had opted for a joint defense council for India and Pakistan. Claude Auchinleck was joint commander in-chief of Indian and Pakistani armed forces. All three services of Pakistan were headed by British officers in the initial years (Rizvi 2000: 41). Jalal (1991: 118), in this respect, has argued that the British deliberately did so as they wanted to make Pakistan dependent on London for its defense needs. Her argument was in line with Sarila, as we have seen before. However, this type of argumentation underscores the value and the purpose of partition. Instead, it has 131 Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State 132 been argued that the British did want to see Pakistan as an ally in its global power calculations – in particular, as an anti-communist force. The assumption of the officer cadre of Pakistan’s armed forces by the British was primarily due to the ineffective political leadership of Pakistan which had failed badly to take defense into its own hands. Table 1 Defense expenditure: 1949-1958 Year Defense expenditure (Rs. million) Percentage of the total government expenditure 1947-48* 1948-49 1949-50 1950-51 1951-52 1952-53 1953-54 1954-55 1955-56 1956-57 1957-58 1958-59** 236.0 461.5 625.4 649.9 792.4 725.7 633.2 640.5 917.7 800.9 854.2 996.6 65.16 71.32 73.06 51.32 54.96 56.68 58.7 57.5 64.0 60.1 56.1 50.9 * 15 August 1947 to 31 March 1948, ** 1 April 1958 to 30 June 1959 Source: Rizvi 2000 The most significant development was the establishment in 1953 of Fauji Foundation (Soldier Foundation), which ventured into textile, sugar, and cereals in the name of meeting army personnel’s welfare (Siddiqi 2003). Also, military personnel largely benefited due to its political position in the praetorian oligarchy with respect to the redistribution of evacuee land –land left behind by non-Muslims who migrated to India in 1947. This land was leased for 99 years to the military for operational purposes which appropriated it for personal gains (Siddiqi 2007). This aspect of the military’s economic activism makes one remember the pre-partition land allocation to the military classes by the British. Thus, in independent Pakistan, the military as an PCD Journal Vol. IV No. 1 2012 important component of the praetorian oligarchy strove on its own to secure its economic interest in the security state of Pakistan. Political military On 8 October 1958, President Iskander Mirza declared martial law in the country. The 1956 constitution and the national-provincial assemblies were abrogated and dismissed respectively (Rizvi 2000: 86). This episode has been analysed by many scholars. Alavi has viewed it as a ‘(civil) bureaucratic coup’ because it was Iskandar Mirza, a bureaucrat, who declared martial law. In addition, the new set-up included a secretary general and his planning committee which gave more power to the civil bureaucracy than military. Alavi and Jalal, among others, have argue that the fear of a general election that was supposed to be held in 1959 was the main reason behind martial law (Alavi 1990; Jalal 1995: 54). Alavi, unfortunately, has focused at the means and not the end. How strange it would seem that a ‘bureaucratic coup’ resulted in a military intervention that sent Iskandar Mirza into exile. In addition, why did the election — which had been postponed many times since 1947 — become the cause for the coup? It has been argued that



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it was a 'military coup' initiated by the military, bringing all power into its hands. The main cause was not the election but the projection of the military as 'ruler' in the Punjab based praetorian oligarchy. The military achieved this seniority due to its overwhelming politico-economic position in the security state of Pakistan. In addition, it sought political power to expand and consolidate itself as an independent economic actor. This shall be explained later. Besides, the abrogation of the constitution may be seen in the light of 'necessity doctrine'. It meant, it has been argued, that the legal and constitutional norms were irrelevant to the state of Pakistan and the so-called constitution was superficial in nature and character. The superficiality of legal-constitutional norms also showed the weakness of parliamentary institutions and civil society in Pakistan. From 1958-69 the country was arbitrarily ruled by soldier 133 Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State 134 president general Ayub Khan, who got himself elected president through arbitrary referendum. He introduced the system of 'Basic Democracies', supposedly to democratise the country. The Muslim League was factionalised. Resultantly, the Muslim League Convention was the king's party. Ayub also blessed the nation with a constitution in 1962. A war with India in September 1965 was, too, planned via Kashmir to humiliate the chronic foe. A year before, the soldier-president got re elected as president through the self-created Electoral College – the basic democrats (Hashami 2005: 147; Tariq Ali 1970: 132; Haqqani 2005: 43-50; see also Ziring 1971: 12-85). The Ayub-led military rule further benefited the praetorian oligarchy. For instance, his economic policies were carried out by the civil bureaucracy which was a medium to penetrate the state and into civil society. The regime's cronies — be they of the landed-feudal class or bureaucrats — were favoured in terms of 'superficial' land reform and industrial licenses (Ziring 1971: 88). In addition, the regime amended Colonisation of Land Act, 1912, in 1965 to allot land (about 100,000 acres annually) to the military (Siddiq 2007). Besides, the Fauji Foundation gathered assets worth Rs152 million by the end of his rule (Siddiq 2003). Ayub's era was anti urban and rural poor. His policies were discriminatory and the more depressed and discriminated were the majority Bengalis – politically, economically, and culturally. This mega-discrimination led to the six-point politics of the Awami League and its leader Mujibur Rehman in the mid 1960s. Poor communities of West Pakistan were also discriminated to such an extent that they took to the streets in late 1960s (Ziring 1971: 174-191; Tariq Ali 1970: 23). The public uprising against Ayub mark the flaws in the work of propagandists, such as Huntington (1968: 250-255), who echoed military-led modernisation. A newly created Pakistan People's Party led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was instrumental in articulating the concerns of poor communities. Awami League did the same in the Eastern Wing. A defamed Ayub Khan proved a liability for the military which removed him from office PCD Journal Vol. IV No. 1 2012 in March 1969 (Tariq Ali 1970: 210). The deposed soldier abrogated his own constitution and dismissed pro-regime assemblies. Martial Law once again engulfed Pakistan in March 1969. Constitutional norms once again proved irrelevant and 'superficial'. Thus, it has been argued that the civil bureaucracy-led praetorian oligarchy ruled the country from independence until 1958. The 1958 military coup registered the military as a senior partner within the praetorian oligarchy. The military regime of Ayub



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Khan further consolidated the military both politically and economically. Legal and constitutional norms remained superficial and irrelevant. The urban-rural poor were extremely discriminated in both wings. This led to heightened agitation in politics, which was capitalised on by the People's Party and Awami League. Resultantly, Ayub Khan unleashed further martial law. Birth of a new state This part of the article explains the partition and resultant disintegration of the state of Pakistan in 1971. This chapter also explains the new state, its politics, and the military. Finally, the chapter attempts to explain how the military consolidated its politico economic position within the praetorian oligarchy from 1971 until present. Partition of Pakistan General Yahya Khan assumed office of the chief martial law administration in March 1969. The military regime under Yahya was seen as continuation of the earlier military rule. I, however, would put the Yahya-led military rule in the praetorian oligarchy which remained undisturbed in the post-Ayub period. Having assessed the public mood, Yahya, under his Legal Framework Order, undid the One-Unit and promised a general election in the country in February-March 1970. The People's Party, Awami League, and other smaller parties started canvassing without pronounced agendas. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto played upon the poor community's emotionality in terms of promising them roti, kapra 135 Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State 136 and makan (bread, cloth and a house). Mujibur Rehman sold the 'autonomy' maxim. The smaller parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami, aspired for pan-Islamism. And the Muslim League was lost with the fall of Ayub Khan (Waseem 1994: 243-254). The election was staged with at least some reports of rigging. Though the military intelligence agencies predicted a mix-mandate, the People's Party and Awami League made a clean sweep in West Pakistan and East Pakistan respectively. From a simple parliamentary democracy principle, the majority party was entitled to form government in the centre as well as East Pakistan. But the Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy could not accept the Bengalis ruling them. Therefore, Yahya Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (a Sindi-landed feudal), in representing the oligarchy, dismissed the public verdict. When the Bengalis resorted to agitational politics, Yahya Khan allowed military means to solve a political issue. In the wake of the civil war, the Bengali refugees proved a burden to India socially and economically. No wonder then that India exploited the situation through war against Pakistan. As a result, on 16 December 1971, Pakistan was partitioned through the formation of the sovereign state of Bangladesh (Waseem 1994: 255-277). Scholars so far have bypassed this partition and its ramifications. However, it has been argued that this partition marked the importance of non-religious identities. The creation of Bangladesh showed the victory of the two-culture theory whereby the dual-nation theory was not able to bind the two wings together. In addition, the partition of Pakistan confirmed the significance of 'structural supremacy' of the Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy which, for its own political and economic interests, underestimated and degraded the majority Bengalis. More importantly, the state of Pakistan virtually disintegrated. It was run by a non-elected apparatus at the time of partition, meaning that the legality and rule of law was absent. Moreover, it lost more than half of its population and territory in a sign of the state's physical collapse. Thus, the partition of old Pakistan gave birth to a new state PCD Journal Vol. IV



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No. 1 2012 which inherited the overdeveloped civil-military bureaucracy and influential landed-feudal class. In other words, the new state structurally inherited the Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy from the old Pakistan. In addition, Punjab once again emerged as a powerful province in terms of population and resources. Politics of appeasement T he post-1971 Pakistani state structurally forced the military to retreat because the latter had been discredited by the masses due to its failure to guarantee even the territorial defense of the state. T herefore, the military handed over power to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with whom the civil-military bureaucracy had developed institutional understanding during the former's association with the Ayub-Yahya regimes. For instance, Bhutto was sent to China by the Yahya regime at a time when the military operation in East Pakistan was at its peak. In addition, he retrospectively represented the old West Pakistan. T herefore, he was the only leader of national standing who could be transferred authority. Therefore, Bhutto acted as the country's first civilian chief martial law administrator as well as its president from late 1971 to 1973. Bhutto and his politics (1971-77) have been discussed by many scholars. For instance, Burki (1980: 81-89), K.B. Sayeed (1980: 91) and Jalal (1995: 77-84) have analysed 'Bhuttoism' from a personalistic perspective, in that he was a feudal and once in power he wanted to maximise it at all costs. Shafqat (1997: 115-159) and Waseem (1994: 285-348) have, however, analysed the Bhutto phenomenon from a party politics perspective. These scholars have argued that Bhutto came to power due to the vote. To fulfil campaign promises, he turned to the politics of reformism. It was in the structure of reforms that resent grew among some groups or classes, and they brought him down. T he 'politics of reformism' thesis of Shafqat and Waseem was partially true. Shafqat (1997:10-16), while formulating his 'dominant party political system' for the 1971-77 period, has ignored the organisational weakness of the People's Party. Thus, it has been argued that the period of the People's Party was not what Shafqat 137 Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State 138 formulated. Waseem has, however, highlighted the organisational weakness of the People's Party which caused Bhutto's downfall. However, he has not touched the military's politics which appeased Bhutto by returning to barracks in the wake of 1971 defeat. Therefore, I would tend to argue that it was the politics of appeasement — political and economic concessions — both on the part of Bhutto and the military during this period. Bhutto was transferred power by the discredited military. In other words, he was appeased by an organisation which was a senior partner of the praetorian oligarchy which also represented the landed feudal. Bhutto, being of the landed feudal, sought about becoming authoritarian. Through that, he was to curtail the powers of a military which had previously ruled the country. Therefore, he restructured the military command and control structure. In addition, he abolished the civil service of Pakistan and unified all services though with military's consent (Haqqani 2005:95; Shafqat 1977:167). Besides, he appeased the socialists within his party by giving them important portfolios, such as the finance ministry (Burki 1980: 140-143). However, very soon he deployed the military in Balochistan in the name of national consolidation (Cohen 2004: 220). The Balochistan operation continued from 1973 until Bhutto's downfall (Waseem 1994: 323-327). The intelligences agencies of the military,



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however, exploited the situation in the former's favour (Haqqani 2005: 172). The underlying assumption was to rejuvenate the morale of the armed forces so as to regain its previous political position. Bhutto, in his rhetoric of appeasement, projected India as the enemy when the latter tested a nuclear device in 1974. The dynamics of the security state urged Bhutto to initiate the country's first nuclear programme in the mid 1970s. In addition, during 1972-77 the defense budget stood at about six percent of GNP (Shafiqat 1997:167). Thus, Bhutto appeased the military to prolong his stay in power. By the mid 1970s, Bhutto had restructured his cabinet and replaced staunch socialists with members of the landed feudal, the PCD Journal Vol. IV No. 1 2012 majority of whom came from Punjab. The entry of the landed feudal class into the corridors of power marked their importance in the praetorian oligarchy. In addition, he also appeased the religious forces by introducing Islamic measures, such as the banning of alcohol (Burki 1980: 193). The religious forces, however, along with the discriminated urban-rural poor, took to agitational politics and demanded an Islamic system. The Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) assisted and aided the religious forces in this respect (Haqqani 2005:105-116). Thus, it has been argued that the clergy was an auxiliary to the military. Bhutto, having sensed the situation, decided to hold general election in March 1977. His People's Party emerged as a majority party. However, opposition in the form of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), refused to accept the results. They alleged Bhutto of massive rigging (Rizvi 2000: 232-235). Thus, the agitational politics of the PNA requested the military to take over. The military matters The new state witnessed martial law imposed by general Ziaul Haq military regime on 5 July, 1977, on charges of corruption and mismanagement of the economy by Bhutto. The latter was arrested and his policies reversed; the 1973 constitution was abrogated. Two years later, Bhutto was hanged by the military (Rizvi 2000:239). Politically, Zia, like Ayub, held a referendum and became a soldier-president. The other partners in the praetorian oligarchy, especially those affected by Bhutto's policies, applauded the military rule. The Afghan jihad of the 1980s against communist Soviet Union made Islamabad a frontline state in Washington. Subsequently, massive military aid (US\$ 3.2 billion) and increased defense allocation strengthened the military at home. It became belligerent: it banned political parties, arrested anti-regime politicians and journalists, delayed oft-promised election, criminalised the civil society through a weapons-drug culture, Islamised the legal system and spilled ethnic-sectarian violence throughout Pakistan (Waseem 1994: 367-388; Burki 1991: 16). 139 Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State 140 Tabel 3 Land Entitlement for Military Personnel Rank Major General and above Brigadiers and Colonels Lt. Colonels Lieutenants to Majors JCOs NCOs Acreage 240 acres 150 acres 124 acres 100 acres 64 acres 32 acres Source: Ayesha Siddiqa (2007) Likewise, the military operation against the nationalist Baloch in Balochistan could be explained in this context. The military led government started Development Projects in Gwadar which favoured Punjabis, including military (70 percent Punjabis). The Baloch resented the military and the conflict has continued (The Friday Times 29 October, 2004). Thus, it has been argued that the apparent goal of the October coup — and also that of November (2007) — was to re-institutionalise military rule and make politicians and civil





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society know that the military remained a powerful political force in Pakistan. However, the underlying objective of the coup was to gain political power to pursue economic interests authoritatively. Conclusion T his article has attempted to explain why the military has remained a powerful political institution/force in Pakistan from a historical-structural perspective. In this respect, I have explored the hypothesis with respect to the colonial authority structure and partition-oriented structural dynamics. My analysis included the military in the colonial authority structure. The colonial military, along with the civil bureaucracy and the landed-feudal class, formed a praetorian oligarchy which has pursued its own political and economical interests in British India. In addition, I have analysed that the partition-oriented structural dynamics in terms of territory PCD Journal Vol. IV No. 1 2012 (Kashmir) and population (Indian refugees) have affected politics and the military in Pakistan. Thus, it has been argued that the hypothesis holds and I have theoretically operationalised the hypothesis in terms of pre-partition ‘praetorian oligarchy’ to explain my research problem. T he post-colonial state of Pakistan inherited the pre-partition praetorian oligarchy based on Punjab. The civil-military bureaucracy has structurally emerged as an ‘overdeveloped’ institution which has an alliance with the landed-feudal class and has projected and institutionalised ‘Hindu India’ to pursue political and economic interests (see the Table 4). Table 4 Evolution and consolidation of praetorian oligarchy in Pakistan 14 Aug. 1947-18 Oct. 1951 19 Oct.1951- 7 Oct. 1958 7 Oct. 1958- 20 Dec. 1971 20 Dec. 1971- 5 July 1977 5 July 1977- present Politicians, oligarchically, ran the affairs of the state. Civil bureaucracy dominated the political structure, in alliance with a section of politicians and the military. T he military-led praetorian oligarchy dominated politics and the state. Bhutto-led politicians ran the affairs in an oligarchic alliance with civil bureaucracy and the military T he military-led praetorian oligarchy has ruled the roost. Source: Data gathered from the existing accounts on Pakistan’s civil military relations. T he military, being part of the praetorian oligarchy, planned and fought a war against India over Kashmir in 1947-48. This exercise helped the oligarchy to rule authoritatively in the 1950s. The civil bureaucracy led the praetorian oligarchy in this period. However from 1958 onward, the military has, from within the praetorian oligarchy, emerged as a powerful political actor due to 141 Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State 142 its coercive power. It has become leader of the oligarchy. Though in the 1970s it disengaged from politics due to its defeat in the 1971 war and the country’s disintegration, yet it regained its prestigious position in 1977. It ruled belligerently in the1980s. However, it again disengaged from politics in the 1990s due to a changed geostrategic environment. But the real power remained with the men in uniform in terms of 58 (B) 2 during this period. T he bureaucrat-feudal presidents, a part of the praetorian oligarchy, dismissed the so-called democratic governments formed by the landed—feudal class. In other words, the praetorian oligarchy politically remained dominant. In October 1999 — and also, in November 2007 — the military overtly intervened to exile an authoritative civilian who attempted to curtail military’s politico economic activities. Since then, the military-led praetorian oligarchy ruled the country. The clergy was auxiliary to this praetorian oligarchic rule. As the study explained, all the coups were primarily economic in



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nature. The military sought political power to act as an independent economic actor. It allocated land among its personnel to expand the institution socially and economically. The other components of the praetorian oligarchy would ally with the military to pursue their politico-economic interests. Thus, the political power has laid with the Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy from 1947 partition until present. This power was exercised on none other but the urban rural poor. In the absence of any (lower) middle-class leadership and political organisation, they have suffered and died in despair. Their state of affairs could be gauged from the State Bank of Pakistan's Inflation Monitor of August 2008. It stated: Inflationary pressures strengthened in the economy with CPI inflation (YoY) soaring to reach 25.3 percent during August 2008 compared to 6.5 percent in the same month last year. Both food and non-food groups of CPI contributed in this upsurge in headline inflation. Food inflation (YoY) remained persistently high and was recorded at 34.1 percent compared to 8.6 percent in August 2007. This rising trend was mainly led by increase in the prices of some key food commodities PCD Journal Vol. IV No. 1 2012 such as coriander seed powder (130 percent), pulse masoor (130 percent), rice irri (121 percent), wheat (76 percent), and maida (68 percent). Similarly, non-food inflation (YoY) also increased significantly reaching 18.7 percent in August 2008 compared to 4.9 percent during the same month last year. Amongst the various components of CPI non-food group, transport and communication, house rent index (HRI), and fuel and lighting sub-group witnessed significant increase in inflation (YoY) during August 2008 compared to the same month last year. Other measures of inflation i.e. wholesale price index (WPI) and sensitive price indicator (SPI) also showed strong growth during the month under review. (Stat Bank of Pakistan 2010) Finally, it has been argued that the theoretical framework in terms of the praetorian oligarchy was useful to civil-military relations in Pakistan. In addition, this article has developed theoretical concepts such as the Punjab-based praetorian oligarchy, overdeveloped civil military bureaucracy, politics of appeasement, and military as pre partition phenomenon.



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The challenge of national integration

Moonis Ahmar



The Quaid was a strong advocate of national integration.

“We are now all Pakistanis — not Balochis, Pathans, Sindhis, Bengalis, Punjabis and so on — and as Pakistanis we must feel, behave and act, and we should be proud to be known as Pakistanis and nothing else’. Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah said in a reply to Civic Address presented by Quetta Municipality on June 15, 1948.

The challenge of national integration in Pakistan is as old as the history of this country. Formed on an ideological ground with the religion of Islam as its prime source of identity, Pakistan began to face numerous issues of language and ethnicity in its formative phase. Ethnic nationalism began to be in conflict with religion particularly in the then East Pakistan where language movement emerged as a cogent force challenging those who wanted that the country should be governed according to the ideology of Islam rather than language, ethnicity or place of origin. Quaid’s warning that the people of Pakistan should be alert and cognizant from those forces who wanted to plant the seeds of ethnic nationalism and secession made sense.



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The Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940, had called for the establishment of Muslim states in the Muslim majority regions of northwest and northeast. However, that resolution was amended in a convention of all members the Muslim League's central and provincial councils from all over India in Delhi on April 7-9, 1946, whereby, it was declared that "the zones comprising Bengal and Assam in the North-East and the Punjab, North West Frontier Province, Sindh and Baluchistan in the North West of India, namely Pakistan Zones, where the Muslims are in a dominant majority, be constituted into one sovereign independent state and that an unequivocal undertaking be given to implement the establishment of Pakistan without delay."

National integration in Pakistan only emerges in times of natural disaster, national dilemma or an external threat. Once the threat is dealt with, the internal contradictions re-appear.

In a book entitled Sheikh Mujibur Rahman The Unfinished Memoirs (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012) the reaction of Bengali participants in Muslim League's convention held in Delhi about dropping the word 'states' as mentioned in Lahore Resolution with 'state' is stated as: "The resolution that was taken there altered the Lahore Resolution in some ways. Only Mr. Hashim and a few others objected when the word 'states' of the previous resolution was replaced with 'State' but they were overruled and the emendation was adopted. Scholars can perhaps decide whether this convention had the right to alter the terms of resolution adopted in Lahore in 1940." It is another story how things unfolded when Pakistan came into existence without Assam, united Punjab and Bengal. Pakistan became a unique state with a geographical distance of more than 1,000 miles between its eastern and western wings with hostile India in the middle. No country in modern history was created by states as in case of Pakistan. Why the challenge of national integration was not taken seriously by the leadership in the nascent state of Pakistan and how feelings of ethnic nationalism permeated particularly in the then East Pakistan? How sense of deprivation deepened in East Pakistan and in the smaller provinces of West Pakistan and why issues which triggered the disintegration of Pakistan were not resolved?

National integration cannot be artificially created but it evolves as a result of a process of social and economic justice along with democratic political pluralism. Cultural, lingual and religious variations exist in many countries of the world but it is the wise and prudent leadership which provides a sense of participation, opportunities for progress and development. In case of Pakistan, after the assassination of the country's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, the West Pakistan dominated military-bureaucratic elite along with feudal class and clergy began to propagate the notion of strong centre and used religion to artificially integrate the diverse provinces of the country. But, religion alone cannot be a binding force to integrate dissimilar people of a country as a nation. There are other essential requirements to unite people as a nation like economic progress, human and social development, justice system, rule of law, political pluralism, non-discriminatory policy of state by providing equal opportunities regardless of religion, caste, race, language, gender and place of origin. The absence of such requirements cannot transform people of a country as a nation but can cause ethnic, racial, lingual, religious and sectarian polarisation.



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The Soviet Union under the communist ideology tried to form a Soviet man and woman keeping in mind diverse ethnic and lingual contradictions in that country. But, that policy failed because it was based on top-bottom approach and imposed on people in a superficial manner. United States, which has numerous lingual and ethnic variations has to a large extent succeeded in creating American man and woman because of a policy pursued at the grassroots' level in a democratic set-up particularly its uniform educational system. India, the neighbour of Pakistan has hundreds of languages, several cultures and religions but has been able to prevent disintegration because of its democratic political system as neither the military nor any ethnic group is allowed to dominate a multi-cultural and multi-religious society.

Pakistan's dilemma of national integration needs to be examined from three different angles. First, Pakistan came into being as a result of an accord reached between the Muslim majority regions of North West and North East of the Indian subcontinent. That accord was the result of a demand which was made through Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940, and then reiterated in Muslim League's convention in Delhi held in April 1946. Two-nation theory was the essence of the creation of Pakistan as the founder of the country and his colleagues in the Muslim League realised that in an undivided India with a Hindu majority, the Muslim minority will not be able to live as equal citizens.

Unfortunately, after the creation of Pakistan, religion which was the bond trying to integrate the nascent state became weak as economic and political exploitation of the majority province of East Pakistan and the smaller provinces of West Pakistan under the system of one-unit and parity unleashed the process of ethnic and lingual nationalism. Second, democracy, rule of law, justice system and good governance which should have been the essence of the new state of Pakistan went into oblivion. Democracy became the first casualty because of military-bureaucratic nexus to seize power through unconstitutional means. Back to back imposition of martial law and military takeover diminished hopes to transform Pakistan as a viable nation state.

Ironically, feelings of Pakistani nation only surfaced at the time of an external threat or natural disaster. Be it 1965 war or the recent terrorist attack at Pulwama, surge of nationalistic feelings among the people of Pakistan helped to unitedly deal with issues threatening survival of a country. Earthquake of October 2005 and the terrorist attack on Army Public School, Peshawar on December 16, 2014, also united the people of Pakistan. But, once such threats receded, Pakistan's internal contradictions in the form of political polarisation and ethnic/lingual discords reappeared. It is yet to be seen what will be the duration of current spell of national harmony and unity in the wake of Indian threat or once the threat fades, will the country revert back to political schism, inter and intra-provincial disharmony?

Third, national harmony and integration requires ownership of the land, resources, good and bad things of a country. Except few exceptions, the history of Pakistan is full of episodes which reflect lack of ownership. Nations are not created by mere slogans but through sheer hard work, integrity, brilliance, planning and statesmanship of the leadership. Unfortunately



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the menace of corruption, nepotism and bad governance tends to reflect the lack of ownership of the country as majority of the people, including those representing various state institutions are interested in protecting their personal, community, clan or group interests than the interests of the country as a whole. The tendency to find faults with the country and not doing anything to remove things which cause social, economic, political and governance crises means the lack of ownership.

Furthermore, the propensity to seek and explore migration as an option so as to achieve a better life abroad means lack of responsibility and commitment to put things in order. Pakistani diaspora, which reflects brain drain from the country is more than 10 million as their migration means to a large extent the failure of state to fulfil essential needs of citizens like clean and safe drinking water, better education, equal employment opportunities, housing, public transport, health and basic security. Even after the induction of the new government in 2018, the migration of people abroad has not stopped and the brain drain continues. Lack of ownership with the resources and public institutions means there is absence of commitment for the country.

The failure of national integration in creating Pakistani man and woman has much to do with dysfunctional educational system of the country which is unable to provide equal opportunities to children to seek basic quality education. In the absence of a uniform educational system, particularly in terms of curricula and mode of education, one cannot expect the youths of Pakistan, who are around 50 per cent of the population, to seek attachment with the land, values, culture, history and other characteristics of the country. It should be state's responsibility to provide free, compulsory and quality education to all the citizens of Pakistan till high school regardless of their class, language, sect, religion and place of origin.

Those wielding power and other stakeholders in Pakistan who are living in their comfort zones, it is their responsibility to examine and analyse how in other countries having diverse cultures, languages and religions, the process of national integration was unleashed and reached to its logical conclusion. Unless there is political will, determination along with honest, clear and a visionary leadership, one cannot expect a country to remain united and integrated as a nation.

In case of Pakistan, the situation is perplexed and rather challenging because it was created as a state like Israel on religious grounds. While Jews from all over the world reached their new homeland along with different cultures and became a majority in a land which was earlier called as Palestine, in case of Pakistan, those who had migrated from India with a common language Urdu were a minority as local people living in a new state already had their established languages and cultures. Therefore, for national integration, whether in case of the United States or India, language was not a major issue as English and Hindi, which were the languages of dominant groups in the two countries were adopted. In case of Pakistan, Urdu was declared as a national language despite the fact that it was not the mother tongue of the majority and was considered only as a lingua franca. As a result, conflict over national language emerged in the formative phase of Pakistan when Urdu was rather imposed on the



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then East Pakistan. Although, in 1956, Bengali was given the status of a national language along with Urdu, the damage was done and Bengali nationalism became a major force culminating into the disintegration of Pakistan in December 1971. The post-1971 Pakistan failed to learn lessons from the trauma of separation as language riots in Sindh broke out when Sindhi was declared as a language of the province by the Sindh Assembly in July 1972. Urdu is a mode of communication and is the language of the provinces of Balochistan, KPK and Punjab yet, it is not the mother tongue of 90 per cent of the people of Pakistan.

It is not only language which matters as far as national integration is concerned but tolerance and acceptance of each other regardless of variation in culture, class and religion also matters. Biases on ethnic, cultural, lingual, religious or sectarian grounds can never lead to political or economic stability. Pakistan's predicament is prejudices and intolerance on the basis of language, place of origin and sect still persists. For instance, in a TV channel interview, prominent nuclear scientist and the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan bluntly talked of the alleged prejudices he had faced. When people start identifying themselves with their language, culture, religion and sect and not with the country, one cannot expect national integration to take place. When lingual and ethnic consideration undermines merit in appointments and promotions, that country can never emerge as a unified nation.

Many countries face the challenge of national integration but in some cases their leadership is able to integrate diverse people by ensuring social justice, tolerance, rule of law, good governance and democratic pluralism. Pakistan's quest for national integration would remain elusive unless the bottom-top approach is adopted where a sense of belonging to the country evolves at the grassroots' level. Care for the resources of the country and pursuing a tolerant approach vis-à-vis those who are different in race, language, class, religion and sect will go a long way in promoting what is called as "Pakistaniat." Promoting the culture of merit instead of favouritism and nepotism is also the essence to achieve the goal of national integration.

Furthermore, no mode of communication can effectively promote national integration as railways because people belonging to different provinces and regions travel together and share their language, culture and way of life. In a nutshell, an insecure state will patronise a particular class or an ethnic group in order to sustain its hold over power but will not be mindful to the damage done to the country by pursuing such a policy.

The writer is Meritorious Professor of International Relations and former Dean Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Karachi.



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Pakistan had no worthwhile civil society and hardly any middle class in 1947 due to rampant illiteracy and absence of an independent media. The masses were poor, the country was described an “economic desert” and there was an unprecedented influx of refugees. The country lacked the necessary infrastructure and institutions. The capability to develop them was lacking. The external and internal threats to the security of the country turned it into a security state. Weak political leadership created space for civil-military bureaucracy. This led to the cut-off periods in democratic governance, which was derailed thrice in 1958, 1977 and 1999. At present, the country is partially developed, the middle class is growing and civil society is assertive; a vibrant media has come up, and majority of the population is literate. There is an overall urge for peace. The people have demonstrated their preference for constitutional government and the rule of law, and to have an independent judiciary to strengthen democratic governance.



Introduction

D

which all the people of a country can vote to elect their emocratic governance implies a system of government in

representatives, who in turn govern the country in the light of the mandate given to them by the people. Pakistan and India emerged as independent democratic nation-states in August 1947, inheriting the same constitution (i.e., Government of India Act 1935), the same system of civil administration, legal apparatus and the armed forces. But unlike India, the governance in Pakistan has been alternating between civilian democratic governments and military-dominated autocratic or partially democratic governments.¹ After several pitfalls, Pakistan has reached a stage where it seems that the people of Pakistan, its vibrant middle class, the civil society, the intelligentsia and the media are convinced that the supremacy of the constitution, strengthening of state institutions, independence of judiciary, and the rule of law are necessary if Pakistan is to become a modern democratic state. Currently, a democratically elected government is keen to strengthen such a system.

Initial Difficulties Obstructing Democratic Governance

There are a number of factors responsible for initial setbacks to democratic governance in Pakistan. For instance:

¹ Civil supremacy (1947-58); military supremacy (1958-71); civil supremacy (1971-77); military supremacy (1977-88); civil supremacy (1988-99); military supremacy (1999-2008); and civil supremacy (2008 onwards). It may be added



Ramshackle Infrastructure

Initially Pakistan was lacking in the necessary infrastructure. For instance, it had no federal government, no secretariat, and no State central bank. “Militarily the country was defenceless and Indian policies were calculated to stifle the new state.”² It had to start from a scratch.

that “some of the military dominated regimes were very liberal in their outlook, or tried to be (notably President Pervez Musharraf) whereas some of the civilian governments were quite abusive of their authority” (notably Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad).

Due to extreme level of illiteracy³ the capability to develop the infrastructure was also limited. The country needed time to build and nurture the state institutions which could sustain democratic governance.



Leadership Void

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the father of the nation and the first Governor-General, died just one year after the establishment of Pakistan on September 11, 1948 and his right hand lieutenant Liaquat Ali Khan, who was the first Prime Minister, was assassinated on October 16, 1951. About the capability of other leaders of Pakistan Muslim League (PML), the party which had successfully piloted the movement for Pakistan, Jinnah had ruefully remarked that “he had false coins in his pocket”.⁴ Consequently, several ministers appointed initially were not politicians and did not have a seat in the Assembly.⁵ Similarly,

² I.H. Qureshi, ed., *A Short History of Pakistan Book Four* (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1967), 228. In 1947, the British Indian Army was approximately 500,000 strong and the Muslim element in it was about 33 percent. According to British Viceroy in India, at the time of partition, out of 67 battalions available in West Pakistan, only 35 would be left behind. Most of these would be at half strength owing to the movement of Hindu/Sikh companies without Muslim companies being available in Pakistan for replacement. (Viceroy’s personal report, no. 16, August 8, 1947, para 43, Mansergh and others, eds., *The Transfer of Power 1942-47*, vol. XII, 599-600). These battalions constituted into about 10 infantry brigades at less than 50% strength and an armoured brigade with only 13 runner Stuart tanks, less than one weeks ammunition with the Army, no mines, no man-made or natural obstacles. They were required to guard about 5000 miles of frontier of East and West Pakistan. (Noor A. Hussain, *Fifty Years of Pakistan Army 1947-1997* (Rawalpindi: ISPR Publication, 1998), 4). In fact, the regiments of the Indian Army were scattered throughout Indian subcontinent and “overseas mainly in Iraq, Malaya, Burma and with the Allied Contingent in Japan”. (Fazal Mugeem Khan, *The Story of the Pakistan Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 24). These scattered regiments and their equipment had to be brought back and organized into a coherent army. “Thus what was at first only a paper army gradually took shape.” (Stephen P. Cohen, *The Pakistan Army* (New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1984), 17).

³ The overall literacy in West Pakistan was hardly five per cent. Government of Pakistan, *Census of Pakistan 1951, vol. 1* (Karachi: Census Publications, n.d.), 77.

⁴ Hamid Khan, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), 853.

⁵ Qureshi, *Pakistan*, 229-230. Jinnah’s first cabinet included A.M. Malik, who was a medical practitioner, Finance Minister Ghulam Muhammad was a former civil servant, and Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan was a lawyer. They had practically no political following.





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in 1954, there were several members of Prime Minister's cabinet without a seat in the Parliament.⁶ "The cabinet and other high political appointments reflected a paucity of talent among the politicians."⁷



Unprecedented Migration and Settlement of Refugees

Due to the partition of the Punjab, where most of the ex-servicemen and war veterans lived, communal riots erupted into a carnage causing an unprecedented refugee influx. There was an inter-state migration of more than 12 million and killing of about one million human beings across the Pakistan-India borders. There is a long background of riots especially in northern India.⁸ It seems that Indian anger against the partition of "mother India" was also a cause of the intense feeling of hatred.⁹ The carnage in the Punjab was caused by "the chaos and anger" owing to the "surprise of partition" when no one was prepared organizationally to cope with the change, for the British government had advanced the date of transfer of power from June 1948 to August 1947. The Radcliffe Commission's boundary award was announced three days after partition. It was "mostly the British fault" but local grievances and hatred created a bloodbath which has left its own "lasting scars" in both states. Till 1955, about seven million refugees from India entered West Pakistan and about 5.6 million Hindus and Sikhs left Pakistan.¹⁰ It was relatively easier for India to absorb the calamity of migrants given its size, resources and available infrastructure, as compared to Pakistan, where one out of every ten persons was a refugee. "But it was the patriotism and self-denial of the people that pulled the country through the most precarious phase of its existence."¹¹

Illiteracy and Extremism

Due to the migration of literate Hindus and Sikhs to India, the literacy rate in Pakistan sharply declined. There was about 95 percent illiteracy in Pakistan in 1947¹², which acted as a hindrance to the growth of a civil and democratic society. Feudalism and economic

⁶ In 1954, Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad, who was himself a bureaucrat, asked Muhammad Ali Bogra, another bureaucrat, to form a cabinet, which included, among others, Major-General Iskandar Mirza, a bureaucrat, and General Muhammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

⁷ Hamid Yusuf, *Pakistan: A Study of Political Developments 1947-97* (Lahore: Sange-Meel Publications, 1999), 34.

⁸ See Appendix 20, "Hindu-Muslim Fighting during July 1946-June 1947", Noorul-Haq, *Making of Pakistan: The Military Perspective* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1993), 231-34.

⁹ Hamid Khan, 82; Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (Rawalpindi: Services Book Club, 1958), 256; quoting Jhon Cornell Auchinleck (London: Cassell, 1959), 906.

¹⁰ Viqar Ahmad and Rashid Amjad, *The Management of Pakistan's Economy 1947-82* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1984), 71, cited by Hamid Yusuf, 35.

¹¹ Qureshi, *Pakistan*, 228.

¹² The province-wise literacy was: Punjab 7.3 percent; Sindh 6.1 percent; NWFP 5.2 percent; Balochistan 3.9 percent. This does not include tribal areas. The percentage should be less in 1947 after the migration of literate Hindus and Sikhs, *Census of Pakistan 1951*.



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constraint did not permit any Pakistani government to launch a “crash course to expand literacy and grow higher standards.”

Poverty and Scarcity of Essential Goods

Pakistan was established in the northwest and northeast of the South Asian subcontinent. These areas were neglected by the British being closer to the borders. It was considered safer to invest in central India which was beyond the reach of enemy air force. The affluent class in Pakistan was mostly Hindus and Sikhs and they transferred their wealth to India. Thus, at the time of its birth, Pakistan was virtually an “economic desert”¹³ and the masses were abysmally poor. There was “an acute famine of commodities of every day use.”¹⁴ The authorities, who were administering the country, were more interested in the procurement of goods and development of the country rather than promoting the cause of democratic governance. Pakistan’s low literacy, bad infrastructure, and instability made it difficult to take advantage of what is commonly called “globalization”. It did not produce much to offer in the exports market except low value primary goods, its work-force was not educated, and the government controlled trade and investment suffered for political reasons, partly due to mutually constrained relations with neighbouring India.



Persisting Problems

Quasi-Federalism and Conflict between Eastern and Western Wings

One of the main bottlenecks in the constitutional development in Pakistan was that its two wings were separated by about 1000 miles of hostile territory. The eastern wing consisted of one province but was more populous than the western wing which was much larger in area and had as many as four provinces. The western wing was not prepared to concede majority representation to the eastern wing in the parliament. After a confrontation of nine years between the two wings, the solution was evolved in the 1956 constitution in the shape of parity of representation in a quasi-federal structure, neutralizing the majority of the eastern wing and paving the way for the manipulated domination of the western wing. The domination of the western wing in governance led to an insurgency in the eastern wing which culminated in the separation and independence of Bangladesh in 1971.

In the post-1971 Pakistan, it came to be realized that ideological moorings alone could not easily overcome ethnic and economic differences. Yet the anti-ethnic attitude and anti-modern thinking prevalent in certain segments of society lean towards a unitary or quasifederal state as against a true federation.

¹³ Yasmin Khan, *The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan* (London: Yale University Press, 2007), 101. ¹⁴ Qureshi, *Pakistan*, 228.



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Religion vs. Secularism

Pakistan was not created as a theocracy but as a place where an economically marginalized minority could operate a democracy independently. It was to save the people from religious discrimination and domination by an overwhelming religious majority. Moreover, it emerged as a territorial state in the Muslim majority areas of the subcontinent. But the religious and secular groups soon started making conflicting demands while formulating the constitution of Pakistan. The speech of Mr Jinnah of August 11, 1947, addressed to the first legislative and constituent assembly of Pakistan, had advocated political pluralism and declared that the “religion or caste or creed has nothing to do with the business of the State”.¹⁴ This was not adhered to. The Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949, pacified demands of Muslim religious parties and elements, but was not supported by religious minorities. The compromise solution attempted to balance the values and the spirit of Islam with requirements of secularism.

Due to lack of competent and visionary political leadership, and the fact that Muslims constituted 98 per cent of the population, the conservative religious leaders, partly due to their conviction and partly owing to their parochial interests, advocated and preached the establishment of a religio-political system based on Al-Quran and Sunnah.¹⁵ They were skeptical of the politico-social development of modern times and western political institutions and form of government.

Their dogmatic theology clashed with the democratic culture envisioned by the founding fathers.

Another adverse impact of the adoption of religion as a guiding principle in the constitution, was the promotion of religious sectarianism, especially between the two major sects inhabiting Pakistan, i.e., Sunnis and Shi’as. Some sections of these sects, instead of peaceful negotiations to overcome their differences, often resort to violence, which is against the spirit of both Islam and democracy. These rivalries fostered reliance on the security forces for maintenance of law and order, which eroded the hold of democratic institutions in governance.



Delayed Framing of the Constitution

The immediate and foremost requirement of the Constituent Assembly was to frame a democratic constitution for the country. The constitution had to lay down the form of

¹⁴ *Quaid-i-Azam Mohammed Ali Jinnah: Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan 1947-48* (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), 8-9.

¹⁵ “The field of medieval political theory has already been subjected to intensive investigation by Von Kremer, Arnold, Sherwani, Rosenthal, Hamidullah, Tyan and others, and movements of modernism in contemporary Muslim world have also been extensively surveyed by scholars such as Smith, Gibb, Adams and Aziz Ahmad.” Manzooruddin Ahmed, *Islamic Political System in the Modern Age: Theory and Practice* (Karachi: Royal Book Coy, 1983); Justice Hamoodur Rehman, *Islamic Concept of State* (Karachi: Begum Aisha Bawany Waqf, 1978).



government, the role of judiciary, military, and bureaucracy. It had to decide the basic issues about provincial autonomy, religion and the state, joint or separate electorate, representation of minorities and women in assemblies, fundamental rights and civil liberties. The debate over the representation of eastern and western wings of the country and religion versus secularism were the two main hindrances in the way of framing the constitution. As against India, which was able to frame the constitution of the country within two years of independence in 1949, Pakistan took nine years to finalise the constitution in 1956, which did not work for more than two years and was abrogated. The second constitution was framed by a military ruler General Ayub in 1962 which could last as long as he was in power. Finally, it was after the separation of East Pakistan and a lapse of more than quarter of a century (1947-1973) that the elected representatives of the people under the leadership of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto framed a consensus constitution envisaging a federal, democratic structure for the country and a parliamentary form of government. This constitution has survived in spite of the breakdown of democracy twice in 1978 and 1999, and hopefully has come to stay. But the delay in framing the constitution harmed the growth of political democracy, as it allowed the authoritarian rule of the Governor-General to continue for seven long years (1947-56), which set this inglorious tradition in the country.



Weak Political Parties and their Infighting

For any healthy constitutional and political system to function smoothly, strong and well-entrenched political parties are essential. ... Unfortunately, political parties in Pakistan have failed to develop into strong vehicles of national political will.¹⁶

The main responsibility for safeguarding democracy in a country falls on political parties¹⁷. Pakistan, since its inception, was lacking in well organized and well established political parties that could carry the representative system of governance forward. The All-India Muslim League, which had piloted the movement of Pakistan during 1940-47, was not a well organized political party, but it was primarily a movement. “Leading a movement and organizing a political party are two different things.”¹⁸ Most of its leaders belonged to areas which became part of the Indian Union and their majority did not come to Pakistan. Of those who were in Pakistan, barring a few exceptions, belonged to feudal and landowning classes that in their nature were in conflict with democratic dispensation. In fact “the leadership of Pakistan movement had few roots in the land that became Pakistan.” Their incompetence and

¹⁶ Hamid Khan, 852.

¹⁷ “Any satisfactory analysis of the practice of Western democracy – and any discussion of how it might be made to work better – must recognize and account for the role of political parties.” Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin, *Democratic Devices and Desires* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 185.

¹⁸ Hamid Khan, 856.





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constant wrangling for power in the initial nine years (1947-1956) was also responsible for the delay in constitution-making. Instead of cooperation and mutual accommodation there was ceaseless infighting. For instance, as early as 1953, a clash between the leadership of the Punjab and the central government led to intense communal riots and imposition of Martial Law in Lahore, the provincial capital.¹⁹ Even as late as the decade of 1988-99 of civil supremacy, the fight between the PML and the PPP led to repeated dissolution of national and provincial assemblies and dismissal of prime ministers and their cabinets.²⁰ Finally, it ended with the military take over in 1999.

Delayed Elections, Rigging and Violence

The representative character of the civilian parliamentary government during the first decade of Pakistan's existence was eroded because the country was governed under Government of India Act of 1935. The purpose of the Act was "to make the appointed governor-general exert dominance over the elected prime minister."²² The Act had introduced a representative and a centralized system of bureaucratic governance, which was an imperative requirement of the colonial government but not of democratic governance.

The first general elections in the country should have been held in 1951, i.e., five years after the previous elections in 1946, but this could not happen till 1970. The reasons for the delay were that the ruling elite, i.e., civil bureaucrats, migrant political leadership, and weak political parties, had few roots in the masses. As a consequence, general elections could not be held for 23 years (1947-1970) of the country's initial history.

On the expiry of the five years term of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1972-1977), the second general elections on the basis of adult franchise were held on March 7, 1977 which the PPP won with a vast majority. The opposition parties alleged that the elections had been "rigged on a massive scale". It has been commented:



National Assembly and the dismissal of the Prime Minister and her cabinet on August 6, 1990. Again differences and confrontation between Ishaq and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993) made both of them to resign on July 18, 1993. The differences between President Farooq Leghari (1993-1997) and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996) ended with the dissolution of the National Assembly and dismissal of the

¹⁹ Punjab Chief Minister Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daultana and Prime Minister of Pakistan Khawaja Nazimuddin, both belonging to PML, were at logger-heads. Hamid Yusuf, 52.

²⁰ The conflict between President Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1988-1993) and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990) resulted in the dissolution of the



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government on November 5, 1996. Thereafter, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (1997-1999), in a bid to become an authoritarian ruler, is discredited for an assault on the Supreme Court (Hamid Khan, 827), declaring a state of emergency in 1998, allowing establishment of military courts for trial of civilians, amending the Constitution taking away the discretionary powers of the President, preventing the floor-crossing in the assemblies, and introducing the Fifteenth Constitutional Amendment Bill which was “apparently a blatant attempt by Nawaz to introduce dictatorship in the country in the name of Islam” (Hamid Khan, 929). Finally, on October 12, 1999, he sacked the Chief of the Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf while he was officially visiting Sri Lanka. This resulted in a *coup d’etat* and dismissal of Nawaz Sharif. (Hamid Khan, 219-249).

²² Shahab Usto, “Mosquerades of Dictatorship”, *Dawn*, August 22, 2008.

Elections in Pakistan had been rigged before, notably the presidential election in 1965 and the Provincial Assembly elections in early 1950s, but rigging in these instances did not arouse the mass uprising as it did in 1977. The people of Pakistan were evidently not of the same mind now as they were in those earlier periods.²¹



Civil-Military Bureaucracy vs. Politicians

The greatest factor impeding the development of the country was the evasion of land reforms in the western wing which strengthened the feudal hold on the instruments of governance. Feudalism was one of the main factors responsible for the weakness of the political parties and the supremacy of the bureaucracy. In West Pakistan (present Pakistan), leaders were mostly drawn from the feudal class. Pakistan being an agricultural country, the landed aristocracy almost dominated the political, social and economic life. Since the feudal leadership of political parties was not capable of dealing with the multifarious problems faced by the country, it depended heavily on the civil and military bureaucracy.²²

It is indeed a sad commentary on the elected members of the first Legislature and Constituent Assembly of Pakistan that they could not find a suitable head of state from among their own ranks. Most of them came from the civil bureaucracy or the military.²³ The civil-military bureaucracy did not have a favourable opinion about the competence of political leaders and often took decisions without consulting them. This adversely affected

²¹ Hamid Khan, 571.

²² Even after six decades of the establishment of Pakistan, Iftikhar Hussain, Minister of Information, NWFP has blamed “feudal, capitalist and tribal systems” responsible for “all social ills and backwardness”. *Dawn* (Islamabad), August 24, 2008.

²³ During 61 years (1947-2008) of existence of Pakistan, civil bureaucrats or military generals governed the country for as long as 45 years. These were: Mr. Ghulam Muhammad (1951-55); Mr. Iskander Mirza (1955-58); General Muhammad Ayub Khan (1958-69); General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1969-71); General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq (1978-88); Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan (1988-93); and General Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008).



their political training, development and growth. The inability to control the Anti-Ahmadiya Movement in the Punjab in 1953 was blamed on an inept political leadership. This religious movement was spearheaded by the religious Ahrar Party which had opposed the establishment of Pakistan and now wanted again to come into limelight. They were supported by other religious parties, i.e., Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiatul Ulema-i-Pakistan, and Jamiatul-Ulema-i-Islam. The movement was exploited by politicians in their own political interest.²⁴ But the civilmilitary bureaucracy was against the religious parties to dominate the power structure either in the provinces or the centre. To rescue the city of Lahore where Ahmadis were in a “virtual state of siege” and their properties were being “burned or looted”, General Azam Khan, the Area Commander, was ordered by the Defence Secretary, to impose martial law in Lahore. It was met with general approval of the people. It was demonstrated that the civil-military bureaucracy “would not let politicians or religious ideologues lead the country to anarchy”.²⁵ This also laid down the foundations of the supremacy of military and orchestrated the initial rehearsal for recurring imposition of Martial Law in the country and its acceptance by the people.

In fact, “since its birth, Pakistan has been governed by bureaucratic, military and political elites. The bureaucratic elite generally became more assertive, steadily increasing their power at the expense of the political elite.”²⁶ “Ayub’s term of office [1958-69] was the golden era for the bureaucracy, which exercised its powers, unbridled by any political interference.”²⁷ The weakness of political elites can be demonstrated from the fact that during seven years from 1951 to 1958, as many as seven Prime Ministers had been changed.²⁸ During 1988-1999, four democratically elected governments²⁹ were replaced on charges of corruption, inefficiency, security risk, etc. The civil-military bureaucracy has dominated governance owing to the inherent weakness of the political parties and their incompetent leadership, resulting in the derailment of democracy thrice in the history of Pakistan, i.e., in 1958, 1977 and 1999.

Kashmir Dispute and Security of the Country

The persistence of external and internal threats to its security converted Pakistan into a security state which thwarted the country’s march towards democracy. The security of Pakistan was threatened externally from its bigger neighbour and internally from

²⁴ Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule*, supra, note 70, 151, cited by Hamid Khan, 119.

²⁵ Hamid Khan, 120.

²⁶ Ibid., 878.

²⁷ Ibid., 345.

²⁸ After assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on October 16, 1951, Khawaja Nazimuddin (1951-53), Muhammad Ali Bogra (1953-55), Chaudhry Muhammad Ali (1955-56), Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy (1956-57), I.I. Chundrigar, and Feroz Khan Noon (1957-58) became Prime Ministers.

²⁹ Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto (1988-90), Mian Nawaz Sharif (1990-93), Benazir Bhutto (1993-96), and Mian Nawaz Sharif (1996-99).



communism,³⁰ religious extremism and ethnic ambitions of the rulers of the princely states. The first threat originated in October 1947 when the Indian Army occupied the state of Jammu and Kashmir, which geographically and demographically should have formed part of Pakistan³¹, and the second one came to surface through the Socialist inspired Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case (1951), the Anti-Qadiani Movement (1953) by religious parties, and declaration of cessation by the ruler of the state of Kalat (1958).

The external threat resulted in Indo-Pak wars and border clashes and threats of war a number of times (i.e., during 1947-48, 1951, 1965, 1971, 1984, 1999, and 2002). Ari Fleischer, a White House spokesman, speaking on December 20, 2002, about the 2002 situation between India and Pakistan said:

the tension reached alarming level ... As a result of the intervention of the President, the Secretary of State, and numerous leaders around the world including [Russian] President



³⁰ The Communist Party of Pakistan was banned in 1950s mainly because of own conservative leadership.

³¹ All the rulers of Princely states were told “You cannot run away from the Dominion Government which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible” (British Indian Viceroy’s address to the Chamber of Princes, July 25, 1947). “Keeping in view the geographical conditions, 80% Muslim majority ... the passage of the important rivers of the Punjab through the State, the language, cultural, racial and economic connection of the people and the proximity of the borders of the State with Pakistan ... the Jammu and Kashmir State should accede to Pakistan” (Resolution of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, July 19, 1947). The accession “of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the peoples expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations” (UNSC Resolution (S/3779) of January 24, 1957). Also see Richard Symonds, *The Making of Pakistan* (London, 1949), 157-58; Alistair Lamb, *Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the Kashmir Dispute* (Hertford, 1997); A. H. Suhrawardy, *Trajectory in Kashmir* (Lahore, 1983), 203).



[Vladimir] Putin and [British] Prime Minister [Tony] Blair, there is now a markedly diminished point of tension.³²

As for earlier internal threats, the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case was quelled by the Armed Forces in 1951, the Anti-Qadiani movement was suppressed when Martial Law was enforced in Lahore in 1953, and military action led to the absorption of the state of Kalat. All this was possible because the British trained Pakistan's Armed Forces were mostly secular in outlook and motivated to ensure the integrity of the country.

The security threat and the need for defence forced the nation to strengthen the armed forces rather than democratic governance. The priority to defence can be judged from the fact that, in the beginning, most of the annual budget of the country, was allocated for this purpose which has gradually been scaled down to about 17 per cent in the last budget.

Immediate Challenges to Governance

Corruption and Nepotism

According to Transparency International, Pakistan got a score of 2.7 out of 10 in 1998, followed by 2.2 in 1999, 2.5 in 2008 and 2.4 in 2009.³³ Corruption³⁴ in bureaucracy and among political leaders poses a grave threat to good democratic governance. Quaid-i-Azam had termed corruption as "poison" and asked to put that down with an "iron hand".³⁵ Now that the National Reconciliation Ordinance, which had withdrawn from prosecution any person "falsely involved for political reasons or through political victimization" between 1986 and 1999, has lapsed on November 28, 2009, the concerned individuals should get themselves cleared in a court of law in a transparent manner. The tribal nature of society in Pakistan is susceptible to nepotism. As an antidote, accountability and transparency are necessary. It is a challenge to the people to reject those leaders and political parties which indulge in corruption and nepotism.



Unprecedented Inflation and Rising Prices

Another threat to the government comes from inflation and unprecedented rise in prices of daily needs, as this adds to poverty of the people.³⁶

³² *Dawn* (Islamabad), December 21, 2008. Also see Noor ul Haq, "Indian Quest for Hegemony", *IPRI Journal*, vol. III, no. 2, (2003): 21-48.

³³ Mansoor Ahmad, "Poor ranking in corruption index no surprise", *The News* (Islamabad), November 21, 2009.

³⁴ Corruption, violence and lack of accountability and transparency have been termed as fault lines in Indian democracy. G. Rana Chandhra Reddy, *Fault Lines in Indian Democracy* (New: Delhi: A.P.H. Publishing Corporation, 2007), xi-x. The same applies to Pakistan.

³⁵ *Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah Speeches* (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), 7.

³⁶ Among the main challenges for Asia Pacific region, poverty, disengagement of the military from political economy, the professionalism of political parties, human rights, human resource development and press freedom



Terrorism and Extremism

The latest threat is emanating from extremism and terrorism, especially in the North West Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). This is the spill over effect of the conflict in Afghanistan and is spreading in Pakistan. It is likely to continue as long as there is no peace and stability in that country. However, the military enjoying the support of the nation is successfully combating against the extremists and terrorists under the supremacy of the civilian democratic government. It is hoped that the process would continue to its logical conclusion.



Human Rights

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the father of the nation, after his election as the first president of the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, outlined his concept and policies for Pakistan, which in essence are secular and democratic. For instance, he emphasized that in Pakistan:

every person no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges and obligations. ... you are free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State. ... in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.³⁷

As Governor-General, he affirmed that he shall always be guided by the “principles of justice and fair play” without any “prejudice or ill-will” or “partiality or favouritism”.³⁸ Unfortunately, he died a year after the birth of the country. Consequently –

have been highlighted. Heraldo Munoz, ed. *Democracy Rising: Assessing the Global Changes* (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2006).

³⁷ *Quaid-i-Azam Mahomed Ali Jinnah Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan 1947-48* (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, n.d.), 6-10. Jinnah’s address has been interpreted differently. Ch. Muhammad Ali in his *Emergence of Pakistan* has viewed it as an assurance for security to minorities, whereas Muhammad Munir states that Jinnah believed in secularism. See Muhammad Munir, *From Jinnah to Zia* (Lahore: Vanguard), 29.

³⁸ Ibid.



... Pakistan has encountered frequent, unresolved political crises. They are woven into its concepts of political community, and have withstood uneasy relationships between state institutions and civil society. Pakistan's politics has also been characterized by incomplete constitution-making, a process that has placed the burden of constitutional interpretation and political change on state instruments varying from the bureaucracy to the military to the judiciary.³⁹

Fundamental human rights are guaranteed in Chapter One of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan but injustices against women and members of minorities continue. However, apart from reservation of seats for women in local, provincial and federal assemblies, the Protection against Harassment of Women at Workplace Bill 2009 sets tough penalties "to protect women from harassment and make them feel more secure."⁴² Similarly, apart from reservation of seats in assemblies, the members of minority communities have been given the right of double voting – one vote for general seats and another for choosing their representative for reserved seats. But sustained and firm efforts are necessary for the protection of the rights of minorities and women. It is a challenge for the democratic government to ensure implementation of rules and regulations concerning the fundamental human rights in true letter and spirit.

Strength of Democratic Governance in Pakistan



Pakistan Movement and Traditions

The Pakistan movement envisaged a democratic country with a federal structure. In all Constitutions of Pakistan (of 1956, 1962 and 1973) the objectives of governance, in the words of Dr. Ainslie T. Embree, Professor Emeritus of Columbia University, are:

democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam, giving Muslims freedom to live their lives in accordance with the teachings of Islam, but with minorities having full freedom to profess their own religions.⁴⁰

³⁹ Paula R. Newberg, *Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan* (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1995), i. ⁴² *Dawn* (Islamabad), January 30, 2010.

⁴⁰ Ainslie T. Embree, Foreword, Hamid Yusuf, *Pakistan: A Study of Political Developments 1947-9* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications 1999), viii.



Islamic and Cultural Traditions

Islam lays emphasis on the concept of *Shura*, i.e., consultation among people, which is the essence of democratic culture. Quaid-i-Azam, the founder of Pakistan had stated:

we learned democracy 1300 years ago. ... democracy is in our blood. It is in our marrows. Only centuries of adverse circumstances have made the circulation of that blood cold. It has got frozen, and our arteries are not functioning. But thank God, the blood is circulating again, thanks to the Muslim League efforts. It will be a People's government.⁴¹

Culturally, in the region of Pakistan, there is a concept of *Jirga* or *Panchayat*, i.e., an assembly of elders, to settle issues and disputes involving two or more than two persons. This system has been prevalent for ages, much before the advent of Islam. Thus, both religion and age-old tradition advocate the concept of consultation in decision-making through an assembly of people, which is the essence of democracy. During the period of British supremacy in the subcontinent, the practice of elections to assemblies (local, provincial and central) was introduced through various enactments. Finally, it was the Government of India Act 1935 under which the dominions of India and Pakistan functioned after independence till they framed their own constitutions. These enactments provided the groundwork for democratic governance.

It may be of interest to note that even when democratic rule was suspended by the armed forces, the military rulers always came with the promise to restore democratic governance. For instance, in 1970, General Yahya Khan is credited with organising the first ever general elections in the country, which led to the establishment of democratic governments both in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Besides holding of general elections in 2002 and 2007, General Musharraf's introduction of local government system introduced in 2001 is considered a "laudable model of governance" because of its principle that whatever can be done at the local level should not be done at a higher tier of governance.⁴²



Growth of Education, Civil Society and Media

The country is on the path to achieve full literacy and progress towards higher standard of education in important disciplines.⁴³ This is strengthening the civil society in ensuring the

⁴¹ Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada, *Evolution of Pakistan*, vol. II (Lahore: All Pakistan Legal Decisions, 1963), 415 and 424. The address was in response to the demand of a section of the Muslim Leaguers who, before the opening of the session, had proposed that the Muslim League should declare that the future Constitution of Pakistan would be based on Al-Quran.

⁴² Editorial, *Dawn* (Islamabad), January 2, 2010.

⁴³ There was only one university/degree awarding institution in 1947. Presently there are 120 universities/degree awarding institutions – 64 in public sector and 56 in private sector. Of these, there are six women



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prevalence of democratic culture at the lower and higher level of governance. Secondly, the print and electronic media in Pakistan is vibrant and independent. A responsible media educates the masses, raises political consciousness and thus promotes democratic values, norms and culture. In addition, a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are playing an active role in the field of education and contributing to the growth of a vibrant civil society and good governance.



Growth of Economy and Middle Class

Since 2003, Pakistan's economy has been growing by more than 6.5 per cent per year except for 2007-08 and 2008-09 when the growth declined to 4.1 per cent and about 2.00 per cent respectively. The decline is partly due to global economic recession and partly owing to disturbed conditions internally in the wake of the "war against terror". The per capita income in 2008-09 was US\$ 1046.00, which has nearly doubled during the last decade.⁴⁴ Hopefully, the current phase of slow growth will soon be over, due to the inherent resilience of the economy and external support from aid giving agencies and remittances of Pakistanis. The Enhanced Partnership Act 2009 (commonly known as Kerry-Lugar Bill) provides assurance for a long-term US assistance and focuses on "democracy, pluralism, stability and fight against terrorism".⁴⁵ Pakistan is a developing country and needs foreign assistance. Its GDP and per capita income have increased and a growing middle class is visible in the country, which is one of the stake holders and a factor in strengthening democracy.

Security and Democracy

During the entire history of Pakistan, the country has faced military threats from the east. Now the country is facing threats in the west also. It is a heaven-sent opportunity for Indians to be active on Pakistan's western borders so as to pressurize it from the east as well as the west. The realization is growing that under democratic dispensation the country can fight as well, if not better, as under an authoritarian rule. It is said that "democracies are more capable than other systems of mobilizing their resources" to fight and win a war.⁴⁶ However, the factor of nuclear deterrence has kept hostilities at bay on the country's eastern borders. Hopefully, the changed policies of the US administration under President Obama will be able to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan with its salutary impact on Pakistan. When Afghanistan's government has stabilized after withdrawal of foreign forces, it is expected it

universities/degree awarding institutions – five in public sector and one in private sector. See Noor ul Haq, "Education in Pakistan: Historical Perspective," Pervez Iqbal Cheema and other, (eds.), *Pakistan and Changing Scenario: Regional and Global* (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2008), 18.

⁴⁴ "Growth in Pakistan", <http://go.worldbank.org/QTEHWNS5Q70>; *Economic Survey of Pakistan 2008-09*; IPRI *Factfile: The State of the Economy of Pakistan*, vol. XI, no. 7, July 2009.

⁴⁵ Senator Dick Lugar's Floor Statement, May 4, 2009.

⁴⁶ Mathew Evangelista and others, (eds.), *Democracy and Security* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 4.



will revert to its traditional role of a neutral country. This would ensure peace on Pakistan's western borders also.

Conclusion: Guarded Optimism

It was tragic that the country faced numerous problems and was “hijacked soon after independence by the ruling classes belonging to feudalists, senior bureaucrats, incompetent politicians and ambitious military generals who transformed it into an elitist system.”⁴⁷ It was visualized that the people of Pakistan may “either remain under the feudal stranglehold for ever or gain direct access to political and economic rights by freeing our political culture from the exploitative elitist and feudal political structures.”⁴⁸ The latter alternative may now be succeeding. Unlike the past assemblies, at present almost half of the new members of legislative assemblies are young and educated. All stake holders seem desirous to establish the supremacy of the parliament. Certain clauses of the 17th amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan which impinge on the supremacy and sovereignty of the parliament or any other anti-democratic constitutional provisions may be scrapped under the pressure of civil society and public opinion.

Second, the politicians may have learnt lessons from their past mistakes and are more mature politically. A consensus politics seem to be emerging in the country. In the past, the constant infighting amongst political parties had often led to interference and take-over by the armed forces. Now a culture of reconciliation, accommodation and dialogue is emerging. The ideological polarization is diminishing. After general elections of February 2008, four major political parties, i.e., Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), PML – Nawaz (PML-N), Awami National Party (ANP), Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam – Fazalur Rahman (JUI-F) and Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) have joined hands to govern the country and re-establish the supremacy of the Parliament in accordance with the Constitution of 1973.

Third, a vibrant and responsible media can also educate the masses and keep them well informed. Currently, dozens of newspapers and journals, and as many as fifty television channels are operating. They are raising political consciousness and thus promoting democratic values, norms and culture. With the help of the media, the unprecedented country-wide lawyer's movement throughout the country during 2007-2008 has demonstrated the strength of political activism and the people's urge for the rule of law and independence of judiciary. The one hundred thousand strong lawyers' community has experienced its power as a pressure group and may again rise in alliance with civil society if independence of judiciary is threatened.

Fourth, the supremacy of parliament was fully demonstrated when President Musharraf resigned on August 18, 2008 after being threatened with impeachment by the Parliament. In

⁴⁷ Javid Husain, “Public welfare and democracy”, *Dawn* (Islamabad), June 18, 2007.

⁴⁸ Shamsah Ahmad Khan, “Primacy of Democracy in Pakistan”, *Dawn* (Islamabad), August 5, 2006.



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the past, exploiting the confrontation between main political parties (especially PPP and PML), the civilian elected President Ishaq (1988-93) had dissolved the National and Provincial Assemblies twice⁴⁹. Similarly, President Leghari (1993-1997) had dismissed the elected Assemblies⁵⁰. However, in 1998, President Musharraf, a military ruler, could not do the same because of the changed political consciousness and environment.

Fifth, the Constitution of Pakistan of 1973 provides the politico-legal framework for parliamentary democracy and federal form of government, guaranteeing freedom of expression and religion and free and fair elections, etc. It has withstood the military governments of General Zia and General Musharraf. This constitution, it appears, has sustained democracy, in spite of intervening periods of suspension, and guarantees the continuation of democratic governance in the country.

Sixth, whereas general elections were not held for a quarter century after the birth of Pakistan, these are now being held regularly.⁵¹

Seventh, the main factors which inhibited and retarded the growth of democracy in the country are slowly dying. Now “the external as well as internal forces that [had] hitherto sustained authoritarianism in Pakistan have either retreated or become dormant.”^{52,53} It is hoped that the congenial atmosphere thus created would strengthen political parties and political institutions, which, in turn, would further promote and strengthen the cause of democratic governance and democratic values, culture and norms.

To sum up, it is the political leadership which can ensure permanence to democratic governance. The prospects are, however, not as dismal as sometimes portrayed. Already, the literacy rate in Pakistan has increased to more than fifty five per cent.⁵⁴ Efforts are afoot to improve the standard of higher education. The economic growth and industrialization has given birth to a vocal urban society and middle class, which is growing, and gradually lessening the influence of the feudal class. The vibrant electronic and print media is playing an effective role in constructive criticism of the government and in educating the masses. Elections are being held regularly, representative political leadership and political parties are

⁴⁹ He dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1988-1990) and Prime Minister Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (1990-1993).

⁵⁰ He dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (1993-1996) in November 1996.

⁵¹ Whereas indirect elections were held in February 1960 and January 1965 by General Ayub, and General Zia held non-party elections in February 1985, direct elections to national and provincial assemblies based on adult franchise were held in December 1970 under General Yahya, in March 1977 under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in November 1988 and again in August 1990 and October 1993 under President Ishaq, in February 1997 under President Leghari, and in October 2002 and February 2008 under General Musharraf.

⁵² Rashid Ahmad Khan, “President vs. Parliament”, *The Nation* (online), August

⁵³, 2008, <http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Opinions/Columns/19-Aug-2008/President-vs-parliament>.

⁵⁴ Ministry of Education, Academy of Education Planning and Management, 2005 census revealed that the literacy rate by age group 10+ was 54.5 percent during 2005-06. The literacy rate should have increased by 2009-10.





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getting stronger and a peaceful mode of transfer of power is becoming the norm. The bureaucracy (both civil and military), though still powerful, may retreat gradually and submit to the peoples' power and will and concede to democratic governance. The democratic process is progressing and, hopefully, will not be obstructed and derailed, as in the past.

Contours of Non-Traditional Security Challenges:

Global, Regional & National Perspectives A Top Down Appraisal



By Air Commodore (R) Khalid Iqbal TI(M)*

*The author is a consultant on Policy and Strategic Response at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI). He is a retired Air Commodore and a former Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Pakistan Air Force.

Abstract

(During the Cold War, main threats to security were pegged around East-West rivalry and nuclear confrontations between the two blocs led by the US and USSR. These military related threats were further extended by the two superpowers through their hydra-headed proxy wars. There was hardly any conflict in the World where both super powers of that era did not have covert or overt participation. In tandem there were other threats such as: environmental hazards; terrorism; organized crime and illegal immigration. However, fast moving military issues had overshadowed and relegated non-military threats to a second-class status. Though the era of heated rivalry between the US and Russia is over, the world continues to be sprinkled with regional conflict zones and sticky bilateral issues. However, these latent hotspots are not potentially over-loaded to graduate to a global level conflict. With the end of Cold War, and the termination of military threat, issues like economic instabilities and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have propped up to centre stage. They have acquired the status of main sources of concern for global security. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, non-traditional aspects of security have been an important area for research¹; especially in the context of the disintegration of the Empire, both without any external military intervention and in the absence of any internal armed struggle. – Author)

The Concept

The parlance 'non-traditional security' is a contemporary buzzword and its usage is on the rise amongst the practitioners of statecraft, strategy and politics. However, as a concept, it still lacks a precise and commonly accepted or, say, an authoritative definition. The sphere of traditional security concerns is quite precise; whereas no similar concurrence exists in the context of non-traditional security. According to Mely CaballeroAnthony, non-traditional security threats may be defined as: "Challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, cross-border



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environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime.”²

Military deterrence, diplomatic manoeuvrings and short-term political arrangements are ineffective and or inadequate in addressing non-traditional security issues. Tackling them essentially requires nonmilitary means including comprehensive political, economic and societal responses. It’s an ongoing process that can only be sustained through robustness of institutions, sufficiency of resources and participative response from state(s) and society/(societies).

Global strategic environment is in a state of perpetual flux; whereby, the nature of threats and security discourses are incessantly shifting positions. The security agenda has gone beyond the preview of state and military. Advocates of an alternative approach to security studies question the conventional wisdom of restricting the expanse of security to military dimension alone. Even a super power cannot adequately and sufficiently handle some non-traditional challenges. For example, Hurricane Katrina exposed huge gaps in the disaster management regime of the United States. It was one of the deadliest hurricanes ever to hit the United States³. An estimated 1,836 people died in the hurricane and the flooding that followed in late August 2005; and millions of others were left homeless along the Gulf Coast and in New Orleans. Officials at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration said: “Katrina was the most destructive storm to strike the United States. It ranks sixth overall in strength of recorded Atlantic hurricanes. It was also a very large storm; at its peak, maximum winds stretched 25 to 30 nautical miles and its extremely wide swath of hurricane force winds extended at least 75 nautical miles to the east from the center”⁴.

Now non-traditional threats are increasingly discussed at transnational and multi-national levels in a comprehensive manner, which clearly reflects the enormity and significance of these issues in the contemporary world. Policy makers now portray these challenges as potent threats to their national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the well-being of respective people and societies. This is a significant development. If such ‘security framing’⁵ is to be effective, it must attract due attention to these challenges, convey a sense of urgency, and develop the capacity to rapidly mobilise national and international resources and create elaborate institutional support for commandeering these resources for their effective, efficient and equitable employment to mitigate these challenges and their consequences.

Though this discourse has swayed the focus away from military power, as the core and sole determinant of international order and security, to several non-traditional determinants, with a much enhanced role of economic, political, and societal forces, it does not mean that the military dimension has become dormant or irrelevant. Coming in full circle, the concept of non traditional security shares much ground with the ‘Fifth Generation Warfare (5 GW), generally called ‘unrestricted warfare’ that may be described as the employment of “all means whatsoever – means that involve the force of arms and means that do not involve the



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force of arms, means that involve military power and means that do not involve military power, means that entail casualties, and means that do not entail casualties”.^{6v}

Also, one could argue that within the umbrella of national strategy, some of the NTS challenges fall under the rubric of indirect strategy. Application of non-kinetic strategy⁷ also has overlaps with some of the NTS dilemmas. Causing climatic changes through, mystery surrounded, scientific military-funded High-frequency Active Auroral Research Programme (HAARP) to unleash floods may fall in this realm⁸. Usage of soft power⁹ could also be a preparatory stage for inducting NTS challenges and later pushing in the traditional security stampede. Likewise, in the domain of cyberspace, sub-activities like crime, conflict, competition and spying have a complementary overlapping zones where both traditional and non-traditional security could concurrently lay their claims upon. Whistle blowing by Snowden in the context of cyber spying by the US, the UK and other countries amply demonstrates how a state with adequate cyber capacities could intrude on the privacies of other states and individuals, and how in such pursuits political borders become meaningless. It also brought to light the tacit collusion of the state with its own intelligence agencies.

Hence national security needs an all comprehensive treatment whereby it could prevent, minimize and mitigate the impact of both traditional and non-traditional threats, which may be in a sort of perpetual orchestration, intricately interwoven in a well thought out benign looking format up to a point when terminal transition takes place from NTS to traditional phase—the final push. Benign looking nontraditional threats may soften the state to the extent that it is no longer capable of defending its territory and people against the traditional threat. It is in this context that even a traditional enemy may make inroads through non-traditional threats with intent to degrade the national potential to ward off military threat planned for an appropriate time. Smart application of non-traditional means could even eliminate the need of application of traditional means, because the victim state may become a pliant state due to erosion caused by non-traditional means; and by the time it realizes as to what is eating it up, it may have lost the capability and national will to resort to traditional defensive means. In a similar way, an apparently friendly country may be engaged in clandestinely generating, supporting and sustaining non-traditional threats. Whenever, norms of healthy competition are violated, a usually benign activity could crossover to the domain of non-traditional threat.

Expanse, Scope and Speed of NTS Challenges



Mely Caballero-Anthony’s definition¹⁰ brings forth few common characteristics in the context of non-traditional security threats ordinarily they are non-military in nature and transnational in scope. These are neither totally domestic nor purely inter-state. These are transmitted rapidly due to globalization and communication revolution¹¹. Non-traditional security issues are those which are termed in contrast to traditional security threats and refer to the factors other than military, political and diplomatic conflicts but can pose threats to the survival and development of a sovereign state and human kind as a whole.¹²



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Therefore, these non-traditional threats are much more intimidating than the traditional ones as they require the national leadership to look not only outwards to cultivate international cooperation, but also inwards, with an open outlook to execute internal socio-economic and political reforms¹³. These threats require maintenance of continuous capacity to generate appropriate response with or without formal warning, for example in case of floods, earthquakes and epidemics.

Notwithstanding, the contemporary shift in the study and analysis of security and the world order from a traditional framework to a nontraditional approach¹⁴, one must avoid going overboard by making water tight compartments for the two. One may err in the comprehension unless there is a clear perception about the overlap zones. V. R. Raghavan¹⁵ has rightly observed that, “The existing state-centred approach to national security, confined to the defence of a country against territorial aggression, has been widened to the idea of security inclusive of a larger set of threats to the people of the state.” It is therefore becoming increasingly crucial to analyze how the non-traditional security threats are reshaping the global institutional architecture¹⁶; singly as well as jointly with traditional security challenges.

Non-traditional issues can affect both government institutions and civilian populations and these can originate from a variety of nonstate human and natural causes; such threats may be upshots of certain acts by individuals or social groups, rather than the actions of states. Hence, one may observe that the outbreak of non-traditional issues is more unpredictable, and the enhanced mobility and expanding activities of individuals enable their impacts to spread and proliferate far more quickly. As indirect effects, such issues can cause tremendous economic losses to a region or the whole world, as done by the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2002-2003¹⁷ and the tsunami triggered Fukushima nuclear fiasco of 2010.

The most comprehensive definition of the concept of non-traditional security was provided by Richard H. Ullman¹⁸ in 1983. According to him national security should not be perceived in the ‘narrow’ sense of protecting the state from military attacks from across the territorial borders. Such a perception was, for him, “doubly misleading and therefore doubly dangerous”, because it “draws attention away from the non-military threats that promise to undermine the stability of many nations during the years ahead. And it presupposes that threats arising from outside a state are somehow more dangerous to its security than threats that arise within it.” Ullman rather preferred to define a threat to national security as, “an action or sequence of events that threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations etc) within the state.”¹⁹

Generally, six broad branches of non-traditional security are identified, namely: International Terrorism; Trans-national Organized Crime; Environmental Security; Illegal Migration; Energy Security; and Human Security. However, one size does not fit all. Each nation is likely to have its own list, which may or may not include all six, likewise regional and sub-



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regional arrangements would also modify the generic list. Irrespective of the list, each item would ordinarily require an independent analysis, with adequate attention upon the necessity of securitization of each issue. Likewise the response would vary as to each particular threat depending upon whether it affects a specific set of people who may belong to one or more states.

The impacts of these new NTS challenges are deep and wide ranging. For example the earthquake of 2005 and flash floods of 2010 caught the state and the people of Pakistan off guard and kept them off balance until the international community extended a helping hand.

The transnational expanse and enormity of such NTS challenges means that they can no longer be sufficiently managed only by domestic resources, measures or strategies. As a consequence of increasing futility of unilateral measures, there is growing realization about the necessity of evolving a sub-regional, regional and global approach.

However, critical to building effective and credible regionalism is the political will of governments to put in place systems, structures and resources to translate the regional plans into actionable deeds²⁰.



Role of Non-State Actors/Entities

Non state actors have a dual role to play. They could generate a non-traditional threat; say by manipulating the market dynamics and playing with the intricacies of stock exchanges. An individual coming home on vacation from a distant county could inadvertently be a carrier of a locally uncommon virus that could erupt in to an epidemic, against which the recipient country has little or no countering capacity. High seas piracy is another non-traditional threat whereby only a handful group of pirates could radiate a sense of insecurity over a wide area.

On the other hand, non state actors, both individuals and entities, also have a role to play in mitigating the effects of some of the non-traditional challenges. Domestic and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) often network with the state/ governmental structures and create synergy in disaster management. Many philanthropic individuals and entities with various politicoreligious leanings have traditionally acted as an extended arm of the government organizations likes National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Civil Defence, and Red Crescent Society. However, if left to themselves, such entities are unable to carry out even handed and large scale activities, mainly due to capacity issues. If allowed to operate for a long time some entities could also trigger non-traditional threats of other types through their doctrinal beliefs, practices and cultural incompatibility.

State's Central Role

Given that many NTS issues are transnational and trans-regional, national efforts in addressing these issues need to be complemented with multidimensional, multilevel, and multi sectoral initiatives. Willing involvement of different regional actors can strike a delicate balance between the push and pull factor for greater regional cohesion. Nevertheless, in spite



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of the crucial role that regional commitments, frameworks and mechanisms have in coping with NTS challenges, the central role and capacity of states towards gainful integration of the mobilised effort is very vital. While regional frame work is critical for addressing common problems through resource augmentation, it is certainly not sufficient²¹; the effected state has to play a central role and take charge for operationalising the regional effort.

Countering NTS Challenges: Global, Regional and Sub-Regional Dimension

The hope of a more stable and peaceful world after the end of the Cold War, was short-lived. Comity of nations continues to confront both traditional and new security challenges emerging from a host of transnational threats. There is growing recognition that new security challenges are proving to be more severe and more likely to inflict more harm to a greater number of people than conventional threats of interstate wars and conflicts²². The NTS issues have direct implications on the overall security of states and societies.²³ At a global level, UNO has a number of organs engaged in mitigating the effect of a number of non-traditional threats viz World Health Organisation(WHO), UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) etc. World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide financial support against macro-economic instability.

Organization of African Unity (OAU) aims to:²⁴ promote the unity and solidarity of African States; co-ordinate and intensify their co-operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence; eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; promote international cooperation, giving due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and co-ordinate and harmonise members' political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, scientific, technical and defence policies.

European Union (EU) is another continent-wide entity. It is an economic and political union of 28 member states²⁵ that are located primarily in Europe. The EU operates through a system of supranational independent institutions and intergovernmental negotiated decisions by the member states. Institutions of the EU include the European Commission, the Council of the European Union, the European Council, the Court of Justice of the European Union, the European Central Bank, the Court of Auditors, and the European Parliament. Its areas of focus are: regional and local development; health, justice and citizen rights; employment and social affairs; economy, energy etc²⁶.

In Asia there is no continent wide organisation for this purpose except the Asian Development Bank. However, there are a number of regional and sub-regional entities. Most of these act in isolation and have limited mission, scope and capacity. The Asian region is addressing the emerging non-traditional security challenges through its various regional and sub-regional institutions, mechanisms, and relevant security arrangements, referred to as 'akin to new, second-generation types of regionalism' that are characteristically more robust and involve closer and wider forms of cooperation²⁷.

Some of these are:-



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- Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO)²⁸, it comprises of ten Asian states and functions under the motto of “Sustainable socioeconomic development for people of the region”, its areas of function are: economy and health related millennium development goals (MDGs) of the UNO; commerce, industry, insurance etc²⁹. It also has a trade and development bank. ECO has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with numerous sister organizations including International Strategy for Disaster Management.
- The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf is generally referred to as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Article four of its charter specifies the basic objectives of the Cooperation Council these *inter alia* include³⁰ to formulate similar regulations in various fields including the following: Economic and financial affairs; Commerce, customs and communications; education and culture; stimulate scientific and technological progress in the fields of industry, mining, agriculture, water and animal resources; to establish scientific research; to establish joint ventures and encourage cooperation by the private sector for the good of their peoples etc.
- South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)’s objectives are³¹: to promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia and to improve their quality of life; to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live in dignity and to realise their full potentials; to promote and strengthen collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia; to contribute to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another’s problems; to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields; to strengthen cooperation with other developing countries; to strengthen cooperation among themselves in international forums on matters of common interests; and to cooperate with international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes.
- Within Asia, the collective effort by Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) presents a role model that the other subregional structures could emulate. A cardinal example is “2003 Bali Concord II”, that announced setting up of an ASEAN community based on three pillars: an ASEAN Security community (ASC), an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and an ASEAN Socio Cultural Community (ASCC). Out of these the ASC later became ASEAN Politico-Security Community (APSC). It has generated a lot of fascination because it speaks of many issues that have come to characterise ‘new regionalism’. Some observers have termed it as an ASEAN attempt for moving towards forming a soft security community. With the emergence of NTS threats, the impetus for effective multilateralism has become quite visible in some Asian sub-regions; ASEAN, ASEAN + 3 (APT), and even the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have responded to new security challenges. The varieties of regional mechanisms that have been established have resulted in creeping institutionalism within ASEAN. These new institutional and structural reconfigurations have also generated different layers of regional efforts going beyond bilateral and multilateral arrangements which had, until quite recently, been largely sub-regional in nature. This has significantly altered the contours of regional institutional architecture in Asia. While these regional efforts are aimed at building regional capacity to address different security challenges, the kinds of measures being adopted have gone beyond



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the usual process oriented, confidence building measures. These initiatives are driven by the broader objectives of building more capacity and coherence in regional efforts to address new regional challenges and, in the process, complement the global efforts of the United Nations and other international organizations to promote peace, human rights, and development.³²

- Within the generic framework for sub-regional cooperation, a workshop entitled “Non-Traditional Security Threats and Regional Cooperation in the South Caucasus” took place in Istanbul between 22-24 October 2009³³. The conference was aimed at highlighting those challenges that the Southern Caucasian countries have been experiencing since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the participation of regional and international experts as well as representatives of key international actors (i.e. international governmental and non-governmental organisations), various issues including identification of problems in the fields of democratization, formation of civil society, economic re-structuring, security building and regional cooperation were discussed with an aim to anticipate, analyze and increase awareness on emerging non-traditional threats to Southern Caucasian security. However, the nature of political transformation, democratization and civil society development has been different in the Southern Caucasus, where the entire process of transition has been dominated by the co-existence of continuity and change. The patterns of continuity inherited from the Soviet past are predominantly represented and reproduced by the ruling elite while the patterns of change associated with liberalization and democratization are mainly internalized and propagated by the societal actors. Looking into the future, the main challenge for the liberalization agenda in the region will arise from the complex political and ideological realities; that is the existence of resistance to modernity by pre-modern indigenous forces, actions of Russia that limit the freedom of choice in its “Near Abroad”, existence and exploitative actions of external forces, and finally post-national imperatives limiting the state’s ability to act according to security requirements.

Most of these regional processes are still at an amorphous stage, one could nonetheless extrapolate that as NTS issues start to take their due place in the security agenda of states in the region, the robustness in these regional initiatives would improve, thus paving the way for strengthening and streamlining the region/sub-region related counter NTS strategies and collaborative processes. This is likely to lead to reorientation of existing mechanisms, practices and institutions for better responses to these NTS challenges. As a corollary, this would attract regional actors toward deeper institutional commitments where member states are compelled to adopt more rules-based regimes in order to effect compliance and successful implementation of regional measures to enhance security cooperation in the region.

Moreover, as regional mechanisms open space to absorb other actors (nongovernmental organizations/civil society organizations, international organizations, and other external actors) in building and enhancing regional capacity to cope with NTS challenges, the nature of regional security cooperation shall experience a redefinition through an evolutionary process leading towards catering for sensitivities’ related attention to issues of human security or say insecurity. These will at times create new tensions within and among states and resolve some chronic ones as they attempt to strike a delicate balance between protecting state and regime security while promoting human security. For example, Pakistan accepted



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Indian offer of aid during the earthquakes of 2005, but declined to accept the offer of Indian helicopters because they were to be piloted by Indian crew, that was viewed as detrimental to traditional security interests. During the country wide destruction caused by the flash floods of 2010³⁴, Pakistan asked India to route its aid through the United Nations.

While these regional efforts are aimed at building regional capacity to address different security challenges, the kinds of measures being adopted in some of the sub-regions have gone beyond the usual process-oriented, confidence-building measures. Instead, many of the regional measures adopted are now geared toward problem-solving, involving sharing of information; developing certain types of regional surveillance systems for early warning on infectious diseases and natural disasters; providing relief in disaster management, rehabilitation, and reconstruction; and, more significantly, working toward coordinated procedures and attempts at harmonizing legal frameworks in addressing transnational crimes.

The sub regional approach is the most suited way of handling localised yet trans-national NTS challenges effecting more than one country, for example floods, earthquake, disease, illegal immigration etc. However, at times mistrust arising out of bilateral disputes in sub-regions mars very good initiatives, and virtually makes the structures ineffective. Unfortunately such has been the case of SAARC. Despite sharing the victim-hood of many NTS challenges, this forum has not been able to stand up to the occasion and formulate a collective workable strategy. In comparison, ASEAN has shown remarkable progress in evolving participatory structures for handling non-traditional challenges.

Asia's Prominent NTS Challenges



Infectious Diseases

Since the Asia-wide outbreak of the SARS virus in 2003, the threats from infectious diseases appear to have become more severe. As the SARS experience has shown that in this era of globalization and regionalization, such types of infectious diseases have the capacity to spread fast, get out of control and detrimentally affect the security and well-being of all members of society and impact almost all aspects of the economy.³⁵ This point was duly brought out during the 2006 World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, with the release of the “Global Risks 2006” report. The report ranked pandemics and natural disasters among the highest in the list of risks currently confronting the international community. The study also concluded that despite the interplay of these multiple global risks and their combined ripple effects, which can be potentially devastating, “disaster planning and crisis management suffer from a number of shortcomings.” Given that Asia has had a history of being the breeding ground for flu pandemics³⁶, the WEF report raised the urgency within and outside the region to finding a common approach to prevent the outbreak of a new and devastating pandemic.

At the domestic level, most obvious is the lack of resources allocated to improving public health systems. Given the prevalent condition of poor health infrastructure in many parts of Asia, the national and regional capacities to respond to transnational health crises remain inadequate. Asia, as a whole, needs to consider a broader and more comprehensive strategy to



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prevent and contain the outbreak of infectious diseases. These would include, among others, focusing on key issues such as building credible and effective regional surveillance systems for monitoring infectious diseases, improving the poor state of health infrastructure in less-developed countries, and addressing the politics of crisis health management in the region³⁷. Especially in East Asia much of the information about pandemic preparedness, response, and capability of countries in the region is sketchy. Since national capacities are still quite weak, more efforts should be made to improve national level capacities³⁸. In Pakistan the outbreak of Dengue fever in 2012 exposed the structural and professional inadequacies of the health department, especially of Punjab. Anticipatory actions were almost no-existence, the number of trained doctors and paramedic was insufficient and there was shortage of testing kits. Sri Lank sent its medical teams to train the local medical staff. However, the lessons learnt were duly applied the following year which was likely to be a peak year in the context of Dengue fever. A public awareness campaign started well in time and the Dengue season came and went un-noticed.

Many of these collaborative programs focus on strengthening the national and regional capacity for disease surveillance and early response and strengthening the capacity to prepare for any pandemic. Most of the measures outlined in these collaborative programs focus on, among others, strengthening of institutional capacities at national and regional levels. Other measures also include establishing information sharing protocols among countries and multilateral organizations and effective, timely, and meaningful communication before or during a pandemic influenza outbreak³⁹.

Natural Disasters

Asia is also a region where major natural disasters often occur. The December 2004 a massive earthquake and tsunami illustrated the kind of devastation that natural disasters cause and the immensity of the tasks involved in undertaking disaster relief operations and in providing humanitarian assistance and post-disaster reconstruction and rehabilitation. Natural disasters generate complex emergencies that require urgent and coordinated responses from a broad range of state and non-state actors. Unfortunately, many states in Asia are least prepared to cope with these complex humanitarian emergencies⁴⁰. This gap was vividly revealed in the region's experience with the 2004 tsunami, 2005 earthquake and 2010 flash floods in Pakistan as well as tsunami triggered nuclear fiasco in Fukushima. These disasters certainly reflected the lack of any regional capacity to respond to disasters and to provide emergency relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. Were it not for the humanitarian assistance provided by external partners like the United States, European Union, Australia etc, plus a number of international aid agencies, the impact of these humanitarian emergencies could have been far more catastrophic⁴¹.

Dangerous Drugs

Proliferation of drugs is a global issue. Asia is a major producer of drugs; many trafficking routs either originate from or pass through a number of Asian countries. The ASEAN and China Cooperative Operations in Response to dangerous drugs, abbreviated as



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ACCORD⁴² outlines work plans toward a drug-free region and identifies priority projects and other cooperative measures including the sharing of information and best practices. Communication networks have also been set up among specialized agencies to facilitate better regional coordination in combating the drug problem.⁴³ ACCORD tries to complement domestic efforts against the illicit trafficking and abuse of drugs by establishing an institutional framework for cooperation. Its success would, however, depend on the actual implementation of its central pillars and action lines. Nevertheless, it presents a foundational frame work that could be expanded to become a continent wide programme to control drugs. Pakistan has earned the notoriety of being a transit route for drug trafficking. It would be worthwhile to be a part of Asia wide anti-drug programme to overcome this menace through collective effort.



Terrorism

Terrorism is a global issue. Especially in the post 9/11 setting the entire world is ready to cooperate against this challenge. In the same stream, ASEAN members agreed to a Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, adopted at the 7th ASEAN Summit in 2001, which outlined several measures to fight terrorism. These include deepening cooperation among front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing “best practices; enhancing information/intelligence exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists and terrorist organizations, their movement and funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property, and the security of all modes of travel, and others.”⁴⁴

SCO also incorporates an elaborate “Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure” that operates in accordance with the SCO Charter, the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, the Agreement among the SCO member states on the Regional AntiTerrorism Structure, as well as documents and decisions adopted in the SCO framework⁴⁵. Today all fingers point toward Pakistan when it comes to terrorism. Pakistan should become party to all regional counter terrorism structures, except those impinging upon its sovereignty. This would help in allaying some of the criticism.

Transnational Crime and Terrorism

These types of crimes not only constitute threats to state security by undermining national authorities and the rule of law, they also threaten the security and well-being of individuals and societies. Addressing these complex problems therefore, requires a transnational response. Yet regional cooperation in this area is often complicated by sensitive issues that impinge on domestic jurisdictions, such as the need to share information, extradition laws, and problems of corruption⁴⁶.

Nevertheless, regional efforts in fighting transnational crime can already be seen on several fronts. At the ASEAN level, the regional mechanisms that have been established to handle this problem are the “Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism” (SEARCCT) based in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and the “Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement”.



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Piracy

According to the International Maritime Bureau, the Straits of Malacca is the most piracy-infested channel in the world⁴⁷. To contain its further spread a trilateral arrangement among ASEAN's littoral states of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore (MALSINDO) was formed to conduct joint coordinated patrols along the Straits to beef up maritime security in the region. After this initiative, other ASEAN countries like Thailand, the Philippines and, Japan, have also been participating in many of MALSINDO's training activities in antipiracy, antiterrorism, and coast guard patrols. There is also the recently launched Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which is the first government-to-government agreement to enhance the security of regional waters beyond Southeast Asia⁴⁸.



Poverty and Human Security

Unlike the other three NTS issues whose linkages to security threats are easier to comprehend, the threats and insecurities brought on by poverty as a result of sudden economic downturn are more difficult to capture and counter. Onslaught of the Asian financial crisis and its economic impact on many affected states were very devastating. It also brought along a host of problems across many facets of the security of states and societies, including ethnic conflict and violence. Despite the discourse at the official level about building a regional community there is a lot that needs to be done in translating these into more concrete terms in order to “promote more inclusive and caring communities.”⁴⁹ One of these is to bridge the developing gaps among states in the region.

Mapping Counter NTS Trends in Asia

The variety of regional structures which have come up in Asia to address a number of transnational NTS threats, have resulted in creeping institutionalism. The nature of this creeping institutionalism has generated different layers of regional efforts going beyond bilateral and multilateral arrangements which had, until quite recently, been largely sub-regional in nature. There are a number of significant developments that could define not just the shape but more importantly the substance of regionalism in Asia as different state and non-state actors respond to NTS dilemmas. An important task ahead is evolving of new norms. As Asian states expand their cooperation in many dimensions, the pattern of interstate relations is bound to effect changes in state behaviour and clear the path for observance of a more equitable regional framework and provision of compatible legal framework for steering inter-state decisions, treaties, and conventions into the national legislation of member countries. However, to ensure that these sporadic and tiny regional efforts do not fizzle out prior to their attaining requisite robustness, sustenance of an inclusive regionalism remains of fundamental importance.

Challenges like pandemics, terrorism, natural disasters, etc., require multilateral approaches which inevitably brings in the involvement of extra-regional powers like the United States and the European Union that have surplus resources.



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One of the main conditions for the successful realisation of regional cooperation is identifying threats and risks common for regional states and expressing readiness to jointly overcome existing problems for the sake of creating a favourable environment for cooperation. Yet, this remains an elusive goal!



NTS Challenges to Pakistan

A wholesome assortment of NTS challenges confront Pakistan. These could emanate from: extremism; economy; energy crisis; demographic challenges; governance issues; human security; border security; refugees and illegal emigrants; trans-border/ trans-national crimes; food security, climate change; fragile political system; foreign policy dilemmas, foreign influences; institutional wrangling, etc. In an interesting way most of these sub-systems are intricately interrelated. Moreover, most of these operate simultaneously, hence accentuating the cumulative effects much more than the linear sum total. Of these, some also make interesting subsets, like economy, energy and demographic challenges; posing a chicken and egg dilemma as to which one causes the others. Aside from being non-military in nature, these challenges share other common characteristics; most of these are trans-national in approach (neither purely domestic nor purely interstate); some of them arise at very short notice and are transmitted rapidly. Most of these cannot be prevented entirely but their impact can be mitigated through systemic approach. At times national solutions are inadequate and thus regional and multilateral cooperation and participation is essential. The object of security is not just the state in terms of sovereignty or territorial integrity, but also the security of the people in terms of survival, well being and dignity, both at individual and societal levels.⁵⁰

While mapping Pakistan's main NTS challenges Ali Tauqeer Sheikh⁵¹ states that:⁵²

- Climate change will continue to negatively affect human activities and livelihoods in Pakistan through increasingly frequent extreme weather events and changes in temperature and precipitation. With the “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (IPCC) conservatively projecting the average world surface temperature to increase from 1.4°C to 5.8°C over the course of the 21st century⁵³, it is evident that alterations in the planet's ecological, biological, and geological system will not only continue but also intensify. In Pakistan, low-probability and high-impact events such as floods, droughts, storms, and cyclones are now increasing in frequency. An analysis of data for the past 60 years, taken from the “Centre for Research on Epidemiology of Disasters” (CRED), shows that the number of natural disasters per decade has increased considerably over the last two decades.
- Pakistan's large population and high growth rate adversely affects all aspects of society, the economy, and the environment. Population growth creates and exacerbates vulnerabilities by endangering basic civic amenities, leading to a lack of clean water and space for housing and ultimately burdening society.
- Growth in agricultural productivity has broadly kept pace with accelerating demand. However, medium-term food security challenges will become far more daunting if immediate



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attention is not paid to managing water resources, both underground and in the Indus basin river system.

- Water security is the most serious challenge for Pakistan due to several factors, particularly the increasing pressure of population and urbanization, massive expansion of tube-well irrigation, reduced levels of precipitation caused by climate change, and the accelerated retreat of Himalayan glaciers.



He recommends that⁵⁴:-

- Pakistan can mitigate the adverse effects of natural disasters through early warning systems, technological advances in building and infrastructure construction, improved sanitation systems, increased disaster preparedness, and an organized health sectoral response. Expanding and enhancing the information and knowledge base on climate change as well as mapping vulnerabilities, trends in internal migration, and new incidence of disease, can help create adaptive measures for reducing the effects of climate change.

- The successful implementation of mechanisms to address nontraditional security issues will require the South Asian countries to work together to adopt ecosystem-wide approaches that incorporates trans-boundary strategies.

- South Asia faces numerous NTS threats that in most cases predate the conventional security problems in the region. NTS threats make many conventional security challenges intractable, as regional conflicts are frequently rooted in the division or management of natural resources, ethnic divides, or ecosystem bifurcations.

- The progress in managing, let alone resolving, these NTS threats has been slow, primarily because the negotiating parties do not view them in the broader context of ecological civilization or ecosystem integrity. South Asia as a region has been slow in developing regional approaches to address NTS issues. Modest beginnings by the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) still require political will, resource allocation, and operational mechanisms. Recent efforts to develop shared positions on climate change have received a lukewarm response.

- Moreover, cracks in the negotiating position of the UN group of 77 (G-77) have further divided South Asia on climate change. Each country seems to be struggling on its own to address its climate vulnerabilities, just the way they have earlier dealt with other specific threats⁵⁵.

Conclusion

Due to inadequate sub-regional and regional cooperative mechanisms, Pakistan, like other countries of South Asia is often caught in the thick of some of the NTS challenges. Natural calamities related disaster management suffers from inadequacy of resources. Hence, initial response is slow. Pakistan is yet to make up its mind whether it wishes to treat its high



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population growth as an asset or a liability. So far, the position has been of jockeying between the two positions. Insecure borders pose a threat of illegal immigrants' issue that entails transnational crimes. Conflict in Afghanistan is a major driver of large scale influx of refugees. Measuring against the yardstick of the UN laid MDGs, Pakistan's performance is unenviable. It is under performing in all eight sectors, posting the highest child mortality rate in South Asia⁵⁶. According to a recent report released by a child rights body,⁵⁷ Pakistan has the second highest number of out-of-school children in the world, behind only Nigeria. Other South Asian countries are also not far better. There is a need to evolve South Asian response towards some of the NTS challenges which are transnational in nature and where collective resources could be utilised in a more efficient and effective way. Still on a larger canvas, there is a need for an Asia level entity to address the challenges which have continent level outreach in terms of effects. For menaces like drug trafficking and terrorism, there is a need for global effort. Though Pakistan is grappling with a number of NTS challenges, survival of state and the society is not in an imminent danger of extinction. Hardship notwithstanding, the state and people of Pakistan would continue to inch forward and maintain their relevance in regional and global affairs.



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