“Nonproliferation needs to become efficient, effective and non-discriminatory. There is a need for trust, transparency and institutional reforms,”

Noam Chomsky

**IAEA**

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[**Founded**](https://www.google.com/search?rlz=1C1SQJL_enPK877PK877&sxsrf=ALeKk03xD56fpDIBJ8QMiJgJa-oG2tqCoA:1591089482169&q=international+atomic+energy+agency+founded&stick=H4sIAAAAAAAAAOPgE-LQz9U3MC43stBSzU620s8vSk_My6xKLMnMz0PhWKXll-alpKYsYtXKzCtJLcoDiybmKCSW5OdmJiuk5qUWpVcqJKan5iVXKkAVAwA4wv2OYAAAAA&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj1w4-b5uLpAhXfRhUIHb1NBCMQ6BMoADAuegQIChAC)**:**July 29, 1957

[**Membership**](https://www.google.com/search?rlz=1C1SQJL_enPK877PK877&sxsrf=ALeKk03xD56fpDIBJ8QMiJgJa-oG2tqCoA:1591089482169&q=international+atomic+energy+agency+membership&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj1w4-b5uLpAhXfRhUIHb1NBCMQ6BMoADAvegQICRAC)**:**171 Member States

The IAEA is an international organisation that seeks to promote peaceful use of nuclear energy and inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons.

With its headquarters in Vienna, the agency reports to the United Nations’ General Assembly and Security Council.

[**Pakistan elected IAEA board member, Sept 21 2018 again**](https://www.dawn.com/news/1434202/pakistan-elected-iaea-board-member-again)

IAEA elects 11 new members of the BoG every year for two-year term. And this year, Pakistan was among those countries which were elected new board members.

Pakistan has been elected 19 times to the BoG in the past which is recognition of the country’s long-standing commitment to the aims and objectives of the IAEA in promoting peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its positive contribution to formulation of the policies and programmes of the agency.

Latest on IAEA

Pakistan seeks support of IAEA to boost its N-power Programme (Feb 2020)

IAEA’s streamlined support for Pakistan aimed to expand the nuclear power generating capacity more than six-fold over the next decade, from 1430MW to 8800MW was discussed by regulators, operators and representatives of organisations involved in Pakistan’s nuclear power programme who gathered at IAEA’s headquarters in Vienna recently.

NPT

[The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)](https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text), which entered into force in March 1970, seeks to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons. Its 190 (191 with North Korea\*) states-parties are classified in two categories: nuclear-weapon states (NWS)—consisting of the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom—and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). Under the treaty, the five NWS commit to pursue general and complete disarmament, while the NNWS agree to forgo developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.

With its near-universal membership, the NPT has the widest adherence of any arms control agreement, with only South Sudan, India, Israel, and Pakistan remaining outside the treaty. In order to accede to the treaty, these states must do so as NNWS, since the treaty restricts NWS status to nations that "manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967." For India, Israel, and Pakistan, all known to possess or suspected of having nuclear weapons, joining the treaty as NNWS would require that they dismantle their nuclear weapons and place their nuclear materials under international safeguards. South Africa followed this path to accession in 1991.

**AFTER the 1974 Indian nuclear test, according to his famous autobiography 'My Country My Life', Indian BJP leader L. K. Advani equated the significance of this event with that of the Indian Army entering triumphantly into the streets of Dhaka in December 1971.**

The euphoria was not limited to the right-wing leaders in India. The director of nuclear policy at the prestigious Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington D.C., George Perkovich quotes the suave left-leaning Indian former prime minister I.K. Gujral, in his award-winning book 'India's Nuclear Bomb', that the entry within the UN Security Council is possible only for those with either economic wealth or nuclear weapons. Hence, for India, building and detonating nuclear weapon was a short cut to great power status.

On the international, legal and diplomatic fronts, from the very outset, the nuclear disarmament commitment of the five states, recognised as the only nuclear weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, was questionable at best. The common intention of the permanent members of the UN Security Council was to confine the scope of NPT to limiting horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and its related technology. In plain words, no other states should build nuclear weapons in future.

However, their acceptance of indefinite vertical proliferation obligations and nuclear disarmament was a reluctant arrangement and the 1995 NPT review conference almost gave up on its cause of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, by indefinitely extending NPT. This drastically eroded whatever leverage the non-nuclear weapon states might have had over the nuclear weapon states to progress towards general and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. In 1995, NPT ceased to be a tool for nuclear disarmament and conferred upon the five nuclear powers not only a legitimate but also an indefinite nuclear power status, imposing no specific timeframe whatsoever within which to eliminate their nuclear weapons.

According to the International Court of Justice's unanimous opinion issued in 1996, the Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) goes beyond the mere obligation of conducting the negotiations in good faith but also to conclude the negotiations. In fact, initially Germany, Italy, Japan and Switzerland insisted that the nuclear weapon states should disarm before rendering their own non-nuclear weapon status, but in the end they also gave up their insistence. Most probably, the US presence of extended nuclear deterrence over Western Europe and Japan might have something to do with it.

In terms of elimination of nuclear weapons by nuclear states, the NPT has completely failed as all the five nuclear weapon states have continued to develop and improve their nuclear weapons. One must rest assured that the recent bilateral New START Treaty between the US and Russia is not motivated by a sudden inspiration by Article VI of the NPT, nor any mysterious desire has overtaken the either side to eliminate their nuclear weapons. This bilateral arrangement, which is yet to be ratified by the US Congress, primarily aims at more effective and efficient management of their ever evolving nuclear arsenals rather than their complete elimination. This discriminatory approach has not only weakened the international nuclear non-proliferation efforts but has also encouraged states aspiring to acquire nuclear weapons, considering it as the ultimate tool to achieve big power status.

Three years after the eventful 1995 NPT Review Conference, in order to rectify the gaping strategic imbalance within South Asia and to pacify BJP leadership's belligerent threats to retake Azad Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan, the second series of Indian 1998 nuclear tests, left Pakistan with no option but to respond in kind.

## [Why the NPT needs a makeover](https://www.dawn.com/news/1187551/why-the-npt-needs-a-makeover)

These questions necessitate a holistic analytical review of the Treaty. First — a preliminary study of NPT Articles I, IV and VI reveals that fundamental problems exist in its structure. Under the NPT, five countries are recognized as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS — P5) while the rest of the treaty’s signatories are regarded as non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). As a logical corollary, these NNWS are barred from acquiring nuclear weapons. Such conspicuous discrimination has led to arguments that the NPT is primarily focused on preserving the interests of P5 states.

Second — despite a strong emphasis and an emphatic promise to rid the world of nuclear weapons (as prescribed in Article VI) no progress is visible on disarmament by NWS. This is despite the fact that during the NPT extension conference, 1995, members had shown a great determination to implement the Treaty in its entirety

Third — the multilateral negotiations on nuclear export control (to oversee trade of the dual use technologies and determine their end usage) resulted, in the 1970s, in the Zannger Committee and Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) — an arrangement which was created against the background of the Indian nuclear explosions in 1974. Through these, which I call ‘short-circuited’ methods, the right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, a highly significant pillar of the NPT, was drawn out of the formal mechanism. For its part, the NSG holds no legal legitimacy and formal structure when you compare it with the institutional stature of the IAEA.

Fourthly — there is a problem with the non-universal status of the NPT and its inability to remain sustainable on the ground. From the outset states adhered to a greater or lesser extent to the terms of the NPT, but India (which detonated devices first in 1974 and later in 1998) Israel (which maintains a policy of opacity since 1968) and Pakistan (which exploded devices in response to the Indian tests in 1998) have never joined the NPT. North Korea withdrew in 2003 thus testing the treaty article IV and X.

The existence of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme is rooted in its security compulsions. Indian testing of nuclear devices changed the politico-strategic canvas of the region — thinning Pakistan’s options to remain a covert nuclear state — and forcing Pakistan to go nuclear. In 1974, Pakistan had proposed to establish a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in South Asia; in 1978 it proposed to India a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons and in the same year also proposed mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities, simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan and also simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards. However, all these initiatives were rejected by India.

During the 1990s, a missile race and Indian nuclear explosions forced Pakistan to change its ‘cautious and restrained’ policy into one of weaponisation. Pakistan’s policy in pursuit of a NWFZ in South Asia was thwarted when the regional security architecture changed in 1998. Since then Pakistan considers its nukes as a national security life-line and strategic assets. The introduction of new technologies such as low-yield weapons into its inventory is thus meant for reinforcing its full spectrum deterrence capability and to respond to the Indian military’s operational concepts, such as the Cold Start doctrine. This does not necessarily imply, explicitly or implicitly, that Pakistan promotes limited or sub-conventional war in this region.

The fact that Pakistan went nuclear and is not a party to the NPT does not mean that it is opposed to global non-proliferation norms. In pursuit of this policy, Pakistan has instituted an elaborate home-grown solution, which by any international standard is exceptionally strong to safeguard its national assets. In parallel, it closely follows international standards and fulfills global commitments.

In the subsequent period, following the infamous Dr A Q Khan revelations, Pakistan-US partnership helped dispel the misunderstandings, increased ‘strategic trust’ and transparency, and opened discussion forums for future relations. The UNSC resolution 1540 created a new norm and Pakistan as a non-NPT state operates under the rules established by the resolution. After the implementation of the act on export control in 2004, Pakistan instituted international standards adopted by the NSG, Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR) and the Austria Group (AG). More so, Pakistan is a member to the IAEA, adheres to its code of conduct, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, CSI, and Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB). With all these measures in place, there has been no reported case of proliferation since 2004.

The NPT review conference outcomes 2015 have proven that the NPT is widely regarded as a system in distress; nevertheless, we should continue working on reducing the structural flaws of the NPT and to bridge the gaps and distances between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, along with working towards the universalisation of this treaty. There is an urgent need to revive the non-proliferation regime and enhance the non NPT states in the full spectrum of non-proliferation and disarmament standards and obligations instead of breaking the designed structure of the NPT for making allowances of non-signatories to seek benefits of signatories.

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| November 28, 1972: President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto inaugurates the first unit of the Karachi nuclear plant |
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In parallel, the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes has become ever more relevant in an energy-hungry world. Despite the Fukushima Daiichi incident, nuclear energy deployment continues to grow and is expected to increase exponentially in the coming decades. The factors contributing to this growing interest in nuclear power are: energy security — the need to handle increasing global demand and maintain a sustained energy supply; mitigating effects of climate change by curbing greenhouse gases, along with other factors that go beyond the supply of electricity. Nuclear energy offers a greater capacity factor, lesser cost and environmentally safer source than most other alternatives. Nuclear power, as a stable base-load source of electricity in an era of ever increasing global energy demands, complements other energy sources including renewables.

As a non-NPT state, India is keen to join the NSG to achieve global support for its civil nuclear deals. Thus, the NSG is under pressure to expand membership outside its defined criteria.

Obviously India, a non-NPT nuclear state, has not placed its facilities under the IAEA full-scope safeguards and, thus, it is not entitled to the benefits of the NSG membership

It is subject to the NSG rules that forbid nuclear cooperation with states that have unsafeguarded facilities and are not party states to the NPT. Besides, India has not signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has not addressed the moratorium on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Without addressing these concerns, expansion in the Group’s membership to accommodate India’s interests on political grounds would damage the efficacy, spirit and structure of the treaty.

During President Obama’s recent visit to India, both the countries under the Indo-US nuclear deal have been able to address the nuclear liability issue, which has opened the pathways for India for its civil-nuclear deals. Obama and Modi, under the US-India Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), laid down a joint military-industrial base for co-production, co-development and partnership between the two countries and agreed to treat each other as close partners. These agreements indeed are aimed at by-passing the non-proliferation norms thereby making our regional politics much more complicated. Through such coupling with India, the US is making the notion of ‘selective bonding’more pronounced and in all probability this would set an additional discriminatory and dangerous precedent.

As a result of its own geopolitical and national security imperatives, Pakistan has proposed to create a criteria base approach, thus demanding revision in the structure of the NSG to align new aspirants to meet the current demands. Such a proposition, pragmatic in nature and consistent with time-sensitive strategic urgency, is paramount for Pakistan as it aspires to institute two additional nuclear power plants to generate 40,000 MW by 2050 to make up for the crippling power deficiency that plagues it.